

ТОКОВИ ИСТОРИЈЕ

Часопис Института за новију историју Србије
3/2014.

CURRENTS OF HISTORY

Journal of the Institute for Recent History of Serbia
3/2014

ИНИС

Београд, 2014.

ИНСТИТУТ ЗА НОВИЈУ ИСТОРИЈУ СРБИЈЕ
THE INSTITUTE FOR RECENT HISTORY OF SERBIA

За издавача
Др Момчило Митровић

Главни и одговорни уредник
Editor-in-Chief
Др Гордана Кривокапић Јовић

Редакција – Editorial Board
Др Драган Богетић
Проф. др Дубравка Стојановић
Проф. др Стеван Павловић (Саутемптон)
Проф. др Јан Пеликан (Праг)
Др Јелена Гускова (Москва)
Др Диана Мишкова (Софија)
Др Владимир Гајгер (Загреб)
Др Слободан Селинић

Секретар редакције – Editorial Secretary
Др Бојан Симић

Лектура и коректура – Editing and proofreading
Биљана Рацковић

Техничка обрада текста – Text editing
Мирјана Вујашевић

Редактура текстова на енглеском – English editing and proofreading
Ванда Перовић

УДК 949.71
YU ISSN – 0354-6497

Издавање часописа *Токови историје* финансира Министарство просвете,
науке и технолошког развоја Републике Србије

На основу мишљења Министарства просвете, науке и технолошког развоја
Републике Србије часопис је ослобођен плаћања општег пореза на промет

САДРЖАЈ
3/2014.

ЧЛАНЦИ
ARTICLES

Др Марија ЛЕСКИНЕН

ХАРАКТЕРОЛОГИЈА СЛАВЈАН В РУССКОЈ ИНТЕРПРЕТАЦИЈИ:
СПОСОБЫ ИЗОБРАЖЕНИЯ ГЕНДЕРНЫХ ТИПОВ „ЭТНИЧЕСКОГО ДРУГОГО“
ВО ВТОРОЙ ПОЛОВИНЕ XIX В.

Maria LESKINEN, Ph. D.

(The Russian Interpretation of Slav Characterology:

Methods of Presentation of the Gender Typology of the

“Ethnical Other” in the Second Half of the XIX Century)..... 11

NIU Jun, Ph. D.

“TURN TO THE LEFT” IN CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY

FROM THE LATE 1950S TO 196251

Aleksandar R. MILETIĆ, Ph. D.

DEGLOBALIZATION IN THE PERIPHERY,

Tariff Protectionism in Southeast and East-Central Europe 1914–192869

Voin BOJINOV, Ph. D.

POLITICAL CIRCLE “ZVENO” BETWEEN SOFIA AND BELGRADE 1934–193589

Bojan SIMIĆ, Ph. D.

“THE GREATEST FRIEND OF BULGARIA” – MILAN STOJADINOVIĆ

IN THE BULGARIAN NEWSPAPER DNEŠ..... 99

Др Драган БОГЕТИЋ

КИПАРСКА КРИЗА 1974. И ПОГОРШАЊЕ

ЈУГОСЛОВЕНСКО-АМЕРИЧКИХ ОДНОСА

Dragan BOGETIĆ, Ph. D.

(Cyprus Crisis of 1974 and the Deterioration of Yugoslav-American Relations) 111

Petar DRAGIŠIĆ, Ph. D.

SEARCHING FOR EL DORADO. WORKERS FROM SERBIA TEMPORARILY EMPLOYED

ABROAD FROM THE 1960S TO THE DISSOLUTION OF YUGOSLAVIA..... 131

<i>Vera GUDAC DODIĆ, Ph. D.</i> DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN IN SERBIA.....	143
---	-----

<i>Milan PILJAK, M. A.</i> POWER GAME IN TITO'S YUGOSLAVIA: CONUNDRUM OF ALEKSANDAR RANKOVIC'S OVERTHROW FROM POWER.....	159
--	-----

<i>He YANQING, Ph. D.</i> THE BEGINNINGS OF PRC'S DIPLOMACY: DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITY OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST REGIME IN THE XIBAIP0 PERIOD – MAY 1948 TO MARCH 1949	177
--	-----

<i>Zoran JANJETOVIĆ, Ph. D.</i> THE ROLE OF THE DANUBE SWABIANS IN THE HISTORY OF THE SERBS: A HETERODOX VIEW	197
---	-----

IN MEMORIAM

Андреј Митровић (1937–2013): сећање Andrej Mitrović (1937–2013): A Remembrance.....	215
--	-----

ПРИКАЗИ REVIEWS

Душан СИМИЋ Σταυρούλα Μαυρογένη, <i>Εκπαιδευτική μεταρρυθμίση και εθνικισμός – Η περίπτωση των χωρών της πρώην юγкоσλαβίας</i> , Θεσσαλονίκη, 2013. Ставрyла Маврогени, <i>Образовна реформа и национализам – случај земаља бивше Југославије</i> , Солун, 2013. (Stavrula Mavrogeni, <i>Educational Reform and Nationalism – Case of ex-Yugoslav Countries</i> , Thessalonica, 2013).....	221
---	-----

Др Гордана КРИВОКАПИЋ ЈОВИЋ Чедoмир Вишњић, <i>Србобран 1901–1914. Српско коло 1903–1914</i> , 2013. (Čedomir Višnjić, <i>Srbobran [Serbian daily newspaper] 1901–1914. Srpsko kolo [Serbian journal] 1903–1914</i> , 2013)	223
---	-----

Др Бојан СИМИЋ Милан Стојадиновић: <i>Политика у време глобалних ломова</i> , Београд, 2013. (Milan Stojadinović: <i>Politics at the Time of Global Breakdown</i> , Belgrade, 2013)	227
--	-----

Др Александар СТОЈАНОВИЋ Мира Радојевић, <i>Милан Грол</i> , Београд, 2014. (Mira Radojević, <i>Milan Grol</i> , Belgrade, 2014)	230
--	-----

Др Радмила РАДИЋ Olga Manojlović Pintar, <i>Arheologija sećanja. Spomenici i identiteti u Srbiji 1918–1989</i> , Beograd, 2014. (Olga Manojlović Pintar, <i>Archaeology of Remembrance. Monuments and Identities in Serbia 1918–1989</i> , Belgrade, 2014)	234
--	-----

ИНФОРМАЦИЈЕ О НАУЧНИМ СКУПОВИМА INFORMATION ON CONFERENCES

Dejan ZEC, M. A. <i>8th Annual Conference: Sport and the Politics of Exclusion</i> , Organized by the Political Studies Association – Sport and Politics Group and John Moores University, Liverpool, UK, 21st and 22nd of February 2014. (Осма годишња конференција: Спорт и политика искључивања, у организацији Удружења политичких студија – Група за спорт и политику и Универзитета Џон Морс, Ливерпул, Уједињено Краљевство, 21. и 22. фебруар 2014)	239
--	-----

ЧЛАНЦИ
Articles

УДК 39(=16)(470)"18"
316.722(=16)(470)"18"

Др Мария ЛЕСКИНЕН

ХАРАКТЕРОЛОГИЯ СЛАВЯН В РУССКОЙ ИНТЕРПРЕТАЦИИ: СПОСОБЫ ИЗОБРАЖЕНИЯ ГЕНДЕРНЫХ ТИПОВ „ЭТНИЧЕСКОГО ДРУГОГО“ ВО ВТОРОЙ ПОЛОВИНЕ XIX В.

Подзаголовочные данные: в статье рассмотрены основные положения теории и практика европейских народоописаний XVIII–XIX вв., а также репрезентации славянских народов в российском народоведении (этнографии) второй половины XIX в. В центре внимания – сравнительные характеристики и образы женских этнических типов западных (польки), южных (сербски) и восточных (малороссиянки) славян.

Ключевые слова: русская этнография XIX в., славяноведение, национальный характер, гендерные типы, имагология, антропозстетика

*Европейские традиции репрезентации этнического
Другого в XVI–XVIII вв.*

Традиция этнокультурных описаний народов восходит еще к античности. До конца XIX в. они являлись важной частью географических сочинений и записок путешественников, часто их помещали в специальный раздел историко-этнографических трудов, они составляли важную часть дипломатической переписки, военных отчетов и т.п. В эпоху Возрождения востребованность сочинений, включающих народоописания, резко возросла – во-первых, в связи с расцветом жанра космографий и путешествий, и, во-вторых, под влиянием морализаторской (параэтической) литературы, нацеленных на формирование социального этоса и религиозного идеала, которые требовали примеров антиобраза. В этом качестве использование информации о Других оказалось эффективным: сведения о чуждом быте и нравах представлялись весьма красноречивыми. В Европе XVII–XVIII вв. описания народов становятся популярной и востребованной разновидностью занимательного чтения, полезного как для образования и воспитания, так и в более конкретном плане – зачастую они служили вполне адекватными пособиями для послов, путешественников, купцов, дворян и др., предоставляя сведения (более или менее точные или полностью мифологизированные) об особенностях поведения других европейских и неевропейских народов, их обычаях, национальном нраве/характере, образе жизни, отношении к „чужим“ и т.п.

Несмотря на то, что новая, возникшая в период Возрождения, гуманистическая традиция нравоописаний известных в христианском мире народов складывалась на протяжении XVI–XVII вв.,¹ информация о них все еще носила общий и ознакомительный характер; значимость упорядочивания уже имеющихся сведений для составления характеристик не только вновь „открываемых“, но и давно известных народов Европы и Азии была осознана лишь в середине XVII в., – как следствие необходимости осмыслить резкое расширение пространственных границ обитаемого мира. Именно к этому времени относится появление масштабных трудов европейских интеллектуалов (гуманистического круга и протестантского вероисповедания), целью которых было не только собирание как можно большего числа сохранившихся и новых источников, но и конкретное сравнение народов (в том числе для установления человеческих „видов“ и типов – по аналогии с каталогизируемым в это время животным миром) по совокупности избранных критериев. Ученым той эпохи казалось бесспорным, что эти отличительные признаки – всегда внешние, „заметные“ и потому очевидные.

Вначале эти нарративы являлись органической частью географических трудов – своеобразных „Космографий“ Нового времени, однако постепенно начинает складываться самостоятельное, отдельное направление народоописаний как таковых, которые в период Просвещения выделятся в специальные „народоведческие“ или этнографические исследования.

Сведения о физическом облике, нраве и быте славянских народов в это время включаются в сочинения „о характере“ или „об образах“ европейских народов,² однако наиболее подробных характеристик, как правило, „удостаиваются“ те из них, которые имеют собственную государственность – прежде всего это поляки и „московиты“. Гораздо большее разнообразие этнической карты славянского мира представлено в географических описаниях „окраин“ Европы, пограничных с Азией и Россией (Балкан в том числе) – но не в сравнительно-описательном ключе, а, скорее, в жанре наблюдений путешественников над жизнью и бытом нецивилизованных племен.³

Среди многочисленных сведений об образе жизни европейских народов в сравнении⁴ выделим лишь некоторые области, важные для нас в контексте избранной темы. Прежде всего следует упомянуть неперенное описание черт внешности, которые кажутся авторам этнически-типичными: это рост, цвет лица, глаз и волос; особенности походки, мимики и жестикаляции, иногда внимание привлекает умение танцевать и фехтовать (которое свидетельствует о таких физических особенностях как пластичность, грациозность или их отсутствие); социальные и региональные отличия в одежде и атрибутах (оружие, украшения). Следующим немаловажным „пунктом“ народоописаний становится характеристика нрава народа, которая фиксирует темперамент, нравственные добродетели и пороки, пристрастия, обычаи, форму правления, умственные свойства, степень религиозности и т.п.

Наконец, еще одной неперенной составляющей данных сочинений становится упоминание о характерном облике и занятиях женщин – представительниц описываемого этноса. Это, как правило, довольно краткие высказывания, иногда на уровне общих сентенций, содержат сведения о

красоте и грации, а также о талантах „общения“ и нормах поведения. Они касаются, впрочем, чаще всего дам знатного происхождения и состоят из оценочных суждений, обусловленных представлениями своего времени о женском предназначении и стандартах светского придворного поведения и хорошего тона.

Эта совокупность качеств и черт, ныне определяемая как „национальный характер“, была призвана установить главные отличительные особенности народа, некую концентрированную его сущность, которую в конце XVIII–XIX вв. назовут „духом“, „душой“ или „физиономией“ народа.

Для адекватного анализа текстов данного жанра необходимо иметь в виду некоторые важные как вербализованные и осознаваемые, так и бессознательные психологические установки наблюдателя в отношении Другого, которые хорошо известны современным антропологам и этнологам.⁵ Это, во-первых, доминирование описательного метода и убежденность в адекватности считывания этнокультурной специфики методом визуального наблюдения. Во-вторых, это каузальная атрибуция – „установка ожидания“: зависимость впечатлений о Другом от сформированных в культуре наблюдателя этнических и цивилизационных представлений, предубеждений и стереотипов. Для этнографических нарративов данного жанра характерно проявление еще одной (универсальной) концепции, обуславливающей явные и скрытые оценки и суждения авторов – это этноцентристская убежденность в превосходстве европейской христианской цивилизации и собственной национальной культуры.⁶ Наконец, в описаниях европейских народов этого времени важной теоретической посылкой выступала трактовка прямого соответствия внешних примет внутренним качествам человека или социальной группы. Кроме того, считалось, что свойства „нрава народа“ всегда легко могут быть воплощены в некотором типичном его представителе,⁷ и потому обобщенный образ народа создавался авторами с той же легкостью, с какой в каждом конкретном представителе этнической группы обнаруживали характерные признаки этничности в целом. Критерием этой произвольно конструируемой типичности становились такие черты Другого, которые воплощали наиболее отчетливые отличия от привычного, „своего“ образа или автостереотипа. Те из них, которые расценивались как максимально несхожие, чаще всего получали статус этнически-типичных (этнодифференцирующих) примет Другого – описываемого этноса.

На протяжении всей истории географических и этнографических описаний идея зависимости образа жизни и характера народа от природных факторов не ставилась под сомнение – даже в XIX веке господства антропо-географической теории. В XVI–XVII вв. природа этноотличительности, ее телесность, непреодолимость и предсказуемость „нрава“ и, в конечном итоге, истории и судьбы народа, тем более казались очевидными. Такая трактовка врожденности имела своим следствием концепцию тесной взаимообусловленности и взаимозависимости антропологического (физического), психического и морального (воплощенного в нраве / характере) параметров этнокультурного своеобразия. Например, описывая французов, барочный автор И. Барклай отмечал, что „ни один человек в мире не обладает природными свойствами (*natura*), более соответствующими их мужественному поведе-

нию: самообладание, походка и жестикуляция составляют единое целое. (...) Тщетно соседние народы надеются обрести их облик и подражать их поведению, напрасно они раболепно копируют их одеяния и манеры, не ведая, что все они – плод того же гения” (под „гением“ Барклай понимал „дух“ или „идею“ народа⁸), и потому „другие в нем (в этом образе. – М. Л.) смешны“. Это дает автору повод порассуждать о возможности и перспективах восприятия и заимствования одними народами качеств (прежде всего добродетелей) других. Такого рода попытки представляются ему безуспешными, так как указанные этнические свойства и внешность определяются врожденными способностями и телесными „привычками“: „Мы можем легко скрыть смирение, ненависть, любовь или благочестие. Но то, что не создано властью ума, а порождено обычаем или (способом. – М. Л.) проявления способностей, соответствующих телу, вы никогда не сможете подделать, ведь против этого – сама Природа“.⁹ В переводе на современный научный язык это означает, что этничность „встроена“ в телесность и передается генетически, она не только воплощена (буквально „инкорпорирована“) в физическом теле, но и „закрепощена“ им; нельзя имитировать или „представлять“ этническое поведение. Барклай, в сущности, формулирует ту самую идею нерасчленности физического и духовного, которая в трудах социальных антропологов XX в. обретает статус исследовательского подхода, позволившего по-новому рассматривать связь материального и социального: М. Мосс вводит понятие «техники тела», а в работах П. Бурдьё она выступает элементом „габитуса“.¹⁰

Заключения автора XVII в. представляются весьма значимыми, так как они дают возможность объяснить еще одну характерную закономерность в систематизации рассматриваемых донаучных этнографических репрезентациях: поскольку нравственность и традиции „встроены“ в человеческое тело и воспроизводятся бессознательно, постольку физический облик не только не в состоянии скрыть темперамент, ум, добродетели и пороки, но, напротив, неизбежно „разоблачает“ их. Поэтому принцип изоморфизма, взаимообусловленности внешних и внутренних качеств обрastaет новыми нюансами и расширяет сферу применения.

Еще одним следствием такой установки является значение внешней красоты в этнических описаниях и изображениях (как вербальных, так и визуальных). Красота, с одной стороны, видится неперменным признаком „своего“ этнического типа (или одного из его региональных вариантов) в самоописании, которое, в свою очередь, неизбежно осуществляется в соответствии с установкой естественного этноцентризма. С другой, красота, как и в античности, выступает „доказательством“ добродетельности или связи с Божественным, в то время как безобразие видится приметой порока или контактов с „дьявольским“, потусторонним, нечистым или чужим (как в традиционной культуре). В-третьих, физическое и нравственное совершенство ассоциируется с социальным статусом человека и группы, оно объявляется присущим лишь знатному сословию, поэтому считается, что „низы“ – как другая „порода“, не могут обладать такими чертами, и в этом смысле социальная и этническая инаковость сближаются (бытовало, в частности, убеждение, что бастарды, как и метисы, легко узнаваемы в связи с тем, что они принимают признаки „низшего“ из родителей). Наконец, в-четвертых,

восприятие иноэтнической внешности подчиняется определенным стереотипам и предубеждениям – наблюдатель „несвободен“ в своих антропоэстетических оценках,¹¹ и, следовательно, фиксация „красивого“ и „некрасивого“ в этнографических описаниях является характеристикой в первую очередь представлений наблюдателя, а не его объекта.

Принцип изоморфизма в этнических репрезентациях разного уровня позволяет увидеть общие принципы человеко- и мироустройства в целом: как климат определяет характеры народов, их благосостояние, которые, в свою очередь, воздействуют на сочетание пороков и добродетелей, заметных в антропологическом типе. Поэтому по одной или нескольким приметам, по мнению описателей, возможно составить цельный образ, реконструировать или спрогнозировать недостающие или неизвестные этнодифференцирующие признаки и качества. Это приводит к еще большей произвольности в оценках наблюдателей, путешественников и несведущих авторов.

Особое место в характеристиках Других занимает установление особенностей физического облика женщин. Не всегда, впрочем, их привлекательность интересовала авторов-мужчин. До Возрождения женская красота вовсе не являлась ни предметом восхищения, ни предметом поклонения; вплоть до XVIII в. она воспринималась, как и мужская, неотделимой от моральных добродетелей. Всякое физическое совершенство исключало, согласно господствующим воззрениям, душевное уродство, а „всякий изъян внешности свидетельствует о внутреннем пороке“.¹² Эта доминанта, в сущности, делала вовсе необязательной фиксацию своеобразия женского этнического облика, ибо он в той или иной степени отражал специфически-этнические свойства в той же степени, что и мужской.

Традиции визуальной „этнической имажинерии“ – то есть создания изображений разных европейских народов в их узнаваемом и одновременно стереотипном воплощении складываются в XVI в., в них гендерные этнические образы занимают важное место, однако наиболее интересными для читателей оказываются экзотические и яркие приметы инаковости – такие как одежда (в связи с чем они и получили именование „костюмов“), социальные и статусные атрибуты и некоторые приметы сословной принадлежности.¹³ Женские образы в этой иконографической характерологии вплоть до конца XVIII в. носили более символический, нежели реалистический характер – так или иначе, антропологические признаки этноса находили в них весьма условное отражение; можно даже говорить об определенной „обезличенности“ женского облика, в визуальных изображениях отчетливо заметен акцент на материальных, вещественных атрибутах этничности и гендера.¹⁴ В большей мере в них проявились расовые приметы телесности, трактуемые, впрочем, также в аксиологическом ключе – посредством категорий оппозиций цивилизованность / варварство, культура / дикость, Запад / Восток и др.

Один из наиболее известных источников, объединивший в себе визуальную и вербальную формы национальной характерологии и продолживший традицию сравнительного описания европейских народов, датируется приблизительно концом XVII–началом XVIII вв. Он озаглавлен как

„Краткое описание пребывающих в Европе народов и их свойств“¹⁵ и представляет собой таблицу различных черт десяти европейских народов (в том числе русских и поляков). Критериями сравнения выступают 17 примет, выраженных в односложной формуле-характеристике. Это – определения особенностей образа жизни, поведения и свойств нрава, которые условно можно разделить на несколько групп: 1) географическое и климатическое своеобразие региона проживания, традиции государственного устройства и конфессиональной принадлежности жителей: „облик страны“, „признание своим государем“, „богослужение“; 2) традиции и физические „слабости“ – „обычай“ и „болезни“; 3) самая большая группа – качества, которые касаются свойств характера / нрава народа: „природа и свойства“, „проявления этих свойств“, „разум“, „наука“, „пороки“, „любовь к...“, „воинские добродетели“, „пристрастия“, „временепровождение“; 4) внешние признаки зафиксированы только опосредованно – в рубриках „одежда“ и „сравнение с животными“. Впрочем, последний пункт (кстати, часто встречающийся и в более ранней традиции народоописаний) в равной степени содержит в себе „намеки“ не только на внешние приметы, но и на особенности характера. Несмотря на отсутствие в таблице определений, касающихся физического облика представителей европейских этносов (информация о них исчерпывается визуальным изображением мужских национальных костюмов, что делает словесный комментарий избыточным), зооморфные уподобления этнических типов дают представление не только о символах, но и о типичных антропологических приметах и нравственных особенностях, воплощенных в собирательном образе звериной ипостаси, что в XIX – XX вв. получит широкое распространение в национальной символике, аллегоризациях и регионально-государственных зооморфных отождествлениях.¹⁶ В упомянутой таблице, например, поляк сравнен с медведем, русский – с ослом, венгр – с волком, француз – с лисой.

Несмотря на очевидные изменения в теории и практике описаний народов в эпоху Просвещения основные постулаты и подходы оставались неизменными: это географический детерминизм (который благодаря работам Ш. Монтескье распространялся теперь на „склонность“ наций к типам политического устройства), метафора стадийности человеческой жизни, применяемая к народам для определения стадии их цивилизованности, изоморфизм внешних и внутренних признаков, зооморфические подобию. Последние два принципа были детально развиты в теории индивидуальной и социальной физиогномики (которая распространялась и на способы изображения этнических групп) – в частности, в трудах И. К. Лафатера и в описаниях так наз. сословных „типов“,¹⁷ остававшимися популярными вплоть до середины XIX века. Теория соответствия внешних черт внутренним качествам человека начиная с Просвещения находилась под воздействием интерпретации категорий прекрасного и безобразного в немецкой философии этого времени, выходя за рамки узко-эстетической проблематики и эволюции представлений о стандартах моды и красоты, столь актуальных для данной историко-культурной эпохи. Все они оказали серьезное воздействие на стандарты визуальной и вербальной репрезентации народов в западноевропейской и русской культуре и этнографии.

На уровне обывательских взглядов характерология (учение о национальных характерах) претерпела в то время весьма незначительные изменения в сравнении с предшествующими эпохами. В качестве примера можно привести „Опись качеств знатнейших европейских народов“, содержащуюся в знаменитом и многократно переиздававшемся на протяжении столетия „Письмовнике“ Н. Г. Курганова (впервые – 1769 г.).¹⁸ Это описание не является, разумеется, оригинальным сводом национальных качеств в русском восприятии, а, напротив – авторским переложением стереотипных представлений европейцев друг о друге, формировавшихся начиная с XVI в.¹⁹ Курганов поместил описание различных сторон нрава только пяти западноевропейских народов.²⁰ Из 14 пунктов сравнения, общий принцип которых восходит к „Доске народов“, внешности отданы лишь три – „ростом“, „лицом“ и „в одежде“, доминируют по-прежнему качества, связанные с характером, при том, что введен отдельный пункт „нрав“. Из совершенно новых параметров обращает на себя внимание фиксация гендерных особенностей – рубрики „в браке“ и „женщины“. Характеристики женщин касаются, однако, не внешности, а нрава и положения в семье – точнее, в отношениях с мужем („гордые“, „злые“, „своенравные“ или „домовые“ и „податливые“).

В целом следует с высокой долей уверенности констатировать, что этнонациональные черты и свойства женщины как отдельный и значимый для народоописателей элемент характеристики обретает своеобразную легитимацию именно с эпохи Просвещения. Можно предполагать, что немаловажную роль в этом сыграла, с одной стороны, сохранявшаяся с раннего Нового времени тенденция к сочетанию образовательных и морализаторских функций этого жанра, а, с другой – новое представление эпохи Просвещения о роли женщины в семье и ее ответственности за воспитание детей. Сатирический элемент в так наз. „криках“ или „физиономиях“ („типах“), вербальных описаниях разных народов и в их визуальных изображениях²¹ довольно долго сохраняется в европейских репрезентациях Других в XIX в., а борьба поборников религиозной и светской морали зачастую была нацелена именно на исправление поведения и сохранения нравственности женщины.

Складывание этнографии как самостоятельной дисциплины начиная с конца XVIII в. поставило задачу упорядочивания сведений о народах – как собранных ранее, так и впервые вводимых в научный оборот, что привело к необходимости выработать теоретически обоснованные стандарты изложения данных об этносах, а также сформулировать способы их изучения. Описание в естественно-научном знании того времени выступало главной формой собирания этнографических данных и одновременно – основным методом исследования. Изучить означало представить подробную характеристику объекта, выполненную в определенной последовательности и по вопроснику, чтобы в конечном итоге определить место данного объекта в существующих таксономических иерархиях. Этим же правилам подчинялось и описание человеческих сообществ.²² Большая часть параметров, подлежавших фиксации, впрочем, осталась прежней: это внешний облик, нрав или характер, формы политического устройства. Новыми факторами стали прежде всего язык (благодаря теориям немецких просветителей) и фольклор (которым начали интересоваться прежде всего романтики), а с 1840-х гг. – и материальная культура народов.

*Быт и нравы народов в изображениях XIX в.:
влияние научно-этнографических теорий*

Особенностью народоописаний XIX в. было признание равноценности научных нарративов и научно-популярных очерков и свидетельств очевидцев. В географо-статистические обзоры европейских стран (и Российской империи в том числе) включались фрагменты мемуаров, записки путешественников предшествующих столетий, путевые впечатления и заметки современников, репортажи, отрывки из художественных произведений. В России даже во второй половине столетия, когда складывается предметное поле и методы этнографии как самостоятельной дисциплины, в строго позитивистские описания страны по регионам и в многочисленные очерки народов зачастую помещалась одна и та же информация из разножанровых источников. Субъективные впечатления наблюдателей, сведения, собираемые волонтерами по академическим вопросам, суждения других описателей, заключения и выводы образованных путешественников представлены как равнозначные и объективные в этнографическом отношении. Отличиями русских этнографических народоописаний этого времени можно считать, во-первых, стремление упорядочить данную информацию в соответствии с программой сбора сведений по этнографии Н. И. Надеждина; во-вторых, „власть номинаций“ над претендующими на объективность мнениями наблюдателей-исследователей, когда известные классификации языков и культур заставляют автора видеть предписанное, усматривать ожидаемое и узнавать знакомое; и, в-третьих, объявление только одного – крестьянского – сословия носителем антропологических, традиционных и поведенческих черт языка, быта, культуры и нрава этноса.²³

В 1870-80-е гг. на научные исследования народов активно влияют заключения и теории антропологического знания (физической антропологии), позволяющие во многом пересмотреть имеющиеся данные о происхождении и родстве этносов. Результаты массового измерения физических параметров этнических групп, количественные методы обработки этих данных и особенно расцвет краниологии обусловил эволюцию расовой теории. В русской науке того времени термин „раса“ понимался неоднозначно, он использовался и в значении „племя“, „народ“ (синонимичном современному пониманию „этноса“).²⁴

Расовые в самом широком смысле (т. е. антропологические) отличия во второй половине XIX в. вполне поддавались определению точными методами, что укрепляло убежденность в возможности объективного описания и оценки физических качеств этнической группы. Полемика касалась вопросов о происхождении расовых отличий, критериев их классификации и тех свойств и признаков, которые определяют эволюцию развития народов и уровень их цивилизованности. На практике (т. е. при полевом исследовании) профессиональные антропологи и неподготовленные наблюдатели могли лишь в самом общем виде зафиксировать на письме или в изображении кажущиеся им характерными особенности физического облика представителей разных рас и народов – это по-прежнему цвет кожи, глаз и волос, рост, черты лица. В описаниях физического облика доминируют ар-

хаические оценочные определения, связанные, во-первых, с эстетическими и вкусовыми предпочтениями тех, кто стремился дать научно-объективное описание в наименее приспособленных для этого терминах и категориях (например, красивый/некрасивый), и, во-вторых, все с теми же моральными свойствами (добрый/злой, нежный/грубый, честный/лукавый) или особенностями темперамента (веселый/угрюмый, энергичный/едлительный, бодрый/вялый).²⁵ В некоторых этнографических и антропологических вопросниках-анкетах осуществлялось гендерное разделение описаний этнического облика (широко распространенного, типичного), а также давалось указание обращать внимание на особенности интерпретации эстетических категорий прекрасного и безобразного в изучаемых культурах, в том числе и касающихся физического облика „своих“ и „чужих“.²⁶ Однако в качестве самостоятельного объекта полевых исследований такие представления выступали реже, чем в реконструкциях, предпринимаемых на основании анализа фольклорных текстов этнической культуры. В то же время во второй половине XIX в. появляется множество публицистических статей и научных работ российских ученых и публицистов, в которых признается историческая и социальная обусловленность представлений о женской внешности и физической привлекательности в „высокой“ и народной культуре разных народов на основании изучения текстов народной словесности и художественной литературы.²⁷

Восприятие физических параметров, составляющих „физиономию“ народа, продолжало оставаться областью, в которой наблюдатели более руководствовались собственными предпочтениями (индивидуальными, социальными, профессиональными, культурными и др.), нежели „объективными“ данными. Впрочем, и ученые, и путешественники не рефлексировали по поводу того, почему те или иные черты казались им привлекательными или отталкивающими. Только естественным (обывательским) этноцентризмом трудно объяснить данную особенность восприятия,²⁸ так как в рассматриваемых нами источниках спектр оценок внешности различных народов Российской Империи весьма широк: в них часто встречаются негативные характеристики физического облика представителей собственного этноса и, напротив, восхищение красотой представителей других народов.

Следует также подчеркнуть и то обстоятельство, что подобные оценки внешней красоты (впрочем, как и иные заключения о характере, нравах и обычаях народов в целом или их отдельных социальных групп, которые составляют совокупность стереотипных суждений авторов этого круга)²⁹ ни в коей мере нельзя считать универсально-национальными. Напротив, они демонстрируют особенности эстетического восприятия и модных канонов образованных сословий Европы своего времени. Несмотря на попытки русских авторов, выявить признаки национальной женской красоты посредством анализа фольклорных произведений³⁰ в народной культуре вообще и в менталитете русских крестьян в частности, в реальной действительности значимость и критерии физической привлекательности были жестко социально дифференцированы. В традиционных представлениях русских, – констатируют современные антропологи, – красота связывалась исключительно с периодом девичества и целомудрия, а потому „ограничивалась перио-

дом от совершеннолетия до свадьбы“; а „представления о красоте... сводились, главным образом, к признакам физического здоровья“.³¹ Красивыми, по мнению крестьян, считались „бойкие“, „веселые“ и задорные девушки.³² Рассуждения о чертах лица, формах телах, грации или нравах женщин (как своей культуры так и расовых типов) – это предмет интереса мужчин, принадлежавших к исключительно европейскому кругу и высшему сословию.³³

Особое место занимал вопрос о гендерных вариациях физического облика (и красоты в том числе) в спорах антропологов. Западноевропейская расовая теория в качестве одного из основополагающих постулатов приняла тезис о том, что критерием цивилизованности и принадлежности к „высшим расам“ служит внешняя физическая гармония – разумеется, параметры этой гармонии обусловлены были представлениями об идеале красоты, формировавшимися в европейской культуре еще в эпоху античности. Можно согласиться с современными исследователями в том, что расовые теории в российской этнографии и антропологии не получили такой актуализации, как в западноевропейской науке того времени.³⁴ Это, однако, не исключало довольно резких и расистских с сегодняшней точки зрения³⁵ высказываний о внешности и нравах некоторых народов Севера России и Сибири.³⁶ Стереотипная констатация „некрасивости“ финнов и родственных им финно-угров Поволжья часто была связана с цветом их лица, который казался желтым или смуглым,³⁷ хотя вызвано такое видение было исключительно теорией, согласно которой финно-угры имели азиатское происхождение (т. е. принадлежали к желтой расе).³⁸ С другой стороны, азиатское происхождение не являлось главным критерием оценки внешности представителей этноса. Подтверждением тому может служить описание казанских татар, относимых к народам „азиатским“ (не в географическом, а в цивилизационном отношении). В одном из учебников говорится, что они „по физическим своим особенностям принадлежат к числу красивых пород“.³⁹

Но если в западноевропейской традиции народоописаний акцент на расовом физическом облике был актуален и ярко выражен еще в „доантропологический“ период,⁴⁰ то в русских этнографических очерках второй половины XIX столетия физическое разнообразие этнических типов, их смешение воспринималось как характерная примета имперской полиэтничности – особенно в отношении народов Европейской России. Немаловажным обстоятельством можно считать и то, что сам великорусский тип в процессе его научной реконструкции трактовался как смешанный не только в этническом, но и в расовом отношении. Причем концепция метисации существовала в двух версиях – бесспорной первой, базировавшейся на заключении о том, что великорусы являются финно-славянским субстратом и менее убедительной для современников второй, заключающейся во влиянии „тюркской“ (т. е. татаро-монгольской) „крови“ на северо-восточных славян.⁴¹

Таким образом, красота оказывалась не только важным доказательством, критерием цивилизационной „развитости“ народа, но и выступала в качестве этнодифференцирующего признака европейских этносов („кавказской расы“). Несмотря на очевидную субъективность данного критерия, ученые стремились обосновать научные дефиниции красоты. Как уже указывалось, этнические описания женщин традиционно включали оценку привле-

кательности их лица, тела, движений и походки. В последней четверти XIX в. вышло несколько масштабных по охвату материала трудов, посвященных рассмотрению всех расовых типов женщин с целью выявления принципов гендерной специфики этнического и антропологического обликов (они стали первыми сочинениями по западноевропейской антропоэстетике). Эти сочинения принадлежали перу врачей-гинекологов и путешественников, и, несмотря на „научность“ поставленных задач – объяснить и показать разнообразие типов женской привлекательности/непривлекательности среди представителей всех народов человечества, – содержали в себе очевидные черты этноцентризма и расовых предубеждений. К числу наиболее известных русскому читателю второй половины XIX в. работ принадлежат: сочинение А. фон Швейгер-Лерхенфельда „Женщины Земли“ (1881),⁴² трехтомник Г. Плосса (1885)⁴³ и исследование К. Штраца „Расовая женская красота“ (1904).⁴⁴ В них отразились многие довольно распространенные в европейской среде второй половины столетия гендерные и этнические стереотипы. В их ряду необходимо рассмотреть следующие.

Французский скульптор Ш. А. Кордые – современник этих авторов, – в своем докладе, прочитанном перед аудиторией Парижского антропологического общества доказывал, что „всякая раса разнится в присущей ей красоте от другой расы. Поэтому нет общих признаков красоты“.⁴⁵ Эту же позицию разделял Г. Плосс, утверждавший, что для мужчины наиболее привлекательной будет казаться представительница его племени и расы, а основным общим условием красоты остается лишь требование здоровья и „нормальности“.⁴⁶ С этим соглашались русские антропологи. А. В. Богданов в связи с полемикой о русском типе писал, что „в каждом из нас, в сфере нашего ‘бессознательного’ существует довольно определенное понятие о русской красоте“.⁴⁷

К. Штрац же, напротив, не сомневался в том, что любому человеку (т. е. мужчине) всегда физически более привлекательным кажется не свой расовый или этнический тип, а „совершенный тип белой расы“. Поэтому он различал понятия женские „расовые типы“ и женская „расовая красота“. Первые могут быть выражены во всяком представителе этноса, а вторая всегда стремится к эталону белой расы, она „развивается только у того тела“, у которого расовые особенности (т.е. по умолчанию „небелой“ расы) настолько ослаблены, что переходят границы красоты.⁴⁸ Именно идеальный образец „белых“, по мнению немецкого автора, становится главным как сознательным, так и неосознанным объектом сравнения. Поэтому представления о красоте универсальны; „красивыми“ всем мужчинам кажутся те представительницы других народов, чьи параметры максимально близки к этому образцу.⁴⁹

Более взвешенная оценка женской этнической красоты содержится в сочинении предшественника К. Штраца по изучению гендерной антропологии – Г. Плосса, который обладал гораздо более широкими познаниями в этнографии. Однако и Плосс разделял широко распространенное убеждение в „умственном и нравственном“ неравенстве полов,⁵⁰ а, точнее, о женском несовершенстве физиологии, ума и морали. Он принимал расхожий взгляд о преобладании у женщин чувств и эмоций над разумом и логиче-

ским мышлением (некоторые западно-европейские антропологи, впрочем, и вовсе отказывали женщинам во втором), соглашаясь с уподоблением женщин детям – по уровню их развития, отсутствию рефлексий и природном имморализме.⁵¹ Не столь жестко Плосс интерпретировал необходимые условия для развития женской красоты, считая, что к ним относятся не только климато-географические факторы, определяющие особенности антропологического облика и физическое здоровье, но и социальные – те, которые формируют положение женщины в социуме, позволяя ей „свободно развиваться“. „Женская красота, – пишет он, – не развивается у того народа, женщины которого с юности низведены к униженному положению домашних животных...“⁵² Кроме того, занятия мужскими промыслами и тяжелым физическим трудом делают трудноотличимой женскую внешность от мужской, особенно с годами. Плосс, однако, не отрицал позитивных последствий метисации для умственного и физического „улучшения породы“ и не сомневался в том, что смешение (но только в ограниченных масштабах) различных рас и народов способствует появлению женских типов, отличающихся признанной красотой и привлекательностью.⁵³

Расово-антропологическая коррекция уже сложившихся стандартов характерологических описаний европейских народов, в которых женские образы были лишь дополнительным аргументом и иллюстрацией общезначимой специфики, не смогли кардинально изменить видение женского этнического типа, но содержание этих описаний и их оценки во второй половине столетия находились под сильным влиянием двух факторов: вне-научного – поэтики романтизма и процессов социальной эмансипации и научного – объявления женского физического типа в наибольшей степени отражающим и сохраняющим устойчивые черты этнической антропологии и культуры.

В XVIII в. и в начале XIX в. части света и связанные с ними оценки цивилизованности и характеристики нравов диктовались позицией наблюдателя, находящегося в Центральной Европе – его точка зрения определяла ориентиры так наз. „ментальной карты“.⁵⁴ Они легко поддавались изменению в зависимости от географического и идеологического „положения“ наблюдателя. Поэтому оппозиции север/юг, запад/восток в эпоху романтизма легко меняли свое семантическое наполнение, приписывая те же характеристики противопоставлению север/запад,⁵⁵ – так же, как в мифе о Европе „Азия“ или „Сибирь“ понимались в первую очередь метафорически, а „восток“ и „запад“ могли оказаться важными маркерами в идентификации „центрального“ и „периферийного“ в пространстве культуры. Это оказало самое непосредственное воздействие и на характеристики этносов, относимых – в соответствии с указанными выше традициями нравоописаний – либо к северу, либо к востоку (югу). Изображение внешних особенностей и нравов этносов выстраивалось в духе евроцентризма. „Южные“ народы выступали носителями „изнеженного“, феминного начала, в то время как северные воплощали маскулинный тип. Поэтому черты, приписываемые женщинам „Востока“ как в европейской беллетристике, так и в литературе путешествий, выбирались из комплекса качеств и особенностей, сложившихся под влиянием ориенталистского дискурса: это опасные покорительницы муж-

ских сердец, томные одалиски,⁵⁶ однако более сексуально раскрепощенные, чувственные и потому опасные.

Сентиментальная литература путешествий уделяла большое внимание и вопросу о влиянии климата на людей и народы,⁵⁷ но в интерпретации различий „южных“ и „северных“ народов следовала за просвещенческими гипотезами, наделяя обитателей холодного климата большими добродетелями и свойствами „молодости“. Вопрос, повторим, был лишь в отсутствии точного перечня стран или краев севера и юга, что позволяло весьма свободно толковать метафору. И в период господства парадигмы позитивизма характеристики групп народов оставались неизменными, лишь частично подвергаясь корреляции.

Гендерные особенности славянского этнического типа

Включение в тексты путешествий и научных этнографических очерков описаний внешнего облика женщин можно считать универсальной особенностью народоописательных текстов, что связано с общими принципами конструирования этнического типа. Авторы и составители – мужчины – оперировали при этом оценочными определениями как, например, красивая/некрасивая, обаятельная/необаятельная, страстная/холодная, живая/вялая, при этом редко поясняя не только природу этой привлекательности/непривлекательности, но и критерии собственных суждений.

Обращаясь к изображению женщин в русских этнографических народоописаниях, отметим, что они, с одной стороны, всегда вписаны в общую схему этнических характеристик народов Российской империи, и, с другой, соотносятся с традицией этнических самоописаний в национальных историографиях и с русскими гетеростереотипами, однако не теми, которые бытовали в народной картине мира, а со сложившимися в образованных слоях общества – в первую очередь под влиянием художественной и научной литературы.⁵⁸ Самостоятельным и почти неизменным пунктом путевых записок, историко-этнографических и географических очерков гендерные характеристики этносов становятся начиная с 1840-х гг.⁵⁹ по двум причинам: во-первых, положение женщин и детей в социуме становится важным критерием определения уровня культурного развития общества в целом и крестьянства в частности, а также показателем цивилизованности народа в целом, и, во-вторых, в антропологической науке все большее признание завоевывает концепция, согласно которой женский этнический („расовый“) тип в наибольшей степени сохраняет в себе характерные этнические физические и нравственные свойства.⁶⁰ Немаловажную роль сыграли и модернизационные реформы в России, поставившие так наз. „женский вопрос“,⁶¹ далеко не ограничивавшийся женской эмансипацией,⁶² в центр общественно-политических дискуссий. Наконец, довольно резкое изменение традиционных и просветительно-романтических представлений о гендерных моделях и правах повлекло за собой интерес к опыту и практике других народов. В этом контексте показательным примером может служить содержание статьи „Женщина“ в Энциклопедии Брокгауза и Ефрона, посвященной поло-

жению женщины в культуре народов мира, в разных конфессиональных и исторических традициях. Главный акцент сделан на процессе постепенной эмансипации женщин в гендерном, сословном и культурном аспектах,⁶³ а собственно „эмансипации“ посвящена отдельная статья энциклопедии.

Наиболее очевидной особенностью любых этнографических описаний женщин является их социально- и гендерно-субъективный характер, ведь подавляющее большинство авторов были мужчинами, причем принадлежавшими к высшим и средним сословиям. Не затрагивая хорошо изученные ныне универсальные особенности мужского нарратива и вопроса о своеобразии мужского письма „дофеминистической“ эпохи, отметим лишь несколько наиболее существенных отличий в изображении женщин в „мужских“ этнографических текстах. Это, во-первых, архаическое стремление дать не нейтрально-антропологическую, но оценочную характеристику внешней привлекательности наряду с нравственными добродетелями. Во-вторых, – четкая сословная дифференциация, проявляющаяся в разных требованиях к „хорошему“ поведению и достоинствам женщин-крестьянок (как социально „чуждых“ в культурном отношении) и женщин условно „высшего“ сословия (дворянок, горожанок, почти никогда – аристократок и представительниц „высшего света“), некой социальной „ровни“ повествователю. Именно вторые, несмотря на декларации описателей, оказывались главным объектом характеристик. Это важная социальная подоплека, поскольку суждения принадлежали представителям иной гендерной и общественной группы – т.е. внешним наблюдателям (социальному и этническому Другому).

Кроме того, значимым критерием позитивной оценки женщин становится степень их приверженности обычаям и нормам традиционного общества, патриархальным ценностям и социальным практикам. Любые проявления модернизации или эмансипации в этом отношении оцениваются, как правило, негативно. Однако последнее можно объяснить и тем, что задачей описателей было изображение „этнического типа“, призванного воплощать именно „вечные“, константные черты культуры народа, не подверженные сиюминутным трансформациям или моде. Чем консервативнее, архаичнее крестьянская культура, тем более адекватна она этнически-культурной „чистоте“ и типичности. Особенно отчетливо эти особенности заметны в сравнении с текстами этнографических описаний, вышедшими из-под женского пера. Их очерки отличает внимание к положению женщины в семье и социуме, к социально-экономическому и правовому статусу, сексуальной жизни, а также нескрываемое сочувствие к „тяжкой женской доле“ и рабскому положению, сформулированное зачастую с позиции личного опыта и гендерной солидарности⁶⁴ (то есть они воспринимались и описывались с позиции социального „своего“, хотя и этнического Другого).

Обратимся к детальному анализу характеристик женщин в русских народоописаниях славян второй половины XIX века на примере очерков о представителях трех славянских групп – восточных (малорусы), западных (поляки) и южных (сербы). Начать следует с упоминания некоторых важных установок наблюдателей. С одной стороны, их отличала общность принципов описания, обусловленная идеями о типичных качествах земле-

дельческих и христианских народов, причем согласно просветительским и романтическим представлениям, принадлежавших к категории „молодых“ европейских этносов. Поэтому все славянские народы наделялись добродетелями трудолюбия, гостеприимства, патриархальной честности, мужества и т.п. При этом, как подтверждает сравнительный анализ перечня этноспецифических качеств нрава (характера) славян в европейской и русской славистике XVIII–XIX вв., разработанного еще немецкими философами (главным образом И. Г. Гердером), сравнение германских и славянских племен как типологически противоположных друг другу, как выразителей двух оппозиционных „стихий“ европейской этноплеменной и цивилизационной истории, оставалось неизменным на протяжении полутора веков, лишь детализируясь и дополняясь.⁶⁵ Наиболее принципиальным для эволюции национальных характерологий стало то, что славянам приписывались душевность, мягкость, сердечность и „детскость“ в противоположность рациональному, жестокому, холодному „зрелому“ началу германцев.

Принято считать, что эта столь значимая и константная, по сути, характеристика славянского „нрава“, основоположником которой был Гердер, вполне позитивна – в сравнении с другими, негативными оценками славян его предшественниками и современниками. Однако это не совсем точно: тщательное рассмотрение оппозиций, используемых в авто- и гетероописаниях славянского нрава демонстрирует важное соответствие, связанное с изображением двух „видов“ Другого – этнически-чуждого и гендерного – т.е. женского начала. В сущности, женские свойства слабости, эмоциональности, незащитности, неорганизованности, неразвитого интеллекта и т.п. приписывались славянам, в то время как представители „своего“ – германского племени – выступали как обладатели мужских позитивных качеств силы, рациональности, дисциплины, организации, ума. О. В. Рябов полагает, что это наложило отпечаток на способ изображения национального/этнического, государственного/культурного, маскулинного/феминного в западноевропейских и российских воплощениях нации и этноса.⁶⁶ Однако далеко не все основоположники и выразители славянских характерологий – в силу доминирования „мужского письма“ в науке, – видели и понимали данную дихотомию отчетливо. Она была отмечена в связи с интерпретацией расовых классификаций, отразившейся в антропологическом дискурсе первой трети и середины столетия: „коренное различие между племенами проводилось некоторыми гораздо дальше, чем между неграми и белыми. Многие немецкие историки и публицисты... видели в различии германцев и славян как бы различие половое и доказывали, что германцы представляют собой элемент мужеский, активный, а славяне – элемент женский, страдательный“.⁶⁷ Это же отождествление этнической и гендерной дихотомий между собой отмечали и слависты – причем не только этнографы. На нее указывал, в частности, В. И. Ламанский, рассматривая западноевропейскую (главным образом немецкоязычную) славистическую историографию XVIII – первой половины XIX вв.⁶⁸ Справедливости ради следует заметить, что данная интерпретация не была единственной, высказывались аналогичные гипотезы относительно других расовых (этнических) европейских групп. В частности, с женским началом сопрягались и романские народы, противопоставляемые

германскому расовому типу как воплощению маскулинности.⁶⁹ Поэтому наиболее известная в наше время классификация Ф. Ницше, делящая народы по „женскому“ и „мужскому“ типам, представляется лишь переосмыслением гораздо более ранних традиций немецкоязычной историософии.

С точки зрения западноевропейской традиции, таким образом, восточных и южных славянок объединяла принадлежность к „феминному“ этническому типу – следовательно, их рассмотрение должно было осуществляться либо в ракурсе „женственности в квадрате“, либо, напротив, им могли приписывать мужскую роль или качества. Российские авторы этнографических очерков – как научных, так и паранаучных, несмотря на прямо противоположную позицию и иные традиции славянских народоописаний, все же не могли полностью избежать влияния авторитетной для русских ученых немецкой историографии (в области этнографии и антропологии, в частности).

Все это оказало значительное влияние не только на стиль и способы описания и типизации женских образов „другого“ в текстах европейской культуры XIX века, но и обусловило длительное бытование определенных этнических стереотипов, особенно тех, которые касались нрава и внешности разных народов. В научно-популярных этнографических описаниях женщин и в записках о путешествиях этого периода – особенно первой половины столетия, очень сильно выражен уже упоминавшийся принцип изоморфизма (взаимосвязь внешности и характера), „прочитаемый“ в соответствии с основными категориями и оппозициями романтизма. Это определенные „стандарты“ в изображении так наз. „экзотических“ и роковых женщин, стереотипные характеристики „северных“, „южных“ (или „восточных“) обитательниц Европы.⁷⁰ Для произведений русского романтизма характерна весьма примечательная – гендерная – двойственность в использовании стереотипа страстной („горячей“) роковой, морально раскрепощенной и зрелой (опытной) красавицы „южного типа“, противопоставляемой сдержанной („холодной“), добродетельной и зачастую целомудренной „северянке“.⁷¹ Эта оппозиция могла выражаться в различных дихотомиях этнического и регионального (петербурженка-русская/провинциалка, „южанка“ (цыганка, малороссиянка, гречанка и т.п.); великороссиянка/малороссиянка) или сословного характера (великосветская дама / провинциальная барышня) и т.п. Довольно отчетливым, как показывают исследования, было отождествление голубоглазой блондинки с „севером“, холодностью и добродетельностью, а черноглазой брюнетки с „югом“, пылкостью и свободолобием.⁷² „Женская красота, – пишет Буле, – виделась романтиками либо как северный, либо как южный тип, каждый из которых символизировал свои темпераментные парадигмы“.⁷³

Перечень этнонациональных особенностей славян в российских этнографических описаниях был универсален – гендерных „подтипов“ в нем почти не наблюдалось. Наибольшие вариации заметны прежде всего в изображении антропологического облика и нравственных качеств. Одним из главных методов этнографического исследования родственных в этническом отношении народов был метод сравнения. Он применялся двояко – для научного сопоставления этносов по известной программе-вопроснику,

и для констатации субъективных, нерелексированных компаративистических суждений, присущих всякому дискурсу о Другом – когда наблюдатель или повествователь воспринимает и изначально фиксирует действительность в категориях „свой/чужой“, подчиняясь закономерности каузальной атрибуции. Неслучайно описание малорусов всегда осуществлялось через фиксацию кардинальных отличий их быта и нравов от великорусских,⁷⁴ лейтмотивом очерков о крестьянстве Сербии становилось сходство образа жизни сербов и малорусов, а карелы, например, рассматривались как „промежуточная“ группа между финнами-тавастами и русскими.

Следует упомянуть еще одну важную тенденцию, касающуюся описания женщин в связи с изображением этнического / национального идеала или этнического типа: это так наз. „этнизация феминного“ (термин О. Рябова), когда женские образы трактовались как воплощение этнического, находящегося в оппозиции к государственно-национальному. Женские образы и символы ассоциировались с традиционно-бытовыми крестьянскими формами культуры, в то время как мужские – с миром „города“, эпохи прогресса, модернизации и т.п., что оказало влияние на формы вербальной⁷⁵ и визуальной⁷⁶ репрезентации народов Европы в период конструирования наций.

Польки

Описания полек в этнографическом дискурсе эпохи можно считать наиболее противоречивыми.⁷⁷ Эта неоднозначность была порождена методологической сложностью в выявлении польского этнического типа: согласно теории этничности того времени, „тип“ выявлялся через крестьянское сословие, в то время как и в польских научных и исторических самоописаниях, и в русской культуре предшествующего периода доминировал образ польки-дворянки, гармонично „встроенный“ в романтический идеал истинной патриотки. Польская крестьянка долгое время оставалась „неизвестна“ и польской, и русской литературе, так что даже обыденные представления, бесспорно оказывавшие влияние на восприятие этнического Другого, никак не могли сформировать необходимую почву. Напротив, сложившаяся традиция изображения „прекрасной и гордой“ польки в поэзии и беллетристике русского романтизма⁷⁸ предоставляла готовые и клише, сложившиеся в сознании образованной элиты „естественным путем“. Красота, грация, гордость, ум, несравненное обаяние, – все эти особенности, по признанию многих наблюдателей, оказывают чарующее воздействие на мужчин, теряющих голову, подтверждая еще одно романтическое предубеждение об опасности и коварстве полек, делающих их своеобразным „орудием“ в патриотической борьбе поляков (представление о том, что именно женщина в условиях сурового политического противостояния является носителем польского патриотизма и готова жертвовать собой, сформировалось сначала в польском национальном автостереотипе).⁷⁹ Довольно распространено было и мнение о том, что польская женщина рядом с русским мужчиной способна оказать на него как цивилизующее, смягчающее влияние (как, например, княгиня И. Лович – на Великого князя Константина Павловича), так и, напротив, по-

губить, сделав его поклонником всего польского или католического – т. е. вылепить из него полонофила. Словосочетание „прекрасная и коварная“ в отношении польки можно оценивать как устойчивое языковое и литературное клише, бытующее и по сей день. Следует согласиться с исследователями-литературоведами в том, что на подобные представления оказал весьма сильное влияние образ польки („гордой полячки“) в русской литературе, причем не только романтической.⁸⁰ Полька выступает как обольстительница, способная сделать из мужчины покорного раба, чтобы использовать его в интересах своего народа. Особенно интенсивные обвинения полек в „составлении“ русских в Западном крае обрушились после польского восстания 1863–64 гг. А. Востоков в „Наставлении своему сыну“ (1865) предостерегал: „берегись обольщения какою-либо полькою. В ремесле увлекать едва ли в целом мире найдутся искуснее обольстительных полячек. Для этой цели они неподражаемо искусно умеют притворяться, играть всякие роли. Не верь, русский, этим фокусам-покусам! Все это ловкая игра, все это обман и ложь. Вышедши замуж за русского, польки искусно успевают выведать все тайны, подметить его склонности, порывы, прихоти, слабости... Она будет шпионкою всех твоих действий,... будет передавать об этом сведения ксендзам и своим соотичам – тайным врагам России“.⁸¹

Красота полек воспевалась как в польской художественной литературе и поэзии, так и в заметках путешественников, – вовсе не только русских. „Польки причисляются к идеально красивым европейским женщинам“,⁸² – констатирует Г. Плосс. Приведем довольно типичное мнение о польках А. фон Швейгер-Лерхенфельда, причем сделанное на основании сравнения с западно-европейским (романским) русским (восточно-славянским) типом, так как заметки эти сделаны автором во время его путешествия по Российской империи: „Полька всеми признана одним из европейских идеалов женской красоты. (...) в ней есть нечто ослепительное, особенно в спокойных классических чертах ее лица. Полька гораздо грациознее русской женщины, и изящество ее служит доказательством, что у нее больше вкуса, нежели у последней. В общем, она более нежного сложения, цвет лица прозрачнее и мягче, темные глаза выражают много живости, но в них нет выражения той чувственности, которую мы наблюдаем в голубых глазах северной русской женщины. Польская дама может служить образцом выдающейся расовой красоты, к которой присоединяется природная грация, вообще встречающаяся только у романских женщин“.⁸³

Наиболее характерный перечень черт полек включает фиксацию их красоты и соответствующих им качеств „изысканности“, важных для коммуникации в определенных слоях общества. В русских описаниях обращает на себя внимание частотность упоминания „веселости“ полек, являющаяся отражением этнографического стереотипа поляка в научном дискурсе этой эпохи.⁸⁴ „Польские женщины известны с древних времен своею миловидностью, нередко замечательной красою. Они отличаются многими высокими качествами: остроумны, любезны, всегда веселы, находчивы, решительны, умеют ободрить мужей, они хорошие жены и матери, пользуются большим уважением, почетом и обыкновенно заправляют всеми делами в доме“.⁸⁵ К. А. Скальковский относит к добродетелям полек их „твердый характер,

деловитость и домовитость. Польша со средствами вдвое меньше против нашей русской женщины лучше будет вести свое хозяйство и лучше воспитывает своих детей (...) Легко командует своими мужьями“.⁸⁶ В последнем утверждении нашло отражение бытующее в русской литературе второй половины столетия представление о том, что славянским женщинам (например, полякам, великороссиянкам и малороссиянкам, казачкам) присуща склонность к „управлению“ мужьями, которая, впрочем, не является врожденной, а вызвана слабохарактерностью и безответственностью супругов.

Достоинства и пороки народа, согласно господствовавшим представлениям, в равной степени находят выражение во всех группах – возрастных, социальных, гендерных. Поэтому кроме веселости, в описаниях полек фигурируют и все другие стереотипные определения поляков – такие как „господство сердца над разумом“, пылкость, эмоциональность, глубокая религиозность и „горячая любовь к родине“.⁸⁷ „Поляки – народ храбрый, умный, легко воспламеняющийся, великодушный, красивый“,⁸⁸ – такое общее описание содержится в учебном пособии К. Кюна, в целом резко негативно оценивающего „бунтарскую“ деятельность польских патриотов. Восхищение грацией и миловидностью польских женщин в этом контексте можно трактовать как естественное внешнее выражение характерных особенностей польского национального характера в целом – открытости и эмоциональности.⁸⁹ Любезность, остроумие, решительность интерпретировались как результат врожденных качеств (темперамента) и традиций рыцарской дворянской культуры. Поэтому подобные черты приписывались, как правило, дворянкам.⁹⁰ Многие авторы, чтобы избежать возможных упреков, сознательно разделяли описания представителей разных сословий: „Польское дворянство резко отличается от массы народа. У дворян выразительные физиономии, волосы и глаза темные и часто орлиный нос. У женщин высших классов красивые и интересные лица; они высоки ростом, стройны, волосы у них очень темные, цвет лица нежный; вся их наружность и осанка дышат благородной гордостью“.⁹¹

В связи с этим можно отметить одну закономерность: описания польки-некрестьянки в этнографических очерках содержатся чаще всего в главах и подглавках, касающихся Варшавы и ее жителей. Таким локальным ограничением авторы, во-первых, стремятся нивелировать социальное противоречие – очевидное с точки зрения жанровой чистоты этнографического научного дискурса, и, во-вторых, имеют возможность выразить личные впечатления от польской столицы, жители которой чаще всего оказываются в сфере первоначального знакомства с краем „среднестатистического“ русского путешественника. Так, в географической хрестоматии 1860-х гг. Д. Д. Семенова говорится, что в Варшаве: „можно встретить много красивых женщин, которыми очень славится Варшава, но резкие черты лица и излишняя полнота часто портят польку (...) В обращении мужчин и женщин проглядывает врожденное благородство и уважение“.⁹²

Фактически отождествляет варшавянок с поляками, правда, „образованными“ К. А. Скальковский, хотя его критический взгляд фиксирует скорее негативные, нежели позитивные изменения типичного образа: „Польские женщины (...) в смысле типа варшавянки вырождаются.

Польки по-прежнему отличаются умом и практической деловитостью, почему играют такую же роль в обществе, которая в других странах, даже во Франции, женщинам вовсе не принадлежит, но в наружном отношении (...) красота польских или варшавских женщин понижается”.⁹³ Не разделяет его мнения В.О. Михневич. Описывая варшавских актрис, он утверждает: „Действительно, более очаровательного Олимпа по красоте богинь мне прежде не приходилось видеть (...) По справке все ‘богини’ оказались польками... Все они были довольно плохие актрисы и еще худшие певицы, но одна другой красивее и грациознее”.⁹⁴

Своеобразным развитием мотива о темпераменте поляков, который просматривается как в утверждениях об их возбудимости и неумении владеть своими эмоциями (вплоть до экзальтированности – „не мешало бы польке немного меньше нервности”⁹⁵), так и в упоминаниях их страстности, горячности, способности увлекаться, является оценка женской сексуальности. Авторы-мужчины интерпретируют ее в совершенно очевидных для читателя категориях чувственности и страстности, – в зависимости от позиции автора, оцениваемых негативно или позитивно. Тот же К. А. Скальковский утверждает, что „Польки менее всего сентиментальны; они, напротив, экзальтированы, строптивы и лукавы. Они холодны (...) недостаток полек – жеманство и аффектация”.⁹⁶ Приписывание полякам вообще склонности к внешним эффектам и некой показной экзальтированности находит выражение в обвинении полек в постоянном желании блистать, производить внешнее впечатление („В их характере проявляется много стремления к блеску”.⁹⁷ „Польские дамы очень любят в своем наряде что-нибудь оригинальное, бросающееся в глаза”⁹⁸), что зачастую, по мнению авторов, приводит к цинизму и моральному падению: „Склонности полек к кокетству и желание их блистать и играть роль, тогда как денежные средства, особенно в чиновничьем мире, так скромны, делают то, что эти гордые и неприступные с виду пани только и мечтают, как бы попасть ‘на утешение’ (‘на содержание’ – М. Л.)”.⁹⁹

Еще одной вариацией темы польской эмоциональности является восходящий еще к XVII в. мотив сопоставления поляков с французами. Поляков издавна именовали „французами” Восточной Европы или „северными французами”. Это сравнение активно используется в разного рода европейских характеристиках французов и поляков (француженок и полек в том числе¹⁰⁰). Некоторые российские авторы, склонные к полонофобии, в 1860–80-е гг. неоднократно обращались к рассуждениям о взаимосвязи этой „французской” живости нрава (горячего и одновременно легкомысленного) со „склонностью” к антироссийским „бунтам”. Например, В. В. Макушев пишет о страстности, живости польского характера и той буйной веселости, за которую поляков справедливо именуют „северными французами”.¹⁰¹ Вторит ему и В. О. Михневич: „интеллигентная полька (...) ближе всего напоминает парижанку... В ней та же французская живость, та же кокетливая грация и то же женственное изящество”.¹⁰² Весьма комплиментарно сравнение польских горожанок среднего достатка с француженками у Д. Д. Семенова: „Ни одна женщина в мире, исключая, конечно, француженки, не одевается так к лицу и так просто, как варшавянка. К сожалению, хорошенький наряд покупается днями тяжелой работы и составляет весь идеал, к которому она стремится о котором мечтает”.¹⁰³

Однако исследования показывают, что перед нами, скорее всего польский автостереотип, причем не чисто позитивного характера – здесь уместно вспомнить некоторые характеристики польского национального характера, содержащиеся в заметках самих поляков, служивших, в частности, в Петербурге и не „запятнавших“ своей репутации среди соотечественников-патриотов подозрениями в русофилии. Так, О. А. Пржецлавский в своих воспоминаниях¹⁰⁴ рассуждал о „стихиях народного характера поляков“: „он есть смесь противоположных элементов: славянской беспечности, природной храбрости с французскою способностью (выделено мной – М. Л.) увлекаться первыми впечатлениями“.¹⁰⁵ При этом автор считает поразительное сходство французского и польского темпераментов вовсе не лестным для славян,¹⁰⁶ но „легкомысленные сарматы“ „делали все, чтобы удержаться на этой параллели. От своего образца они перенимали не только язык свободы, нравы, но и все умственное и политическое направление... Сходство с французами распространяется в Польше даже на низшие слои общества. Общественная жизнь в Варшаве, Вильне и других больших городах (...) есть сколок с жизни Парижа. Та же страсть к рассеянной уличной жизни, к публичных сборищам на открытом воздухе, ко всяким шумным увеселениям“.¹⁰⁷ В этом же ключе следует рассматривать рассуждения о сходстве польского и французского национальных характеров русского по происхождению католика-эмигранта В. С. Печерина,¹⁰⁸ которого нельзя отнести к типичным носителям русских этнокультурных стереотипов.

Впрочем, можно отметить также довольно явную взаимосвязь мотива польской – в том числе и женской – „веселости“ с любовью именно варшавян к праздничному времяпрепровождению, которая зачастую оценивается в мужском письме как позитивное качество полек и отличительная особенность досуга в варшавском дамском обществе. Умение варшавян отдыхать и развлекаться „удостоено“ неоднократных упоминаний в записках русских путешественников XVIII–XIX вв., став устойчивым стереотипом.¹⁰⁹ В. Дедлов, как и другие, связывает эту „приятную“ для общения особенность с „женственностью“ истинной польки: „Она стройна и красива, она нравится и хочет нравится. Она, пока молода, имеет такой вид, точно задача ее существования – веселье во что бы то ни стало (...) Полька не знает скучным кавалеров. Она развеселит любого; она не знает скучных собраний: где она, там шутки и смех“.¹¹⁰

Для сравнения обратимся к еще одному нерусскому описанию полек, включенному в географический труд Э. Реклю (который использовал как западноевропейские, польские и российские источники для своих обобщенных этнических характеристик народов): „Если первобытный тип сохраняется лучше всего у женщин, как это утверждают антропологи, то польки, развитые и образованные, ясно показывают своими качествами высокое достоинство расы, к которой они принадлежат: они не только отличаются изяществом манер, умом, постоянной веселостью, даром слова, но обладают также силой самоутверждения, мужеством, быстрой решимостью и живостью мысли; они хранят во всей чистоте и благородстве идеал нации“.¹¹¹ Отметим корректное уточнение автором объекта описания – „развитые и образованные“ польки, что, вероятно, и побудило редакторов русского пе-

ревода к обширному комментарию, касающемуся „типичности“ данного социального варианта этнического образа: „Эти стороны характера польской женщины и ее большее, чем где-либо, влияние на общественную жизнь и нравственность встречаются не только в среде образованных классов общества, но и простом народе; (...) в сословии сельских крестьян (...) явно обнаруживалось преобладание бойкой и живой инициативы женского ума“,¹¹² и далее в качестве аргумента приведено мнение Н. В. Милютина.

Как видим, оценки Э. Реклю, хотя и позитивные, выдержаны в несколько более нейтральном тоне. Можно рассмотреть в связи с этим цитату из довольно популярного в свое время путешествия В. Дедлова, фрагменты которого очень часто включались в этнографические популярные издания „для детей“ и „для народа“.¹¹³ Дедлов цитирует характеристику Реклю, но по ходу несколько видоизменяет ее: „Вероятно, поляки привлекательны для женщин в такой же мере, как польки для нашего брата мужчин, но полька благородней. Вот что говорит о польках Реклю в своей знаменитой географии: если антропологи правы, что первоначальный тип полнее сохраняется в женщине, тогда развитая и образованная полька своими редкими качествами обнаруживает высокое достоинство родной расы: она не только любезна, остроумна, всегда весела и разговорчива, но и преданна, мужественна, решительна и здравомысляща. К сожалению, таким идеалом является полька развитая и образованная, великая редкость в стране“.¹¹⁴ Как видим, он дважды повторяет уточнение „развитая и образованная“, подчеркивая тем самым социальную ограниченность позитивных черт женского образа.

Вернемся к описанию Михневичем варшавянок. Несмотря на избранный автором жанр путевых заметок и живописные экскурсы, его изображение полек выполнено с явной опорой на известные научно-этнографические описания и антропологические классификации – это заметно в лексике, в последовательности изложения. Его попытка выявить гендерные антропологические подтипы свидетельствует о том, что он действительно был знаком с современной научной литературой и стремился представить „максимально объективную“ и научно-обоснованную картину: „Мне бросилось тогда же в глаза подтвержденное потом другими наблюдениями разнобразие типов варшавянки, которые (...) можно разгруппировать на два расовых. Один тип – чисто сарматский, несколько аналогичный кавказским – восточным: черные волнистые волосы, большие черные, огненные глаза, продолговатый овал лица, тонкие черты, тонкий небольшой орлиный нос и стройное, сухоощавое тело. Другой тип – контраст первому – тип чисто славянский: русые волосы, голубые или серые глаза с ‘соболиными бровями’ и чудесными ресницами, нежный цвет лица не совсем правильного, с шаловливым, чуть вздернутым носом, прекрасно-развитый торс и ослепительная белизна кожи. (...) В эти два генерические типа, без сомнения, укладывается множество разновидностей“.¹¹⁵ Таким образом, противопоставляя кавказский расовый тип славянскому, он одновременно выделяет два субэтнических антропологических подтипа, заметных только в женской ипостаси. Такой „научный“ подход также предоставляет ему основания для объяснения причин польской женской притягательности: „не в этом ли (...) – воскликает автор, – смешении противоречащих качеств и недостатков, делаю-

щих самую убогую в нравственном и умственном отношении польку чем-то загадочным?”¹¹⁶ Однако К. А. Скальковский довольно строго „комментирует“ этот вывод Михневича, усматривая в этой „этнической классификации“ отчетливую социальную подоплеку, которая в некотором смысле является подтверждением известной вариации сарматской теории – так наз. „теории завоевания“: „Первый тип встречается чаще у аристократок, второй – в массе народа. В первом типе давно находили сходство с восточным... второй тип приближается к славянскому; (...) (он – М. Л.) демократический, ибо подглавлявшие носы всегда отличают отсутствие в женщинах породы“.¹¹⁷

Малороссиянки

В российских репрезентациях разного рода – в том числе и визуальных – в XIX в. малорусы (малороссы) представляли как смуглолицые и румяные, черноглазые и черноволосые, статные, дородные, с обликом, „исполненным жизненной энергии и силы“.¹¹⁸ Аналогичные „типы“ малороссов фигурировали в качестве персонажей художественной „малороссийской“ литературы „народного“, этнографического характера (украинско- и русскоязычной) – особенно многочисленной в 1830–60-е гг.¹¹⁹ В них женские образы всегда занимали значимое место, способствуя формированию украинского этностереотипа, в том числе и гендерного,¹²⁰ в русском сознании.

Этнографические очерки второй половины XIX в. часто включали описания малороссиянок (именуемых „хохлушками“ – в отличие от „казачек“), напрямую заимствованные из беллетристики или составленные на основании литературных произведений (прежде всего Н. Гоголя, а также повестей и пьес таких малороссийских авторов как П. Гулак-Артемовский, Е. Гребенка, Г. Квитка-Основьяненко – в которых отчетливо проявлялась сатирическо-юмористическая тональность). Если в начале XIX в. описания „малороссийских красавиц“ составлялись без учета их сословной принадлежности – в их число попадали социально „неопределенные“ представительницы провинциального общества („Женщины здесь очень миловидны, почти все с томными и вместе пламенными глазами, в которых чувствительность души и сердца так ясно изображается. Природа положила на лицах их печать любви и нежности“,¹²¹ – писал князь П. И. Шаликов в 1803 г.), то во второй половине столетия эталон женского этнического типа – в строгом соответствии с этнографическими установками – формировался исключительно на примере низших социальных слоев.

Следует отметить, что образ „простого малороссиянина“ – „хохла“ функционировал в российских этнографических описаниях на протяжении всего XIX в. и комплекс внешних примет, существовавших до научно-антропологической реконструкции, вовсе не является плодом одной лишь украинской романтической литературы.¹²² Определяющую роль играло характерное для украинофильских деятелей, начиная еще с Н. И. Костомарова и П. А. Кулиша, стремление „описать через отличия“ – то есть обозначить своеобразие малоруса и великоруса (в том числе и антропологическое¹²³ и „нравственное“) посредством их сравнения, в то время как аналогичные по-

иски идеального великоруса, как правило, оказывались безуспешными – в связи с большим количеством вариаций типа.¹²⁴

Любопытно, что метод такого сопоставления в описании „русских“ Российской империи (т.е. восточнославянских этнических групп) отличает и западноевропейские очерки. Можно предположить, что это связано концепцией единого русского народа – в этом случае иностранный наблюдатель сам должен был установить очевидные различия между малорусами и великорусами, интерпретируя их как региональные, а не этнические, используя при этом наиболее удобное объяснение несходства „северной“ и „южной“ разновидностей „русского этноса“, и, кроме того, включая сопоставление с поляками. „Малорусская женщина – гораздо более живого и горячего темперамента, нежели ее северная сестра (великороссиянка – М. Л.) и по внешности более напоминает собой женщин южного типа. Оно большого роста, стройна, с темными, выразительными глазами и темными волосами... Формы тела так стройны и изящны, что невольно напоминают собою польских женщин.... горячее чувство или пылкая страсть (...) часто овладевает душой южно-русской женщины“,¹²⁵ – пишет А. фон Швейгер-Лерхенфельд.

Согласно научным взглядам эпохи, внешние черты, как уже говорилось, всегда отражают свойства народного нрава и наоборот, что позволяет по визуальному наблюдению делать выводы о национальных качествах народов. Поэтому признаки красоты и „довольства“, которые можно считать типичными в этнографических очерках о малорусах, являются важными показателями их благополучия и добродетельности. Представителей малорусского племени отличает также физическая выносливость и „крепость“. Малороссиянкам приписывается красота, живость и веселость (последнее свойство отличает их от мужчин, которые, по мнению наблюдателей, угрюмы, неразговорчивы и склонны к хандре – стереотипные качества нрава малорусского крестьянина),¹²⁶ а также бесспорная „статность и грациозность“.¹²⁷ При этом авторы подчеркивают, что женская „живость не переходит в бабность и нескромность“.¹²⁸

Малороссиянки – так же, как и польки, описываются в категориях красоты и физической сексуальной привлекательности – в первую очередь в связи с внешней „яркостью“, здоровьем, телесной „пышностью“, ассоциируемой с „востоком“. О женской красоте „хохлушек“ упоминается, например, в „Живописной России“. Автор очерка об Украине при этом подчеркивает, что малороссийская женщина отличается от другой русской красавицы-сестры: „Украинка совсем не похожа на свою великорусскую сестру – лебедушку белую“.¹²⁹ Это несходство связано прежде всего представлениями об отличительных особенностях жителей „юга“, в том числе и Российского: невысокий рост, телесная „крепость“, витальность, темный цвет глаз и волос, выразительность черт лица, стройность и гибкость стана. Но эти приметы пылкого темперамента и живости „природного склада“ казались в то же время признаками чувственности, что могло быть почвой для „злоупотреблений“ в нравственной сфере. Отсюда – настойчивое стремление авторов оградить читателей от поспешных выводов. Так, некоторые авторы вступаются за репутацию малороссийских девушек, давая „этнографическое“ объяснение ложному мнению: „об украинских девушках сложилось убеждение, что они

будто бы рано лишаются целомудренности. Но это – ошибка. Причиной ложного мнения о малорусской девушке является обычай, не существующих у великорусов – это ‘вечорницы’”.¹³⁰

Еще одним характерным примером может служить следующее заключение, в котором „хохлушки“ сравниваются с польками: „Малороссиянки одарены всею тою прелестью обхождения, которую так прославляют в польках, но превосходят их в искренности и прямоте, чужды их навязчивого кокетства и никогда не теряют власти над собой даже в минуты самого страстного увлечения”.¹³¹ В этой „двойной“ оценке славянских женских типов отчетливо выражены не столько эстетические или гендерные предпочтения конкретного автора, сколько проявлено стремление указать на большую этническую близость (и потому „безопасность“) восточной славянки „южного типа“. Некоторые другие особенности характера малороссиянок (верховенство над мужчинами, решительность и др.) связываются с более высоким (вплоть до лидерства), нежели у великорусов, правовым и семейным статусом женщины.

Образ малороссиянки в этнографических описаниях Российской империи в целом можно определить как положительный, особенностью этих гендерно-этнических характеристик является, на наш взгляд, отсутствие прямых описаний. Большая часть довольно скупой, по сравнению, например, с очерками великорусской или польской женщины, информации дается на фоне двойного сравнения. В подавляющем большинстве „русских“ (восточнославянских) репрезентаций доминирует сравнительный способ изложения – в форме перечня сходств и различий двух или трех этносов между собой. В этом случае в центре внимания оказывается внешность женщин и ее положение в семье и обществе. Авторы утверждают, что малороссиянки более свободны („менее угнетаемы“), чем великороссиянки, пользуются большими правами и авторитетом, принимают заметное участие в общественной и национальной жизни, а также редко оказываются в роли забытых и беспомощных „рабынь“ мужа.¹³²

Второе сопоставление присуще только малороссийским очеркам: характер, образ жизни и способности женщин поданы как отличающие их от нрава, темперамента и видов деятельности мужчин. Этим сравнением, которое оказывается не в пользу мужчин-малороссов, пронизано изображение этнического нрава в очерке П. П. Чубинского и в главах „Живописной России“. При этом речь идет не только о гендерных вариациях этнического типа, но, в сущности, о противопоставлении мужского и женского „психотипов“ и характеров. Несмотря на сентиментальность и „задумчивость“ обоих, женщину легче довести до слез, она более „чувствительна“ и жалостлива.¹³³ Кроме уже упоминаемой веселости (противопоставляемой „хохлацкой угрюмости“), малороссиянке приписывается и другая черта, оцениваемая как признак „духовной силы“: она еще более, чем мужчина, „упарта“ и оттого менее подвержена упадку духа – не впадая в уныние, столь типичное для малоруса, она одна выносит все выпадающие на долю семьи тяготы, являясь не только главой семьи, но и опорой всего сообщества (во время войн и бедствий).¹³⁴ Женщины малороссийского племени, в отличие от мужчин, в полной мере наделены способностями и желанием вести торговлю, а по-

тому у них развита сметливость и предприимчивость, полностью отсутствующая в мужском типе.¹³⁵

Гораздо более негативно оценивается различие между мужским и женским типами в области морали: П. П. Чубинский утверждает однозначно, что „малорусская женщина положительно стоит выше мужчины во всех отношениях“.¹³⁶ Мужчина ленив и медлителен,¹³⁷ женщина работяща и „быстра“: „малорусская женщина работает вдвое больше мужчины“.¹³⁸ Часто упоминаемое чувство юмора – как типичная черта малорусов – в женском варианте проявляется более деликатно: „тон женской речи большей частью добродушно-наивный. Шутка женщины не резка, и в речи ее, как и на лице, всегда отыщется оттенок грусти“.¹³⁹

Наиболее характерно чертой, отличающей описание полек от очерков о малороссиянках, является, безусловно, отчетливо выраженные сословная (в первом случае) и гендерная (во втором) типизация этнических образов.

Сербки

Описания сербок не включены в народоописания этносов Российской империи, и потому содержатся главным образом в путевых заметках, мемуарах и репортажах из Сербии, однако в 1890–1900-е годы они постепенно складываются в цельные научные очерки, создаваемые по уже разработанному в русской этнографии образцу.

Обратимся сначала к западноевропейским характеристикам. Например, Францу Шереру сербки очень нравятся: „особенно в городах Сербии встречаются часто очень изящные женские фигуры; между ними попадаются лица с самыми тонкими чертами и часто действительно поразительной красоты. Живые темные глаза, темные волосы, удивительно бледный и притом с южным оттенком цвет лица, щеки, подернутые нежным румянцем, придают такому лицу нечто необыкновенно благородное; если ко всему этому представить себе безупречную фигуру такой красавицы, одетую в национальный костюм, весьма выгодно выделяющий мягкими линиями стройные формы тела, то получается прелестная картина“.¹⁴⁰ Не столь вдохновлен женской красотой сербского этнического типа Э. Реклю, безусловно признающий мужскую привлекательность сербов; женщины в его описании, напротив, „не обладают красотой, но имеют благородную осанку и их полувосточный костюм отличается удивительной гармонией цвета“.¹⁴¹ Сдержан в оценках А. фон Швейгер-Лерхенфельд: „Несмотря на свое пониженное положение в семействе, сербка весела и энергична, очень любит пение... Относительно внешности сербки можно заметить, что истинные красавицы между ними не слишком часты. В городах, правда, встречаются иногда безупречно прелестные, правильные лица, но (...) в деревне они грубее и резче“.¹⁴² Наибольшего восхищения удостоились „прекрасные карие глаза сербок“ и их „прекрасные темные волосы“, фигура же произвела впечатление „плотной“ и потому недостаточно подвижной и грациозной.¹⁴³

Российские характеристики сербок – независимо от позиций и взглядов авторов – отличает некоторая дистанцированность наблюдателей

от объекта описания. Неверно было бы определять эту дистанцию как обусловленную „чуждостью“ культуры – напротив, в очерках постоянно подчеркивается племенное и конфессиональное родство, а также признание в явной симпатии и духовной близости сербам (которые, вероятно, следует объяснять славянофильскими идеями и мотивами солидарности с сербами во время русско-турецкой войны).¹⁴⁴ Однако некая отстраненность в нраво-описаниях в целом все-таки присутствует.

Как и во всех других характеристиках гендерных вариантов этнического типа, наиболее пристальное внимание привлекает внешний облик сербок, с непеременными оценками женской привлекательности. Одним из наиболее квалифицированных в этнографическом отношении специалистов по славяно-балканскому региону был, безусловно, П. А. Ровинский. Но и его детальный антропологический очерк не лишен мужской пристрастности: „В Белграде много красивых женщин, в особенности девушек. Вот вам тип: правильный профиль, тонкие черты лица, большие глаза – черные или темно-голубые, спокойно глядящие через бархатные ресницы из-под тонких смежных черных бровей; лицо белое как мрамор, и редко увидишь на нем игру румянца; как мрамор, оно холодно и неподвижно. (...) Вечно потупленный взгляд и какая-то неподвижность в лице молодой сербской женщины как будто скрывает тайну ее мыслей и желаний, и отнимает у него жизнь и выражение. Вся она тонкая и стройная, но грудь впалая, в движении неловкость и вялость. Такая красота проходит очень рано: вскоре после замужества“.¹⁴⁵ „Карие глаза и черные волосы, – разделяет такое мнение К. А. Скальковский, – их красят, но плотная и неловкая фигура и недовольно белая кожа их портит; они не отличаются оживлением...“¹⁴⁶

Столь приятная мужскому взгляду русских наблюдателей польская и малороссийская „живость“ и „бойкость“ в Сербии не находит воплощения в женском облике – он кажется как бы „скованным“, „зажатым“ – объясняемой жесткими (вероятно, под влиянием строгой патриархальности и мусульманства) нормами поведения в обществе чужих мужчин. Красота сербок бесспорна.¹⁴⁷ Вторит П. А. Ровинскому еще один другой русский путешественник: „Женщины красивы, но красота эта представляет что-то слишком однообразное и неоживленное; слишком мало игры физиономии на женских лицах“.¹⁴⁸ Грации лишены и движения сербок: „Говорят, что красивые женщинами Сербия значительно богаче, чем соседняя Черногория, но зато они, подобно сербам, лишены той легкости и эластичности движений, которые свойственны черногорке. Относительно своих наружных преимуществ сербка занимает среднее положение между северной славянкой, романкой и гречанкой“.¹⁴⁹

Такое восприятие легко объяснить, обратившись к центральному и признаваемому наукой той эпохи принципу изоморфности в изображении „физиогномических“ отличий этнического типа и образа жизни народа. Наиболее часто констатируемой особенностью положения сербской женщины в общине (задруге) и обществе является ее полная зависимость от мужчины, воспитываемая в ней покорность. Несмотря на общие для мужчин и женщин такие свойства национального характера как мужество и выдержка, в семейной и общинной жизни женщины эти качества остаются

невостребованными – она не имеет права голоса, а всякое проявление каких бы то ни было чувств к ней со стороны мужчины подвергается осуждению и насмешкам. „Нравы“ сербов в этом отношении оказываются более схожи с кавказскими и мусульманскими народами России, а облик сербской женщины напоминает мусульманско-турецкий эталон прекрасной, но недоступной собственности мужчины-хозяина. Ее главный недостаток – всякое общение для нее полностью исключено, а потому отсутствуют открытые эмоции; самовыражение и какое-либо проявление чувств и мнений исключается. Довольно жесткий и циничный в оценках женских этнических типов К. А. Скальковский отмечает, что в связи с закрытостью и фактически запретом на коммуникацию вне семьи сербки (Далмации) ведут „жизнь живых мертвецов, которые влачат чопорное существование“¹⁵⁰

Как уже указывалось, наиболее эмоциональные оценки такого положения принадлежат авторам-женщинам. Е. Н. Водовозова и Э. К. Пименова, например, употребляют определения „рабская покорность и униженность“, „бесправие“.¹⁵¹ „Пожалуй, ни у одного европейского народа женщина не занимает такого унижительного положения, как в Сербии“,¹⁵² – убеждена Э. К. Пименова. Эта архаично-патриархальное отношение к женщинам и накладывает неизгладимую печать приниженности на ее красоту.

Таким образом, гендерные вариации славянских типов трех разных групп, представленные в российских научных этнических репрезентациях второй половины XIX века, нельзя трактовать как прямое отражение особенностей русского восприятия. Они выстраиваются в соответствии с европейскими традициями изображения этнической специфики, что проявляется, в частности, в некоторых европоцентристских оценках, в усвоенной просвещенческо-романтической дихотомии славянской и германской стихий и классификации этнокультурных типов в категориях севера/юга, запада/востока, цивилизации/дикости и т.д., а также – в общих установках мужского этнографического нарратива. Но в российских этнографических описаниях славянских народов находит выражение собственно национальная специфика восприятия и описания Других. Она заметна в воздействии женских образов и типов художественной литературы вообще и литературы так наз. „этнографизма“ в частности, в бытовании русских этнокультурных стереотипов более раннего времени.

При этом их авторы активно используют общеевропейские установки в изображении женских антропологических типов в категориях красоты/безобразия. Трудно судить о „расовой“ (в современном смысле слова) предубежденности российских наблюдателей, так как мы рассматривали только восприятие ими славян, поэтому следует предполагать, что общая позитивность этого образа вполне может быть обусловлена не этническим, но „племенным“ центризмом (фаворитизмом) позиции. Наконец, конкретные „параметры“ описания внешности и нравственных качеств демонстрируют присущие „дофеминистической эпохе“ гендерные предубеждения авторов с одновременным признанием взаимосвязи внешнего облика с положением женщины в социуме. Кроме того, очевидно, что они содержат в себе многие архаические черты русских этностереотипных визуальных и вербальных репрезентаций в целом, выполненных в жанре сравнительных

народоописаний: условность изображения, акцент на сопоставление, лаконоичность формул и др.

В триаде рассмотренных гендерных образов, репрезентирующих этнические типы западных, восточных и южных славянок, обнаруживается не только их своеобразная иерархия, обусловленная, во-первых, обще-этническими характеристикам этих народов, во-вторых, продиктованная степенью этнокультурной близости. Эта разница в дистанции, на наш взгляд, может быть объяснена в контексте так наз. „колониального“ взгляда наблюдателя и описателя-мужчины. Наиболее позитивными оценками наделены польки – как представительницы западноевропейской культуры, сравниваемые с француженками. Но они и самые далекие на шкале оппозиции свой / чужой. Неслучайно им приписывается коварство и неискренность. Напротив, самыми „близкими“, „своими“ – по вполне очевидным причинам этнокультурного родства – для русских наблюдателей оказываются малороссиянки. Их внешний облик, с одной стороны, воспринимается авторами этнографических очерков как эстетически, эмоционально и сексуально более привлекательный (они наделены приметами „южных“ женщин), однако постоянно акцентируемые высокие нравственные качества, особенно заметные в сравнении с недостатками мужской этнической ипостаси малороссиянина, выступают доказательством их „безопасности“ и потенциальной эмоциональной, душевной близости и надежности. Наименее отчетлив образ сербки. Ее физическая красота, некоторое сходство со стереотипным изображением „восточных дев“ (турчанок, „одалисок“¹⁵³), должно было бы привести к некоторой общности в оценках и описаниях их нрава. Однако этого не произошло. Сербки изображаются как чрезмерно закрытые (вплоть до забитости) „славянские рабыни“ мужчин, что не позволяет отождествить их со стереотипным образом восточных женщин, доминировавшим в западноевропейском расовом дискурсе эпохи. В их характеристиках прочитывается гораздо более сходства со знакомой русским наблюдателем кавказско-мусульманской культурой, недоступность и нравственная чистота женщин в которой не ставится под сомнение. Это – иной „восток“ и несколько иной гендерный ориентализм. Вместе с тем на восприятие и описание русскими авторами этнических типов их женском воплощении оказали влияние не декларируемые, но просматривающиеся сословные различия: полька всегда в сословно-культурном и образовательном отношении ближе, нежели крестьянка-сербка. Хотя многие наблюдатели отдают себе отчет в том, что в Польше существует – так же, как и в России, – огромная дистанция между дворянским и крестьянским женскими типами красоты и характера.

Таким образом, можно констатировать, что в российских народоописаниях второй половины XIX в. гендерные образы избранных славянских народов подчиняются общим принципам их характерологии. Изображение внешнего облика женщин ограничивается кругом оценочных суждений, касающихся „красоты“ лица и телодвижений, которые формируются в дискурсе так наз. „мужского письма“ (исключение составляют сочинения женщин), играя лишь дополнительную роль в репрезентации этничности. По-прежнему заметны архаические элементы нравоописаний – такие как

изоморфизм внешних признаков и нравственных свойств, а также принцип пространственно-географической обусловленности этих элементов национального нрава / характера. При этом последний, климатический, фактор проявляется в двух видах: как природно-хозяйственные основания и как символически-образный контекст рассуждений. Славянские женщины в соответствии с романтическими установками выступают, с одной стороны, как носительницы европейского начала, противопоставленного германской стихии, а, с другой, подвергаются дифференциации на основании выделения „южных“ и „северных“ типов, причем в различных областях сопоставления эти предписанные им образы могут варьироваться. В целом не вызывает сомнений факт, что данные описания в гораздо большей степени отражают стереотипы и бытующие в европейском сознании суждения о Других народах Европы, нежели сугубо русский взгляд или национальное восприятие этнокультурных особенностей поляков, сербов и малороссиянок. Они продиктованы общеевропейскими и романтическими русскими традициями этнических репрезентаций-нарративов.

Примечания (Endnotes)

- 1 Мыльников А. С. Картина славянского мира: взгляд из Восточной Европы. Этногенетические легенды, догадки, протогипотезы XVI – начала XVIII века. СПб., 1996; Он же. Картина славянского мира: взгляд из Восточной Европы. Представления об этнической номинации и этничности XVI – начала XVIII века. СПб., 1999.
- 2 Мыльников А. С. Картина славянского мира: взгляд из Восточной Европы. Представления об этнической номинации и этничности. С. 149–179.
- 3 Вульф В. Изобретая Восточную Европу: карта цивилизации в сознании людей Просвещения. М., 2003.
- 4 *Boemus I. Omnium gentium mores, leges et ritus. 1520*; пер. на англ. яз.: *Boemus I. The Fardles of Facions...* of J. Boemus by W. Warerman. Edinburgh, 1611; *Barclay I. Icon animorum. London, 1614*; пер. на англ. яз.: *Barclay J. The Mirror of Minds. London, 1634*; *Besoldus Ch. De natura populorum et de linguarum ortu atque immutatione. Tubingen, 1619* и др.
- 5 См., например: Байбури А. К. Некоторые вопросы этнографического изучения поведения // Этнические стереотипы поведения. Л., 1985. С. 7–18; Чеснов Я. В. Этнический образ // Этнознаковые функции культуры. М., 1991. С. 58–85; Соколовский С. В. Этнографические исследования: идеал и действительность // Этнографическое обозрение. 1993. № 2–3; Соколовский С. В. Этнография как жанр и как власть // Этнометодология: проблемы, подходы, концепции. Вып. 2. М., 1995. С. 133–147; Куприянов П. С. Представления о народах у российских путешественников начала XIX в. // Этнографическое обозрение. 2004. № 2. С. 21–38 и др.
- 6 Саид Э. В. Ориентализм. Западные концепции Востока. СПб., 2006; Вульф В. Изобретая Восточную Европу: карта цивилизации в сознании людей Просвещения. М., 2003.
- 7 Лескинен М. В. Поляки и финны в российской науке второй половины XIX в.:

- „Другой“ сквозь призму идентичности. М., 2010. С. 102–113.
- 8 Подробнее об этом: *Лескинен М. В.* От „натуры“ к „гению“: традиции нравоописания европейских народов XVI–XVIII вв. // Текст славянской культуры. К юбилею Людмилы Александровны Софроновой. М., 2011. С. 431–448.
 - 9 *Barclay J.* The Mirror of Minds. Ch. 3.
 - 10 *Мосс М.* Техники тела // *Мосс М.* Общества. Обмен. Личность. Труды по социальной антропологии. М., 1996; *Бурдые П.* Начала. М., 1994.
 - 11 *Халдеева Н. И.* Антропозстетика. Опыт антропологических исследований. М., 2004. С. 5–6.
 - 12 *Marwich A.* Beauty in history. 1988; *Липовецкий Ж.* Третья женщина. СПб., 2003. Ч. 2. Гл. 1.
 - 13 *Fulemle A.* Dress and Image: Visualizing Ethnicity in European Popular Graphics – Some Remarks on the Antecedents of Ethnic Caricature // Images of the Other in Ethnic Caricatures of Central and Eastern Europe / Ed. by D. Demski and K. Baraniecka-Olszewska. Warsaw, 2010. P. 30–41.
 - 14 *Leerssen J.* The poetics and anthropology of national character. 1500–2000 // Imagology. The cultural construction and literary representation of national characters. A critical survey edited by M. Beller and J. Leerssen. Studia Imagologica. Vol. 13. Amsterdam, NY, 2007. P. 63–75; *Вишленкова Е. А.* Визуальная антропология империи, или „увидеть русского дано не каждому“. Препринт WP6/2008/04. М., 2008. Гл. 1–2.
 - 15 „Краткое описание пребывающих в Европе народов и их свойств“ опубликовано в: *Kopelew L.* Fremden bilder in Geschichte und Gegenwart // Russen ind Russland aus deutschen Sicht 9–17. Мюнхен, 1985). Текст и анализ памятника на рус. яз. см.: *Мыльников А. С.* Картина славянского мира: взгляд из Восточной Европы. Представления об этнической номинации и этничности. С. 176–179. Детальный разбор таблицы представлен в работах: *Stanzel F. K.*: Europder. Ein imagologischer Essay. Universitdsverlag C. Winter, Heidelberg, 1997. Первая известная „таблица“ народов помещена в сочинении доминиканского монаха Иоанна Зана (*Zahn J.* Specula physico-mathematico-historica notabilium ac mirabilium sciendarum Vol. 1–3. Nurnberg, 1699). Подр. о нем: *Leerssen J.* The poetics and anthropology of national character. 1500–2000 // Imagology. P. 68–69.
 - 16 *Fulemle A.* Op. cit. P. 45–47.
 - 17 *Вишленкова Е.* Визуальное народоведение империи, или „увидеть русского дано не каждому“. М., 2011. С. 139–144; *Лескинен М. В.* Поляки и финны. С. 102–104.
 - 18 *Курганов Н.* Российская универсальная грамматика, или Всеобщее письмословие, предлагающее легчайший способ основательного учения русскому языку, с семью присовокуплениями разных учебных, полезнозабавных вещей. СПб., 1769.
 - 19 Исследователями источников, используемых Н. Г. Кургановым (он не скрывал своих прежде всего компиляторских задач) обнаружено главное сочинение, из которого составитель непосредственно позаимствовал таблицу свойств народов – многократно переиздававшаяся на протяжении полутора веков „Полная грамматика французского языка“ Ж.-Р. де Пеплие (точная дата неизвестна, незадолго до 1689 г.) (*Рак В. Д.* „Присовокупление второе“ в „Письмовнике“ Н.Г. Курганова // XVIII век. Сб. 12. Радищев и литература

- его времени. СПб., 1977. С. 209). Можно с высокой степенью уверенности предположить, что в грамматику оно попало, в свою очередь, как обработка или переделка по образцу уже упомянутой „доски народов“ (Volkertafel) – „Краткого описания пребывающих в Европе народов и их свойств“.
- 20 Здесь и далее цитирование по изданию: *Курганов Н.* Присовокупление II // *Курганов Н.* Письмовник, содержащий в себе науку российский язык. М., 1837. С. 353.
- 21 *Вишленкова Е.* Визуальное народоведение империи. С. 107–117.
- 22 *Лескинен М. В.* Поляки и финны. С. 37–48.
- 23 Подробнее об этом: Там же. Гл. 1.
- 24 Там же. С. 116–118. Истории интерпретации расовой теории в российской физической антропологии XIX века посвящена монография: *Могильнер М.* Ното Imperii. История физической антропологии в России. М., 2008, однако некоторые заключения автора представляются нам не достаточно убедительными. Среди новых публикаций о содержании понятия „раса“ в российской науке XIX в. следует упомянуть также: *Тольц В.* Дискурсы о расе: имперская Россия и Запад в сравнении // „Понятия о России“. К исторической семантике имперского периода. М., 2012. С. 145–193; *Холл К.* „Расовые признаки коренятся глубже в природе человеческого организма“: неуловимое понятие расы в Российской империи // Там же. С. 194–258.
- 25 Однако многие ученые полагали, что заключения, сделанные на основании количественных методов и „интуитивных“ способов, совпадают (подр. об этом: *Лескинен М. В.* Поляки и финны. С. 109–111).
- 26 В частности: Программа для этнографического описания губерний Киевского учебного округа, составленная по поручению Комиссии, высочайше утвержденная при Университете святого Владимира, действительными членами Князем В. Д. Добижею и (по языку) А. А. Метлинским. Киев, 1854; Известия ОЛЕАЭ при Императорском Московском Университете. Т. XXVII. Антропологическая выставка. Т. I. М., 1878; Программа для собирания этнографических сведений, составленная при Этнографическом Отделении ОЛЕАЭ. М., 1887; Программа для собирания сведений по этнографии. Императорское русское географическое общество // Живая старина. 1890. № 1. Раздел II. С. XLVII–LII.
- 27 Например: *Шульгин В.* Историческое исследование о состоянии женщин в России до Петра Великого. Киев, 1850; *Забелин И. В.* Древняя русская литература. Женщина по понятиям старинных книжников // Русский вестник. 1857. № 9; *Мосолов А.* Русское воспитание в женских типах нашей литературы // Светоч. 1860. № 3; *Макушев В.* Сказания иностранцев о быте и нравах славян. СПб., 1861; *Добряков А.* Русская женщина в домонгольский период. Историческое исследование. СПб., 1864; *Ровинский П. А.* Из истории славянских женщин // Неделя. 1869; *Веселовский А.* Из истории развития личности. Женщина и старинные теории любви (1872). СПб., 1912; *Мниховский А.* Женственность. Киев, 1885; *Котляревский А. А.* Женская красота по понятиям славянских и германских племен // *Котляревский А. А.* Собрание сочинений в 6-ти тт. Т. 4. СПб., 1895. С. 693–701; *Шашков С. С.* Исторические судьбы женщины // *Шашков С. С.* Собр. соч. в 2-х тт. СПб., 1898. Т. 1; *Астафьев П. Е.* Психологический мир женщины, его особенности, превосходство и недостатки. М., 1899 и др. Несколько особняком в этом ряду стоит весьма своеобразное сочинение Скальковского, получившего большой резонанс в

- русском обществе из-за жестко-ироничной позиции автора по „женскому вопросу“: Скальковский К. А. О женщинах: мысли старые и новые. СПб., 1886.
- 28 Тодоров Ц. Раса и расизм // Новое литературное обозрение. 1998. № 34. С. 8.
- 29 Аргументация в: Лескинен М. В. Поляки и финны. Гл. 9.
- 30 Например, в: Богданов А. П. Антропологическая физиогномика // Русская расовая теория до 1917 г. Сборник оригинальных работ русских классиков / Под ред. В. Б. Авдеева. В 2-х вып. Вып. 1. М., 2004. С. 139–141; Котляревский А. А. Указ. соч.
- 31 Красота // Мужики и бабы. Мужское и женское в русской традиционной культуре. Иллюстрированная энциклопедия. СПб., 2005. С. 279, 280.
- 32 Семенова-Тян-Шанская О. Жизнь „Ивана“. Очерки быта крестьян одной из черноземных губерний // Записки ИРГО по отделению этнографии. Т. 39. СПб., 1914; Семенов С. Т. Двадцать пять лет в деревне. Петроград, 1915. С. 40–43; Ожегов М. И. Характеристика своего народа. По вопросам Программы исследований литературы для народа Н. А. Рубакина // Чтение в дореволюционной России. Вып. 1. М., 1992. С. 135–142.
- 33 Репрезентативной квинтэссенцией наиболее типичных, но не претендующих на научность, суждений по этому вопросу, представляет собой упомянутая книга Скальковского (Скальковский К. А. О женщинах...).
- 34 Подробная библиография проблемы и некоторые обобщения историографических позиций даны в: Могильнер М. Указ. соч. С. 6–18; Knight N. Ethnicity, Nationalism and the Masses: *Narodnost'* and Modernity in Imperial Russia // Russian Modernity: Politics, Knowledge, Practices. NY, 2000. P. 58.
- 35 Тодоров Ц. Указ. соч. С. 8–9; Соколовский С. В. Расизм, расиализм и социальные науки в России // Расизм в языке социальных наук. СПб., 2002. С. 31–44.
- 36 Слѣзкин Ю. Арктические зеркала. Россия и малые народы Севера. М., 2008. Гл. 3–4.
- 37 Подробно об этом: Лескинен М. В. Поляки и финны. Гл. 5, гл. 7-1.
- 38 Kilpeläinen J. I. Rotuteoriat läntisistä suomalais-ugrilaisista kansoista Keski-Euroopan antropologiassa 1800-luvulla ja suomalaisten reaktiot niihin // Mongoleja vai germaneeja? – rotuteorioiden suomalaiset / Toim. Kemiläinen A., Hietala M., Suvanto P. Helsinki, 1985. S. 163–194.
- 39 Инородцы Казанской губернии // Отечественноеведение. Россия по рассказам путешественников и ученым исследованиям. Учебное пособие для учащихся. В 6-ти тт. / Сост. Д. Д. Семенов. СПб., 1866–1870. Т. V. Великоорусский край. СПб., М., 1869. С. 210.
- 40 Вишленкова Е. Визуальное народоведение. С. 95–116.
- 41 Подробнее о полемике по вопросу о происхождении великорусов и их этническом и антропологическом типе – в статьях: Найт Н. Империя на просмотре: этнографическая выставка и концептуализация человеческого разнообразия в пореформенной России // Власть и наука, ученые и власть. Материалы международного научного colloquium. СПб., 2003. С. 437–457; Лескинен М. В. Великоороссы/великорусы в российской научной публицистике (1840–1890) // Славяноведение. 2010. №6. С. 3–17.
- 42 В русском переводе: Швейгер-Лерхенфельд А. фон Женщина. Ее жизнь, нравы и общественное положение у всех народов земного шара. Пер. с нем. М. И. Мерцаловой. СПб., 1889.

- 43 Плосс Г. Женщина в естествоведении и народоведении. В 3-х тт. СПб., 1898–1900. На русском языке вышло 6 изданий, последнее – в наше время (см. сноску 45).
- 44 Штрац К. Расовая женская красота. М., 2003.
- 45 Цит. по: Плосс Г. Женщина в естествоведении и народоведении. В 3-х тт. Сыктывкар – Киров, 1995. Репринт. изд. Т. 1. С. 84.
- 46 Там же.
- 47 Богданов А.В. Указ. соч. С. 133.
- 48 Штрац К. Введение // Штрац К. Расовая женская красота. М., 2003.
- 49 Там же.
- 50 Плосс Г. Указ. соч. С. 59–60.
- 51 Там же. С. 67–72. В контексте анализа народоописаний следует обратить внимание на эти черты противопоставления мужчин и женщин – ими в этнографических текстах, начиная с эпохи Просвещения, наделяются два европейских „племена“ – германцы и славяне (т.е. этническая оппозиция совпадает с дихотомией мужского и женского начал).
- 52 Там же. С. 85.
- 53 Там же. 99–101.
- 54 Шенк Б. Ментальные карты. Конструирование географического пространства в Европе со времени эпохи Просвещения // Новое литературное обозрение. 2001. № 6(52). С. 42–61. О процессе „регионализации“ Европы см. обзор Е. Сюча (Сюч Е. Три исторических региона Европы // Центральная Европа как исторический регион. М., 1996. С. 147–265).
- 55 О механизмах переориентирования ментальных карт в XVIII – начале XIX вв. с оппозиции юг/ север на запад / восток см., например: Вульф Л. Изобретая Восточную Европу. М., 2003; Шенк Б. Указ. соч. С. 42–48.
- 56 Сауд Э. Указ. соч.; Lewis R. Gendering Orientalism: race, femininity and representation. Routledge, 1996. P. 12–52.
- 57 Подробно об этой традиции в Европе и России см., в частности: Богданов К. Климатология русской культуры. Prolegomena // Новое литературное обозрение. 2009. № 99. Текст доступен по адресу: <http://magazines.russ.ru/nlo/2009/99/bo7.html>
- 58 Подробнее об этом см.: Лескинен М. В. Поляки и финны. Гл. 8.
- 59 См., например, Григорович Д. В. Нравы и обычаи разных народов. СПб., 1860; Природа и люди. Курс географии, содержащей описание частей света в физическом, этнографическом и политическом отношениях. В 2-х вып. СПб., 1868–1869 / Сост. и изд. А. Павловский. сочинения Э. Реклю, „Живописная Россия“, „Народы России. Этнографические очерки“. Подтверждением этому может служить также коллекция вырезок журнальных и газетных статей из фонда М. Д. Хмырова в ГПИБ, в котором теме „Женщина у древних и новых народов“ посвящены три объемных тома, а собрание „Женщина в России“ состоит из двух томов (Государственная публичная историческая библиотека. Фонд М. Д. Хмырова). О месте и роли истории женщин в историографии позитивизма см., в частности, краткую характеристику основных тенденций в: Пушкарева Н. Л. Русская женщина: история и современность. М., 2002. С. 11–23.
- 60 Реклю Э. Европейская Россия // Реклю Э. Земля и люди. Всеобщая география. В 19-ти тт. СПб., 1877–1896. Т. V. Вып. II. СПб., 1883. Стлб. 105.

- 61 *Пиетров-Эннкер Б.* „Новые люди“ России. Развитие женского движения от истоков до Октябрьской революции. М., 2005. С. 47–75.
- 62 *Михайловский Н. К.* Борьба за индивидуальность (1876) // *Михайловский Н. К.* Полное собрание сочинений. В 6-ти тт. СПб., 1911–1913. Т. 1. СПб., 1911. С. 422–593.
- 63 *Женщина* // Энциклопедический словарь Ф. А. Брокгауза и И. Е. Ефрона. В ХLI тт. (82 полутт.) / Под ред. Е. И. Андреевского. СПб., 1890–1907. Т. 22 (п/т XI а). СПб., 1894. С. 873–888. Подробная и наиболее полная библиография „женского вопроса“ во второй половине столетия приведена в: *Пушкарёва Н. Л.* Указ. соч.
- 64 *Ефименко А. Я.* Исследования народной жизни. Обычное право. М., 1888; *Водовозова Е. Н.* Жизнь европейских народов. В 3-х тт. СПб., 1875–1883; *Она же.* Как люди на белом свете живут. СПб., 1897–1904. Вып. 1–10; *Пименова Э. К.* Сербия. Историко-этнографический очерк. СПб., 1908; *Витте Е. И.* Путевые впечатления: Далмация, Герцеговина, Босния и Сербия. Лето 1902 г. Киев, 1902; *Семенова-Тян-Шанская О.* Указ. соч. и др.
- 65 *Лескинен М. В.* Теории племенной и национальной характерологии в русской славистике XIX в. // *Славистика в центральноевропейском контексте.* М., РГГУ (в печати).
- 66 *Рябов О. В.* „Матушка-Русь“. Опыт гендерного анализа поисков национальной идентичности России в отечественной и западной историософии. М., 2001. С. 23–30.
- 67 *Анучин Д. Н.* О задачах этнографии // *Этнографическое обозрение.* 1889. Вып. 1. С. 10.
- 68 *Ламанский В. И.* Об историческом изучении Греко-славянского мира в Европе. СПб., 1871. С. 69–74.
- 69 Пример этнографического обоснования такого рода содержится в упомянутой выше работе австрийского автора: *Швейгер-Лерхенфельд А. фон* *Женщина...* М., 1998. С. 561–563.
- 70 Об этом, в частности: *Зенкин С. Н.* Французский романтизм и идея культуры. Аспекты проблемы. М., 2001; *Шёнле А.* Подлинность и вымысел в авторском самосознании русской литературы путешествий. 1790–1840. СПб., 2004; *Мочалова В. В.* Миф Европы у польских романтиков // *Миф Европы в литературе и культуре Польши и России.* М., 2004. С. 129–146; *Лескинен М. В.* Миф Европы и Польша в „Записках“ В. С. Печерина // Там же. С. 161–181. Как верно отмечает В. Мильчина, объяснение особенностей образа жизни разных (чужих для описателя народов и племен) осуществлялось при помощи классификации черт „южан“ и „северян“, и во многих подобных сочинениях заменяло категорию национальности (*Мильчина В.* Сентиментальный национализм и многообразная русификация (Круглый стол „национализм в имперской России: идеологические модели и дискурсивные практики“, 2002 г.) // *Ab Imperio.* 2002. №2. С. 537–539).
- 71 *Andrew J.* Women in Russian Literature. 1780–1863. NY, 1988.
- 72 *Буле О.* Заметки о споре между *la brune et la blonde* в эпоху романтизма // *Концепция и смысл. Сборник статей в честь 60-летия проф. В. М. Марковича.* СПб., 1996. С. 28–47.
- 73 Там же. С. 30.
- 74 *Лескинен М. В.* Понятие „нрав народа“ в российской этнографии второй поло-

- вины XIX в. Описание малоросса в научно-популярной литературе и проблема стереотипа // *Украина и украинцы: образы, представления, стереотипы. Русские и украинцы во взаимном общении и восприятии. М., 2008. С. 67–94; Она же. „Малороссийская народность“ в российской науке второй половины XIX века. Проблемы этнографического описания // Русские об Украине и украинцах. СПб., 2012. С. 244–283.*
- 75 *Mosse G. L. Nationalism and Sexuality. Middle Class Morality and Sexual Norms in Modern Europe. L., 1985; Lewis R. Op. cit.*
- 76 См., в частности, статьи раздела „Island of the Sea of Others“ в сборнике: *Images of the Other.*
- 77 Подр. аргументация см: *Лескинен М. В. „Прекрасная поляка“ в русском воплощении: эволюция этногендерных стереотипов в образах и нарративах второй половины XIX в. // Россия – Польша: два аспекта европейской культуры. Царское село, 2012. С. 334–346; Она же. Гендерные особенности польского этнического типа в российских народоописаниях второй половины XIX в. // Amicus Poloniae. Памяти Виктора Хорева. М., 2014. С. 214–229.*
- 78 *Хорев В. А. Стереотип Польши и поляков в русской литературе накануне и после национально-освободительного восстания 1830 г. // Хорев В. А. Польша и поляки глазами русских литераторов. Имагологические очерки. М., 2005. С. 35–59.*
- 79 *Kukołowić T. Szacunek dla kobiety i starszego człowieka, umiłowanie dziecka // Wartości w kulturze polskiej. Lublin, 1993. S. 223–227; Prokop J. Kobieta Polka // Słownik literatury polskiej XIX wieku / Pod. red. J. Bachórzea i A. Kowalczykowej. Wrocław. 2002.*
- 80 *Duszenko K. Polak i Polka w oczach Rosjan // Narody i stereotypy. Kraków, 1995. S. 158–164; Левкиевская Е. Е. Стереотип русско-польской любви в русской литературе XIX–XX вв. // Россия – Польша. Образы и стереотипы в литературе и культуре. М., 2002. С. 192–200; Мочалова В. В. Образ Марины Мнишек в историографии и литературе // *Studia polonica. К 70-летию В. А. Хорева. М., 2002. С. 372–397; Сараскина Л. „Гордая полячка“ в русской истории // Dusza polska i rosyjska. Spójrzanie współczesne / Pod red. A. de Lazari. Łódź, 2003. S. 140–149.**
- 81 Цит. по: *Левкиевская Е. Е. Стереотип русско-польской любви. С. 193.*
- 82 *Плосс Г. Указ. соч. С. 102.*
- 83 Цит. по: *Плосс Г. Указ. соч. С. 103–104. Интересно отметить, что в русском переводе немецкоязычного оригинала сочинения А. фон Швейгер-Лерхенфельда 1882 года в данном фрагменте сравнение с „северной русской женщиной“ снято – скорее всего, редактором российского издания. (Швейгер-Лерхенфельд А. фон Указ. соч. М., 1998. С. 636.)*
- 84 *Лескинен М. В. Поляки и финны. Гл. 6-2.*
- 85 *Пуцыкович Ф. Ф. Поляки. СПб., 1899. С. 11*
- 86 *Скальковский К. А. Несколько дней в Варшаве // Скальковский К. А. Новые путевые впечатления. СПб., 1889. С. 61–132. С. 84.*
- 87 *Лескинен М. В. Поляки и финны. Гл. 6-1.*
- 88 *Кюн К. Народы России. СПб., 1888. С. 54.*
- 89 *Варшава // Отечествоведение. Т. 4. Восток и Запад (Сибирь и Западный край). СПб., 1867. С. 187–189; Пуцыкович Ф. Ф. Указ. соч. С. 11; Сно Е. Э. На за-*

- падных окраинах. Поляки и литовцы. (Серия „Рассказы о родной стране и ее обитателях“). СПб., 1904. С. 10; *Водовозова Е. Н.* Поляки // *Водовозова Е. Н.* Как люди на белом свете живут. Чехи – поляки – русины. СПб., 1905. С. 126–127.
- 90 Поляки (Народы России. Этнографические очерки) // *Природа и люди*. 1878. №4. С. 1.
- 91 Поляки // *Народы России. Живописный альбом*. В 2-х вып. СПб., 1877–1878. Вып. 1. СПб., 1877. С. 58.
- 92 Варшава. С. 188–189.
- 93 *Скальковский К. А.* Несколько дней в Варшаве. С. 84–85.
- 94 *Михневич В. О.* Варшава и варшавянки. Наблюдения и заметки. СПб., 1881. С. 50.
- 95 *Дедлов В. (В. Л. Кигн) У поляков* // *Дедлов В.* Вокруг России. Польша – Бессарабия – Крым – Урал – Финляндия – Нижний. Портреты и пейзажи. СПб., 1895. С. 7–95. С. 20.
- 96 *Скальковский К. А.* Несколько дней в Варшаве. С. 84, 86.
- 97 Варшава. С. 189.
- 98 Поляки // *Народы России*. С. 60.
- 99 *Скальковский К. А.* Несколько дней в Варшаве. С. 87.
- 100 *Швейгер-Лерхенфельд А. фон* Указ. соч. С. 537–539; 636.
- 101 *Макушев В.* Поляки в России // *Голос*. 1873. № 160. 11 июня / 23 июня. С. 1–3. С. 2.
- 102 *Михневич В. О.* Указ. соч. С. 51.
- 103 Варшава. С. 189.
- 104 *Пржецлавский О. А.* Калейдоскоп воспоминаний // Поляки в Петербурге в первой половине XIX века / Сост., предисл., подготовка текста воспоминаний О. А. Пржецлавского и коммент. А.И. Федуты; пер. воспоминаний С. Моравского, Т. Бобровского и А.-Г. Киркора с пол. Ю. В. Чайникова. М., 2010. С. 29–168. На русском языке фрагменты этих воспоминаний публиковались в 1872, 1874, 1876 и 1873 гг. на страницах „Русского архива“ и „Русской старины“ (Там же. С. 733), а потому Макушев вполне имел возможность ознакомиться с самыми ранними заметками еще до сотрудничества с „Голосом“.
- 105 Там же. С. 35.
- 106 Там же. С. 140.
- 107 Там же. С. 140–141.
- 108 *Лескинен М. В.* Миф Европы и Польша в „Записках“ В. С. Печерина.
- 109 *Свирида И. И.* О гедонистической ипостаси топоса Варшавы // *Studia Polonica*. К 70-летию В. А. Хорева. М., 2002. С. 398–408.
- 110 *Дедлов В.* Указ. соч. С. 19, 20.
- 111 *Реклю Э.* Европейская Россия. Стлб. 710.
- 112 Там же.
- 113 Подробный анализ путешествия В. Дедлова по Польше см.: *Хорев В. А.* „Польский вопрос“ в России после восстания 1863 г. // *Хорев В. А.* Польша и поляки глазами русских литераторов. С. 78–101.
- 114 *Дедлов В.* Указ. соч. С. 19.

- 115 Михневич В. О. Указ. соч. С. 50.
- 116 Там же. С. 51.
- 117 Скальковский К. А. О женщинах. С. 269.
- 118 Лескинен М. В. Понятие „нрав народа“ в российской этнографии второй половины XIX в. Описание малоросса в научно-популярной литературе.
- 119 Александровский И. С., Лескинен М. В. Указ. соч.
- 120 Левкиевская Е. Стереотип украинца в русском сознании // Украина и украинцы. С. 154–176.
- 121 Другое путешествие князя П. И. Шаликова в Малороссию. М., 1804. С. 4.
- 122 Так пишет, анализируя работы первого десятилетия XX в., написанные украинским антропологом Г. Вовка, М. Могильнер (Могильнер М. Homo Imperii. История физической антропологии в России. М., 2008. С. 294).
- 123 Екельчик С. Человеческое тело и национальная мифология: некоторые мотивы украинского национального возрождения XIX века // Ab Imperio. 2006. № 3. С. 23–54.
- 124 Подробнее об этом: Лескинен М. В. Поляки и финны. С. 105–111; Она же. Великороссы /великорусы в российской научной публицистике (1840–1890) // Славяноведение. 2010. № 6. С. 3–17.
- 125 Цит. по: Плосс Г. Указ. соч. С. 104. Здесь снова необходимо оговориться, что в русском переводе текста Швейгер-Лерхенфельда глава о русских (российских) женщина полностью отсутствует. Издатель А. Ф. Девриен помещает на ее место статью В. И. Немировича-Данченко, аргументируя необходимость замены тем, что „внутреннее понимание нашей женщины, каким владеет русский читатель, конечно, недоступно иностранцу, хотя бы и ученому“ (Предисловие // Швейгер-Лерхенфельд А. фон Указ. соч. С. VI).
- 126 Руководство к изучению русской земли и ее народонаселения. По лекциям М. Владимирского-Буданова сост. и издал преподаватель гимназии во Владимирской киевской военной гимназии А. Редров. Киев, 1867. С. 261.
- 127 Очерк I. Малороссийское племя. С. 6.
- 128 Руководство к изучению русской земли и ее народонаселения. С. 324.
- 129 Очерк I. Малороссийское племя // Живописная Россия. Отечество наше в его земельном, историческом, племенном, экономическом и бытовом значении. Под ред. П. П. Семенова. В 12-ти тт. Т. 5. Малороссия, Подолия и Волынь (Полтавская, Черниговская, Волынская, Херсонская и Киевская губернии). Ч. 1. СПб.-М., 1897 (автор – Д. Л. Мордовцев). С. 6.
- 130 Там же. С. 16.
- 131 Тихорский Н. Повесть А. Кузьмича „Казаки“ (СПб., 1843). Рецензия // Маяк. 1843. Кн. XXIV. Гл. IV. С. 75–147. С. 110.
- 132 Очерк I. Малороссийское племя. С. 9, 19.
- 133 Там же. С. 9.
- 134 Там же. С. 16.
- 135 Там же.
- 136 Чубинский П. П. Труды этнографическо-статистической экспедиции в западно-русский край, снаряженной Императорским Русским географическим обществом. В 7-ми тт. СПб., 1872–1874. Т. 7. Вып. 2. СПб., 1872 (пагинация выпусков – сплошная). С. 354.

- 137 Очерк I. Малороссийское племя. С. 8.
138 Там же. С. 19.
139 Там же. С. 8.
140 Плосс Г. Указ. соч. С. 102.
141 Реклю Э. Земля и люди. Всеобщая география. В 19-ти тт. СПб., 1898–1901. Кн. 1. Т. 1. СПб., 1893. Стлб. 250.
142 Швейгер-Лерхенфельд А. фон Указ. соч. С. 632.
143 Там же.
144 Некоторые главные тенденции в описании сербов в источниках данного жанра проанализированы в работах А. Л. Шемякина. В частности: *Шемякин А. Л.* Относительность самооценок: сербский крестьянин глазами русских путешественников // *Славянский мир в глазах России*. М., 2011. С. 175–194.
145 *Ровинский П. А.* Белград. Его устройство и общественная жизнь // *Русские о Сербии и сербах* / Сост., подготовка к изданию, введение и заключительная статья А. Л. Шемякина, комментарии А. А. Силкина, А. Л. Шемякина. СПб., 2006. С. 59.
146 *Скальковский К. А.* О женщинах. С. 280.
147 *Мураневич А. Й.* Русско-балканский торговый вопрос // Там же. С. 280; *Вейнберг Р.* Сербь и Сербия (Этнографический очерк) // Там же. С. 471.
148 *Мещерский В. П.* Правда о Сербии. Письма. Письмо одиннадцатое // Там же. С. 158.
149 *Вейнберг Р.* Указ. соч. С. 471.
150 *Скальковский К. А.* О женщинах. С. 277.
151 *Водовозова Е. Н.* Как люди на белом свете живут. Болгары, сербы, черногорцы. СПб., 1898. С. 105–125.
152 *Пименова Э. К.* Указ. соч. С. 19.
153 *Саид Э.* Указ. соч.

Резиме

Др Марија Лескинен

Карактерологија Словена у руској интерпретацији: начини представљања родних одлика „етнички другог“ у другој половини XIX века

Кључне речи: руска етнографија XIX века, словенске студије, национални карактер, родни типови, имагологија, антропоестетика

У чланку се разматрају основне тенденције етнокултурних представа (описивање спољашности и карактера) *другог* код словенских народа у руским етнографским радовима XIX века. Анализирани су теоретски ставови и пракса европског етнографског дискурса тог доба. У центру пажње се налазе особине родних образаца трију словенских етничких типова (Западних, Источних и Јужних Словена на примеру Пољакиња, Малорускиња и Српкиња) у контексту општих представа о природи националне специфичности. Приказана је и специфична хијерархија образаца, која је условљена општеетничким карактеристикама словенских народа и диктирана степеном њихове етнокултурне блискости.

"TURN TO THE LEFT" IN CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY FROM THE LATE 1950S TO 1962

Abstract: This article explores the radicalization process of China's foreign policy from the late 1950s to 1962. It argues that the initiative for foreign policy radicalization was very much founded in domestic politics, particularly since the key role was exercised by the overt struggle inside the CPC leadership over the results of the Great Leap Forward.

Key words: China's diplomacy, radicalization, border conflict

As the study of the Chinese foreign policy deepens, questions such as the change of Chinese foreign policy from 1959 to 1962 and its impact on the later foreign policy of China have become focal points for the Chinese academic community. Emphasizing the unprecedented severe domestic and international milieus facing China on the juncture of 1962, recent studies in China point out the co-existence of the unceasing incidents surrounding China and the changing domestic political situation, and try to analyze these phenomena against the backdrop of change in Chinese foreign policy, asserting that these phenomena, indeed, had huge impact on the diplomacy of China.¹ One question should be raised and answered explicitly: whether these two phenomena were correlated and whether they influenced each other? Further on, in terms of influencing Chinese foreign policy, which factor was of more determining effect? It seems to be insufficient to merely enumerate the phenomena and describe these processes. In the light of the queries existing in the previous studies, this article aims at discussing the features of the interactions between the continuously changing international milieu and the domestic politics in China during the period, while singling out the impetus of change in Chinese foreign policy, as well as pointing out the historical niche of this change in the development of Chinese foreign policy during the 1960s.

1 Zhang Baijia, "Biandong zhong de guoji huanjing yu zhongguo duimei zhengce", pp. 190–91; and Li Jie, "60 niandai zhongguo guonei jushi de bianhua yu zhongmei guanxi", pp. 264–70, both in Jiang Changbin and Robert S. Ross eds. *1955–1971 nian de zhongmei guanxi – huanhe zhiqian: lengzhan chongtu yu kezhi de zai tantao*, Beijing: Shijie zhishi, 1998.

Turmoil of the 1950s

This article argues that the Chinese foreign policy underwent changes in the year of 1962, as it was the turning point towards the “left”. First of all, we need to clarify what were the basic features of the so-called leftist Chinese foreign policy, for the conceptions of “left” and “extreme left” had different definitions under various political circumstances. During the Cold War era, in Chinese politics, “left”, to put it simply, meant to pursue goals which were beyond the time or higher than the ones that were realistically possible. When extended to the domain of Chinese foreign policy, the so-called “left” or “extreme left” foreign policy included the following four basic characteristics:

First, in theoretical dimension, it held a dogmatic position toward Lenin’s doctrine of “time”, while simply asserting that the world is “in a time when capitalism and imperialism are moving toward destruction, and socialism and communism are striding toward victory,” and therefore does not acknowledge the possibility of maintaining peace for a long period of time.²

Second, it exaggerated China’s position and influence in world politics, manifested in “China as a revolution center” theory, such as proclaiming China as “the focus of the world contradictions and the center of the world revolutionary storm,” and so on.³ “China as a revolution center” theory reflected Chinese leaders’ strategic thinking on the important issues such as China’s position and influence in world politics. From a deeper perspective, it was more or less involved with the “Chinese Centralism” view in the history of China.

Third, it put so-called proletarian internationalism in a supreme position, therefore denying the paramount status of national interests in making and implementing foreign policies, declaring the “proletarian internationalism” to be “the highest guiding principle” of Chinese foreign policy.⁴

Fourth, in terms of specific policy domains, it adopted strategies such as “to strike enemies with two fists” (*liang ge quan tou da ren*), and “to make attacks in all directions” (*si mian chu ji*).

The second thesis, very much related to the first one, supposes that the Chinese foreign policy was undergoing a fundamental change in the early 1960s. Since the proposing of the “Five Peaceful Co-existence Principles” in 1954, the Chinese foreign policy had ushered in a process of smooth development more than before. However, this momentum had not lasted for too long before it was interrupted by the unfolding of two events, which were going to ultimately re-mold the direction of Chinese foreign policy. These two events were the deterioration of the Sino-Soviet alliance and the unleashing of the “Great Leap Forward” movement.

Since the late 1950s, the Sino-Soviet alliance had experienced an all-round decline. One of the key issues was the relationship between the one who

2 Lin Biao, “Renmin zhanzheng shengli wansui”, *People’s Daily*, September 3, 1965; Lin Biao, “Zai shoudu renmin jinian shiyue geming wushi zhounian dahui shang de jianghua”, November 7, 1967; Lin Biao, “Zou shehui zhuyi daolu, haishi zou ziben zhuyi daolu?”, August 15, 1967.

3 Lin Biao, “Renmin zhanzheng shengli wansui”; “Zhongguo gongchandang zhongyang weiyuanhui tongzhi”, *People’s Daily*, May 17, 1966.

4 “Zhongguo gongchandang bajie zhongyang weiyuanhui di shiyi ci quanti huiyi gongbao”, *People’s Daily*, August 14, 1966.

led (the Soviet) and the one who was being-led (China), which took shape during the formation of the Sino-Soviet alliance. This kind of situation could no longer continue due to the jolt of Poland and Hungary incidents in 1956. The change in such a relationship manifested itself through the following two aspects:

First, capitalizing on the severe crisis the Soviet Union was facing due to the incidents in Poland and Hungary, the Chinese leadership compelled the Soviet leaders to change their way in dealing with the inter-state relations within the Socialist bloc by releasing the *Manifesto Concerning Developing and Further Strengthening the Basis of Friendship and Cooperation between the Soviet Union and Other Socialist Countries*, in which the Soviet Union was forced to acknowledge previous mistakes when dealing with other socialist countries.⁵ Second, China's role had risen up within the Socialist bloc, and in particular, China's influence had been ostensibly strengthened, which was demonstrated by the Chinese leaders' activities during the Moscow Conference in November 1957.

Chinese leadership might have believed that there was no longer a relationship of leading and being-led between China and the Soviet Union.⁶ Previous Soviet relationship with other countries inside the Socialist camp, especially in its relationship with China, often characterized as the "cat-mouse relationship" and "father-son relationship", had been fundamentally changed.⁷ Therefore, Chinese leaders could no longer withstand the arrogant attitude of the Soviet Union and they rebuked it as the repeating of mistakes of the Stalin period. For example, Mao complained the "now again (you are) doing what Stalin has done" when the Soviet side raised the suggestion to establish the "joint fleet" and "long-wave radio station" in spring 1958, Mao complained that "now [you are] doing what Stalin did".⁸

The Sino-Soviet alliance was a giant and crucial cornerstone of Chinese foreign relations at the time. Once such a cornerstone was shaken, there would be an overall instability in Chinese foreign relations, and even in Chinese domestic politics, which would be demonstrated by later history. Chinese leaders might not have expected the extent to which the deterioration of the Sino-Soviet alliance would have impact on China.

Soon after the deterioration of the Sino-Soviet alliance, there emerged a tendency of fundamental change in the Chinese domestic policy. Two important events happened in China from the spring of 1957 to 1959. One was the so-called "mizhu zhengfeng" (the Democratic Rectification) in the spring of 1957, aim of which was to resolve the contradictions between the masses and some party cadres through "democratic rectification". Another was the Great Leap Forward

5 Pei Jianzhang, ed., *Zhonghua renmin gongheguo waijiao shi, 1949-1956*, Vol. 2, Beijing: shijie zhishi chubanshe, 1994, pp. 37-38, 61-62; *Zhou Enlai nianpu, 1949-1976*, Vol. 2, 1997, pp. 630-31; Mao Zedong, "Xi qu lishi jiaoxun, fandui daguo shaowen zhuyi", September 18, 1956, *Mao Zedong waijiao wenxuan*, Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian, 1994, pp. 251-262.

6 Yang Kuisong and Chen Jian, "Mao Zedong yu zhongsu tongmeng de xingshuai", pp. 359-360; Li Jie, "Cong jiemeng dao polie: zhongsu lunzhan de qiyin", p. 442, in Li Danhui ed., *Beijing yu Mosike: cong lianmeng zouxiang duikang*, Guangxi: Guangxi shifan daxue chubanshe, 2002.

7 On the terms of "Father-Son Party Relationship" and "Cat-Mouse Party Relationship", see Mao Zedong, "Tong sulian zhuhua dashi youjin de tanhua", July 22, 1958, *Mao Zedong waijiao wenxuan*, p. 324.

8 Mao Zedong, "Tong sulian zhuhua dashi youjin de tanhua", July 22, 1958, p. 331.

launched in 1958, with an aim of accelerating the steps of modernization of Chinese economy and trying to outpace the Western powers such as Britain and the U.S. and achieve communism in China in the shortest possible period.

Both the Democratic Rectification and the Great Leap Forward ended as a great debacle. The former directly caused the anti-rightists struggle, intensifying the social contradictions, whereas the latter led to three years of catastrophic economic recession, and significantly aggravated the tense atmosphere within the Chinese Communist Party. Particularly, by the summer of 1959 it had become evident that the Great Leap Forward could not be carried on any more. Opinions to correct the mistakes of the Great Leap Forward were voiced within the Chinese leadership. Mao Zedong, however, refuted all critical opinions within the party as "rightist", and regarded the emergence of different opinions as "the continuance of the life and death struggle between the two antagonistic classes".⁹ Marshall Peng Dehuai, who fought shoulder to shoulder with Mao for more than twenty years, was brought down completely.

It is worth noting that almost at the same time Sino-Soviet relations were also slipping into crises. Believing that Khrushchev's talk about the communes in Poland in July 1959 was an insinuation about the People's Communes Movement, Mao Zedong virtually made up his mind to publicly split with the Soviet Union. Khrushchev's talk, which was published in *Neibu cankao* (*Internal References*) for the CCP leadership and was regarded as a hint at attacking the people's communes, in the eyes of Mao, echoed Peng Dehuai's criticism at home and was aimed at hitting at him personally while he was already down. In autumn 1959, no later than spring of 1960, Mao promptly ordered to strike the "opposition and suspicion factions" close to the Soviet Union, while he was even considering to publish Khrushchev's "anti-communes" speech in the *People's Daily*,¹⁰ which was ultimately not put into circulation when other leaders disagreed with this idea.¹¹

Khrushchev probably did not quite understand Mao's wrath. After his visit to the United States, Khrushchev came to Beijing in hope of persuading Mao to go along with Soviet foreign policy. At the National Day reception on September 30, Khrushchev could not help hinting to Chinese leaders that they needed to revise their foreign policy.¹² During the meeting with Chinese leaders, Khrushchev criticized that China had adopted a policy of "adventurism" regarding the Taiwan Strait in summer 1958 and the Sino-Indian border conflict in summer 1959.¹³ Mao, repugnant by Khrushchev's criticism, condemned him as a "rightist opportunist," and claimed that the Soviet Union "is afraid of two things: one is imperialism,

9 Mao Zedong, "How to Treat the Revolutionary Masses Movements", August 15, 1959; "The Origins of Machinegun and Trench Mortar and Others", August 16, 1959, in *Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao*, Vol. 8, pp. 447, 451.

10 Mao Zedong, "Guanyu yanjiu renmingongshe wenti de piyu", July 29, August 1, 1959, in *Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao*, Vol. 8, pp. 390–92. Mao Zedong, "Guanyu dui renmingongshe jinxing diaocha yanjiu wenti gei Wu Lengxi, Chen Boda, Hu Qiaomu de xin", August 9, 1959; "Guanyu zhuyi fabiao guowai duihua pinglun wenti de piyu", May 4, 1959, *ibid.*, pp. 462–463, 504.

11 Wu Lengxi, *Shinian lunzhan*, Vol. 1, Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1999, p. 204.

12 Alan J. Day, ed., *China and the Soviet Union, 1949–1984*, London: The East Press, 1985, pp. 14–15.

13 "Qiansulian guojia xin pilu de youguan 1959–1962 nian zhongyin guanxi wenxian", *Dangshi yanjiu ziliao*, Vol. 8, 1998, pp. 19–20; Li Yueran, *Waijiao wutai shang de xinzhongguo linxiu*, Beijing: Waiyu Jiaoxue, 1994, pp. 160–64.

and another is communism in China."¹⁴ In fact, this Sino-Soviet summit became a turning point in the Sino-Soviet alliance towards eventual rift.

As the Great Leap Forward was unfolding, situation in the Chinese neighborhood began to deteriorate since the summer of 1959. Chinese border conflict with India intensified, two sides went into military conflict along the Longjiu and Gongkashan passes in August, thus creating an explosive situation along the Sino-Indian border. In a way, the Sino-Indian border conflict was a harbinger of the process of deterioration in China's relations with its neighbors. In the summer of 1960, the Sino-Soviet border also became restless. Meanwhile, the situation in Indochina became tense due to the turmoil in Laos, especially after America evidently strengthened her direct intervention into the region.

Seriously concerned with this situation, Chinese leaders believed that "now the international anti-China tide is on the rise", while Mao said that the forces of "imperialism", "revisionism", and "reactionaries" were all involved.¹⁵

Revision of course since the early 1960s

Starting from November 1959 to the first half of 1960, Chinese leadership spent quite a lot time on discussing "international issues" in order to decide how to comprehend and respond to the deteriorating strategic environment.¹⁶

It did not take that long, however, for the Chinese leaders to decide to adopt firm principles of response. At the Standing Committee Meeting of the CCP Politburo presided by Mao Zedong during January 7–17 1960, Chinese leadership concluded that "new initiatives should be adopted vigorously in order to create a new situation in foreign policy."¹⁷ Soon afterwards, the CCP Politburo also convened several more times and it discussed specific ways of policy implementation. Pragmatism re-emerged in Chinese diplomacy soon after that.

First of all, in terms of Sino-Soviet relations, Chinese leaders were not only determined to avoid the split, but also to strive to "reach a unity based on new foundations."¹⁸ This is why the Chinese, after several months of disputes with the Soviet Union, even after the poignant clash at the Bucharest Conference and the withdrawal of all Soviet experts from China, still reached an understanding with the Soviet leaders at the Moscow Conference of 81 Communist Parties and Workers' Parties in December 1960, that is, "to confer together on anything that

14 Mao Zedong, "Guanyu guoji xingshi de jianghua tigang", in *Dangshi yanjiu ziliao*, Vol. 8, 1998, pp. 19–20; Yu Zhan, "Yici bufunchang de shiming", in *Xinzhongguo waijiao fengyun*, Beijing: Shijie zhishi, 1994, p. 18.

15 Wu Lengxi, *Shinian lunzhan*, Vol. 1, p. 234.

16 The situation concerning these discussions still cannot be verified by the archives. However, some important publications have disclosed that many discussions of this kind had been carried out. For instance, we can find this in both *Zhou Enlai nianpu* (The Chronology of Zhou Enlai) Vol. 2 and Wu Lengxi, *Shinian lunzhan* (A Decade of Polemics) Vol. 1, which thus provide important hints.

17 Wu Lengxi, *Shinian lunzhan*, Vol. 1, p. 248.

18 *Ibid.*, p. 241.

may come up so as to avoid conflict.”¹⁹ The bilateral relations were improved after a follow-up state visit to the Soviet Union by the Chinese Chairman Liu Shaoqi.

When deciding to “create a new situation in foreign policy,” Chinese leaders also had to find ways to resolve the Sino-Indian border conflict. At the meeting of the Standing Committee of the Politburo in January 1960, Chinese leadership outlined the guidelines regarding the peaceful resolution of the Sino-Indian border disputes and it proposed to reach a compromise with India through “mutual understanding and mutual concession” (*huliang hurang*), that is, “we are to make some concessions, as long as India does too.” It was decided at the same meeting that Zhou Enlai should visit New Delhi to negotiate with the Indians in person.²⁰ Meanwhile, Chinese troops stationed along the Sino-Indian border received an order to adopt measures in order to avoid opening fire, patrolling, putting down rebellions, hunting, conducting military exercise, and making explosions within the area of twenty kilometers from the line of actual control, so as to avoid possible military clashes with Indians.²¹

After the meeting, Zhou Enlai started preparing for the visit to India, and he worked out *The Proposal Concerning the Border Issue Meeting between the Premiers of China and India (Draft)* that suggested to defuse tensions, but also not to be afraid of a delayed resolution, while setting the goal of this visit to be one of “further relaxation” of the bilateral relations and “preparing conditions” for a peaceful resolution of the border issues in the future.²² After Zhou’s visit to India in April, the situation along the Sino-Indian border cooled down.

Chinese leaders had a thorough discussion of the border issues with all neighboring countries at a January meeting, when they set up basic guidelines to resolve border issues through negotiations step by step and as quickly as possible. The rough order was to try to resolve the Sino-Indian border issue first, while trying to resolve the border issues with North Korea and Mongolia as quickly as possible, and to accelerate the pace of resolving the border issues with Burma, Nepal, and Laos. It was concluded that the border issues with Vietnam, because of its ongoing war against America could be temporarily put aside. China had the longest borderline with the Soviet Union and the problems were also very complicated, but still China should try to resolve them.²³ Factually, as Zhou Enlai was preparing for his visit to India, China also started resolving her border issues with other neighboring countries.

China’s policy toward Indochina was also facing the pressure of adjustment, as the tensions went up. Two problems were on the table. One was whether to support the military struggle by the Vietnam Worker’s Party (the VWP) in South Vietnam, and another was how to solve the Laos crisis. Comparatively speaking, at the time Chinese leaders were more occupied by the Laos crisis. China’s persistent stance and efforts on the peaceful resolution of the Laos crisis during this period may better reflect the main characteristics of China’s Indochina policy. During this

19 “Huigu yu sikao – yu zhongsu guanxi qinlizhe de duihua”, in Li Danhui, *Beijing yu mosike: cong lianmeng zouxiang duikang*, p. 474.

20 *Ibid.*, p. 248.

21 Lei Yingfu and Chen Xianyi. *Tongshuaibu canmou de zhuihuai*, Nanjing: Jiangsu wenyi chubanshe, 1994, p. 219.

22 *Zhou Enlai nianpu*, Vol. 2, p. 302.

23 Wu Lengxi, *Shinian lunzhan*, Vol. 1, p. 248.

period, China was active in bringing together the Geneva Conference to resolve the Laos crisis and Beijing played an important role in the final signing of the *Neutral Statement Concerning Laos* and its related agreements.²⁴

Under pressure of the dramatic changes in the situation in South Vietnam in 1959 and 1960, the VWP's leaders began to change their strategic guideline for strengthening the construction in the North and striving for peaceful unification.²⁵ A policy of strengthening the military struggle in the South was established at the Third National Congress of the VWP in September 1960.²⁶ This policy change of the VWP confronted China with a very complex situation. China clearly declared before that the VWP should put forward as its prime task the consolidation and construction of the North, while adopting in the South "a guideline of long-term lurk, accumulation of strength, contacting the masses, and waiting for the opportunity."²⁷ Now, however, China had to make a choice between the contradictory policy goals of maintaining peace in Indochina and preventing large-scale American military intervention on one hand and supporting its traditional ally on the other.

China promptly expressed her support of the VWP's effort to strengthen the armed struggle in the South.²⁸ On the other hand, however, China did not want the leaders of the VWP to completely rule out the option of a political resolution, precisely it did not want the scale of war in South Vietnam to become too large to bring about a large-scale American military intervention. Beijing stressed again and again that Hanoi should adopt a "flexible strategy", and "combine political struggle with military struggle."²⁹ Up until mid-1961, China still publicly declared that it supported Vietnam's struggle to "strive for the peaceful unification of the motherland" according to the Geneva agreements.³⁰

Even when the United States was observed as prone to escalating intervention in Indochina, Chinese leaders still made an effort to break the stalemate in Sino-American relations. Although such an effort was a very limited probe, it could, in a sense, demonstrate Chinese leaders' determination in adjusting Chinese foreign policy.

At the standing committee meeting of the CCP Politburo in January 1960, Chinese leaders also outlined a guideline for handling Chinese relations with the United States: "To talk but not in haste, to talk but not to break." That is to continue to negotiate with the Americans and not to break off the talks and also not to establish diplomatic relations with the U.S. in haste.³¹ Mao Zedong himself showed interest in

24 *Jiejue laowo wenti de kuoda de rineiwa huiyi wenjian huibian*, Beijing: shijie zhishi chubanshe, 1962, pp. 2-11.

25 Shi Yinhong, *Meiguo zai yuenan de ganshe he zhanzheng*, 1993, pp. 66-75.

26 On the changes in the VWP policy, see Shi Hongyin, *ibid*.

27 Guo Ming, ed., *Zhongyue guanxi yanbian shinia*, Guangxi renmin chubanshe, 1992, pp. 66-67.

28 "Yuenan gemin he jianshe de xin lichengbei", *People's Daily*, September 12, 1960.

29 Yang Kuisong, *Mao Zedong yu yinduzhina zhanzheng*; Li Danhui, ed., *Zhongguo yu yingduzhina zhanzheng*, Hongkong: tiandi tushu chubanshe, 2000, p. 36; Guo Ming, *Zhongyue guanxi yanbian sishi nian*, p. 67.

30 "Zhou Enlai zhongli zai huanying yuenan Fang Wentong zongli de guoyan shang de jianghua", June 12, 1961, in *Zhonghua renmin gongheguo duiwai guanxi wenjianji*, Vol. 8, Beijing: shijie zhishi chubanshe, 1962, p. 181.

31 Wu Lengxi, *Shinian lunzhan*, Vol. 1, p. 247.

a report of January 1960 which analyzed the possible change in the U.S. China policy. The report concluded that the U.S., based on certain reasons, might increase contacts with China in the future, and try to use the Warsaw talks to make further probes.³² Of course, this policy also had something to do with the on-going presidential election in the U.S., which opened a window for the Chinese leaders to understand the American policy towards China.

Zhou Enlai, when meeting British Marshall Montgomery in May 1960, indicated that China was willing to resolve the Taiwan issue peacefully, as long as the U.S. announced that it was willing to withdraw American troops from Taiwan. China and the U.S. could then start negotiations.³³ When meeting American journalist Edgar Snow on August 30, Zhou proposed a more flexible suggestion that the U.S. had to first promise to withdraw its troops, but the problems of when and how to do it could be left for future discussion.³⁴ On October 18, Zhou Enlai again met Snow, expounding on Chinese stances and policies of disarmament, Chinese representation in the U.N., nuclear tests, and the Taiwan issue, and introducing the situation on the Sino-Soviet split.³⁵ Four days later, Mao Zedong again received Snow and discussed with him the presidential debates between Kennedy and Nixon. Mao explicitly told Snow that China would not attack two offshore islands as Jinmen (Quemoy) and Mazu (Matsu) and it "wanted to resolve (the Taiwan issue) through negotiations". He also said that China would not fight the Americans on its own initiatives.³⁶

After J. F. Kennedy was elected, Chinese Ambassador to Poland Wang Bingnan indicated to his American counterpart in the Warsaw talks that China hoped the Kennedy Administration "would make some progress in developing Sino-American relations." His statement, of course, had been approved by the Chinese leadership.³⁷ Soon, Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Yi conveyed the same message while visiting Burma.³⁸

The above mentioned discussion demonstrated that during the first half of 1960, Chinese leaders seriously desired to stabilize Sino-Soviet relations, improve relations with neighboring countries, and create a "new situation in diplomacy," through active promotion of a pragmatic and moderate foreign policy. An important question needs to be further explored: what were the reasons that caused Chinese leaders, including Mao, to reach a consensus in order to promote a pragmatic foreign policy?

An analysis of the disclosed historical materials reveals that Chinese leaders had considered a revision of foreign policy from two aspects. One is the consideration of domestic economic and political programs. They wanted a peaceful international environment so that China could deal with the problems that had emerged and finally accomplish the Great Leap Forward.

32 *Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao*, Vol. 9, pp. 3-6.

33 *Zhou Enlai nianpu*, Vol. 2, pp. 321-323.

34 Edgar Snow, *The Other Side of the River: Red China Today*. New York: Random House, 1962, p. 91.

35 *Ibid.*, pp. 159-61.

36 Mao Zedong, *Tong Si Nuo tan Taiwan wenti ji qita*, October 22, 1960, *Mao Zedong waijiao wenxua*, Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian, shijie zhishi chubanshe, 1994, pp. 448-454.

37 Wang Bingnan, *Zhongmei huitan jiu nian huigu*, Beijing: shijie zhishi chubanshe, 1985, p. 83.

38 *People's Daily*, April 3 and 6, 1961.

Although by summer of 1959 signs had emerged that the Great Leap Forward was doomed to fail, Chinese leaders, including Mao, did not recognize the severity of its consequences. People, especially top leaders were buoyant, even blinded, by the dazzling "victory" of the Great Leap Forward, which was only built on the coxcombical reports of economic performance across the nation.³⁹ At the meeting of the Standing Committee of the Politburo (the SCP) in January 1960, Mao Zedong declared that "the domestic situation is good" and, confident about the prospects of the Great Leap Forward, he suggested that China should strive for peaceful development for about "10, 15 years."⁴⁰

Second, however, Mao came to a very serious assessment about the tendency in international relations. In the meeting of the SCP in Hangzhou in December 1959, Mao claimed that, "the international anti-China tide is rising."⁴¹ Several months later, Mao again raised the "so-called great anti-China tide." In a comment made on a telegram concerning Chinese exhibition in Pakistan, Mao reminded that we had to understand "the nature and meaning of the so-called great anti-China issue," and "be thoroughly psychologically prepared."⁴² In order to fight the anti-China tide, "the centrality of every issue comes down to the fact that we are doing well in our own unity as well as in our own job." Mao claimed that, "if they give us 40 years, there will have been a great change in international situation by then."⁴³ Therefore, Mao and other Chinese leaders did not wish to rule out any disturbance from outside, which became quite severe at the time.

In general, the direction in Chinese foreign policy in this period was by and large determined by the development of domestic situation in China and, to be more specific, by Chinese leaders' considerations of the goals of the Great Leap Forward, and the success or failure of the movement as well as by its consequences.

Shift to the left again in 1962

The revision of foreign policy since early 1960 was effective, but the pressure on foreign policy, brought by the serious economic recession, first of all by the severe recession in agriculture, was unexpected for the Chinese leaders, especially for Mao. One of the consequences was that foreign policy came under even more pressure.

First of all, Chinese foreign trade was troubled by the fact that neither the production plan for agriculture nor light industry was fulfilled. The Chinese had to request for a postponement in paying back the 1960 loans to the Soviet Union and some East European countries, reduce the scale of imports and exports with

39 Fang Rongkang's reminiscence, to some extent, reflects how people were blinded by an unfounded optimism. Fang Rongkang, "Shelun chuanqilai de lishi" (The History Connected with Editorials), *Bainianchao*, Vol. 8, 2002, pp. 38–39.

40 WU Lengxi, *Shinian lunzhan*, Vol. 1, pp. 243, 271.

41 *Ibid.*, p. 235.

42 Mao Zedong, "Guanyu fanhua wenti", March 22, 1960, in *Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao*, Vol. 9, p. 95.

43 *Ibid.*, p. 94. Wu Lengxi, *Shinian lunzhan*, Vol. 1, pp. 234–35.

them, and receive economic aid from the Soviet Union.⁴⁴ So, China had to stabilize rather than exacerbate the Sino-Soviet relations, thus it had to make compromises.

In addition, two years of continuous poor harvest forced the Chinese government to import food from non-Soviet bloc countries. Meanwhile, a tendency was seen in the development of trade relations in other areas with the Western countries. In August 1960, China proposed "Three Principles for Trade" to gradually resume the Sino-Japanese trade, which had been interrupted in 1958. A civil trade agreement was signed in November and the trade between China and Japan was gradually resumed in 1961.⁴⁵ Chinese leaders were even considering signing an agreement to import food from the United States.⁴⁶ The economic situations had become grim by the end of 1961. Heavy industry production also plummeted. The unexpected economic recessions further underlined the limited extent of the changes in the Chinese foreign policy during 1960.

Meanwhile, changes in the external environment also brought up the pressure on the need for further revisions in Chinese foreign policy. First, although there was a lessening of tensions in the Sino-Soviet relationship, it was still very fragile. In the first half of 1961, Chinese trade, technological cooperation, and military cooperation with the Soviet Union were resumed and they were further developing. China signed a new trade agreement with the Soviet Union in April 1961. Although the stipulated trade amount was lower than during the previous year, which was mostly an outcome of the Chinese economic recession, the trade relationship between the two states was nonetheless resumed.⁴⁷ Two sides tried to coordinate with each other in international affairs and brief each other on concerning situations. Some high-level visits between the two were being arranged.⁴⁸ Both China and the Soviet Union gave a positive appraisal of this situation.

However, Chinese leaders might have not come to understand that it was impossible for the Sino-Soviet relationship to further develop when ideological disputes were continuing, while it might continue to improve if all ideological disputes were ceased or evaded. Problem was that Mao Zedong believed that the Sino-Soviet solidarity could only be achieved through struggle and clarifying who was right or wrong in theory. To achieve such a victory, Mao argued that the CCP leaders should also understand what real Marxism was, and what revisionism was.⁴⁹ Actually China's restraint in its ideological dispute with the Soviet Union was only reflected in not directly naming the Soviet Communist Party (i.e., the three articles commemorating the 100 year anniversary of the birth of Lenin in the spring of 1960) or indirect criticism (i.e., the dealing with the assessment on the 20th Soviet Communist Party Congress in the *Moscow Declaration* in 1960), etc.

China and the Soviet Union entered into disagreement over how to deal with the Soviet policy toward Albania in the spring of 1961. Even Chinese leaders

44 Liu Xiao, *Chushi sulian banian*, Beijing: zhonggong dangshi chubanshe, 1986, p. 105; Zhou Enlai nianpu, Vol. 2. p. 394.

45 Zhou Enlai, "Guanyu cujin zhongri guanxi de zhengzhi sanyuanze he maoyi sanyuanze", August 27, 1960, in *Zhou Enlai wajiao wenxuan*, Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1990, pp. 289–291.

46 Zhou Enlai nianpu, Vol. 2, p. 385.

47 Zhou Enlai nianpu, Vol. 2, p. 385.

48 Li Sheng, *Xinjiang duisui (e) maoyishi, 1600–1990*, Xinjiang: Xinjiang renmin chubanshe, 1994, p. 635.

49 WU Lengxi, *Shinian lunzhan*, Vol. 1, pp. 241–243.

believed that the attacks on Albania by the Soviet leaders were actually aimed to denounce China.⁵⁰ More severely, about sixty thousand Chinese residents in Yili region, Xinjiang crossed the border and fled into the territory of the Soviet Union in the spring and summer of 1962. Regardless of the causes for this incident, one of the unavoidable consequences was the tension across the Sino-Soviet border.

Another important factor was how to deal with the intensifying situation in Vietnam. China's primary strategic goal was to prevent a large-scale American military intervention and to maintain regional stability and support revolutionary movements in the region. Chinese foreign policy would be constrained by this strategic goal. Nevertheless, in terms of Chinese policy of supporting the armed struggle of South Vietnam, China gradually assumed more and more responsibilities with regards to aid and assistance. It is significant to note that Chinese leaders once planned to build an alliance system with neighboring Asian socialist countries, including Mongolia, North Korea, and North Vietnam. For this purpose, Mao Zedong suggested that the proposed agreement could include an article about Chinese military aid.⁵¹ Under such considerations, it was reasonable for China to provide support and aid when North Vietnam requested it.

Although there was an impulse for assisting the Vietnamese unification war on the part of Chinese leaders, the scale and nature of such assistance was greatly influenced by the intensifying USE military intervention in Indochina. The American intensification of military intervention made Chinese leaders aware that the security of the southern border of China was under more and more severe threat. In early 1962, Chinese government publicly stated that the American military operations in South Vietnam constituted a threat to Chinese security, believing that the American intervention was "directly targeted against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and indirectly targeted against China."⁵² The Chinese leaders believed that only through increasing military assistance to North Vietnam, the American military intervention could be defeated.⁵³ In May 1962, the Kennedy Administration announced that U.S. ground troops and air force would enter and be stationed in Thailand. Seeing U.S. troops enter into one of China's neighboring country, the Chinese government immediately responded with a tough reaction, publicly calling to "evict American aggressors out of Southeast Asia."⁵⁴ Shortly afterwards, China decided to offer North Vietnam free of charge military equipment that could be used to equip 230 infantry battalions. It may be argued that the American intervention in the region made China's increase of aid to Vietnam an irreversible tendency, and the deeper the U.S. intervened, the more China would aid North Vietnam.

Another factor was the further intensification of the Sino-Indian border conflicts. The Sino-Indian border saw temporary peace after Zhou Enlai's visit to

50 "Mao Zedong huijian yindunixiyagongchandang zongshuji yaidi tongzhi de tanhua", January 1, 1961, The Central Archives (hereafter CA).

51 Mao Zedong, "Dui dijie zhongmeng hezuo youhao tiaoyue wenti de piyu," March 21, 1960, in *Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao*, Vol. 9, p. 88.

52 "Waijiaobu guanyu meiguo dui yuenan nanfang jiajin wuzhuangganshe de shengmin", February 24, 1962, in *Zhonghua renmin gongheguo duiwai guanxi wenjianji (1962)*, Vol. 9, p. 263.

53 Han Nianlong, ed., *Dangdai zhongguo waijiao*, Beijing: Chinese Social Sciences Press, 1987, p. 159.

54 Editorial, "Ba meiguo qinlue zhe cong dongnanya ganchuqu!", May 19, 1962, *People's Daily*.

India in April 1960. Since April 1961, however, the Indian government launched a so-called forward policy. As a response to Indian encroachment, China denounced India's action. Chinese media claimed that the Indian purpose for provoking the border dispute was to concert with the "anti-China tide" raised by the U.S. *People's Daily* even publicly criticized the top leaders of the Indian Communist Party for not taking the correct stance over the Sino-Indian border issue.⁵⁵

The People's Liberation Army (the PLA) resumed patrols along the border and strengthened its military deployment in the border regions in early 1962. Meanwhile, the Chinese government officially warned the Indian government in its diplomatic note that if the Indian troops refused to retreat from their positions and continued with military provocation, "Chinese frontier defense troops would have no choice but to be forced to defend themselves."⁵⁶ Chinese decision-makers, however, still tried to avoid military conflicts. Chinese leaders were contemplating almost all possible methods to avoid military conflicts, which is evident in the February 1 directive issued by the Central Military Commission and the decree of the "Principle Concerning the Concrete Methods of Resuming Border Patrol and Handling of the Frontier Defense Posts" issued by the PLA General Staff on May 6.⁵⁷

In the summer of 1959, Indian troops provoked a military conflict on the border and inflicted deaths and injuries on the PLA, arousing outrage among the Chinese troops. Mao Zedong's proposal in September 1959 that both the Indian and Chinese troops retreat 20 kilometers so as to disengage the troops of both sides, followed by the unilateral retreat of Chinese troops, to some extent, had taken into consideration the feeling of outrage among PLA troops. Chinese leaders believed that military conflicts would be difficult to avoid if troops of both sides were not quarantined.⁵⁸ As long as India would not give up its demand on Chinese territory and try to resort to force, Chinese military, especially the border troops, would certainly demand a military counterstrike. In another words, Chinese decision-makers had to face the pressure from within that was demanding military response.

Besides tensions along the Chinese borders with the Soviet Union, Indochina, and India, meanwhile, tensions were also mounting on the southeast coast of China. The Jiang Jieshi regime on Taiwan attempted to take advantage of the economic recession on the mainland and launch military attacks. Because the Kuomintang (the KMT) regime was allied with the U.S., Jiang Jieshi's military preparations put great pressures on the Southeast coast of mainland China. The PLA began combat mobilization, concentrated troops in respective regions, and started conscription earlier than scheduled in May, so as to defeat the probable "combat landing of two to three hundred thousand forces" of Jiang Jieshi troops.⁵⁹ War preparations on the Southeast coast, along with the anti-encroachment

55 Editorial, "Nihelu cedong de yindu fanhua yundong de zhenxiang", December 7, 1961, *People's Daily*.

56 *Zhonghua renmin gongheguo duiwai guanxi ji*, Vol. 9, p. 38.

57 Zhongyin bianjie ziwei fanji zuozhan shi bianxiezhu, ed., *Zhongyin bianjie ziwei fanji zuozhan shi*, Beijing: Military Science Press, 1994, p. 122.

58 Lei Yingfu and Chen Xianyi, *Tongshuaibu canmou de zhuihuai*, pp. 218–19.

59 "Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu zhunbei fensui jiangfeibang jinfan dongnan yanhai diqu de zhishi", June 10, 1962, in *Jianguo yilai zhongyao wenxian xuanbian*, Vol. 15, pp. 481–484.

combat along the Sino-Indian border, had elevated the morale of the PLA to a new height, thus at that time Chinese military had already completed the preparations for combat.⁶⁰

The pressure caused by the economic recession and the stern situation in Chinese foreign relations, finally caused the emergence of a current within the leadership demanding for a comprehensive and systematic critical review of the Chinese foreign policy. The Central Committee of the CCP convened an enlarged working meeting in January 1962 that is the so called Seven-Thousand-Cadre Conference, which aimed at conducting a review of economic policies of the past a few years. However, this directly led to the questioning and open criticism of the Great Leap Forward.⁶¹ It is worth noting that the policy revision since the Seven-Thousand-Cadre Conference was meant to solve the problems of economic recession, but the scale of policy adjustments was not just constrained to the economic arena. Rather it touched upon some sensitive political issues, such as the democratic system within the party, policy with regards to cadres, policy with regards to intellectuals, and the cultural and educational policy. The implementation of new policies in these areas, indeed, clearly improved the political atmosphere in the whole society. In such atmosphere, it is not surprising that the recognition and criticism of previous mistakes became more profound and sharper, of which Wang Jiaxiang's proposals on foreign policy were part. At that time, Wang was the minister of the Liaison Department of the CPC. Some officials who had previously suffered attacks in party struggles because of raising different opinions, like high-ranking officials Marshal Peng Dehuai and others, would surely like to appeal.

Indeed, the Seven-Thousand-Cadre Conference did not discuss foreign policy issues directly, nevertheless the report made by Liu Shaoqi on behalf of the Central Committee actually set the tone on foreign policy issues. In the written report, Liu suggested as usual that the CCP, after gaining power, should "aid revolutionary movements of the people of all states in the world, until the realization of a communist world."⁶² However, in the ensuing supplementary talk, Liu Shaoqi clearly stated at the beginning that, "to fulfill our international obligations, first of all we have to do well our work at home... the bulk of our attention should be put on the domestic issues."⁶³ Liu's words indicated that at the time the Chinese leadership, including Mao Zedong himself, had come to an agreement that "the bulk of attention" should be focused on solving domestic economic problems.

Shortly after the talk by Liu Shaoqi, on February 27 Wang Jiaxiang wrote a letter to Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiaoping, and Chen Yi, in which Wang exposed his opinion and proposals on Chinese foreign policy, and he also wrote few reports afterwards, raising questions concerning Chinese foreign policy. On one hand, Wang Jiaxiang attempted a full-scale, deep, and systematic review of some deeper issues in the

60 *Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao*, Vol. 10, p. 156.

61 Zhang Tianrong, "1961 nian zhaokai de qiqianren dahui", in *Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun guofang daxue dangshi dangjian zhenggong jiaoyanshi*, ed., *Zhonggong dangshi jiaoxue cankao ziliao*, Vol. 24, pp. 20-21.

62 Liu Shaoqi, "Zai kuodade zhongyang gongzuo huiyi shang de jianghua", January 27, 1962, in *Jianguo yilai zhongyao wenxian xuanbian*, Vol. 15, p. 61.

63 Liu Shaoqi, "Zai kuodade zhongyang gongzuo huiyi shang de jianghua", January 27, 1962, p. 86.

previous foreign policy, including the fundamental goal of the Chinese foreign policy, a basic judgment about the probability of a world war, an understanding of the relationship between war, peace and revolution, and an understanding of the plausibility of peaceful co-existence, etc. Other suggestions were about further adjustments in foreign policy.⁶⁴

Questions Wang Jiaxiang raised had to some extent challenged a certain “foreign policy route”, which was probably the main reason why Mao Zedong later sharply criticized the view of Wang Jiaxiang. To Mao, a concrete policy may be discussed, but the fundamental theoretical thought at the deeper level should never be questioned. However, in hindsight, it is evident that the policies Chinese leaders adopted before the summer of 1962 were in accordance with some proposals for a new foreign policy tactic laid out by Wang Jiaxiang.⁶⁵

Both the speech by Liu Shaoqi and the proposals of Wang Jiaxiang originated from common domestic and international backgrounds. They shared the same principle, which was to argue for a more pragmatic and stable foreign policy, creating a favorable international environment for solving China's economic difficulties. It is out of the question that the deteriorating international situation influenced the complete implementation of those policies and forced the Chinese leaders to adopt some decisive methods, including the use of force, to deal with surrounding pressures.

As explained above, peripheral circumstances of China were deteriorating at the time, while some tendencies were unfavorable for the revision of Chinese foreign policy along the line of pragmatism and stability. In addition, some of the proposals for certain concrete issues put forward in Wang Jiaxiang's reports, though logically speaking, were reasonable, but proved to be impractical under dramatic changes in the domestic and international situation. Nevertheless, in terms of the extent to which the peripheral circumstances of China were deteriorating, they were still not severe enough to compel the Chinese leadership to fundamentally change the foreign policy which was firstly implemented in early 1960 and further explicitly advocated and developed by Wang Jiaxiang in early 1962.

If incidents of various kinds that happened during this period had any impact on Chinese foreign policy, it was mainly to forge a political atmosphere in China which made the radical argument for change of the relatively pragmatic foreign policy more acceptable and popular among the masses. Of course, the deteriorating international environment might have also influenced the psychological state of Mao Zedong. In sum, the main reasons that caused Mao Zedong to criticize the so-called “three kindnesses and one fewness” (*san he yi shao*) at the Tenth Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee which led to the change of Chinese foreign policy, need to be sought among the important

64 On the content of the letter by Wang Jiaxiang, see Li Chen ed., *Zhonghua renmin gongheguo shilu*, Vol. 2, Jilin renmin, 1994, pp. 656–657; Zhang Tuosheng, “Nanneng de tansuo, kegui de nuli: shilun Wang Jiaxiang dui dang de guoji zhanlue sixiang de gongxian” in *Huanqiu tongci liangre: yidai linxiu men de zhanlue sixiang*, Beijing: zhongyang wenxian, 1993, pp. 170–183; On other reports by Wang Jiaxiang such as “Shishi qishi, liangli erxing” and “Luetan dui mouxie guoji wenti de kanfa”, etc., see *Wang Jiaxiang xuanji*, Beijing: Remin chubanshe, 1989.

65 On Wang Jiaxiang's suggestions concerning concrete issues, see *Zhonghua renmin gongheguo shilu*, Vol. 2, Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 1998, pp. 247–248.

events in the domestic politics of China. That was the political struggle within the CCP concerning the assessment of the results of the Great Leap Forward.

The Great Leap Forward had its origins in the economy, but then it made an impact on a range of areas. Now the Great Leap Forward waned due to economic difficulties and it also must have had impact on other issues too. Just as the Great Leap Forward elicited a sharp struggle within the party, in fact the denunciation of the Great Leap Forward caused a similar effect. There were different opinions at the so-called Seven-Thousand-Cadre Conference, while those different opinions included those that were both pro and against the Great Leap Forward. The key to the issue was how to treat those differences within the party, especially how Mao Zedong viewed those opinions that denounced the Great Leap Forward.

Mao Zedong's attitudes were manifested in his talks at the Seven-Thousand-Cadre Conference. On one hand, he set "to carry forward democracy" as the tone of his talk, while on the other hand, he reminded participants of the meeting about the severity of class struggle, and about the "fundamental stance issue" which side one was to take. In particular, in response to the current international environment, Mao pointed out that *di xiu fan* (imperialists, revisionists, and the anti-revolutionary elements), Jiang Jieshi, together with *di fu fan huai you* (the landlords, the rich peasants, the bad and anti-revolutionary elements, and the rightists) were all slandering China.⁶⁶ This reminder in a sense demarcated an implicit bottom line for the criticism of the Great Leap Forward. Unless we understand that no criticism was allowed to cross the bottom line, only then can we comprehend the nature of the counterstrike launched by Mao after August 1962. It is evident that Mao believed that the criticism of the Great Leap Forward within the party had already crossed the line and it must be totally rectified.

Following the Seven-Thousand-Cadre Conference, at the Enlarged Meeting of the Standing Committee of the CCP Politburo in February (also called the West Pavilion Meeting) and at the Working Meeting of the Central Committee in May, the mainstream opinion within the Chinese leadership was that a serious degree of the economic recession must be acknowledged and a strategic decision for change of economic policies and a large scale adjustment of the national economy must be made.⁶⁷ However, the situation changed dramatically during the summer. The Central Committee of the CCP convened a working meeting in Beidaihe on August 6, 1962, aimed at preparing for further discussions on the economy. In his talks, however, Mao Zedong revised the scheduled agenda, suggesting that the class struggle issue during the socialist period must be discussed, and he vehemently attacked those opinions that denounced the Great Leap Forward. At the Tenth Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, Mao Zedong further developed his arguments, summarizing the denial of the Great Leap Forward as *san feng* (Three Winds), namely "*hei'an feng*" (the dark wind), "*dan gan feng*" (the work-alone wind), and "*fan'an feng*" (the reverse-the-verdict wind), and alleged the so-called rightist leaders like Liu Shaoqi as "Chinese

66 Mao Zedong, "zai kuoda de zhongyang gongzuo huiyi shang de jianghua", January 30, 1962, in *Zhonggong dangshi jiaoxue cankao ziliao*, Vol. 24, pp. 5, 9–10.

67 Jin Congji, *Zhou Enlai zhuan, 1949–1976*, Vol. 2, p. 683; Xie Chuntao, *Dayuejing kuangchao*, Zhengzhou, Henan: Henan remin chubanshe, 1990, pp. 236–237.

revisionists".⁶⁸ The severest consequence was the publication of the bulletin of the meeting that included Mao's famous statement concerning the class struggle issue during the socialist period.⁶⁹

There were two crucial arguments in Mao's criticism of the so-called "Three Winds." The first argument was that the criticism of the Great Leap Forward and its consequences within the party was a reflection of class struggle within the party, and this was "Chinese revisionism", The second one was that "there was a connection between the revisionism at home and abroad", that is, they were colluding.⁷⁰ Such reasoning determined that, when considering foreign policy, during this period Mao could easily link differences in opinion with the so-called "revisionism", especially at a theoretical level.

It was at these two meetings that Mao criticized the views of Wang Jiaxiang. Up to date, however, there is no sufficient information that Mao himself read the letters and reports of Wang Jiaxiang. There are obscure places in the description and introduction of some of his work. For example, whether Mao demonstrated dissatisfaction with the current foreign policy? If he did, was Mao merely dissatisfied with some aspects of the foreign policy, or was he completely dissatisfied with the foreign policy as a whole? What were the concrete factors that led to Mao's criticism of the views of Wang Jiaxiang? etc.⁷¹

It was a diplomatic event that led Mao Zedong to criticize Wang Jiaxiang's work. In July 1962, at the so-called International Conference on Disarmament and World Peace, the Chinese delegation signed a joint document without such sentences as "against American imperialism," that was drafted by the organizer of the conference. Mao Zedong believed that the essence of this policy was "to leave the leftist, to strengthen the rightist and to sway the middle grounders." At the preparatory meeting of the Tenth Plenary Session of the Eighth CCP Congress, Wang Jiaxiang had to take the responsibility and openly criticize himself. After that, the Foreign Affairs Office of the State Council personally criticized Wang Jiaxiang.

Historical documents that have been disclosed so far showed that what caused Mao to link the suggestions by Wang Jiaxiang with the so-called "three winds" in domestic policy was the remark by the Foreign Minister Chen Yi at the Southeast China Group meeting on September 14. Chen Yi commented that there was a puff of wind that could be called "*sanmian he yimian shao*" (three-side kindness and one-side fewness). This comment was probably the earliest version of the later phrase of "three kindnesses and one fewness." Chen Yi argued that it was inevitable to struggle with the U.S., the Soviet Union, and India, "political

68 "60 niandai de zhongguo guonei jushi de bianhua yu zhongmei guanxi", pp. 2267-70; *Zhou Enlai zhuan*, Vol. 2, pp. 990-994.

69 "Zhongguo gongchandang dibajie zhongyang weiyuanhui dishici quanti huiyi de gongbao", September 27, 1962, in *Zhonggong dangshi jiaoxue cankao ziliao*, Vol. 24, p. 166.

70 *Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao*, Vol. 10, p. 199.

71 On the descriptions and remarks on this incident, see Zhu Zhongli, "Suowei de 'san he yi shao', 'san xiang yi xmie' wenti de zhenxiang", in *Dang de wenxian*, No. 5, 1993; *Mao Zedong yu Mosike de enenyuanyuan*, p. 474; "Nanneng de tansuo, kegui de nuli," p. 181; "Biandong zhong de zuoji guanxi yu zhongguo duimwi zhengce", p. 191; "60 niandai zhongguo guonei jushi de bianhua yu zhongmei guanxi", pp. 274-276.

costs-and-benefits calculation" needed to be done, and more support needed to be given to the national liberation movements. It was evident that Mao Zedong liked Chen Yi's remarks a lot and Mao commented on the briefing that it was "worth reading, very good".⁷² Afterwards the "three kindnesses and one fewness", like the domestic "three winds", began to be listed as an subject for criticism.

Chen Yi might not have understood the ultimate purpose of Mao criticizing the "three winds" in domestic policies and the possible consequences it might bring. The key, however, was the phrase of "a puff of wind". This phrase might have been dropped by the speaker unintentionally, but picked up by the listeners carefully. Mao Zedong's praise of the opposition to the so-called "three kindnesses and one fewness" in diplomacy was linked with the opposition to the "three winds" on the domestic front, which was to Mao an issue concerning the guiding thought. That is, what purpose should foreign policy serve? The direct result was that the Tenth Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee in fact changed the guiding thought on foreign policy since 1960. Of course, it took time for changes in the guiding thought to be implemented into actual foreign policy, as was the case with the final implementation of the class struggle theory of Mao Zedong. Indeed, the implementation of the changes of the guiding thought of Chinese foreign policy went hand in hand with that of the class struggle theory.

In conclusion, the change of the Chinese foreign policy that took place from 1959 to 1962 was neither caused by the severe-enough-changes in the external environment (i.e., the world war, large-scale invasion by foreign enemies, or other matters threatening the fundamental national interests), nor was it an outcome of a complete re-examination of various aspects of foreign policy (i.e., the situations prior to the Eighth Party Congress and around end 1950s). Rather, it was initiated by the changes in domestic politics and began as changes in the guiding thought of Chinese foreign policy. Also, due to this reason these two issues are worth pointing out in the studies of its impact on the Chinese foreign policy afterwards. Firstly, changes in the guiding thought were gradually implemented into policy making, which, logically speaking, was closely linked with the changes in the domestic political situation. Domestic politics were still playing a major a role. Secondly, changes in the guiding thought might have manifested themselves differently in various aspects of foreign relations, while in certain policy areas these changes in the guiding thought might not even have been carried out. Therefore, a careful and thorough examination of the evolution of Chinese foreign policy after 1962 is necessary.

72 *Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao*, Vol. 10, pp. 188–189.

Резиме

Др Ниу Ђун

„Заокрет налево“ кинеске спољне политике од касних 50-их до 1962.

Кључне речи: кинеска дипломатија, радикализација, гра-
нични сукоб

Од касних 50-их до 1962. кинеска спољна политика је пролазила кроз нагле преокрете и временом започела процес радикализације. Многе студије заступају мишљење да је основна покретачка снага радикализације кинеске спољне политике током овог периода била погоршана ситуација, како у окружењу тако и у односима две суперсиле. Овај рад заснован је на новим историјским доказима и истраживању непрекидних интеракција међународне заједнице и кинеске унутрашње политике у овом периоду. Аутор заговара став да иницијатива за радикализацију кинеске спољне политике проистиче из ситуације у кинеској унутрашњој политици, а нарочито из борбе која се водила унутар вођства Кинеске комунистичке партије око резултата Великог скока напред.

DEGLOBALIZATION IN THE PERIPHERY

Tariff Protectionism in Southeast and East-Central Europe 1914–1928*

Abstract: This article deals with technical features of a system of state imposed constraints on the foreign trade of Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and Poland (including state predecessors of the last three countries 1914–1918) in the period under review. It also analyses *modus operandi* and a range of applications of implemented policies in order to point out the similarities and differences in a cross-country comparison.

Key words: trade protectionism, deglobalization, tariff barriers, Southeast Europe, East-Central Europe

The article is written as a contribution to studies of phenomena that have been described either as the “recasting” of 19th century capitalism,¹ or as the “deglobalization”² of the world economy after 1914. In connection with this central inquiry it deals with the effects and outcomes of state intervention in foreign trade operations triggered by the First World War. Given the choice of European regions under study, it might seem rather strange to undertake an examination of deglobalization process in the countries that were either completely out or, at best, on the troublesome easternmost borderlines of the Atlantic economic system. For the most part, the economic systems in Southeast and East-Central Europe were disconnected from global trade and labor markets, and were under strong state control, even in the most prosperous period during the so-called “first globalization”. Yet, as we will see in the following sections, the changes which affected these countries were very much analogous to those that took place in the core economies. In this regard, the article does not suggest that an ideal free

* This article has been written within the framework of the scholarly project *Tradition and Transformation – Historical Heritage and National Identity in Serbia in 20th Century* (№ 47019), financed by the Ministry of Education, Science and Technological Development Republic of Serbia. Apart from the Ministry, the research was funded by Mediterranean program of the European University Institute in Florence and Imre Kertész Kolleg in Jena.

1 I refer here to the influential book of Charles S. Maier: *Recasting Bourgeois Europe: Stabilization in France, Germany and Italy in the Decade after World War I*, Princeton, 1975.

2 Concept of “deglobalization” applied to the developments following 1914 implies that there was a significant trend towards trade and labor market globalization in decades prior to WWI. The concept of deglobalization has been applied by distinguished contemporary economic historians, such as Timothy J. Hatton, Jeffrey G. Williamson, James Harold, Barry Chiswick, Kevin H. O’Rourke, Ronald Findlay and Stefano Battilossi. Consequently, the era between the Franco-Prussian war 1870–1871 and 1914 is considered to be “the first globalization” period.

trade economy form of capitalism actually existed in the region or anywhere in the world before 1914; it only implies a general trend of moving away from the conventional rules of market economy in the decades preceding the war. In the domain of international exchange of goods, trade restrictions which had existed earlier became far more elaborated and developed in comparison to their pre-war standards.

The general features of the system in question were founded during the extraordinary wartime conditions that brought about almost a complete breakdown of the pre-war trade system, both in the domain of volume and the very nature of trade per se. Even after the war was over, much of the interstate and internal trade relations remained disrupted throughout a period of slow European post-war recovery. This huge upheaval in international trade proved to be one of the most significant features of the international economy during the period. Yet, not all of these restrictive policy patterns were invented and applied for the first time during and after the First World War. Even during a time of what might be considered prosperous European capitalism, i.e. the decades preceding 1914, international commercial affairs were not immune from state intervention in the form of ever-rising tariff protection. Such exceptional trade restriction patterns as export tariffs could be found in many colonies and in several European countries before 1914.³ This applies to remarkably excessive tariffs also known as “tariff wars” which accompanied the newly emerging nation-economies’ struggle for economic emancipation: the Russo-German tariff war in 1890s, Spain’s tariff wars with France and Germany (1892), and the tariff wars between Austria-Hungary and Romania (1886–93) and later with Serbia (“the Pig War” of 1906–1911), provide relevant examples.⁴

Regardless of whether the war only accelerated these trends towards protectionism, or as an exogenous force it changed the very nature of the system, it is true that the basics of the trade regime became significantly different after the war-time period. During the first post-war decade, the state prerogatives in some European countries and for certain domains of trade controls went much further than those applied in the time of the late 19th century capitalism. The article deals with huge structural economic and social changes behind these tremendous changes. It focuses on the comparison of the specific features of the state-interventionist practices in the four countries within the global context during the period under review.

This article relies on primary archival sources, newspapers, statistical yearbooks, contemporary publications, parliamentary debates, and secondary literature. Studies and monographs by Ronald Findlay and Kevin H. O’Rourke,⁵

3 For historical background of export taxation see in: Richard Goode, George E. Lent, and P. D. Ojha, “Role of Export Taxes in Developing Countries”, *Staff Papers – International Monetary Fund*, Vol. 13, 3/1966, pp. 454–455.

4 Paul Bairoch, “European Trade Policy 1815–1914”, *The Cambridge Economic History of Europe* (vol. VIII). *The Industrial Economies: the Development of Economic and Social Policies* (eds Peter Mathias and Sidney Pollard), Cambridge, 1989, p. 78.

5 Ronald Findlay and Kevin H. O’Rourke, *Power and Plenty. Trade, War, and the World Economy in the Second Millenium*, Princeton, 2007.

James Harold,⁶ Charles P. Kindleberger⁷ and Derek H. Aldcroft⁸ proved to be particularly useful sources of empirical data and relevant examples also as a general analytical framework for approaching the phenomenon of global trade in the period under review. The statistical material and reports by organs of the Geneva based League of Nations provided important statistics and documentary information on global trade and international conferences summoned to deal with global trade problems.⁹ Extremely useful was a book of German economist Heinrich Liepmann which presents a broad elaboration on economic, social, and political implications of trade issues and an exhaustive statistical survey on changing trends in tariff policies of European countries.¹⁰ Apart from these general synthetic works, available publications and monographs (Anglo-Saxon, French, Bulgarian, Polish, Yugoslav, and Czechoslovakian) are applied to shed light on particular issues of the phenomenon.

The article consists of four sections, the first of which deals with global development of interstate trade constraints. The second section deals with pre-1918 traditions of the restrictive trade policies in Bulgaria, and state predecessors of other three countries under review. The third section elaborates on degree and nature of tariff taxation by the four countries. Conclusions will be presented in the fourth section. Comparative perspectives will be applied with an aim to point out similarities and differences of the pan-European phenomenon. Particular attention will be given to the upheaval caused by the first global warfare between 1914 and 1918; now let us begin with this issue.

Global impact of the war, post-war recovery, and "stabilization"

Much of the "total character" of World War One in Europe came as the consequence of the maritime and continental blockades applied by belligerents. Findlay and O'Rourke noted significant differences when these blockades were compared to those imposed during the Napoleonic wars of the late mercantilist era. While in the Napoleonic epoch the main effort was invested in preventing enemy countries from exporting their products (and acquiring precious metals in return), in the first global conflict the aim was quite the opposite. Namely, as the First World War proved to be a long-lasting war, the imports of raw materials and foodstuff became critically important for the maintenance of social peace and military order. For that reason, the European belligerents were primarily concerned with providing imports for their countries, and preventing their enemies from importing foreign goods. Concerns about the exports as well as the export-oriented industry, were given a low priority by their governments.¹¹

6 James Harold, *The End of Globalization. Lessons from Great Depression*, Cambridge, Massachusetts: London, 2001.

7 Charles P. Kindleberger, "Commercial Policy between the Wars", *The Cambridge Economic History of Europe* (vol. VIII), (eds Peter Mathias and Sidney Pollard), Cambridge, 1989, pp. 161–196.

8 Derek H. Aldcroft, *From Versailles to Wall Street 1919–1929*, London, 1977.

9 League of Nations, *Commercial Policy in Interwar period: International Proposals and National Policies*, Geneva, 1942 and *Ibid.*, *Tariff Level Indices. Economic and Financial Section – Documentation for the International Economic Conference*, Geneva, 1927.

10 Heinrich Liepmann, *Tariff Levels and Economic Unity of Europe*, London, 1938.

11 Findlay and O'Rourke, *op. cit.*, p. 431.

Since European production was disconnected from the global market during the war, a window of opportunity opened for new production centers outside Europe. As a result, a new geographic distribution of production regions and trade routes was established with an aim of compensating for the loss of European supplies. Particularly high rates of increases became apparent in agricultural and meat production in the Americas and Australia. The rising trends were noted also in domains of industrial production and semi-manufacturing throughout the colonial areas, and also in independent countries outside Europe; this was the case particularly in Japan and India. In this regard, huge problems occurred after the war, when European producers returned to the global trade market. A significant surplus of supplies, especially in the grain market, became evident shortly after the post-war reconstruction period. A global downturn of agricultural prices from 1925 onwards appears to be a vivid example of the eventual failure of the process of adjusting the global market to the changes in global production triggered by the war.¹²

Although the belligerents during the First World War were mainly concerned about providing imports, however even in this domain new restrictions were imposed. In Great Britain and France, the war brought about harsher tariff protection and a limitation in the freedom of trade for a large variety of goods. The average tariffs in France in 1918 were four times higher than in 1914, while in Britain one can notice a significant shift from liberal trade towards tariff protectionism and a system of trade preferences granted to her Dominions.¹³ During the inflationary turmoil of the first few post-war years, nominal tariffs have been raised chaotically by national governments in desperate attempts to compensate for the loss of value of domestic currencies. It is very difficult to calculate changing trends of tariff indices in such an unstable environment. Moreover, it is complicated to estimate the efficiency of tariff protection in a period when international trade was much more affected by non-tariff measures, which will be described in the following section. Probably for all these reasons, the most dynamic period of the post-war recovery and adjustment of the peacetime economy, namely the period between 1918 and 1925, has not been covered in the available econometric studies on the tariffs trends.

A complete European nation-states' statistical account on tariff indices in the period under review is available only for 1925 (League of Nations' indices see above) and 1927 (Liepman's indices see above). These data (see figures 1 and 2) come from a post-inflationary period of relatively stable national currencies and a more or less consolidated economic situation in Europe; in the period between 1923 and 1925, most European countries underwent currency stabilization which ended the period of uncontrolled inflation and monetary instability in Europe. One more important indication of the post-war recovery in the domain of international commercial performance is the volume of trade, which attained its pre-war level in 1924.¹⁴ Nevertheless, when compared to the 1913 level, the nation state indices from 1925 and 1927 differ significantly in the level of tariff protection (see figures 2 and 4). While the League of Nations' indices for manufactured goods fluctuated between 66 and 150 percent of the 1913 level, the Liepman indices for industrial


12 *Ibid.*, pp. 434–439; Aldcroft, *op. cit.*, pp. 40–49.

13 Kindleberger, *op. cit.*, p. 162.

14 Findlay and O'Rourke, *op. cit.*, p. 434.


manufactured goods range from an exceptionally low 65 percent for Poland to an average of between 150 and 190 percent in most European countries, and go up to 385 percent of the 1913 level in the exceptionally high tariff protection in Bulgaria (the country which has not been covered by the League of Nations' study). It is apparent from the data presented that tariff protection was on a significant rise, however, not as dramatic as one would expect taking into account the overall economic upheaval caused by the First World War. A dramatic rise in tariff protection occurred only during the Great Depression of 1930s.

Figure 1: The League of Nations' Tariffs Indices (ad valorem) for manufactured goods (MG) and all goods (AG) in 1925



Source: League of Nations, Commercial Policy in Inter-war period, p. 15

Figure 2: The Liepmann Tariffs Indices (ad valorem) for foodstuff, semi-manufactured (SM), and industrial manufactured (IM) goods in 1927



Source: Liepmann, Tariff Levels and Economic Unity of Europe, p. 413


On the other hand, it has already been pointed out that, apart from tariff measures, the 1920s witnessed the advent of a wide range of new and unorthodox non-tariff measures in the domain of trade controls. The scale of the application of these measures, and the intensity of state involvement, were particularly high in the newly-created nation states in the territories which used to be under the control of the Central Powers during the war. During the war, under the regime of the continental and maritime blockades imposed by the Entente Powers, these countries/territories were cut-off from their traditional sources of raw materials and food, this caused scarcity and an unprecedented scale of state control over available supplies of goods. This tendency would continue even after the war was over: Bulgaria and the successor states of Imperial Germany and Austria-Hungary (Austria excluded) imposed the highest levels of tariff protection and the most severe trade restrictions in Europe during the inter-war period. These were exceeded only by the revolutionary Bolshevik practices in the domestic and foreign trade of the Soviet Union. Yet, the USSR which was for some geopolitical reasons (and due to the nature of its regime) almost completely excluded from the European and world trade system during the 1920s represents a unique case.

On the other hand, the impact of the war on the trade policies in the rest of Europe (Northern and Western European countries) and North America was not so profound. It seems as if these countries managed to return to the pre-war trade practices in quite a short period during post-war reconstruction. The protection tariff levels imposed by these countries during the 1920s were quite close to those applied at the end of 19th century, or on the eve of the First World War. Huge changes and increased levels of pre-war protectionism occurred only in Germany and the European economic periphery. Furthermore, the significant distinctive patterns of trade protection in the successor countries of the pre-war Central and eastern-European Empires became apparent at an institutional level. In addition to the pre-war protectionist policies based solely on import tariffs, a new system of inter-war trade controls also included export tariffs and non-tariff measures, such as the inter-state barter arrangements, quota system, or even the official prohibitions of trade for certain goods or certain countries.

Using the available literature and sources, a typology of institutional patterns that were imposed on inter-state trade, can be constructed. This differentiates between six basic means of controls and/or restrictions: the license system, the quota contingent system, export tariffs, import tariffs, the barter system, and the complete ban on trade (including the excessive protective tariffs which were meant to prevent imports rather than to charge them). Within the license system state approval was obligatory for each foreign trade transaction. Usually it was imposed on the export or import of certain goods, but it could have been imposed also on a broader basis. One way or another, this system of control required significant state involvement in commercial affairs and an immense amount of paperwork on the part of the traders and state personnel. Equally, administrative complications were caused by a highly bureaucratized quota contingent import/export system through which the state could facilitate control over the volume of its foreign trade. Under the system, private traders and companies could not sell or buy abroad without a special license which designated the approved amount of raw materials or goods that could be traded. The overall


contingents of certain goods were limited by the state for a set period of time. The barter arrangements, concluded in the form of inter-state agreements, prescribed quantities and goods to be exchanged between two countries.

Figure 3: League of Nations' tariff indices (*ad valorem*) in 1925 (1913=100)



Source: League of Nations, Commercial Policy in Inter-war period, p. 15.

Figure 4: Liepman's Tariff indices (*ad valorem*) for Foodstuff, Semi-Manufactured



Goods (SMG), and Industrial Manufactured Goods (IMG) in 1927 (1913=100)

Source: Liepmann, Tariff Levels and Economic Unity of Europe, p. 413. Some of the aforementioned measures were linked to the extremely bad global monetary and fiscal situation: while high tariffs could help increase fiscal revenues,

barter arrangements appeared as the only way of exchange between countries whose economies were provided with unconvertible inflationary banknotes. Particularly harsh restrictions against the importation of manufactured and “luxurious” goods were imposed by the pan-European program of economic reconstruction, and the industrialization of underdeveloped and mostly rural economies of European periphery. How global changes in trade policy and trade regimes affected commercial policies in the four countries will be presented in the following chapter.

*Pre-1918 traditions of Bulgaria and the state predecessors
of Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Poland*

State involvement in foreign trade was by no means a novelty for industrialists and merchants in Polish territories. This was particularly true for the Russian Partition (of the post-war Poland) which witnessed the introduction of the world’s most protectionist system; created using the economic ideas of the famous chemist Dmitri Ivanovič Mendeleev, it was fully applied throughout 1890s in the era of the Minister of Finance, count Sergei Witte.¹⁵ The tariffs imposed both for protectionist and fiscal reasons surpassed, in the degree of taxation, any known system of that time. In 1913, these amounted to 85 percent (ad valorem) for industrial goods, 69.4 percent for foodstuff and 63.5 for semi-manufactures. This tariff umbrella helped the development of Russian heavy industry, situated mainly in what would later become Poland. On the other hand, due to such a strong protectionist system, the Russian Partition was almost entirely disconnected from the economic systems of the Austrian and German partitions. According to Polish economist Henryk Tennenbaum, no less than 90 percent of exports from the Russian Partition went to other parts of Russia, while around 58 percent of partition’s imports came from the rest of the Empire before 1914.¹⁶ The German Partition traded predominantly with the rest of Germany; it accounted for 77 percent of the partition’s exports and 80 percent of its imports.¹⁷ For these reasons, during and after the war the Polish economy suffered immensely from the loss of export markets.

Bulgaria was inclined towards industrial protectionism from its very beginnings as a semi-independent country. The problem was that its limited sovereignty, as provided by the 1878 Treaty of Berlin stipulations, did not include the freedom of introducing its own tariffs system. Bulgaria was to maintain quite a liberal Ottoman tariff system which applied a universal 8 percent (ad valorem) taxation on all imported goods. Bulgaria became a completely independent country only in 1908, yet in terms of foreign trade, the process of emancipation

15 Vincent Barnett, *A History of Russian Economic Thought*, London and New York, 2005, pp. 63–64.

16 Quoted in: Zbigniew Landau, Jerzy Tomaszewski, *Gospodarka Polski międzywojennej 1918–1939. W dobie inflacji 1918–1923 I*, [Economy of Interwar Poland 1918–1939. Inflation Era 1918–1923, I] Warszawa, 1967, p. 323. If not indicated otherwise, the data and analysis from Landau and Tomaszewski’s book will be applied here for the reconstruction of the developments in the Polish trade policies.

17 *Ibid.*, p. 324.

from the Ottoman tariff system was ongoing throughout the period. Regardless of the Berlin Treaty, Bulgarian authorities were gradually raising tariff protections: by 1894 the universal tariff was 10.5 percent, and by 1896 – 14 percent. In 1904, the Bulgarian Parliament established the first national tariff system which replaced previous universal taxation on imports.¹⁸ It proved to be among the most protectionist countries in pre-war Europe. For certain goods taxation was as high as 50 percent (*ad valorem*), and in several exceptional cases even up to 100 and 150 percent.¹⁹ On average, according to Liepmann's calculation, Bulgarian taxation ranged between 19.5 percent for industrial goods and around 24 percent for foodstuff and semi-industrial products.²⁰

The pre-war Kingdom of Serbia had an exciting history of struggling for its tariff emancipation from Austro-Hungarian economic tutelage. In the history of European protection tariffs this episode is well-known as "The Pig War", since pig livestock constituted an important share of Serbia's exports to Austria-Hungary. The tariff (1906–1911) war was provoked by the Dual Monarchy's desire to maintain the dominant position on the Serbian domestic market. Statistically this dominance accounted for no less than about 85 percent of Serbian exports and imports at the beginning of 20th century. However, from 1904 on, Serbia began seeking other economic partners and trade arrangements in Europe. In order to halt the course of events Habsburg authorities introduced a ban on the importation of Serbian goods which, as has already been mentioned, mainly consisted of pig livestock. This was a successful method in many similar previous situations; this time, however, Serbian authorities decided to fight the Austro-Hungarians by raising tariffs on manufactured goods to quite a high level. In addition, Serbian exports were redirected towards new markets in Germany, Egypt, Turkey, Belgium, and some other European countries. Instead of livestock, Serbia began exporting meat products, grain and even some semi-manufactured goods.

A high protective tariff of around 18 percent (*ad valorem* average for semi-manufactured and industrial goods) facilitated the influx of capital investment to Serbia. The overall number of industrial enterprises increased more than fourfold after 1906; the tariff conflict proved to be beneficial for the Serbian economy.²¹ Apart from Serbia and Montenegro, the newly created Yugoslav state was composed of former Austrian and Hungarian provinces of the Habsburg Monarchy. The industrial entrepreneurs based in these provinces enjoyed the protection of even higher tariffs of around 20 percent. On the other hand, Serbian protection of agricultural production was significantly higher than that applied by the Dual Monarchy (31.6 against 29.1 percent *ad valorem*). Yet, no domain of tariff protectionism in the Dual Monarchy,

18 Динко Тошев, *Принос за изучаване на индустриалната политика на България от Освобождението до Балканската война* [Dinko Tošev, *A Contribution to the Study of Industrial Policy of Bulgaria from the Liberation to the Balkan Wars*], Varna, 1941, pp. 140–158; Bairoch, *op. cit.*, p. 80; Рахам Берахов, *Индустриалният протекционизъм у нас* [Our Industrial Protectionism], Sofia, 1927, pp. 40–53.

19 Тошев, *Принос*, p. 156.

20 Liepmann, *op. cit.*, p. 413.

21 Димитрије Ђорђевић, *Царински рат Аустро-Угарске и Србије: 1906–1911* [Dimitrije Đorđević, *Tariff war between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, 1906–1911*], Beograd, 1962; Mari-Žanin Čalić, *Socijalna istorija Srbije 1815–1941*, [Social History of Serbia 1815–1941], Beograd, 2004, pp. 157–160.

Bulgaria, and Serbia, is comparable to the level of protective taxation imposed by Russian authorities prior to 1914. We will proceed to present how foreign trade in Bulgaria and in the territories of what would become Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Yugoslavia, were affected by global warfare.

Apart from the Kingdoms of Serbia and Montenegro (in the period between the outbreak of the war and the defeat and occupation of these countries by the end of December 1915), territories in all four countries during the war were mainly under control of the Central Powers, and thus affected by severe trade restrictions, and also by maritime and continental blockades imposed by the Entente Powers. On the other hand, during the first phase of the war in Serbia, its population was quite well provided with all kinds of commodities from Greek ports, and by its French, Russian, and British allies. After the Bulgarian army launched its offensive and occupied this part of Serbia, capturing the Serbian town of Niš in October 1915, a Bulgarian contemporary, Hristo Mutafov, was amazed at the quantities of high-quality imported merchandise, stored in shops and inventories there. Let us read the first-hand impressions of Mutafov, then a Bulgarian soldier:

"While we were entering Niš we thought we would find ourselves in a devastated town without any supplies of goods, foodstuff, clothing etc. Yet, we were wrong as the French and English took extra care of their allies. Inhabitants were quite nicely supplied with all necessities. They are well dressed, well fed; they did not even lack the opportunity for extravagancies. Great quantities of chocolate, all sorts of candies, lokums, and tobacco were displayed on the streets for sale; in some shops – good cognacs, vines, food delicatessens, etc. – are offered for a high price".²²

However, the well-being of Serbian citizens, as documented by an enemy soldier, was not to last. After the joint German-Bulgarian and Austro-Hungarian military operation was successfully brought to an end (by the beginning of 1916), all Serbian territories were occupied and integrated into the system of the Central Powers' autarchic war economy. The populations and territories of all four countries, for the most of the time during the war, consequently, were within the same or similar wartime situation. Correspondingly, the basic trade conditions and policies imposed on all the four countries' territories appear to be very similar at least to the extent of a malfunctioning of the system and its main institutional features. These similarities were maintained by inertia during the first post-war years. To a great extent this initial period was marked by unorthodox measures applied with an aim to either restrict or control foreign trade.

*The four countries' tariff barriers*²³

Apart from the unconventional ways of restricting interstate trade circulation, the four countries introduced or proceeded with conventional tariff barriers. Since the tariff systems of all the countries under study applied taxation in nominal amounts (rather than *ad valorem*), much of the expected fiscal revenue

22 Христо Мутафовъ, *През Сърбия, Въ походъ съ 9-та дивизия* [Hristo Mutafovă, *Through Serbia, on the March with 9th Division*] Sofia, 1916, pp. 94–95.

23 The term "tariff barriers" applied in this subsection only refers to import tariffs. The export tariffs, i.e. export taxes and export duties will be considered as non-tariff measures.

depended on the monetary developments in these countries.²⁴ From this point of view, the outcome of the national tariff systems could be perceived differently in the period of post-war hyperinflation and in the following period of currency stabilization. We will proceed to present how the tariff system developed from country to country and how it affected trade performance of these countries, especially when compared to the pre-war situation and the tariff system which were then in force.

In the technical terms, the Yugoslav tariff policy at the very beginning of the state existence depended on the efficiency of the establishment of the custom service and border controls. A complete procedure of taxation of goods could hardly be applied in the chaotic circumstances immediately after the proclamation of the new state. When the dues were levied on goods they were implemented according to either the Serbian or Habsburg system, and both depended on the location of the customs office. On February 1919, the Serbian tariffs were established for the entire territory of Yugoslavia. When the Finance Minister Momčilo Ninčić was asked in the Yugoslav Parliament to give an explanation for this decision, he pointed out the fact that the pre-war Serbian tariffs' system was "more protectionist in domain of agriculture, than the Austro-Hungarian one".²⁵ Very soon, however, extreme rates of post-war inflation diminished any significance in the differences outlined between these two tariff systems. Since the tariffs were designated as a nominal sum of money, there was no other way of maintaining real taxation rates other than to increase nominal banknote charges in accordance with the domestic currency devaluation. According to the data from the Yugoslav Ministry of Finance, it is apparent that the state was losing the race with inflation for the period 1919–1924. The average tariff taxation in this period ranged from 2.30 (in 1919) to 11.80 percent in 1922, while the minimal Serbian pre-war tariffs were between 19 (for industrial) and 31 percent (for agricultural goods).²⁶ One would say that the inflationary chaos actually created a more liberal trade environment than the one before the war. It would be true of course only if the non-tariff measures were not taken into consideration. One should also keep in mind that the high rates of inflation at the same time hindered the ordinary use of money as a means of payment in interstate trade, and degraded much of commerce to the level of bartering arrangements.

Another relevant issue connected with the rate of taxation of imports is related to the human infrastructure, i.e. the quality of the customs personnel. An

24 A detailed "Report on the Work of the Ministry for Trade and Commerce" will be used as the main narrative guideline and the most important archival source for the reconstruction of the developments of Yugoslav trade affairs and policy. The report was written in second half of 1930s as a part of the preparation for the Yugoslav state jubilee, namely the 20th anniversary of the new state. It was to provide necessary documentary material for a publication, which would mark the anniversary. Regardless of the actual context, the report itself was written in a highly professional manner and with impressive detail and valuable information. The text was produced by professionals, after certain time distance, and probably for that reason one will not find much panegyric undertones, but rather a critical account on the state policy. If not indicated otherwise, this source will be used in elaboration of the Yugoslav foreign trade policy. In: AJ, Collection of Vojislav Jovanović - Marambo (335)–99.

25 In: *Stenografski dnevnici Privremenog narodnog predstavništva*, Beograd, 1919, p. 358.

26 Ministry of Finance's reports on tariffs revenues 1919–1927. In: AJ, 81–1–1.

unsuccessful attempt of imposing ban “on luxury items imports” in 1920 provides us with an illustration of the administrative constraints that were very similar to those experienced in the procedure of the licensing imports contingents. The Yugoslav authorities imposed this ban with an aim to prevent the outflow of hard currency from the country. Much of this aim might have been achieved if only the custom officials had been more trustworthy. Milan Stojadinović, an economic expert, and later Yugoslav Minister of Finance and an important figure in state policy during the 1930s, explained the developments after the official ban was introduced:

“The importation of forbidden goods carried on uninterrupted, not openly but through smugglers’ routes, with payment of bribes, instead of customs charges. This ban did not compel us to discard luxury goods, but it was spreading corruption; it did not teach us to economize ourselves, but it was increasing our expenditure as the prices for forbidden goods plunged up. Since the luxury goods were being imported uninterruptedly it was natural that the demand for hard currency for these payments still existed. The state revenues, instead of enjoying benefits of good exchange rates were additionally crippled by decreased customs returns caused by smuggling.”²⁷

In October 1920, the State finally abolished the imports ban on luxury items; in its place, a moderate customs charge of about 10 percent (*ad valorem*) was introduced. Since the charge was moderate there was no reason for domestic traders (i.e. smugglers) to avoid legal means of importation. Just as in the case of the exports licensing system, the state had given up hope of imposing complete control over trade affairs. In both cases it chose rather to impose a feasible level of control which would correspond to the actual capacities of its administrative apparatus. Stojadinović was very much in favor of such a realistic approach to the trade controls. However, in his article he underlined that the policy of trade prohibitions still had supporters in Yugoslav public and policy: “It comes from the fact that we are still much more dedicated to the theory than to the reality, and that we forget the circumstances of our society, and the very fact that the [current] organization of our institutions are still quite far from the one that should exist in one [organized] state.”²⁸

The unsettled fiscal and monetary situation in Yugoslavia lasted up to mid-1925 when the national currency (Dinar) was finally stabilized. In the domain of trade affairs it was marked by a confused and disorganized state intervention in tariff management and in the domain of trade. The degree of tariff taxation and commercial regime (free, contingent restricted or completely prohibited exports/imports for certain goods) could change monthly or even weekly depending on various domestic or foreign influences. At the same time, many exemptions from tariff payments and exceptions from the trade bans in individual cases undermined the foundations of the very system of control. Much of these anomalies came from the fact that almost the entire body of law and regulation in this domain was both decreed and administered by the country’s executive power. The extraordinary post-war circumstances contributed to the fact that Parliament had no influence on tariff and trade policy at all. Furthermore, some of the institutions created by government

27 Милан Стојадиновић, „Ограничење увоза“ [Milan Stojadinović, “Export Restrictions”], *Политика*, November 9, 1920.

28 *Ibid.*

had never been made operational, or even created. The Consumers' Cooperative for Imports provides a relevant example. It had been designated in November 1919 as a state institution with an aim to bridge the gap between consumers' and traders' interests. The contingents of foodstuffs could leave the country only with the consent of the consumers' cooperative associations. One would never discover the mechanics of the negotiations between commercial and consumers' interests, since the institution, although decreed, had never been created in practice.

The taxation rates of the Yugoslav tariffs system could not have become stable and predictable before the national currency had become stable. When it finally happened in 1925, new tariff items and tariff charges were decreed by the government. On average, the tariffs charges were around 35 percent (*ad valorem*), with an excessive charge on foodstuff (44 percent). Semi-manufactured and manufactured goods were charged with 25 and 28 percent respectively. This could be considered as moderate taxation if compared with the most protectionist European countries, where it reached double or more in comparison with Yugoslavia's taxation level. However, this was a considerable increase compared to the previous inflationary period when the actual tariff charge was not higher than 15 percent (*ad valorem*). Apart from the new tariffs, Yugoslav trade policy still relied on bans and export tariffs up to the end of period under review (1928); yet these measures had increasingly less impact on the overall Yugoslavian trade policy.²⁹

There are noteworthy similarities between the developments of the Polish and Yugoslav trade policies. The Polish tariff system, in its formative period, maintained the three different systems of its predecessor states (German, Austro-Hungarian and Russian), just as Yugoslav officials maintained the Serbian and Austro-Hungarian systems. The only exception in the Polish case was foreseen for the trade arrangements with the Entente Powers. In this particular case, namely, the German tariff system (so-called Hindenburg tariffs) was applied, since it was the most moderate among Polish tariffs. Yet, when the first Polish "temporary tariff system" was inaugurated in November 1919 it was based on the Russian, highly interventionist model, again this was similar to the Yugoslav model that followed the more interventionist Serbian tariff system.

The problem with collection of the Polish tariffs incomes, as in Yugoslavia came from inadequate customs personal and a constant devaluation of national currencies during the period of post-war inflation. It was estimated by contemporaries that around 90 percent of all Polish foreign trade in 1919 was carried out without licenses, i.e. illegally. With regard to the problem of ever decreasing revenues from the tariff taxation, the same technique of multiplying basic tariff amounts was applied in Poland, and with similarly bad results, as in the case of Yugoslavia. Contemporary analysts from the period agree that there is no competent method of calculating average percentage (*ad valorem*) tariff income as foreseen by the 1919 legislation. They all agreed merely that the real sum was much smaller than the one indicated by real prices in 1919. One way or another, it is apparent that non-tariff measures played an important role in Polish trade policy during the "first provisory tariffs" (1919–1924).

29 Milan Becić, *Finansijska politika Kraljevine SHS*, [Financial Policy of the Kingdom of SCS], Beograd, 2003, pp. 90–94.

In June 1924, after the introduction of a new national currency, a new Polish tariff system was also introduced, in attempt to replace all non-tariff measures. It was again based on the Imperial Russian model. Nominal tariff taxation was increased; yet again due to the prolonged inflationary increases these amounts did not represent a serious protectionist barrier until the official stabilization of the zlot in 1927. When the tariff war with Germany started an overall state control and licensing system was reintroduced and remained part of the official Polish trade policy until the end of the period under research.

The tariffs system and customs procedure in the newly created Czechoslovakian state was based on the administrative personnel and regulations of the former Dual Monarchy trade policy. Primarily this refers to the 1906 Austro-Hungarian tariff system, which remained in use in Czechoslovakia with modifications introduced during the war.³⁰ One of the peculiarities of the Czechoslovakian monetary policy when compared with those of other countries under review was the slower pace of inflation which contributed to maintaining a higher real level of tariff protection during the first half of 1920s. Actually from 1922 onwards, the Czechoslovakian koruna was one of the most stable currencies in Europe. Yet, the authorities did their best to maintain and even to increase the pre-war parity of their tariff revenues. At the beginning, the nominal rates of the Austro-Hungarian tariff system were multiplied in accordance with rates of inflation.

From May 1921 on, a new system of "tariff coefficients" was introduced by applying different scales of increase depending on the level of projected protection.³¹ The heaviest burden was placed on luxury and industrial items, and the most moderate were on raw materials which were necessary for domestic industries. In this way, not only was the Austro-Hungarian tariff system revalued, but it was also modified in order to serve the interests of the Czechoslovakian economy. On January 1922, the coefficients were increased significantly, which, combined with good monetary conditions, resulted in much better results in terms of fiscal revenue, than those achieved by the customs services of the other three countries. For instance, on January 1922, the pre-war tariff rates levied on manufactured goods were increased by 15 to 30 times. Since the Czechoslovakian Koruna by that time retained about 10 percent of the pre-war parity of the Austro-Hungarian Krone in gold, the real tariff increase was between 50 to 100 percent, and even in some exceptional cases no less than 200 percent (or threefold higher) above the pre-war level.³² At the same time, the corresponding rates for Bulgaria and Yugoslavia were at about half the pre-war level. Yet, regardless of the fact that the level of tariff protection was so high, the Czechoslovakian authorities also maintained the licensing system to control imports from abroad. As already mentioned in the previous subsection, it remained in use for the majority of products until the mid-1920s.

During the first half of 1920s the Czechoslovakian tariff policy was quite benevolent towards the import of foodstuff and agricultural products. This was

30 Aleš Skřivan, "K charakteru, rozsahu a zaměření československého vývozu v meziválečném období", [On Main Features, Volume and Orientation of Czechoslovak Export during the Inter-war Period] *Acta Oeconomica Pragensia*, no. 7 (2007), p. 369.

31 *Ibid.*

32 Ferdinand Peroutka: "The Commercial Policy and the Tariff", *Czechoslovakia: A Survey of Economic and Social Conditions*, (ed. Josef Gruber), New York, 1924, pp. 135–136.

especially true for the immediate post-war period that was marked by scarcity. Later on, the principle was accepted that the foodstuff imports would be allowed for basic necessities, and only for those items which were not available on the domestic market. The governments' logic was that there should be no additional tariff charges on these necessities. If these had already been allowed to enter the country for the sake of maintaining social peace, and it would be utterly counterproductive to burden consumers with additional taxes.³³ This attitude changed in 1925–1926 when protectionist coefficients were also applied on agricultural products. This resulted in a somewhat protectionist trade policy. According to the Liepmann indices, the tariff taxation on foodstuff and industrial products was around 36 percent (*ad valorem*).³⁴

In Bulgaria, as well as in the other three countries, tariff policy management depended heavily on national currency monetary developments. The basic indexes of the pre-war 1904 tariff were tuned in accordance with the national currency depreciation during the war. In the period between 1918 and 1922 this new index was being consecutively increased by up to 15 (pre-war level = 1).³⁵ Nevertheless, the actual level of tariff protection was sliding downward, not only due to the rapid rates of inflation but also as a result of the subsequent interventions in the country's economic policy by the Inter-Allied Control Commission (IACC), an institution installed in Sofia according to the provisions of the Treaty of Neuilly of November 1919.³⁶ The commission was in charge of the fulfillment of the peace treaty obligations accepted by the Bulgarian government; however, its interference in domestic affairs went much further, especially in the domain of monetary and trade policies. For instance, the IACC quite decisively opposed the harshening of trade barriers and protectionism at the time of the Agrarian government. Bulgarian economic historian Rumen Avramov wrote about one of the arguments that broke out over the tariffs issue. For example, in 1921 the commission stood up against revaluation of the nominal tariffs amounts planned by the Bulgarian government in November that year. The Treaty of Neuilly indeed forbade Bulgaria from increasing tariffs above the 1914 level, but only for a period of one year after its official enactment (i.e. between August 1920 and August 1921), and the above mentioned case was ongoing after the expiry of this provision.

According to Avramov, by that time, the exchange rate of the Bulgarian national currency had already been decreased by 28 times, while the (pre-war) nominal tariff rates were only multiplied by a coefficient of 12, which means that the real price of tariff taxation fell to about 43 percent of the pre-war *ad valorem* value.³⁷ According to the Liepmann's calculation, the Bulgarian tariff rates (*ad valorem*) in 1913 were between 20 (for industrial products) and 25 percent (for the foodstuff

33 *Ibid.*, p. 131.

34 Liepmann, *op. cit.*, p. 413.

35 Динко Тошев, *Индустриалната политика на България след първата световна война* [Dinko Tošev, *Industrial Policy of Bulgaria after the First World War*], Varna, 1943, p. 67.

36 On the commercial constraints imposed on the Bulgarian government see: Димитър Николов и Богдан Кесяков, *Ньойски договор* [Dimităr Nikolov and Bogdan Kesiakov, *Treaty of Neuilly*] (Sofia, 1999), pp. 38–66; Берахов, *op. cit.*, pp. 59–60.

37 Румен Аврамов, *Комуналният капитализъм. Из българското стопанско минало* (I) [Rumen Avramov, *Communal Capitalism. From Bulgarian Economic History, I*], Sofia, 2007, pp. 587–588.

and semi-manufactured goods), which means that an average (ad valorem) tariff taxation in Bulgaria 1919–1924 was between 8 and 10 percent. These rates are even smaller than those estimated by the Yugoslav authorities in inflationary period between 1919 and 1924. Due to pressure coming from the IACC Bulgaria could not maintain its tariff policy. Similar limits in the domain of trade policy were imposed on Germany, another country defeated in war. The western liberal countries could not impose such a recipe for the trade policies of (more or less) new sovereign states in the economic periphery (Poland, Romania, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia) in the 1920s, but they could try this approach in countries whose sovereignty was being limited by the prescriptions of peace treaties. The aforementioned successor states of Austria-Hungary did not even ratify the conclusions of the Portoroso Conference of 1920, which aimed at the normalization of foreign trade between them.³⁸

The IACC was eager to preserve this artificially created moderation by opposing attempts at increasing tariff rates. In spite of the opposition, the Stambolijski government introduced a new tariff system in April 1922. While in Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, the new tariff systems only came into practice after a final consolidation of their national currencies, in Bulgaria it was inaugurated in the midst of the inflationary crisis in 1922. The tariff system was extremely protectionist, yet the high rates of taxation were not easy to maintain due to the ever rising dynamics of inflation. According to Dinko Tošev's data, the tariff coefficient that was applied by customs officials was constantly lagging behind the official rate of inflation. For instance, in October 1922, the coefficient was 15, while the official exchange rates of the Lev banknotes (related to the gold standard) was 32.30.³⁹ Thus, only around half of the projected revenue could have been collected from tariffs. The real effects of the tariff protection came only in 1926 with the final stabilization of the Bulgarian currency. From that time on, Bulgarian trade policy almost entirely depended on tariff measures in the domain of control over imports. Yet, in the domain of export controls, the export taxation in the form of an official tariff system was maintained by the end of period, as in the other three countries.

Conclusion

The trade restrictions triggered by the First World War proved to be the most significant war-related upheaval in the prosperous system of 19th century capitalism. While it could take years before scholars could contemplate how the breakdown of the global labor market had affected the global economy from 1914 onwards, in the case of trade constraints the consequences became apparent almost immediately after the war broke out. The constraints placed on inter-state circulation of goods were simultaneously applied in domestic trade by belligerent, as well as by neutral countries, globally. The overwhelming state intervention in the affairs of trade continued even after the war, in spite of the fact that it proved counterproductive. In Europe, the situation became even more complicated after the new nation-states were established in its fragile economic periphery. Not only

38 Findlay and O'Rourke, *op. cit.*, p. 443.

39 Тошев, *Индустриалната*, p. 67.

were the number of national tariff systems increased (from 20 to 27) and the length of inter-state borders was extended by 20,000 km, but also a variety of new and unorthodox measures and concepts of trade protectionism emerged.

The four countries in this study proved to be among the most interventionist with respect to the degree of tariff protection, and unconventional (i.e. the non-tariff policy measures applied in foreign trade). Yet even before the war Bulgaria and the predecessors of Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and Poland were notable among European countries for the high protective tariffs. After the war, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia further increased tariff protections especially in the domain of industrial goods. According to the Liepmann indices, by 1927 *ad valorem* taxation in this domain went as far as almost four times that of the 1913 level in Bulgaria, and almost twice as high as in Czechoslovakia. Only Poland's taxation levels decreased (for semi-manufactured and industrial goods) relative to the pre-war Russian tariffs system, which was so rigorous that it almost equated to an official ban on those items.

However, the full extent of tariff taxation could have been imposed only after the monetary stabilization of the four countries' national currencies. In Czechoslovakia it happened in 1922, in Yugoslavia in 1925, in Bulgaria in 1926, and in Poland only in 1927. In the meantime, the four countries applied a range of non-tariff measures of administrative control over foreign trade. Among these, the most prominent became various licensing schemes in a range of import controls, and a broad application of export taxation dues and quota contingents in the export trades. The most intensive system of tariff protection one finds in Bulgaria, where almost all non-tariff measures were removed after the stabilization of the lev. Poland, on the other hand provides the combined model of a high tariff protection and licensing system, which functioned throughout the period under review. With respect to their administrative features, and in all areas of applied policies, these were among the most interventionist among the European countries (Russia excluded).

According to Liepmann's indices, the Bulgarian (*ad valorem*, 1927) tariff on foodstuffs were around four times higher than the French and German ones; the Polish tariff taxation was more than three times higher than the corresponding French and German data; the Yugoslav was around two times higher; the Bulgarian tariffs on industrial goods was around three times higher than in France and Germany, etc. In addition to the high rates of tariff taxation, these countries also applied a broad range of non-tariff measures, which additionally complicated the inter-state circulation of goods. Their own economic prosperity was affected by subsequent reciprocal measures applied by trade partners' countries. This was particularly true in the Czechoslovakian case, since its economy was by far the most advanced among the four countries, and much more sensitive to abrupt changes in trade regimes. The other three countries, particularly Yugoslavia and Bulgaria were at the very beginning of their industrial development, and the protectionist schemes were an obvious choice for their governments in trade policy. Given the fact that the global economy, affected by the disastrous consequences of the war, the lack of substantial investment, and the deflationary policies in the second half of 1920s, could not provide them with business incentives, it is difficult to envision an alternative solution. One way or another, the four countries under study contributed immensely to the deglobalization of the international trade market in the interwar period.

Резиме

Др Александар Р. Милетић

Деглобализација на периферији

Царински протекционизам у југоисточној и источној
средњој Европи 1914–1928.

Кључне речи: трговински протекционизам, деглобализација, царинска заштита, југоисточна Европа, источна средња Европа

Глобални систем рестрикција у међународној трговини, као последица насиља Првог светског рата, указује се као један од најзначајнијих поремећаја у систему просперитетног капитализма 19. века. Ограничења у промету робе успостављена на међудржавном нивоу истовремено су примењивана и на домаћем тржишту, најпре у земљама учесницама ратних сукоба, а потом и у неутралним државама које су такође трпеле последице рата. Значајна државна интервенција у домену међународне трговине, иако у основи неуспешна и контрапродуктивна, продужена је инерцијом и на период после рата. У Европи, ситуација је постала још компликованија када су основане нове националне државе на простору њене економске периферије. У новим околностима број националних тарифних система у Европи је порастао са 20 на 27, а дужина међудржавних граница увећана је за 20.000 км; такође, низ нових и неуобичајених мера и концепција трговинског протекционизма постао је свакодневица међународне трговине у првој деценији после рата.

У европским размерама, власти четири државе које су предмет истраживања ове студије демонстрирале су највиши ниво државне интервенције како у погледу степена царинске заштите тако и примене неконвенционалних (тј. нецаринских) мера трговинског протекционизма. Високе заштитне царине биле су значајна одлика трговинске политике у предратној Бугарској и у земљама претходницама Југославије, Чехословачке и Пољске. После рата, Бугарска, Југославија и Чехословачка још су додатно увећале степен царинске заштите домаћег тржишта, посебно у домену индустријских производа.

У техничком смислу, пун обим тарифног опорезивања могао је бити заведен тек након монетарне стабилизације националних валута четири земље. У Чехословачкој је национална монета стабилована у 1922, у Југославији 1925, у Бугарској у 1926, а у Пољској тек у 1927. У међувремену, четири земље примењивале су низ нецаринских мера административне контроле спољне трговине. Међу њима, најпознатије су постале мере које су подразумевале издавање посебних дозвола за појединачне контингенте робе у увозу или извозу; широко су биле заступљене и извозне царине и систем

одобрених увозних и извозних контингената. Најинтензивнији систем царинске заштите био је заведен у Бугарској, где су након стабилизације лева уклоњене скоро све нецаринске мере. У Пољској је, с друге стране, модел високих заштитних царина комбинован са системом дозвола до краја двадесетих година прошлог века.

По питању административне рутине, као и у свим областима примењене политике, пољски и бугарски модели протекционистичке политике одликовали су се највећом мером државне интервенције међу европским земљама (изузев СССР-а). Рестриктивна политика и реципрочне мере које је изазивала компликовале су функционисање националних економија. Ово је посебно тачно у случају Чехословачке, јер је њена економија била далеко најразвијенија и извозно оријентисана, стога и много осетљивија на нагле промене трговинских режима. Остале три земље, посебно Југославија и Бугарска, биле су на самом почетку свог индустријског развоја, а протекционистичке шеме биле су изгледа очигледан избор њихових влада у трговинској политици. С обзиром на то да је глобална економија била погођена последицама ратних разарања и дефлаторне политике у другој половини 20-их, узимајући у обзир и да на економској периферији Европе није било суштинских страних инвестиција, тешко је замислити алтернативно решење на нивоу државне политике. Неоспорно је да су четири земље које су предмет студије у значајној мери допринеле тренду деглобализације међународне трговине у међуратном периоду.

POLITICAL CIRCLE “ZVENO” BETWEEN SOFIA AND BELGRADE 1934–1935*

Abstract: The paper examines the political circle Zveno – a small, but powerful political organization, one of the ruling factors in Bulgaria, after the coup d'état of 19 May 1934. Based on various sources, the aim of the research is to reveal certain aspects of Zveno's foreign policy towards the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenians (KSCS)/Yugoslavia at a time when revisionist aspirations of the Versailles status-quo in Europe emerged.

Key words: Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, IMRO, Military League/Union, Zveno

The outcome of the Great War completely changed the Old Continent and the destiny of millions of people. The long symphony of “*the European concert*” was replaced by the Treaty of Versailles, which secured the domination of France, Great Britain and their allies in Europe. This new order was guaranteed by a complex mechanism of treaties (Versailles, Saint-Germain-en-Laye, Neuilly-sur-Seine, Trianon, Sevres) and alliances (e.g. the so-called Little Entente, formed by Czechoslovakia, Romania and the KSCS in 1921), that formed a solid barrier against eventual revisionism. However, the confidence of the victorious Allies that the new *status-quo* had no alternative was soon shattered by reality. Led by Mustafa Kemal the Turkish nation won the war against the Greek Kingdom (1919–1922), turning the Treaty of Sevres into a piece of paper.¹ At the same time, in Italy, Benito Mussolini's fascist movement took power (1922), demonstrating Rome's increased ambitions to play a role in European affairs – ambitions, which were in contradiction with the Versailles order.² However, the biggest threat to the postwar borders in Europe was National-Socialism founded in Germany in the early 1920s. Adolf Hitler and his followers considered the Versailles Treaty absolutely unacceptable;³ therefore when the Nazis came to power they proclaimed the annulment of the treaty as their primary task. Consequently, several nations defeated in WWI or certain parts of

* This article has been written within the framework of the scholarly project *Serbs and Serbia in the Yugoslav and International Context: Internal Development and Position within European/World Community* (№ 47027), financed by the Ministry of Education, Science and Technological Development Republic of Serbia.

1 О. Петрунина, *Греческая нация и государство в XVIII–XX вв.*, Москва, 2010, с. 505–518.

2 J. Burgwyn, *Italian Foreign Policy in the Interwar period 1918–1940*, Greenwood Publishing Group, 1997, pp. 35–56.

3 У. Ширер, *Взлет и падение Третьего Рейха*, Москва, 2003, с. 50–51.

their societies saw extreme political ideas as a means to fight against the new peace system. This trend was quite visible in the Tsardom of Bulgaria.⁴

Bulgaria lost the war, which put the country in a difficult international position (in some cases more complicated than that of Germany).⁵ Sofia was surrounded by hostile countries, clearly demonstrating who the winners in the world conflict were. The only way for Bulgaria to break the diplomatic isolation it was in was to resolve the issues between Sofia and Belgrade – a mandatory condition for the improvement of Bulgarian relations with the major powers France and Great Britain. Therefore the Bulgarian authorities hurried to restore diplomatic relations with its western neighbour, which took place immediately after the signing of the Treaty of Neuilly.⁶ Namely its decrees would be the prism, through which the Bulgarian-Yugoslav “friendship” until April 1941 would be refracted.

During the governance of the Bulgarian Agrarian National Union (1919–1923), led by Aleksandar Stamboliyski, Sofia tried to reconcile with Belgrade, avoiding the Macedonian question and the fate of the Bulgarians in the Vardar part of Macedonia.⁷ This catalyzed a severe conflict between BANU and the Internal Macedonian Revolution Organization (IMRO), which accused Stamboliyski of betrayal. Ultimately, Bulgaria and the KSCS reached political consent – the so-called Niš Convention, which was practically directed against IMRO.⁸ This act was perceived as high treason by a part of Bulgarian society and the military (the Military League/Union) and was one of the prerequisites for the bloody coup d'état of 9 June 1923. As a result Stamboliyski was assassinated by the agents of the Internal Organization and the People's/Democratic Alliance (1923–1926) led by Prof. Aleksandar Tsankov who took power.⁹

The new government in Sofia was looked upon with suspicion by Belgrade.¹⁰ The government of Nicola Pašić saw the political change in Bulgaria as an act against the Niš Convention due to the close ties between the Bulgarian military and the IMRO. The ruling elite in the Kingdom was well aware of this. Of course, the concerns of Belgrade were greatly exaggerated. Bulgaria was not a serious threat to the KSCS. According to the Neuilly peace treaty, the Tsardom was disarmed and the country was in a severe civil conflict. The weakness of Sofia and the strong position of Belgrade in the region were only too visible in the so-called Krstić incident – a *cherchez la femme* scandal, turned by the Kingdom into a political issue, whose solution demeaned the honor of the Bulgarian Army.¹¹

4 Н. Поппетров, В. Божинов, *Национално могъща и обединена България*, С., 2014, с. 20–30.

5 As a state with big potential, Germany succeeded to break the post-war isolation with the Locarno Treaties and cooperation with the Soviet Union. Cf. X. Кисинджър, *Дипломацията*, С., 1997, с. 232–251. For a small nation as Bulgaria such options were unthinkable.

6 Д. Петрова, *Самостоятелното управление на БЗНС 1920–1923*, С., 1988, с. 146.

7 *Ibidem*, с. 151–155, 228–230, 361–363.

8 Ал. Гребенаров, *Легални и тайни организации на македонските бежанци в България 1918–1947*, С., 2006, с. 124–129.

9 Г. Марков, *Парола “Сабя”. Заговорите и превратите на Военния съюз 1919–1936*, С., 1992, с. 39–50.

10 *История на България*, Том IX, С., 2012, с. 222.

11 *Политика*, бр. 5579, 4. XI. 1923; бр. 5580, 5. V. 1923 г. Атенат на г. Крстића нашег војног аташеа у Софији; бр. 5583, 8. XI. 1923 г. Бугарска се извинила; Cf. *История на България...*, с. 223–224.

The events took a turn during the mandate of the so-called Second government of the Democratic Alliance (1926–1931) led by Andrey Lyapchev (who was born in town of Resen, today in the Republic of Macedonia). The new Prime-Minister was connected with the movement of the Bulgarians in Macedonia since the late 19th century.¹² So, searching for a trump against the KSCS/Yugoslavia and being closely committed to the Bulgarian cause in this region, Lyapchev gave his quiet support to the Internal Organization. Its leader Ivan (Vanche) Mihaylov became one of the most important figures in the Tsardom. He was also very influential among the members of the Organization in Vardar Macedonia, which created persistent problems for Belgrade. The murders of General Kovačević and Velimir Prelić, as well as the assassination attempt on Živojin Lazić, showed how powerful the IMRO was.¹³ At the same time, Sofia tried to maintain good relations with Rome hoping that the Italian support (Rome and Belgrade being in a serious political conflict) would help improve the situation of the Bulgarians in Vardar Macedonia.¹⁴

That situation continued until 1931, when the general elections were held in Bulgaria. Rapprochement with Yugoslavia was a priority for the new coalition government of the People's Block (the two major powers in it were BANU "Vrabcha 1" and the Democratic Party). Bulgaria aspired to break the hostile encirclement with the help of Belgrade thus gaining access to the Great Powers on whom its financial and economic development practically depended. Therefore, the authorities in the Tsardom tried to curb the Internal Organization (without any success) and use this as an argument for good neighborly relations with the Kingdom.¹⁵ The peak of this activity was the meeting between Tsar Boris III and King Aleksandar in Belgrade (December 1933), when the Yugoslav ruler tried to convince the Bulgarian Monarch that Bulgaria should join the planned Balkan Entente.¹⁶ However, if Bulgaria joined the future union it would mean acceptance of the Versailles *status-quo*, which was absolutely contrary to Bulgarian aspiration for a revision of the Treaty of Neuilly. Finally, after much diplomatic activity, the Tsardom refused to join to the Balkan Pact, leaving the door open for its ambitions to change the situation in the region.¹⁷

In such political circumstances the "Pro-Yugoslav" political circle *Zveno* was formed.¹⁸ For a second time in the interwar period in Bulgaria (the first one was the coup of 9 June 1923), a group from the so-called national elite founded a political organization and later took power with the support of the military. The circle turned itself into a political facade for a "classical" military junta and it completely

12 В. Божинов, Андрей Ляпчев, С., 2006, с. 16–20.

13 *Политика*, бр. 6983, 6. X. 1927, Југославија и Бугарска. Убиство генерала Ковачевића; бр. 7080, 14. I. 1928, Крвави атентат на Велимира Прелића; бр. 7257, 15. VII. 1928, По наредби Ванче Михайлова. For revenge the Belgrade authorities killed Ivan Mihaylov's father and brother. Cf. Ив. Михайлов, *Спомени*. Том III 1924–1934, С., 1997, с. 341–376, 383–403.

14 И. Димитров, *Българо-италиански политически отношения 1922–1943*, С., 1976, с. 121–189.

15 Кр. Манчев, В. Бистрицки, *България и нейните съседи*, С., 1978, с. 63–83.

16 Z. Avramovski, *Balkanska Antanta 1934–1940*, Beograd, 1986, с. 87–90.

17 *Ibidem*, с. 111–115.

18 English = Unit, Bulgarian = Звено.

abolished democracy in the country, thus paving the way for authoritarianism. The putschists initiated radical social changes, modifying the entire Bulgarian political and economic life and giving a new direction to Bulgarian foreign policy. One of its aspirations was the improvement of Bulgarian-Yugoslav relations – a very difficult task, having in mind the complex historical remnants between the two nations.

Zveno was founded in 1927 by Dimo Kazasov – a former member of the Social Democratic Party and a minister in the cabinet of Prof. Aleksandar Tzankov. The political circle was formed not as a typical political party but as a group of intellectuals (no more than 300 men), united by the ideas of a political system without parties and a strong state, combined with tendency for centralization and statism.¹⁹ Shortly, the organization grew in strength and attracted those who were disappointed in the traditional parties in the Tzardom.²⁰ Thus, the circle acquired the image of an organization with an anti-democratic face, which united politicians across the whole political spectrum. Viewed through the prism of the era, the aims of Zveno were not new and original. At that time authoritarian/totalitarian trends were popular in Europe. Thus, the political circle was a part of the right wing wave which spread throughout the continent after Mussolini had come to power in Italy.

At the same time, despite the deep anti-communism of the organization, Zveno was not a typical fascist formation. Kazasov admitted in his articles that the doctrine of fascism greatly influenced the members of the circle, but he also reminded the audience of something else. According to Kazasov, Zveno had its own face: “*we are not fascists, we are zvenars*”, wrote the founder of the circle, emphasizing the distinctive character of the organization. Ultimately, Zveno rejected the extreme nationalism in its Bulgarian variant, which was so well represented in all fascist formations in the state.²¹ According to the circle, the old nationalism (the style of the IMRO) belonged to the past and it was one of the biggest problems of Bulgaria and its political system. It isolated the Tsardom from the neighboring countries, which treated Sofia with suspicion. Therefore, the Bulgarian nation had to build “*a new national state*” without a parliament and political parties. In other words, as one of the members of the circle wrote, Zveno was a group of people, who had sympathies for Italian fascism and German National-Socialism, but they were mostly impressed by the “*enlightened authoritarian regime of Salazar*” (without its nationalism) in Portugal.²² In addition, the circle favored states with an anti-Italian (anti-fascism) stance, like France, the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. This

19 Д. Казасов, *Видяно и преживяно 1891–1944*, С., 1969, с. 382–384; В. Задгорска, *Кръгът “Звено” 1927–1934*, С., 2008, с. 68–122.

20 Soon after its foundation, Kimon Georgiev – a former minister in the government of Andrey Lyapchev, joined the circle. Georgiev left the cabinet after a scandal, caused by the support of the Bulgarian authorities for the IMRO. The former minister was an eminent opponent of Ivan Mihaylov and a supporter for the subjugation of the Internal Organization. Over time, Georgiev turned into the most important figure of Zveno.

21 Н. Поппетров, *Фашизмът в България*, С., 2008, с. 44.

22 Н. П. Николаев, *Фрагменти от мемоари*, С., 1994, с. 103–104.

stance was paradoxical. Practically, Zveno was the only totalitarian organization in Bulgaria, which declared its intentions for good relations with Belgrade. Why?

Zveno began its political life like most of the right-wing organizations in Bulgaria, who were anti-Serbian/Yugoslav because the Bulgarian society always regarded Belgrade as the one who had conquered old Bulgarian lands. Of course, the biggest issue was Vardar Macedonia and the position of the Bulgarians in the region. According to the circle, after the Great War the authorities in the KSCS/Yugoslavia introduced a regime of terror against the Bulgarians, because every expression *"of Bulgarian feelings [in Vardar Macedonia] is considered as high treason"*. Such a standpoint could have been related to any totalitarian organization in Bulgaria, if Zveno had not introduced a new important moment in the dispute between Sofia and Belgrade. It took the stance that the problems with the western neighbour could be resolved by following *"the path of understanding"*, because these were *"the vital interests of the Bulgarian people and state"*. Zveno knew well that the Bulgarians could hardly accept such ideas, since they considered the Serbs as their most dangerous enemies. Therefore, the circle grounded its position on the following arguments: *"We know that our way is a paradox. But who, with common sense, will prefer provocation as a form of action, when he knows well what the consequences will be for the population [in Vardar Macedonia], which we must protect"*.²³

Such a position sharply distinguished Zveno on the Bulgarian political stage. The difference was so big that the circle was coerced to explain its stance towards the issue. The circle hurried to add that the outstretched hand to Belgrade had its price. Kazasov personally demanded that the KSCS give full rights to *"the Bulgarians from Bitolya, Prilep, Stip, Skopje, Bosilegrad and Tsaribrod (now Dimitrovgrad)"*. This also meant the restoration of Bulgarian schools and churches in these lands (Vardar Macedonia and the Western Outlands – the cities of Tsaribrod and Bosilegrad with their surroundings) and the possibility to openly use the Bulgarian language. Only then the rapprochement between Sofia and Belgrade would be effective.²⁴ Simultaneously, the founder of the circle raised his voice against those *"who sing songs remembering the past"*, which was an obstacle to good relations with the Kingdom. Kazasov wrote that not everyone who wanted peace with Belgrade was a traitor. Only certain circles close to the IMRO voiced these reproaches and it was precisely the Internal Organization that was the barrier, which divided the political elites in the two countries.²⁵

It should be mentioned that Zveno had an interesting stance towards the Organization, based on two major points – the conflicts inside the organization and the balance between the IMRO and the Bulgarian authorities. Regarding the internal conflicts, the sympathies of the circle were on the side of Alexander Protogerov, who was an old functionary of the Organization with many connections among the zvenars.²⁶ Protogerov was a Bulgarian army general (some officers, united in

23 *Звено*, 1928, кн. 14, ст. Пак на западната ни граница.

24 *Звено*, 1928, кн. 30, ст. Италия и Югославия.

25 *Звено*, 1929, кн. 33, ст. София–Белград.

26 *Алманах на българските национални движения след 1878 г.*, С., 2005, с. 343–344. Exactly Protogerov led the squads of the Internal Organization and Bulgarian military forces, which quelled the Toplica insurrection (1917).

the so-called Military League/Union, had close relations with the zvenars) and a high-standing freemason (many members of the circle were freemasons too).²⁷ The general's group was weaker than its opponents in the IMRO, which did not mean it was harmless. It used the same methods as did its adversaries – threats and murders.

Ivan Mihaylov's faction was on the other side. He was the young leader who declared total war against Belgrade, because of the difficult position of the Bulgarians in Vardar Macedonia.²⁸ His group had the tacit support of the Bulgarian authorities during the rule of the cabinet led by Andrey Lyapchev and took advantage of the powerless government of the People's Bloc (1931–1934). This gave a visible vantage to Mihaylov's faction, which became a dominant factor in the Internal Organization. Such a strong position was one of the reasons for the high self-confidence of the group and the conviction that Mihaylov and his men were above the law. Logically, having so much unofficial power, Mihaylov ordered the assassination of Protogerov (1928) and after it had been successfully carried out, he became an undisputable leader of IMRO.²⁹

The second point was more important. In 1930a a highly publicized so-called spy scandal broke out in Bulgaria which shocked the society. A colonel from the Bulgarian army (his name was Konstantin Marinopolski) was accused of spying for the Yugoslav intelligence. Immediately, the IMRO captured the colonel, tortured and murdered him as a traitor to the Bulgarian ideals. But the guilt of Marinopolski was questionable. His tragic destiny shocked the zvenars, who had many friends among the officers' corps. For this reason, Zveno declared its indignation against Mihaylov's group and its methods of handling justice.³⁰ The circle accused the IMRO that its actions were immoral and illegal. The main questions raised in the campaign of the circle against the Internal Organization were why the Bulgarian authorities did nothing to avert the death of Marinopolski and why the government turned a blind eye to IMRO's operations. Zveno's replay was simple – the Bulgarian government did not want (or could not) keep Mihaylov's group under control because the government was too weak. The zvenars thought that only a strong state organization could be a guarantee against formations which put themselves above the law.

Mihaylov replied to the accusation of Zveno accordingly. He sent death threats to Kazasov, Damyan Velchev (the major figure in the Military League and an adherent of Zveno) and K. Georgiev.³¹ This practically meant that the IMRO declared war on the most powerful factor in the Bulgarian politics – the military and their political ally (in this case Zveno). Under these circumstances, the circle and the largest part of the Bulgarian army (more precisely the officers' corps)

27 В. Георгиев, *Масонството в България*, С., 1986, с. 246–247.

28 *Алманах на българските...*, с. 325–326.

29 Ив. Михайлов, *Спомени*, Том IV, С., 1998, с. 217–373. According to Mihaylov, some members of Protogerov's faction were in contact with the Serbian agents in Bulgaria – something unacceptable for the rules of the Internal Organization. Cf. Ив. Михайлов, *Спомени...*, с. 278.

30 Г. Марков, *Парола "Сабя"*..., с. 77–87.

31 *Из личния архив на Кимон Георгиев*, Том I, София, 2005, с. 551; 3. Тодоровски, *Политиката на българското правителство на Андрей Ляпчев спрямо ВМРО. - В: Андрей Ляпчев. Изкуство, култура, политика*, С., 2006, с. 102.

united against the Internal Organization, which brought them closer to Belgrade. The Kingdom also wanted the destruction of the IMRO, for of its own reason – to stop the armed resistance of the Bulgarians in Vardar Macedonia. So, paradoxically, but quite logically, the Bulgarian military and Zveno, on one hand and the Yugoslav authorities on the other, had a common goal – removing the Internal Organization from the political scene of the Balkans.

Soon, such an option became a reality through the coup, organized by the Military League and Zveno, which took place in Sofia on 19 May 1934. The radical change transformed the entire political life in Bulgaria. Less than a month after the coup, the new authorities prohibited, without any exception, all parties in the Tsardom. The head of the state – Tsar Boris III was isolated, even threatened with dethronement and later with a murder. The constitution was suspended and the parliament was dissolved. The new government, formed by Zveno with the support of the Military League and led by K. Georgiev (a few months before the coup, Dimo Kazasov left Zveno and his position, as a leader, was taken by Georgiev), began to rule by the so-called regulations, which had the effect of laws.³² Thereby, having cleared their way to absolute power, the zvenars and military dealt with the Internal Organization. In time, the long hand of the coup organizers reached the IMRO as well. In just twenty-four hours Mihaylov's mighty fraction was disbanded, its weapons were confiscated and its money was seized by the state. Moreover, all estates of the Internal Organization were nationalized and some members of the academic society, who were in close relations with the IMRO, were fired from the Sofia University. But the heaviest blow was inflicted on the members of the Internal Organization. Many of them were arrested and interned in special camps, while Ivan Mihaylov, who the authorities put on the wanted list, fled abroad.³³

The results of the government activities were achieved faster than the officials expected. The influence of the IMRO in Bulgaria, especially in the region of the town of Petrich, obviously decreased. Thus, K. Georgiev declared at a press conference that the Internal Organization had been completely annihilated.³⁴ Of course, the Prime-Minister spoke about Mihaylov's fraction. The deceased general Protogerov's group of was not prosecuted by the authorities and it fully supported the coup and the new regime.³⁵ Some of the protagonists were even employed in the administration, but in practice, Georgiev was right – the government really managed to erase all traces of the IMRO on Bulgarian territory. This fact was accepted with relief in Belgrade, where the IMRO was considered to be one of the Kingdom's main enemies.

The political events in Bulgaria were followed with great interest in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. The official newspaper "Politika" paid great attention to the processes in Bulgaria,³⁶ while the government circles received the news from Sofia with some restraint. The Yugoslav foreign minister Bogoljub Jevtić directly

32 В. Георгиев, *Буржоазните и дребнобуржоазните партии в България 1934–1939*, С., 1971, с. 72–74; В. Simić, *In the Spirit of National Ideology*, Belgrade, 2013, pp. 80–82.

33 *Нови дни*, бр. 20, 16. IX. 1934 г., Бягството на Иван Михайлов.

34 *Нови дни*, бр. 57, 27. X. 1934 г., Важни изявления на м-р-председателя.

35 Ив. Михайлов, *Quo vadis, Bulgaria*, Индианаполис, 1937, с. 15.

36 *Политика*, бр. 9341, 20. V. 1934 г., Државни удар у Бугарској.

asked the Bulgarian ambassador in Belgrade Georgi Kyoseivanov whether the new Bulgarian cabinet would continue to maintain good relations with Belgrade and what the opinion of Tsar Boris on the radical change was.³⁷ These questions showed some reticence, because the Yugoslav side became aware that it was their turn now. With the liquidation of the Internal Organization, Sofia had fulfilled one of the basic conditions of the Kingdom Yugoslavia for the beginning of rapprochement between the two countries. In return, the Bulgarian government expected some concessions from the Yugoslav side. Sofia wanted Belgrade to improve the position of the Bulgarians in Vardar Macedonia, hoping that the Yugoslav political elite would recognize the ethnic reality in the province.

The culmination of Bulgarian expectations was King Alexander's visit to Sofia, which took place in the end of September 1934. The monarch, who was welcomed by a huge crowd in the Bulgarian capital, expressed hope for a radical improvement of the relations.³⁸ During the stay, excellent interrelations between the Bulgarian Tsar and his guest were demonstrated which further encouraged the Bulgarian public that a breakthrough was really possible. In fact, the Yugoslav and Bulgarian side signed several agreements (opening of new border checkpoints, admission of Bulgarian books and newspapers on Yugoslav territory),³⁹ but actually the main issue – Macedonia, was not mentioned.⁴⁰ This gave rise to some disappointment in Sofia, but also hopes that the problem would be solved in the future. These expectations were based on the understanding reached between the two monarchs and the agreements made during the royal visit.

The Bulgarian-Yugoslav rapprochement, however, was halted by the assassination of King Alexander in Marseille.⁴¹ Immediately after the assassination the world learned that the assassin was a Bulgarian – Vlado Chernozemski, who was killed on the spot. Chernozemski was a member of the IMRO and the most dangerous assassin of the Internal Organization.⁴² After receiving the news that a Bulgarian had been involved in the murder of the King, the political elite in Sofia was overcome by anxiety. The ghost of a joint Balkan Pact action against Bulgaria became very real. But the Bulgarian authorities had an important trump in their hands. It was the Bulgarian state who disbanded the IMRO and the arguments that Sofia was behind the assassination did not have an effect.

37 ЦДА, ф. 3К, оп. 12, а. е. 1627, л. 1; ф. 176К, оп. 6, а. е. 2529, л. 59.

38 *Нови дни*, бр. 31, 28. IX. 1934 г., Блясково и възторжено посрещане на височайшите гости; *Политика*, бр. 9470, 28. IX. 1934 г., Историјски дани у Софији.

39 *Нови дни*, бр. 34, 1. X. 1934 г., ст. Резултатите от политическите разговори; Кр. Манчев, В. Бистрички, *България и нейните съседи...*, с. 137.

40 Z. Avramovski, *Balkanska Antanta...*, s. 170–172.

41 Г. Марков, *Покушения, насилие и политика в България 1878–1947*, С., 2003, с. 266–280.

42 The real name of Vlado Chernozemski was Velichko Dimitrov Kerin. He was born in the village of Kamenitza, now Velinograd, located in the northern slopes of the Rhodopes. Before assassinating King Alexander, Chernozemski murdered the prominent Bulgarian communist Dimo Hadjidimov and the functionary of the Internal Organization Naum Tomalevski, who was an opponent of Mihaylov inside the IMRO. Chernozemski was also a poet. In 1924, in some of his poems he described his future sacrifice: "O, life give me your winged thunderbolt/and the sacred impulse of the hawk,/to meet my enemy – the tyrant,/to crush his power". Cf. Ив. Михайлов, *Спомени...*, с. 538.

The assassinations of King Alexander froze the rapprochement between Sofia and Belgrade. After the murder of his cousin, Prince-Regent Paul (Pavle) became suspicious of the Bulgarian leaders, especially to the Bulgarian Tsar. The efforts of Zveno for closer relations with Yugoslavia were suddenly cut short. Meanwhile, other important events took place in the Bulgarian capital. The monarch was involved in a complicated power struggle against Zveno. Through skillful political maneuvering, Boris III managed to destroy the Military League, which was the basis of the circle's government. This determined the fate of the Zveno cabinet. On January 22 1935 Georgiev's government was toppled by the Tsar. Gradually, Boris III became the only relevant factor in Bulgarian politics and he continued to seek the support of Belgrade for Bulgarian revisionist demands, directed against Romania and Greece, which finally led to the signing of the Pact of Eternal Friendship in 1937.

Резиме

Др Воин Божинов

Политички круг „Звено“ између Софије и Београда 1934-1935.

| **Кључне речи:** Бугарска, Југославија, ВМРО, Војна лига, Звено

Појава организације „Звено“ на политичкој сцени је симптоматична за ситуацију у Бугарској током тридесетих година XX века, услед разочарања друштва дотадашњим политичким развитком. Звенари су предлагали несвакидашње мере (беспартијски режим, централизацију државног апарата, умањивање краљевске власти) и брзо су стекли знатну популарност а после преврата 19. маја 1934. преузели су кључну улогу у држави. Један од њихових првих задатака на спољнополитичком плану било је побољшање односа са Краљевином Југославијом и елиминација ВМРО, као гаранције добросуседских односа две државе. Из свега тога су произишле наде владајућих кругова у Софији да ће Београд признати етничку реалност у Вардарској Македонији и да ће се олакшати положај тамошњег становништва.

УДК 32:929 Стојадиновић М.(093.2)
327(497.1:497.2)"1935/1939"
070:32(497.2)"1935/1939"

Bojan SIMIĆ, Ph. D.

"THE GREATEST FRIEND OF BULGARIA" – MILAN STOJADINOVIĆ IN THE BULGARIAN NEWSPAPER *DNES**

Abstract: Based on primary sources and relevant literature the image of the Yugoslav Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Milan Stojadinović (1935–1939) in Bulgarian press will be analyzed. Special attention will be paid to the central pro-government newspaper *Dnes*. The article will cover three years, from the founding of the newspaper (February 1936) to the fall of Stojadinović (February 1939).

Key words: Milan Stojadinović, Bulgaria, Press, *Dnes*, propaganda

Relations between Bulgaria and Serbia (later Kingdom of Slovenes Croats and Serbs and from 1929 Yugoslavia) were one of the most important issues in the Balkans in the first half of twentieth century. A brief cooperation in the First Balkan War (1912–1913) against Ottoman Empire was followed by conflicts in the Second Balkan War and WWI. After the wars the two countries were once again on opposing sides. While the interest of Yugoslavia was to protect its existing frontiers, Bulgaria attempted to change them. The question of Vardar Macedonia was especially traumatic for Bulgaria which considered it to be its priority foreign policy issue for many years. Only after the regime was changed in 1934 did the policy begin to change.¹ In order to end the country's political isolation, the ruling circles in Bulgaria sought rapprochement with Yugoslavia and its support for the change of borders in the north and south, at the expense of Romania and Greece. Joint efforts of both sides to reach some kind of agreement resulted in the Pact of Eternal Friendship signed on 24th January 1937 in Belgrade.²

* This article has been written within the framework of the scholarly project *Tradition and Transformation – Historical Heritage and National Identity in Serbia in 20th Century* (№ 47019), financed by the Ministry of Education, Science and Technological Development Republic of Serbia.

1 More on the internal situation and political struggles for power in Bulgaria during the 1930s: В. Георгиев, *Буржоазните и дребно буржоазните партии в България 1934–1939*, София, 1971; В. Мигев, *Утвърждане на монархофашистката диктатура в България 1934–1936*, София, 1977; И. Димитров, *Българската демократична общественост, фашизмът и войната 1934–1939*, София, 2000; П. Цветков, Н. Поппетров, „Към типологията на политическото развитие на България през 30-те години“, *Исторически преглед*, 2/1990, с. 63–78.

2 Some notable papers on the topics of Bulgarian-Yugoslav relations in the second half of 1930s and Pact of Eternal Friendship: П. Арсов, „Българско-югославския пакт от 1937 г. – балкански Мюнхен“, *ТрВНИИИКМ*, 1961, No. 1, с. 331–345; Ж. Avramovski, *Balkanske zemlje i velike sile 1935–1937*, Beograd, 1968, str. 237–243; Ж. Avramovski, *Balkanska Antanta*, Beograd, 1986, str.

The key representative of the new policy of closer cooperation with Bulgaria on the Yugoslav side was the Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Milan Stojadinović (1935–1939).³ His policy of “preserving old friendships and creating new ones” was put in motion in the case of Bulgaria. Stojadinović wanted to secure his country’s eastern borders by accepting the Bulgarian offer of a bilateral pact. He saw the pact as one of the milestones of his foreign policy.⁴ On the other side, Bulgaria recognized Stojadinović as the key figure for maintaining good relations between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia and possibly as a strong ally in regards to its territorial claims towards Romania and Greece. The Bulgarian officials were also well aware of Stojadinović’s respectable position in contemporary Europe, especially in Rome and Berlin. Considering all this, they decided to abandon their claims to Vardar Macedonia at least for the time being.⁵ The value of Stojadinović for Bulgarian future plans was clear to his colleague, Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bulgaria, Georgi Kioseivanov (Георги Кюсеиванов, 1936–1940) who once said: “We made the pact with Stojadinović not Serbia”.⁶

The image of Milan Stojadinović created in the Bulgarian press, primarily in the central pro-government newspaper *Dnes* will be analyzed. Before doing so, I will discuss the following: position of the press in the country, press legislation and the founding and significance of the newspaper *Dnes*. The press was the most powerful tool in the hands of the regimes in Bulgaria in the interwar period. It was the traditional and the most widespread media for informing the masses as well as being the least expensive one. All governments in Bulgaria were well aware that controlling and influencing the press was one of the most important steps towards controlling public opinion. The ruling circles in the country put a lot of effort into controlling the transfer of information in order to control what was to be published in the press. Control was accomplished in various ways from enforcing harsh censorship to resorting to bribery.

The newspaper industry was not as developed in Bulgaria as it was in Western Europe, but it was no less interesting. As illustrated below, one can see the situation at the end of the reviewed period:

250–256; К. Манчев, *Югославия и меѓународните одношенија на Балканите 1933–1939*, София, 1989, с. 137–152; Л. Спасов, Цв. Спасова, „Българо- югославският пакт от 24 јануари 1937 г. за ‘Нерушим мир и вечно пријателство’“, *ИИВИБА*, 61, 1997, с. 146–157; В. Божинов, „Пакта за ‘Вечно пријателство’ в контекста на българскиот национален вѣпрос“, *Tokovi istorije*, 1–2/2008, стр. 38–55; V. Bojinov, „Bulgaria and Yugoslavia on the Eve of the April War“, *Срби и рат у Југославији 1941. године*, Београд, 2014, стр. 189–194.

3 For the latest literature considering Stojadinović one should check anthology *Милан Стојадиновић: политика у време глобалних ломова*, Београд, 2013.

4 М. Stojadinović, *Ni rat, ni pakt*, Rijeka, 1970, стр. 403–408.

5 Божинов, „Пакта за ‘Вечно пријателство’...“, с. 50.

6 Арсов, „Българско-югославският пакт...“, с. 345.

Newspapers and Magazines in Bulgarian in the Second Half of 1930s⁷

Year	Newspapers	Magazines	Total
1936	470	373	843
1937	512	363	875
1938	531	381	912
1939	513	393	906

It is important to note that according to the same statistics, the number of newspapers marked as political was less than 4% (33 in 1936 and barely 22 in 1939). This clearly meant that the regime did not encourage the founding of new political newspapers and as can be seen, some of the already existing newspapers ceased to exist.

Nevertheless, there were several important daily newspapers with a large circulation in Bulgaria during the 1930s and the aforementioned table shows their monthly circulation:

Newspapers in Bulgaria on June 1939⁸

Newspaper	Published	Sold
<i>Utro</i>	2,220,000	1,908,000
<i>Zora</i>	2,172,000	1,904,000
<i>Zarya</i>	735,000	538,000
<i>Dnevnik</i>	661,000	529,000
<i>Dnes</i>	614,000	476,000
<i>Slovo</i>	309,000	240,000
<i>Mir</i>	271,000	197,000

According to the data, we can conclude that in 1939, the key pro-government newspapers *Utro* daily published more than 74.000 copies and *Dnes* more than 20.000 copies.

One of the important events in the development of the press in Bulgaria was the founding of the *Strela* (Arrow) society. It belonged to the Society of Journalists from the Capital (Дружество на столичните журналисти). This society had an exclusive right to distribute journals and periodicals in Sofia and in the provinces. One representative, delegated by the Prime Minister, was a member of the governing body of the society⁹ and this made it easier to spread propaganda to more people in more places. In 1935, the Society had 11.000 subscribers¹⁰ and *Strela* retained its monopolistic position in Bulgaria, even after the Second World War.

One of the characteristics of the Bulgarian press in the 1930s was the small number of journalists employed by the newspapers. The main pro-government

7 Статистически годишник на Българското царство 1939, София, 1940, с. 733.

8 Централен държавен исторически архив [The Central State Historical Archives], (further on in the text CDA), 176k-20-19, Report of *Strela* on 29 July 1939.

9 „Наредба-закон за разпространение на вестниците и периодическите издания“, art. 8, *Държавен вестник*, No. 161, 16. X 1934, с. 2434–2435.

10 CDA, 284k-3-42-30.

papers were *Dnes* and *Utro*, which only had respectively 25 and 18 full time employees. However, the newspaper *Zora* had the largest number of employed journalists 30.¹¹

The Bulgarian press legislation introduced a new registration system for all newspapers which now had to pass a series of inspections prior to distribution and this proved particularly strict. The decree dated 12th June 1934, which had legislative power, ordered that following a period of ten days after its enactment, all newspapers and journals in Bulgaria should be re-registered. A permanent ban was proscribed by the law (Article 2) for those newspapers that would fail to follow this procedure. Editors who attempted to publish newspapers without a permit faced a three year imprisonment term and a fine of 30,000 leva (Article 4).¹²

On 6th April 1938, several decrees were issued on the control of the press. Control was preliminary, which meant that no material could be published before official approval. In order to obtain approval, one would need to provide the following data: name of newspaper, financial sources, name, age, education, birthplace and address of the editor. The eligibility for the position of the editor was precisely prescribed, he had to be a Bulgarian citizen aged 30 or more (for newspapers) and 21 (for magazines), could not be: persons convicted for treason and betrayal, debauchery or corruption, crime against dynasty and for crimes punishable by the "Law for Protection of the State" etc. Sanctions included fines, confiscations and seizures but compared with 1934, there was no imprisonment.¹³ The aim of the ruling class was to financially cripple the power of the opposition press with high fines and taxes. Additional pressure was put on the newspapers by an order dated 15th April 1938, which established supervision and pre-released proofing of all printed materials with a right to ban or stop publication permanently.¹⁴

Soon after the Press Law was passed in Bulgaria in 1934, the first bans on newspapers were imposed and 14 different journals were banned. Four of these were newspapers that supported the communists: *Rabotnik* (Работник, Worker), *Edinstvo* (Единство, Unity), *Zvezda* (Звезда, Star) and *Rabotnicheska Misl* (Работническа мисъл, Workers' Thought).¹⁵ However, around 120 journals were given permission to be published amongst them were newspapers loyal to the regime as well as some apolitical ones.

At the end of 1935 and beginning of 1936, certain weaknesses in censorship appeared in Bulgaria due to the change of regime and the efforts of the Tsar's circle to find the most appropriate policy for the country. However, after this brief period, press control was strengthened once again and the analysis of the Society of the Capital's Journalists, gives a clear picture of the position the Bulgarian press was in:

1935 – was difficult for journalists due to ongoing censorship, limited employment, unfulfilled promises for terminating censorship; 1936 – partial liberation but only sporadic and unsatisfactory, Kioseivanov promised less

11 *Ibid.*

12 *Слободата на печата в България*, София, 1992, с. 151.

13 И. Димитров, „Диктатурата и печатът“, *Политическата цензура в България*, Ф. Панаитов (ed.), Варна, 2003, с. 102.

14 Р. Даскалов, *Българското общество 1918–1939*, II, София, 2006, с. 485.

15 *Държавен вестник*, No. 69, 27. VI 1934, с. 1195.

censorship on a few occasions, but instead new, harsher measures against the press were introduced; 1937 – press control regime did not change, it became more strict, not only regarding internal but also external affairs; there was a lack of instructions, no one knew what was permitted and what was not.¹⁶

However, the government did not always succeed in achieving its goals. In 1938, we noted one, not insignificant, victory for the democratic forces in Bulgaria. The Parliament, with a narrow margin, did not vote for loans to be taken in order to buy machines and other equipment for the pro-government newspaper *Dnes*. One of the deputies even said that he would not vote for the newspaper "in the service of propaganda and advocating the aims of the government, with anti-parliamentary and anti-social stance".¹⁷ In this case the remaining opposition was strong enough to block some authoritarian laws, even in Parliament.

In the second half of 1930s, the most influential daily newspapers in the service of state propaganda were: *Dnes* (Днес, Today), *Utro* (Утро, Morning) and *Večer* (Вечер, Evening) and *La Parole Bulgare* (The Bulgarian Word). From 1936–1944, *Dnes* was one of the most important newspapers for state propaganda in Bulgaria. Some of the most notable journalists of the period were its directors like Dino Bozkov (Дино Божков)¹⁸ and the editor in chief Simeon Gruev.¹⁹ The newspaper usually had eight pages, except for the holiday editions which had 12 or sometimes even more. In the first issue of *Dnes*, the main tasks of the newspaper were underscored on the front page:

To start one comprehensive newspaper, which will fill the absence of true and documented facts on state activities and social life in the country and help, in its own way, stabilize life in the country, with the aim of bringing better days to Bulgaria, which has every right to expect them after all its suffering.²⁰

The formulation of helping the country in practice clearly meant helping the government. That was one of the primary tasks of *Dnes* from its beginning until its end. This tendency was clearly stated in 500th issue of the newspaper when in editorial stated that if the government continued with this policy of success in all fields, *Dnes* "would be happy to write about it even in its 5,000th issue".²¹ Later in the 1940s, under Prime Minister Bogdan Filov,²² the newspaper officially became the mouthpiece of the government.

The central part of this paper will focus on the writings of the central Bulgarian pro-government newspaper *Dnes* about the Yugoslav Prime Minister

16 Димитров, „Диктатурата...“, с. 97.

17 *Ibid*, p. 109.

18 Dino Bozkov (1876–1966) – teacher, translator and publisher. He was the author of various publications on religious topics and propagandist of Christian ethics. He was the publisher and director of *Vchera i dnes* (1939–1940) and *Večer* (1939–1940), unofficial newspapers of the Kioseivanov government.

19 Simeon Gruev (1894–1944) – journalist. He worked for several different newspapers like: *Balkanska tribuna*, *Zarya*, *Narod*, *Slovo* and *Makedonia*. Editor in chief of *Vchera i dnes* (1939–1940) and *Dnes* (1939–1940). He disappeared in the first days of communist rule in Bulgaria.

20 *Днес*, No. 1, 3. II 1936, с. 1.

21 *Днес*, No. 500, 30. IX 1937, с. 1.

22 Bogdan Filov (1883–1945) – professor of archeology (1920–1944), dean of University of Sofia (1931–1932) and president of Bulgarian Academy of Science (1937–1944). As a politician, he was Minister of Education (1938–1940), Prime Minister (1940–1943) and regent (1943–1944).

and Minister of Foreign Affairs Milan Stojadinović. The period under review is three years, from the founding of the newspaper in February 1936 to the fall of Stojadinović's government in February 1939, – more than 920 different issues. The general policy of *Dnes* did not differ from other political newspapers in Europe of the time. The main focus was on domestic news and the most important international events. The neighboring countries, such as Yugoslavia, were covered by news that was directly connected with Bulgaria, or indirectly as were the activities of the Balkan Pact and Little Entente. In other cases, only the most important events in the country such as the change of government, the King's birthday and national holidays were reported on the pages of *Dnes*.

Between February 1936 and February 1939 two different phases, can clearly be seen, in the writings of *Dnes* about Yugoslav Prime Minister Stojadinović and I will elaborate that further. In its first months the newspaper printed only a few articles, mostly news on Yugoslavia and its Prime Minister. The only stories that received more attention were the private visit of the Bulgarian monarch Tsar Boris to Belgrade in February and an assassination attempt on Stojadinović in March 1936.²³ The first story was favorable and mostly about the reception the Bulgarian monarch was given in the Yugoslav capital. The second story had more facts without further interpretation – what happened, who were the conspirators and what was the outcome. It is important to mention that during 1936 *Dnes* published several articles on the activity of the opposition parties in Yugoslavia and their stance towards the government. One article reported the speech of Ljubomir Davidović, leader of Democratic Party, who criticized the government using strong language. Furthermore, news about political violence in Croatia was published quite often. Titles like: "Riots in Zagreb", "Two political murders in Croatia" and "Bloodshed in Kerestinac" were published at the end of the March and during April. Those articles did not blame Stojadinović directly but the general impression that Bulgarian readers could get certainly was not good. We should underline that information about government activity was predominant but as mentioned, the activities of the opposition and internal conflicts in the state were also reported.

The change took place at the end of 1936. The two Prime Ministers had several meetings at that time. It is important to mention that all roads from Bulgaria to Western Europe passed through Yugoslavia. In order for the Bulgarian Tsar or Prime Minister to visit that part of Europe he had to pass through Belgrade and that was an opportunity to meet Yugoslav officials. Kioseivanov visited Belgrade on his way back from Geneva in October 1936. Tsar Boris was in Yugoslavia at the beginning of the same year and then again in August. The intentions of the Bulgarian side were made clear in the interview the Prime Minister gave to a Greek newspaper prior to his visit. He stated that basic premises of Bulgarian foreign policy were: "Good relations with the Great powers, friendship with neighbors, especially with Yugoslavia and dedication to the League of Nations".²⁴

Negotiations regarding the future pact continued in November when Stojadinović traveled to Turkey. He met Kioseivanov on the way to Ankara, and

23 On 7th March 1936 member of opposition Damjan Arnaudović (Yugoslav National Party), unsuccessfully tried to kill Stojadinović in Parliament. He and his accomplices were arrested and sentenced.

24 *Днес*, 24. X 1936, c. 2.

then both him and Tsar Boris III on his way back. The Yugoslav Prime Minister received outstanding attention (special train at his disposal, admission to the royal castle in Krichim, hunting with the Tsar at his hunting ground) and the relations between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia became headlines in every newspaper. In *Dnes*, Stojadinović was called: "one of the most educated minds of Yugoslavia", "the greatest friend of Bulgaria", "dearest guest of Bulgaria" and "symbol of rapprochement" between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia and "pillar of two ideas: Peace on Balkans" and "Balkans to the Balkan nations".²⁵ It is true to say that the Yugoslav Prime Minister did not only support the Bulgarian-Yugoslav rapprochement but he actively worked with the Balkan allies to make it possible. Romania and Greece were especially opposed to it at the beginning.²⁶ This visit clearly defined the stance that pro-government newspapers in Bulgaria would take towards Stojadinović and his government in following years. From that moment the Prime Minister of Yugoslavia was seen as a guarantee of good relations between two brotherly nations and possibly a powerful Bulgarian ally in support of its territorial claims towards Romania and Greece.

The most fruitful period for creating Milan Stojadinović's positive image in the Bulgarian press was the celebration of the Pact of Eternal Friendship. Throughout January 1937 articles covering the relations between the two states filled the newspaper. Close to a hundred different articles were published together with many photos of the two country's highest officials. *Dnes* republished not only articles from the Yugoslav and Bulgarian press but also articles from the European press. All of them had one thing in common: they all praised the pact as a significant document for two nations. The pact was presented in the Bulgarian newspapers as an achievement of the greatest importance, not only for the Balkans but also for entire Europe. It was underlined that the idea came from the late Yugoslav king Alexander and the Bulgarian Tsar Boris III and that it was developed and concluded by the current Prime Ministers. The pact was described as "the best possible Christmas gift", "historical act", "most important event in the history of both states", "first light of new Slavic life" etc. Similar coverage was given to the celebrations of the first and second anniversary in 1938 and 1939.

Beyond any doubt, Stojadinović's portraits and photos helped create his positive image in *Dnes*. During the three years under review more than a dozen different profile photographs were published and on each of them the Yugoslav Prime Minister looked powerful and determined. Special prominence was given to photos taken by photographers of *Dnes* during Stojadinović meetings with Bulgarian officials, both at home and abroad. The most interesting were the ones where he was shown walking hand in hand with K joseivanov and those of cordial greetings at farewells. It was underlined that two prime ministers had been friends even before they became heads of governments. The friendship was dated as going back to the time when K joseivanov was Bulgarian ambassador in Belgrade (1933–1934).

An exceptional event was the statue of Stojadinović made by the Bulgarian artist Kiril Todorov. The newspapers published a photo of Todorov and Stojadinović beside the statue. In the following interview the Bulgarian artist praised the

25 *Днес*, 3. XI 1936, с. 2.

26 Avramovski, *Balkanska Antanta*, str. 253–256.

Prime Minister as a man “with passion for culture” and as a person who already owned “many great works by Yugoslav and European artist”.²⁷ It is not without importance that the statue of Stojadinović was made during the election campaign in Yugoslavia and that it was used for domestic propaganda purposes. The photos and the story were first published by one of the most important newspapers in Yugoslavia, *Vreme*, practically owned by Stojadinović family. The Prime Minister himself took a personal interest in that specific newspaper and considered it to represent a model newspaper.²⁸

Dnes cooperated with the Yugoslav pro-government press. The celebration of the first anniversary of the Pact of Eternal Friendship on 24th January 1938 is an important example of this cooperation. A special issue of the newspaper on 8 pages was published dealing with Yugoslav-Bulgarian relations, plus articles on the development of Yugoslavia and achievements of Stojadinović’s government. Clearly most of the material was prepared in Belgrade and only translated into Bulgarian. Re-publishing articles taken from Stojadinović’s main propaganda newspapers *Samouprava* and *Vreme* was a frequent form of cooperation between the two newspapers. A good example is: *Dnes* re-published in its issue of 16th August and in the following days most of the special edition articles printed in *Samouprava* published in August 1938 that dealt with Yugoslav-Bulgarian relations. Some Belgrade newspapers were designated as the official voice of the ruling party and government. On the other hand, some articles from *Dnes* were re-published in the pro-government press in Yugoslavia. Furthermore, *Dnes* was cleared by the Yugoslav Central Press Bureau for free import and trade within the country.²⁹

An example of how strong the support of *Dnes* to Stojadinović and his government was, can be seen in its coverage of the Concordat crisis in Yugoslavia during the summer of 1937. The Concordat was signed in 1935 as one of the first acts after Stojadinović took office in June 1935. The agreement with the Catholic Church was prepared by the previous government but the new Prime Minister acted on it, although he delayed submitting it to parliament for ratification for two years. It was strongly opposed by the Serbian Orthodox Church and diverse opposition circles, spanning from the right to the extreme left that led to demonstrations, conflicts and finally to the withdrawal and renunciation of the Concordat.³⁰ Considering the dimensions of the crisis in Yugoslavia at the moment, *Dnes* printed only few articles in those two months. On the 1st July *Dnes* reported that Stojadinović had visited the seriously ill Patriarch Varnava and that they had talked about the Concordat. On 7th July they re-published an article from *The Times* that said that the position of the Serbian Orthodox Church

27 *Днес*, 18. X 1938, с. 8.

28 About Stojadinović relation towards *Vreme* see: М. Јовановић Стоимировић, *Дневник 1936–1941*, Нови Сад, 2000, стр. 404–408.

29 Archive of Yugoslavia (AY), Collection of Central Press Bureau (38), box 88. See also: Б. Симић, *Пропаганда Милана Стојадиновића* [Milan Stojadinović’s Propaganda], Београд, 2007, стр. 91.

30 More about Concordat crisis in Yugoslavia from various literature see: М. Мишковић, *Srpska crkva i Konkordatska kriza*, Београд, 1983; Р. Радић, *Живот у временима: Гаврило Дожич 1881–1950*, Београд, 2006, стр. 156–186.

towards the Concordat was irreconcilable. The same article claimed that the government in Belgrade had made concessions to the Catholic Church but asked in return that it stopped supporting the Croatian Peasant Party.³¹ That was the only neutral article on that issue. When riots broke out *Dnes* not surprisingly chose to support the Yugoslav Prime Minister. The newspaper completely ignored violent street protests that took place on 19th July in Belgrade, later called "Bloody Liturgy (*Krvava litija*)" because a few priests had been injured. The only published articles dealt with the illness and death of Patriarch Varnava. Theories about him being poisoned, popular with the Yugoslav opposition, were never mentioned.

The following month *Dnes* continued to defend Stojadinović. Several articles criticizing the Serbian Orthodox Church and the opposition were published. The decision of Holy Synod to excommunicate the Prime Minister and all Orthodox members of Parliament who had voted for the Concordat was seen "not only as illegal but as a severe violation of both the state and Serbian Orthodox Church constitutions".³² Another article by the *Dnes* correspondent from Belgrade analyzing the situation concluded that "The Serbian Orthodox Church strayed away from its old and traditional tasks. Nowadays it is under political influence and everything it does is connected to politics".³³ Obviously the correspondent was not only influenced by Belgrade's government propaganda but also expressed the already established position of his editorial board in Sofia. Thus the Concordat crisis was summarized in 6th October issue by saying: "Stojadinović's position has just become stronger after the Concordat crisis".³⁴

The following two articles are the most interesting from the propagandistic point of view. The first one was titled "Mr. and Mrs. Stojadinović at Home", published in July 1937 and the second "50th Birthday of Milan Stojadinović" from August 1938. Both are examples of a more personal approach to the Yugoslav Prime Minister. In the first one, the Yugoslav Prime Minister and his wife were presented as "highly cultured people" who had "impeccable taste". It was an unorthodox interview in which the husband and wife talked about gardening, free time activities, favorite literature and the place of women and children in the society. It is interesting to note that Mrs. Stojadinović underlined that a woman's place was "first and foremost in the home".³⁵ The text was illustrated with four different photographs of the spouses in their garden. The second article was a brief biography of Stojadinović and a retrospective of his political career. The tone of the article was very positive and the politics of the Yugoslav Prime Minister were glorified. The article on his birthday was illustrated by a photograph of Stojadinović reading in his cabinet. A similar approach can be seen in the two photographs of Stojadinović taken during his vacation at St Moritz (published on 16th January 1937), one of him wearing a ski suit and the other a photo of his wife and daughter (13th February 1937).

31 *Dnes*, 7. VII 1937, c. 2.

32 *Dnes*, 16. VIII 1937, c. 3.

33 *Dnes*, 18. VIII 1937, c. 2.

34 *Dnes*, 16. X 1937, c. 1.

35 *Dnes*, 23. VII 1937, c. 6.

It has been said that a picture is worth a thousand words. This is true in the case of image of Milan Stojadinović created in *Dnes*. After the elections in Yugoslavia a caricature was published that clearly backs this up. We can see two peasants, a Bulgarian and a Serbian one watching the plant that represented the Pact of Eternal Friendship which was covered by white ballots cast for Stojadinović. They both happily concluded: "While there is snow like that there is no fear for our plant".³⁶ Once again, in form of caricature, *Dnes* affirmed the constructed image of Stojadinović as the greatest friend of the Bulgarian people and defender of the pact between two states. The author was a regular artist of *Dnes* who signed himself as K. Kamenov.

The image of Stojadinović was constructed even through short stories. One of them is especially interesting. While traveling through Bulgaria the Yugoslav Prime Minister saw a Bulgarian peasant in a beautiful handmade white jacket. Stojadinović asked him how much he would ask for the jacket. Peasant said 120 levas. He was given 500 instead. The scene ended with the happy Bulgarian peasant blessing the Yugoslav Prime Minister.³⁷ This *Dnes* article, illustrated by photos taken on the spot, made Stojadinović looks both noble and generous.

Occasionally *Dnes* offered its readers to judge for themselves the results achieved by Stojadinović and his government. One such occasion was the exhibition of *Italian Portrait through Centuries* that was held in Belgrade from 28th March until 9th May of 1938.³⁸ The newspaper published the advert that offered train tickets to the Yugoslav capital from 17 different Bulgarian cities.³⁹ It was described as "one pleasant and useful trip" but also an opportunity to see what the Yugoslav government had achieved in last few years.⁴⁰ The advert was published in different issues.

There were no signs that things would change any time soon. After the election and Stojadinović's victory with a narrow margin, *Dnes* continued to write positively about the situation in Yugoslavia concluding that the Prime Minister had everything under control.⁴¹ The first comments were that "Stojadinović's election victory opens an even brighter page of good relations, cordial friendship, peaceful and cultural cooperation in the interest of two brotherly nations".⁴²

The change of government that took place in February 1939 in Belgrade was unexpected for the editorial of *Dnes* and its readers. It is clear from the first mentioned demission of Stojadinović that it was unwanted. It covered his meeting with the Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs on the day of his resignation

36 *Днес*, 15. XII 1938, c. 8.

37 *Днес*, 2. III 1938, c. 3.

38 L. Carletti, C. Giometti, "'Un altro sfallo del 1938': La Mostra del Ritratto Italiano nei secoli a Belgrado", *Atti dell'Istituto Veneto di Scienze, Lettere ed Arte*, Tomo CLXVIII (2009–2010), pp. 257–290; B. Simić, „Izložba 'Italijanski portret kroz vekove' u Beogradu 28. mart – 9. maj 1938", *Istorija 20. veka*, 1/2013, str. 23–34.

39 The cheapest one was from Sofia 368 levas and the most expensive one was from Burgas, total 689 levas.

40 *Днес*, 26. IV 1938, c. 5.

41 Stojadinović's list claimed around 54% while list made of Croatian and Serbian opposition parties claimed 45% of total votes.

42 *Днес*, 12. XII 1938, c. 1.

expressing no doubt in Stojadinović's long lasting presidency. However, the next day they published the names of the new ministers and the first statement of the new Prime Minister Cvetković. Only after some time did *Dnes* publish its final judgment of Stojadinović and his work. In the editorial article entitled "Government Change in Yugoslavia", the former Prime Minister was described as "careful and competent statesman with a vision, who resolved many internal problems and had significant success in foreign policy". In addition, the following was written:

For us, Bulgarians, Stojadinović's time in office will be remembered as the period of greatest cooperation and most fruitful for the relations of two countries. During his government the foundations were laid that led to the Pact of Eternal Friendship between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. (...) The greatest merit for that fortunate act of brotherly cooperation goes to the two Prime Ministers to whom both states will forever be grateful.⁴³

The author of the article concluded that the next government should continue to follow that policy for the greater good of two nations. In following days *Dnes* published several articles that quoted the statement of the new Yugoslav government that the foreign policy of the country would remain unchanged. One article even claimed that Milan Stojadinović would support his successor.⁴⁴ Those articles were a combination of official Yugoslav statements and Bulgarian newspaper editorial's wishes. Generally, in the months that followed, *Dnes* did not change its stance towards Yugoslavia after Stojadinović's fall from power. However, it did not express the same level of positive language and enthusiasm as it did in the previous period.

Резиме

Др Бојан Симић

„Највећи пријатељ Бугарске” – Милан Стојадиновић у бугарском листу *Днес*

Кључне речи: Милан Стојадиновић, Бугарска, штампа, *Днес*, пропаганда

У раду се анализира писање бугарског централног провладиног листа *Днес* о председнику владе и министру спољних послова Југославије Милану Стојадиновићу од фебруара 1936. до фебруара 1939. године. У овом периоду јасно разликујемо две фазе. Прва, која траје до новембра 1936. и постизања договора о Пакту о вечном пријатељству, потписаном у јануару наредне године, и друга, до краја наведеног периода. У почетној фази, поред текстова о активности југословенске владе и њеног председника, можемо наћи и текстове посвећене активностима опозиције, као и чланке који критикује одређене аспекте друштвеног живота у Југославији.

⁴³ *Днес*, 7. II 1938, с. 1.

⁴⁴ *Днес*, 14. II 1939, article entitled „Stojadinovic will give support to the new government”. The article was written by *Dnes* correspondent from Belgrade.

Друга фаза, након постизања споразума о пакту, а нарочито након његовог потписивања, одликује се афирмативним и позитивним извештавањима о Југославији, пре свега о самом Стојадиновићу. Схваћен као гарант спровођења споразума од којег је бугарска страна очекивала вишеструке користи, председник југословенске владе приказиван је као далековид државник и способан политичар који води своју земљу путем мира и благостања. Посебно је истицано његово пријатељство са бугарским премијером Кјосеивановим и благонакланост према Бугарској. С друге стране, вести о делатности опозиције у Југославији сведене су на минимум, а у неким осетљивим ситуацијама, као што је била конкордатска криза током лета 1937, њена активност била је потпуно игнорисана. *Днес* је чак објављивао чланке које му је прослеђивала режимска штампа из Београда, који су били потпуно на страни владе и њене политике.

Пад Стојадиновића фебруара 1939. *Днес* је дочекао са изненађењем и жаљењем. Након почетног ћутања, закључено је да би нова владала требало да настави путем који је заједно са бугарским премијером утабао управо Стојадиновић. И у наредном периоду централни провладин лист у Бугарској наставио је са позитивним текстовима о Југославији и њеној влади али не у толикој мери и обиму као до тада.

КИПАРСКА КРИЗА 1974. И ПОГОРШАЊЕ ЈУГОСЛОВЕНСКО-АМЕРИЧКИХ ОДНОСА*

Апстракт: У раду се анализира утицај кипарске кризе на тадашње стање у југословенско-америчким односима. Оштре изјаве југословенских званичника и коментари у југословенској штампи о америчком учешћу у припремама и реализацији државног удара на Кипру изазвали су лавину незадовољства у Вашингтону. Међутим, после неочекиване отворене изјаве председника Форда да је Ција била креатор сличног државног удара у Чилеу претходне године и да је то било у „најбољем интересу“ Американаца, али и чилеанског народа – нико у Београду више није испољавао минимум разумевања за револт Стејт департмента поводом југословенске кампање уперене против империјалне политике САД-а у свету.

Кључне речи: Југославија, САД, Грчка, Турска, Ција, кипарска криза, Медитеран, Тито, Кисинџер, Макариос, војна хунта, НАТО

Током 1974. године два важна догађаја на Медитерану ће, заједно са бурним превирањима на Блиском истоку, подстаћи и засводити и иначе присутна југословенска страховања од даље америчке пенетрације на Медитерану и Балкану, која би потенцијално могла угрозити безбедност и суверенитет Југославије. Наиме, током пролећа и лета 1974, у релативно кратком временском распону, Сједињене Државе су учествовале у политичким и војним збивањима која су у неку руку ослабила међународну позицију Југославије и која су се косила са глобалним приоритетима које је она као несврстана земља упорно заговарала. Крајем марта, у време када поново долази до драматичне ескалације тршћанске кризе и оштре југословенско-италијанске конфронтације око некадашње Зоне Б, америчка Шеста флота заједно са италијанским оружаним снагама укључује се у маневре у северном Јадрану, надомак Трста. Такав потез САД-а у Београду је тумачен као намерна провокација и америчка подршка италијанским територијалним претензијама према Југославији. Следећи корак у склопу америчких настојања да се потпуно овлада Медитераном, југословенске власти су виделе у америчкој подршци грчким генералима који су организовали државни удар на Кипру и насилно свргли са власти Титовог блиског

* Чланак је резултат рада на пројекту *Српско друштво у југословенској држави у 20. веку: између демократије и диктатуре* (№ 177016), који финансира Министарство просвете, науке и технолошког развоја Републике Србије.

сарадника из покрета несврстаности, архиепископа Макариоса, 15. јула 1974. године. Да је тај пуч успео, Макариоса би очигледно снашла слична судбина као и чилеанског лидера Аљендеа (годину дана раније), а Кипар би, попут Чилеа, напустио покрет несврстаности.¹

Југословенско руководство је страховало да Сједињене Државе намеравају да, после овладавања Медитераном, наставе свој продор и акцију усмере ка Балкану и Европи, покушавајући да дестабилизују режиме у Албанији, Бугарској и Југославији, као што су то већ учиниле помажући конзервативне кругове у Грчкој и кроз сличну политику на Кипру. Сада су у први план избили међународни спорови који су географски и физички били ближи југословенској територији и самим тим представљали далеко већу потенцијалну опасност по Југославију и њену политику несврстаности него што је то био случај претходних година. Америчке акције на северном Јадрану, Кипру и на Блиском истоку све више потхрањују југословенски страх да се ту, заправо, ради о јединственој и синхронизованој акцији САД-а, чији је циљ пуна америчка доминација на том простору, при чему се отворено прибегава директном мешању у унутрашња политичка збивања у медитеранским земљама и дестабилизацији режима који не испољавају довољан степен кооперативности када су у питању амерички витални интереси. Југословенски званичници су у томе видели склоност САД-а да своју стратегију све више пребацује са терена „директних војних интервенција“ (после дебакла у Вијетнамском рату) на терен „прикривених операција“ (изазивања унутрашњих немира, организовања и подстицања државних удара у земљама чија им спољна политика не одговара). „Јавно признање“ Форда, на конференцији за штампу одржаној 17. септембра 1974, да је САД организовао државни удар у Чилеу,² у Београду је оцењено као рецидив промењеног односа снага у САД-у и „непрекривено упозорење целом свету, а посебно несврстаним земљама, да ће се Сједињене Државе свим средствима одупрети активностима које сматрају да су уперене против њихових националних интереса“.³

Кипарска криза достигла је своју највишу тачку средином лета 1974. Припадници кипарске Националне гарде, чији су комплетни командни кадар чинили грчки официри, извршили су 15. јула 1974. државни удар и уклонили са власти легално изабраног председника Макариоса, у намери да присаједине ту острвску земљу Грчкој. Пет дана касније, 20. јула, турска армија је извршила инвазију на Кипар (заузела је северни део острва, насељен турским становништвом) уз образложење да жели да рестаурира уставни поредак и заштити своје грађане од грчке агресије. Дебакл грчке акције на Кипру усло-

1 Robert D. Šulcinger, *Američka diplomatija od 1900. godine*, Beograd, 2011; Dušan Nikoliš, *SAĐ. Strategija dominacije*, Beograd, 1985; Саша Д. Мишић, *Политички односи Југославије и Италије у периоду од 1968. до 1975. године* (докторска дисертација, одбрањена 13. марта 2013. на Факултету политичких наука у Београду); Ivo Visković, „Odnosi Jugoslavije i Sjedinjenih Američkih Država“, *Jugoslovenski pregled*, Godina XXXII, 1. 1988, str. 23–45; Leo Mates, *Međunarodni odnosi socijalističke Jugoslavije*, Beograd 1976.

2 Дипломатски архив Министарства спољних послова Републике Србије (ДАМСПРС), 1973, Политичка архива (ПА), САД, ф-124, 445 570, Изјава председника Форда у вези делатности и задатака Централне обавештајне агенције.

3 Архив Југославије (АЈ), Кабинет председника Републике (КПР), I-3-a/107-212, САД и политика несврставања.

вио је, само три дана после тријумфа турске војске, пад грчке хунте и формирање нове грчке владе, на челу са председником Караманлисом.⁴

Сукоб Грчке и Турске око Кипра, који временски коинцидира са ескалацијом кризе на Блиском истоку, додатно је искомпликовао и иначе сложену и запаљиву ситуацију на Медитерану. Не само што је довео у питање актуелни детант него је и озбиљно уздрмао односе у самом НАТО-у. Наиме, због благонаклоног држања САД-а према Турској и притиска на Караманлису да прихвати формулу поделе Кипра на два дела, ту војну алијансу средином августа 1974. напустила је Грчка, чиме је доведен у питање опстанак америчких војних база у Грчкој.⁵

Кипарска криза је изазивала озбиљну забринутост у југословенским политичким круговима. Никада од завршетка Другог светског рата није неки оружани сукоб био физички ближи Југославији. У рату су се нашле Грчка и Турска, две суседне балканске земље, чланице НАТО-а које су се граничиле са земљама Варшавског пакта, а једна од њих и са осетљивим подручјем јужног дела СССР-а. Тито и његови сарадници су са великом зебњом пратили покрете флота двеју суперсила на Медитерану.

Југословенско руководство је сматрало да у позадини свих ових криза и догађаја стоје „империјалистичке“ аспирације САД-а и да би у сваком моменту следећа жртва такве политике могла бити Југославија. Имајући то у виду, а придржавајући се начела своје несврстане политике, југословенска влада је већ првог дана, 15. јула 1974, у посебном саопштењу оштро осудила пуч и „страну војну интервенцију“.⁶ Југословенско министарство иностраних послова је изразило протест грчком отпавнику послова због учешћа Грчке у насилном обарању легалне владе архиепископа Макариоса и истакло став Југославије да једино решење види у пуном поштовању независности, суверенитета и територијалног интегритета Републике Кипар.⁷

У својим јавним наступима Тито и његови сарадници су отворено оптуживали Сједињене Америчке Државе и агенте Ције (CIA) да стоје иза овог насилног акта. У Београду је то оцењивано као покушај да се Кипар преусмери са политике несврстаности на политику тесног везивања за НАТО.⁸

4 Кипар је стекао независност на основу Лондонских и Циришких споразума, које су потписали фебруара 1959. године представници кипарских Грка, кипарских Турака и влада Велике Британије, Грчке и Турске. Сходно тим споразумима, Кипар је прогласио независност августа 1960. Пошто се радило о компромису, чија је чврстина зависила од воље трију држава које су биле његови гаранتي (Велике Британије, Грчке и Турске) – унутрашњи живот Кипра је стално био поприште страног мешања. И Грчка и Турска су током раздобља које је уследило и даље испољавале своје претензије према том острву. Оне су се кретале од неоствареног и никад напуштеног циља свих режима у Грчкој за присаједињењем целог Кипра „матници“ Грчкој („енозис“) и дугорочног циља Турске за поделом Кипра („дупли енозис“). И једно и друго решење је лишавало Велику Британију супериорног положаја „непристрасног арбитра“ на Кипру, њених база (на које је стекла право на основу Споразума из 1959) и водило опадању њене улоге на Медитерану. Стога су се Британци залагали за поштовање независности Кипра и били привржени Макариосу. (ДАМСПРС, 1974, стр. пов., ф-2, 228, Догађаји у вези са Кипром)

5 *Godišnjak Instituta za međunarodnu politiku i privredu*. 1974, Beograd, 1975, str. 396–397.

6 ДАМСПРС, 1974, стр. пов., ф-2, 228, Саопштење Савезног извршног већа поводом збивања у вези са Кипром.

7 АЈ, КПР, I-3-а/57-4, Југословенски став у вези са Кипарском кризом и резиме наших акција.

8 АЈ, КПР, I-5-6/56-2, Информација о догађајима на Кипру.

Иако се у моменту када је група грчких генерала преузела власт на Кипру није могло у целини сагледати право стање ствари (није се чак ни знало да ли је Макариос ликвидиран или је успео да емигрира са Кипра), Тито је одмах, наредног дана, 16. јула, оштро осудио актере тог догађаја и повезао их са страним обавештајним службама. „Покушај пуча на Кипру, иза кога стоји једна страна земља, представља најгрубљи насртај на независност, суверенитет и интегритет Републике Кипра... Народи Југославије најодлучније осуђују овај гнусни атак на пријатељску, несврстану земљу, на слободан развој једног малог народа, који већ дуги низ година доприноси изграђивању праведних међународних односа и развијању сарадње у свијету... Опасност ове оружане интервенције је утолико већа што до ње долази у источном Средоземљу, у непосредној близини жаришта кризе на Блиском истоку, која не престаје да оптерећује међународне односе, угрожава мир и безбједност.“⁹

Шефови делегација и шефови сталних мисија несврстаних земаља у седишту Уједињених нација у Женеви су већ 16. јула, само дан после пуча на Кипру, одржали састанак и усвојили документ у коме је тај пуч осуђен као акт који представља кршење основних начела Повеље УН и представља најбруталнији вид отвореног мешања у унутрашње послове Кипра.¹⁰ Југословенски министар иностраних послова Милош Минић, 20. јула, позвао је америчког амбасадора Малколма Туна (Malcolm Toon) да би му изложио став Југославије у вези са најновијим развојем догађаја на Кипру, уз молбу да то пренесе америчкој влади. Објаснио је да југословенска влада сматра да је криза узрокована интервенцијом грчких оружаних снага на Кипру. Грчка влада ту сноси сву одговорност. Турска интервенција која је потом уследила се могла очекивати као „природна последица“ насиља. Све то заједно представља озбиљну опасност по безбедност региона и балканских држава. „Криза на Кипру и могући оружани сукоб између Грчке и Турске угрожавају и безбедност Југославије, јер се ради о сукобу између нама суседних земаља“. Једино решење у таквој ситуацији југословенска влада види у томе „да све земље уложе напоре да се отклони агресија на суверенитет и независност Кипра и да се врате прерогативи уставној и легитимној влади председника Макариоса“.¹¹

Међутим, у моменту када је Минић излагао амбасадору Туну став Југославије о решавању кризе на Кипру, ситуација на овом острву се још више искомпликовала. Наиме, управо је 20. јула уследила турска војна интервенција на Кипру, уз образложење Анкаре да се ради о мери предузетој у циљу заштите турског становништва и уставног поретка на Кипру. Истог дана сазван је састанак Савета безбедности УН. На том састанку усвојена је Резолуцију 353 у којој се инсистира на моменталном прекиду ватре, на повлачењу свих страних трупа са Кипра и на обавези свих земаља чланица УН да поштују сувереност и независност кипарске републике.¹²

9 „Изјава председника Тита о догађајима на Кипру“, *Борба*, 17. јул 1974. године.

10 ДАМСПРС, 1974, стр. пов., ф-2, 228, Догађаји у вези са Кипром.

11 ДАМСПРС, 1974, стр. пов., ф-2, 219, Zabeleška o razgovoru potpredsednika Saveznog izvršnog veća i saveznog sekretara za inostrane poslove M. Minića sa ambasadorom SAD M. Toon-om, 20. јул 1974. године.

12 United Nations Security Council 353/1974, *Godišnjak Instituta za međunarodnu politiku i privredu*. 1974, Beograd, 1975, str. 63.

Да би показали да имају конструктиван став поводом избијања кипарске кризе, југословенски званичници су, поред оштре осуде виновника те кризе, указивали и на конкретне мере које би требало предузети у циљу превазилажења опасног стања. У Саопштењу југословенског министарства иностраних послова, 20. јула, инсистира се на томе „да се што пре успостави пуна независност и суверенитет Републике Кипар и омогући легитимној влади председника Макариоса да врши своја уставна права“. У Београду је сматрано да се у решавање овог спорног питања морају укључити и несврстане земље, а не само САД и државе гаранте Споразума о Кипру из 1959. Стога је у поменутом саопштењу истакнуто да „Југославија сматра да су Уједињене нације, а посебно Савет безбедности, дужни донети хитне одлуке које ће обезбедити и гарантовати решење кризе у овом духу“.¹³ Исте ставове је, 23. јула, изложио у Савезној скупштини југословенски министар иностраних послова Милош Минић, указујући истовремено и на конкретне мере које је предузела његова влада на међународном плану. Југословенска формула разрешења кипарске кризе базирала се на императиву очувања независног, сувереног, интегралног и несврстаног Кипра. Да би се то постигло, инсистирало се на повлачењу са Кипра свих страних војних трупа (и грчких и турских), на пуној примени резолуције Савета безбедности УН о Кипру (Резолуције 353, усвојене 20. јула) и изналагању решења на основу пуне равноправности, прихватљивог за све непосредно заинтересоване стране – за обе националне кипарске заједнице, али и за Грчку и Турску. Дакле, акценат је био на недељивости и територијалној јединствениости Кипра (супротно аспирацијама Турске, а донекле и САД-а, ка формирању двеју национално независних федеративних држава на том простору); на равноправном учешћу у преговорима директно инволвираних актера (без наметања решења великих сила) и на евентуалном посредовању Уједињених нација и несврстаних земаља у случају да се за тим укаже потреба.¹⁴

Иако је Југославија генерално осуђивала примену силе као метод за решавање међународних криза, она је, ипак, подржала војну интервенцију Турске, покренуту 20. јула, непосредно после државног удара на Кипру. При томе је уважила образложење турске владе да је циљ тог акта заштита турске мањине, очување суверенитета и интегритета Кипра и заштита уставног поретка те земље (чији је она гарант, на основу важећег уговора, потписаног 1959. године). Како се подршка војној интервенцији косила са основним начелима међународне политике за која се залагала током претходних година, југословенска влада се оправдавала да даје само „условну подршку“ турској акцији, искључиво у случају „ако она нема други циљ од онога који је наведен у изјави турске владе“.¹⁵

Пошто одлука Савета безбедности од 20. јула 1974. није спроведена у пракси, Координациони биро несврстаних земаља на састанку у седишту УН у Њујорку, 6. августа, усвојио је свој први документ о кипарској кризи

13 ДАМСПРС, 1974, стр. пов., ф-2, 228, Саопштење Савезног секретаријата за иностране послове, 20. јул 1974.

14 АЈ, КПП, И-5-6/56-2, Информативни материјал. Југословенски став у вези са Кипарском кризом и резиме наших акција.

15 Исто.

– Декларацију о Кипру. У овом документу, који је предложио представник Југославије у име четрнаест несврстаних земаља, поново је потврђена позиција несврстаних у односу на Кипар и затражено поштовање раније донете Резолуције УН 353. Уз оцену да свако одуговлачење повлачења страних трупа и војних ефектива са Кипра представља озбиљну претњу миру и безбедности у источном Медитерану, у документу је истакнуто легитимно право владе Кипра да равноправно учествује у доношењу свих одлука које се тичу нормализације стања у тој земљи. Радило се о захтеву несврстаних земаља за укључивањем представника Кипра у тројне разговоре које су започели представници Велике Британије, Грчке и Турске (земаља гаранта Уговора из 1959. који је регулисао политичко устројство Кипра) у Женеви, на позив Савета безбедности УН.¹⁶

Неуспех женевских преговора и друга турска војна интервенција на Кипру, која је уследила 9. августа,¹⁷ учинили су још сложенијом ситуацију на Медитерану, али и унутар НАТО-а, јер су две чланице те војне алијансе – Грчка и Турска – биле пред непосредним међусобним војним сукобом. Позив на смирење је поново дошао из Савета безбедности УН, који је истога дана затражио хитну обуставу борби на Кипру.¹⁸

Будући да одлуке Уједињених нација нису поштоване и да је фактички дошло до поделе Кипра због присуства турских инвазионих трупа, Тито је предузео интензивну дипломатско-политичку активност у односу на све заинтересоване стране. Упутио је личне поруке званичницима из Грчке, Турске и Кипра у којима је изложио своје ставове у вези са модалитетима решавања кипарске кризе. Те поруке уручио је југословенски министар иностраних послова Милош Минић, и то 17. августа председнику Грчке Гизикосу и премијеру Караманлису, а потом, 19. августа турском председнику Ецевиту. Посредством Амбасаде СФРЈ у Лондону, 22. августа уручена је и Титова лична порука архиепископу Макариосу. Најзад, 27. августа, током свог боравка у Никозији, Минић је разговарао са вршиоцем дужности кипарског председника Клеридисом и потпредседником Денкташом, којима су такође уручене Титове поруке.¹⁹

Пошто је у својству Титовог изасланика посетио Грчку, Турску и Кипар, Милош Минић је преузео на себе улогу посредника између Грка и Турака и иницијатора компромисног решења, које би евентуално могло бити прихватљиво за све стране у спору. Будући да је са свим инволвираним актерима Југославија имала изузетно присне и пријатељске односе и да нико од њих није сумњао у њене добре намере – чинило се да би она у датим околностима могла да направи неки позитиван искорак. Тим пре што се Минићева посета

16 АЈ, КПР, I-3-а/57-4, Југословенски став у вези са Кипарском кризом.

17 Пошто се том интервенцијом Турска оглушила о Резолуцију УН 353, Југославија је 11. августа упутила турској влади промеморију у којој ју је подсетила да је подржала њену прву војну интервенцију у циљу заштите турске мањине и уставног поретка Кипра, али да овакав турски накнадни потез представља опасност по мир и безбедност Медитерана и отежава решавање кипарске кризе. (АЈ, КПР, I-3-а/57-4, Југословенски став у вези са Кипарском кризом)

18 United Nations Security Council 357/1974.

19 ДАМСПРС, 1974, стр. пов., ф-2, 235, 241, 242.

Грчкој, Турској и Кипру одвијала у време када су практично све могућности за решење кризе такоређи биле блокиране и када је постојала реална опасност да се криза даље прошири и заоштри.

Прилаз Југославије овако амбициозном задатку сводио се на релативно једноставну методологију. Полазило се од исцрпне анализе свега онога што је било заједничко у ставовима сукобљених страна око разрешења кризе и онога што је ту на први поглед било потпуно инкомпатибилно (због чега су сви дотадашњи преговори око Кипра пропали). Оно у чему су се бар делимично Грци и Турци слагали – требало је потенцирати и развити у прелиминарни сегмент будућег споразума, а оно у чему су се разилазили ублажити кроз постизање одређених концесија и уступака са обе стране. Минић је прецизно маркирао питања у којима су се ставови Грка и Турака у већој или мањој мери додиривали: и једни и други су декларативно били против поделе Кипра; и једни и други су у принципу били за преговоре (с тиме што их је грчка страна условљавала претходним повлачењем турских трупа на линију прекида ватре од 9. августа, дакле на линију разграничења пре друге турске војне интервенције на Кипру); обе стране су увиђале неопходност ревизије Устава Кипра, као и Циришких и Лондонских споразума и неопходност спровођења у дело Резолуције УН о Кипру; условно је постојала обострана сагласност око опште демилитаризације Кипра; и једна и друга страна се држала кооперативно по питању посредовања несврстаних земаља у спору.²⁰

Наравно, много већи је био број питања око којих се Грци и Турци нису слагали. Обе стране су одговорност за кризу пребацивале на своје противнике; Грци су били за хитно отпочињање преговора, али су то условљавали претходним повлачењем турских трупа са Кипра (које сматрају агресорима), што су Турци одлучно одбијали уз аргументацију да су прво Грци извршили агресију на Кипар, а да су турске трупе сада ту лоциране да спрече агресорске амбиције Грчке; Грци су били за хитно решавање кипарског проблема, док се Турцима није журило и одговарао им је статус кво, јер су кипарски Турци успели да учврсте државну власт на освојеној територији; у том смислу, пошто је Турска географски била много ближе Кипру него Грчка, а истовремено и војно надмоћна у односу на Грчку – није показивала ни неку посебну заинтересованост око добијања сталних гаранција територијалног интегритета и независности Кипра од других држава, док су Грци упорно инсистирали да се повећа број гараната (велике силе, сталне чланице Савета безбедности УН, најутицајније несврстане земље); Грци су углавном имали позитиван став у вези са враћањем прерогатива власти Макариосу, док су Турци ту имали негативан став, замерајући Макариосу што дуги низ година није водио рачуна о положају и третману кипарских Турака. Како су обе стране позитивно реаговале на Титове поруке, а самим тим делимично подржале југословенску формулу решавања кипарског проблема – Минић је покушао да отклони камен спотицања у премошћавању кључног питања по коме су се разилазили ставови Грка и Турака (уколико би у томе успео,

20 ДАМСПРС, 1974, стр. пов., ф-2, 259, Посета потпредседника Савезног извршног већа и савезног секретара за иностране послове М. Минића Грчкој и Турској; Исто, Посета потпредседника Савезног извршног већа и савезног секретара за иностране послове М. Минића Кипру.

остала питања би се временом сама по себи разрешила). Радило се о дилеми: какво би требало да буде будуће државно уређење Кипра – како у будућности регулисати односе двеју заједница на Кипру? Грци су инсистирали на унитарној држави са проширеним правима турске заједнице, а Турци на „географској федерацији“ уз широку аутономију обе федералне јединице. Чинило се да је и једнима и другима био подједнако близак и подједнако далек југословенски предлог о једној функционалној, административној и кантоналној федерацији. Она је делимично, али уз одређене резерве и модификације, могла да задовољи политичка настојања обе стране, имајући у виду нереалност реализације екстремних ставова које су заступали Грци и Турци, претежно из тактичких разлога, како би изборили што боље решење за себе. Наиме, разговори у Грчкој, Турској и на Кипру су показали да постоји нека врста условне, али не и експлицитне подршке свих актера кипарске кризе успостављању још увек нејасно дефинисане форме федерације која би у себи садржала елементе југословенске федерације.²¹

Иако је пут инструментализације и реализације овакве широке платформе за будуће преговоре о кипарској кризи био далек и неизвестан, југословенска страна је могла бити задовољна што је актуелни проблем макар мало померен са мртве тачке и што је, кроз срдачне и пријатељске разговоре са представницима Грчке, Турске и кипарских Грка и кипарских Турака, ојачано пријатељство Југославије са овим медитеранским земљама, али и њена укупна међународна позиција. Тиме је уједно заокружен још један циклус југословенске дипломатско-политичке акције, чији циљ није било класично или рутинско посредовање, већ покушај да се искористе традиционално добри и пријатељски односи са свим актерима кризе и на бази евидентно присутног поверења у добре намере Југославије изнађе општеприхватљив компромис.

У паузи, после повратка из Грчке и Турске, а током припрема за следећу дестинацију – Кипар, Милић је 23. августа 1974. позвао Туна да би га упознао са корацима које предузима Југославија у циљу разрешења кипарске кризе, са садржајем Титових порука свим актерима, реаговањима на те поруке у Грчкој, Турској и на Кипру, са мотивима којима се при томе Југославија руководила и са циљевима које је желела да постигне.²²

Милић је разјаснио да циљ југословенске акције „није био да посредујемо“, него „да помогнемо пријатељским земљама“. Имајући у виду да су у Вашингтону с великом дозом неповерења пратили југословенску политику према кипарској кризи, Милић је објаснио Туну да су актуелне југословенске активности покренуте после неуспеха женевске конференције и друге турске интервенције на Кипру. „Наш основни циљ је био да допринесемо тражењу мирног политичког решења пре него што наступе даље и нове компликације“. У Београду је оцењено „да је ситуација постала веома опасна и да се криза може проширити и најдиректније угрозити нашу безбедност, те не можемо остати пасивни, већ као суседна, пријатељска и несврстана земља морамо да нешто предузмемо. То је наше право и наша дужност... Једна несврстана земља Република Кипар је у опасности да буде ликвидира-

21 Исто.

22 ДАМСПРС, 1974, ПА, САД, ф-124, 440 465.

на као суверена држава, а ако би она могла да буде раскомадана, могла би у будућности слична судбина да задеси и сваку другу несврстану земља, не искључујући ни Југославију. Такав један акт довео би до веома опасне ситуације у свету, до опште несигурности, што би потпуно поткопало досадашње резултате детанта и приближило свет новом светском рату“.²³

У свом излагању Минић је акценат ставио на додирне тачке у ставовима Грчке и Турске око путева разрешења кризе и подвукао „да за Кипар нема другог решења осим оног које смо и ми као вишенационална заједница усвојили током НОБ-а – братство и јединство, пуна национална равноправност, и независност и несврстаност“. Сугерисао је разрешење кипарске кризе кроз форсирање свега онога у чему постоји макар делимична сагласност у ставовима сукобљених страна. Ту је указао на грчку и турску подршку идеји да се повуку све стране трупе са Кипра. Тун није крио своје чуђење када је чуо да је „Турска сагласна са демилитаризацијом острва“ и напоменуо је „да је претерано тражити повлачење Турске на линије од 9. августа“. Минић није коментарисао ову упадицу америчког амбасадора, већ је прешао на следећу тачку, у којој је сматрао да такође постоји сагласност страна у спору да сами представници двеју кипарских заједница треба да имају кључну улогу у преговорима око решавања насталог проблема. Стога ће Минић наредних дана посетити Кипар и водити разговоре са Клеридисом, вршиоцем дужности председника Кипра, Денкташем, вршиоцем дужности потпредседника, а потом и са Макариосом, легално изабраним председником Кипра. Иако се Тун невољно сложио са Минићевом проценом да би сами Кипрани требало да воде главну реч у преговорима и то у смислу да би могли „да одиграју корисну улогу“, упозорио је Минића да одлуке „морају бити донете у Атини и Анкари“. Пошто се решавање кризе стално пролонгирало, југословенски министар је указао на забринутост несврстаних због тога и њихов став о неизбежности стављања тог питања на дневни ред заседања Генералне скупштине УН. Таква идеја Туну није била прихватљива. За разлику од Југославије, Сједињене Државе су на све начине покушавале да спрече интернационализацију кипарске кризе и да обезбеде решавање овог питања кроз преговоре у ужем кругу директно заинтересованих земаља у оквиру НАТО-а.²⁴

Уобличавање платформе евентуалног компромисног решења кипарске кризе, после Минићевих разговора са свим њеним актерима, подстакло је Тита да почетком септембра 1974. упути нове поруке: генералном секретару УН Курту Валдхајму, совјетском лидеру Леониду Брежњеву, америчком председнику Џону Форду, шефу кинеских комуниста Чу Ен Лају, премијерима Велике Британије, Француске, СР Немачке, Шведске, Данске, шефовима држава и влада већег броја несврстаних земаља, сталним чланицама Савета безбедности УН и неким другим државама.²⁵

Југословенска дипломатско-политичка акција око разрешења кипарске кризе истовремено је настављена и у оквиру ОУН. Наиме, већ 12. септем-

23 АЈ, КПР, I-5-6/104-19, Забелешка о разговору потпредседника Савезног извршног већа и савезног секретара за иностране послове М. Минића са амбасадором САД М. Туном на дан 23. августа 1974. године.

24 Исто; ДАМСПРС, 1974, ПА, САД, ф-124, 440 465.

25 ДАМСПРС, 1974, стр. пов., ф-2, 259.

бра, на састанку Координационог бироа несврстаних земаља, непосредно пред XXIX редовно заседање Генералне скупштине УН, на предлог југословенског представника, усвојен је трећи документ о Кипру. Координациони биро одлучио је овом приликом да формира групу састављену од пет несврстаних земаља (Алжир, Гвајана, Индија, Мали, Југославија – „ГРУПА 5“) са задатком да прати развој догађаја везаних за Кипар и да се стави на располагање директно заинтересованим странама за успостављање везе и услуга добре воље. Она је требало да, кроз посредовање, обезбеди превазилажење неких ставова владе Кипра који нису могли добити одговарајућу подршку Генералне скупштине УН (осуда турске агресије, претходно повлачење турских војних јединица, враћање избеглица, неприхватање принципа једнаких права две заједнице), као и превазилажење турских ставова који такође нису могли да обезбеде подршку већине у светском парламенту (противљење употреби термина „Влада Кипра“ и инсистирање на термину „Република Кипар у лицу две националне заједнице“, инсистирање на ставу да враћање избеглица треба да буде резултат, а не услов за преговоре). Истовремено је донета одлука да се овај текст достави Савету безбедности са захтевом да, као званичан документ тог извршног тела, буде упућен свим земљама чланицама УН.²⁶

Образлажући југословенску иницијативу, стални представник у ОУН Јакша Петрић је истакао „да Кипарска криза чини велику опасност за међународни мир и безбедност“ и да је овде угрожена „независност и суверенитет једне несврстане земље, што нужно налаже акцију свих несврстаних земаља“. Југославија је сматрала да се несврстане земље држе исувише пасивно у односу на збивања на Кипру и да Алжир као координатор није у потпуности испунио своје обавезе око енергичнијег деловања Координационог бироа у том склопу,²⁷ па је Петрић подсетио чланице тог тела на став из недавно усвојене Алжирске декларације „да агресија на једну несврстану земљу значи напад на све и сваку другу“. Нагласио је „да Кипарска криза нема локални карактер, већ чини претњу миру, безбедности и стабилности у ширем региону“. Наводећи разлоге који налажу несврстанима да не буду по страни и да не дозволе да се онемогући њихов утицај на кипарску ситуацију,

26 АЈ, КПР, I-3-a/57-4, Југословенски став у вези са Кипарском кризом и резиме наших акција; „Иницијатива несврстаних“, *Борба*, 14. септембар 1974; *Godišnjak Instituta za međunarodnu politiku i privredu* 1974, Beograd, 1975, str. 63.

27 У извештајима југословенског министарства иностраних послова у вези са акцијама несврстаних земаља у циљу решавања кипарске кризе и у извештајима о проблемима координације заједничких акција указано је на присуство „одређених тешкоћа“ узрокованих „понашањем Алжира као координатора, који шире интересе несврстаних подређује својим ужим интересима“. Такво понашање све је више изазивало незадовољство већег броја несврстаних земаља, међу њима и Југославије. „Због недовољно разрађеног механизма координације и пасивног понашања једног броја чланица Координационог бироа – долазило је до спорости и неадекватног реаговања КБ, нарочито приликом избијања кризне ситуације (Чиле, Кипар). Алжир, као координатор, није показивао спремност да покрене акцију КБ по питању Кипра, чак и поред инсистирања појединих чланица КБ. С друге стране, када је одговарало његовим ужим интересима, Алжир је у својству координатора, покренуо ширу међународну акцију без претходних консултација са осталим чланицама КБ“. ДАМСПРС, 1974, стр. пов, ф-2, 245. Најновији развој у свету, посебно у светлу Блискоисточне и Кипарске кризе; *Исто*, 43, Оцена XXVIII заседања Генералне скупштине УН; *Исто*, 1975, ф-2, 135, Координација активности несврстаних земаља.

Петрић је упозорио да велике силе „улажу озбиљни напор да се и несврстани и Уједињене нације спрече да дају свој допринос праведном решењу Кипарске кризе и да се решење наметне у затвореном уском кругу“. С друге стране, велики део светске јавности исказује наду да несврстани „иницирају неку акцију или корак који би допринели кретању ка решењу те кризе“, јер су „несврстане земље посебно квалификоване за овакву улогу, с обзиром на огромно поверење које уживају као одговоран, објективан и прогресиван фактор у међународним односима“.²⁸

Акција несврстаних је настављена на XXIX заседању Генералне скупштине УН (23. септембра – 10. октобра 1974). У условима оштрог сукоба између представника Грчке и Турске по овом питању, увршћеном у дневни ред заседања, на предлог Кипра, контакт група несврстаних успоставила је везу са свим странама у сукобу – Грчком, Турском, представницима кипарске владе, као и две националне заједнице на Кипру. Њена акција била је пре свега усмерена на ублажавање ставова Турске (у спорним питањима повлачења турских трупа и повратка избеглица, као и у њеном оспоравању легитимности кипарске владе да представља обе националне заједнице на Кипру), али и радикалних ставова владе Кипра (у њеном захтеву за претходним повлачењем турских оружаних снага, као предуслова за преговоре, односно у пренебрегавању принципа једнаких права две кипарске заједнице). После дугих, сложених и веома деликатних преговора, вођених са две државе у спору, Кипром и осталим заинтересованим странама, контакт група је, у име свих несврстаних земаља, предложила Нацрт резолуције о Кипру, који је у Генералној скупштини усвојен једногласно. Овом резолуцијом (Резолуција 3212, гласало свих 117 земаља, нико није био против, нико није апстинирао) постављена је основа за решавање суштинских питања везаних за сукоб на Кипру. Принципи на којима се базира решење су: уставно уређење је ствар споразума између грчке и турске кипарске заједнице; поштовање суверенитета, независности, територијалног интегритета, несврстаности Кипра; повлачење свих оружаних снага. Резолуцијом се, поред тога, позива на предузимање хитних мера за повратак избеглица својим кућама и охрабрује наставак преговора две националне заједнице на Кипру. Тако је посредничка акција несврстаних, остварена у покушајима смиривања ситуације око Кипра и на самом Кипру, довела до почетних резултата који су отворили могућности за даље решавање спора. Од посебног је значаја што су се у прилог резолуцији истовремено изјаснили и Грчка и Турска и Кипар, и припадници турске и припадници грчке националне мањине, што су за њу гласале и велике силе и што је њено једногласно усвајање у Генералној скупштини омогућавало да се она наметне као општеприхватљива платформа за даље решавање проблема. Иначе, ради се о првој резолуцији Генералне скупштине у којој се од свих земаља чланица тражи да поштују, поред класичних принципа Повеље, и несврстаност једне државе чланице светске организације – што је представљало врло важан политички и правни преседан.²⁹

28 „Иницијатива несврстаних“, *Борба*, 14. септембар 1974.

29 ДАМСПРС, 1974, стр. пов, ф-2, 295, Генерална дебата на 29. заседању Генералне скупштине ОУН.

Све активнији наступ Југославије у циљу укључивања што ширег круга земаља у решавање кипарског проблема и његове интернационализације кроз акцију у Уједињеним нацијама, негативно је примљен у политичким круговима у Вашингтону. Американци нису веровали у делотворност оваквих акција и сметало им је што их при томе југословенски представници стално критикују због настојања да истисну из преговора несврстане земље и преузму улогу кључног арбитра. Додатно је код њих изазивало револт то што Тито и његови сарадници своје незадовољство америчким настојањима да се сузи круг посредника између Грка и Турака поткрепљују оптужбама да је САД умешан у избијање кризе и да је заинтересован искључиво за решење које би допринело јачању јужног крила НАТО-а на Медитерану и Блиском истоку.

У том духу југословенска штампа је перманентно на насловним странама извештавала о „провидној игри НАТО-а на Кипру“ и о „спрези војне хунте и ЦИА-е“. Да би се постигао већи степен веродостојности и убедљивости, често су цитирани текстови познатог коментатора америчког *Њујорк тајмса* Сајруса Л. Шулцбергера (Cyrus Leo Sulzberger), у којима овај познати новинар износи податке о умешаности САД-а у државни преврат на Кипру и америчким настојањима „да се ликвидира његов независан и несврстани статус, који је симболисан у влади председника Макариоса“.³⁰

Посебно је оштро интониран и врло експлицитан био Титов говор у Јесеницама, 12. септембра 1974. године. Објашњавајући „који је био главни разлог пуча на Кипру“, Тито је прецизирао: „тај пуч су организовали ЦИА, грчка војна хунта и Атлантски пакт. Требало је убити Макариоса, јер је Кипар био несврстана земља, а Макариос један од оснивача политике несврстаности. Требало је њега макнути и претворити Кипар у базу Атлантског пакта.“ Лидер југословенских комуниста објаснио је и шири смисао преврата на Кипру у склопу даље „пентерације НАТО-а“ на подручја Блиског истока, Медитерана и Балкана. Надовезујући се на своју тезу о претварању Кипра у базу НАТО-а, поставио је реторичко питање: „Шта би значила та база?“ и одмах појаснио: „Она би се налазила на важној стратешкој тачки. С једне стране била би окренута према Совјетском Савезу а са друге – према Сирији, која је јако близу и која би се нашла у котлу, који с друге стране затвара Израел. Сирија би се нашла у тешкој ситуацији, јер не би имала никакве могућности да морем добија помоћ. То је био стратешки план да би се створила таква база. План је пропао и хунта је пропала с тим планом.“³¹

Титов наступ у Јесеницама је изазвао буру незадовољства и протеста у Вашингтону. Одмах после објављивања текста Титовог говора, 13. септембра, помоћник америчког државног секретара Артур Хартман (Arthur Hartmann) упутио је тим поводом оштар демарш своје владе југословенском амбасадору Томи Гранфилу. Нагласио је да Титове оптужбе на рачун САД-а „нису засноване на истинитим чињеницама“ и „да је Кисинџер врло огорчен“. Замолио је Гранфила да саопшти југословенској влади „сву озбиљност“ америчких примедби и „дубоко незадовољство“ САД-а због Титове изјаве.³²

30 „Провидна игра НАТО пакта“, *Борба*, 4. август 1974.

31 J. B. Tito, *Nezavisnost i savremeni svet*, Tom 2, Beograd, 1982, str. 504–505.

32 АЈ, КПР, I–5–6/104–19, Амбасада СФРЈ, Вашингтон, бр. 1161, 13. 9. 1974.

Хартман је, истовремено, подсетио свог саговорника на писмо које је Тито упутио председнику Форду септембра 1974. поводом збивања на Кипру.³³ У том писму нигде није било речи о уплетености америчке Централне обавештајне агенције (CIA) у пуч против Макариоса, нити иједне оптужбе на рачун САД-а у том контексту. Све што је изречено у писму у потпуности се поклапа са званичним ставом Стејт департмента. Стога „они не могу да схвате“ како је дошло до овако великог одступања у Титовој оцени збивања на Кипру у тако кратком року. Једино објашњење, по Хартману, јесте да Тито има „два стандарда“ када су у питању југословенско-амерички односи. Један је онај који фигурише у тајним, личним порукама са америчким званичницима, а други када јавно наступа и обраћа се својој и светској јавности. Таква недоследност, не само што „не доприноси решавању ствари“ него „само још ствара додатне тешкоће“. Колико су ове оптужбе биле чињенички засноване, види се из доста необудљивог Гранфиловог коментара „да председник Тито никад не говори неистину“ и да у тексту Титовог говора он не види „напад на владу САД и Кисинџера, него на делатност ЦИА“. Да Титов наступ није баш био идеално конципиран, видело се из завршне констатације југословенског амбасадора „да је најбоље да овакве разлике расправљамо и објаснимо у директним контактима“. На томе се управо и инсистирало у Вашингтону, да када су у питању јавни наступи, Тито и његови сарадници воде рачуна о својој реторици, а да евентуалне примедбе на рачун америчке политике отворено изнесу у склопу дипломатске комуникације.³⁴

Неколико дана касније (18. септембра 1974), амерички амбасадор Тун је, истим поводом, затражио пријем код Лазара Мојсова, заменика југословенског министра иностраних послова. Већ на почетку разговора је нагласио „да је он лично запрепашћен и шокиран“ Титовом изјавом „да је ЦИА један од организатора пуча на Кипру“ и указао на сву озбиљност ситуације насталу због ове „неосноване и неистините тврдње“. Због те изјаве „америчка влада је веома узнемирена“. У новонасталој ситуацији, по Туну, могло би доћи и до отказивања раније договорене посете Кисинџера Београду. Као „своје лично мишљење“, Тун је навео да би са југословенске стране било потребно „дати неку врсту исправке“. У том смислу би можда било добро да се „неким каналом изрази жаљење“ или да се Титова изјава „на неки начин минимизира“.³⁵

Могућност да дође до отказивања Кисинџерове посете због Титовог говора у Јесеницама наговестио је и сам Кисинџер током разговора са југословенским министром иностраних послова Милошем Минићем, у Њујорку, 24. септембра 1974. Иако је Минић наглашавао да је југословенска страна сматрала да је договор око те посете дефинитиван, Кисинџер му је упорно давао на знање да више није сигуран да ли ће ту посету уврстити у свој програм путовања и неодређено му најавио да ће га ускоро обавестити „о евентуалној могућности доласка“. За овакав обрт оптужио је Тита: „Кад год се наши

33 АЈ, КПР, I-1/1121, Порука председника Републике Јосипа Броза Тита председнику САД-а Џералду Р. Форду, 6. септембар 1974.

34 АЈ, КПР, I-5-6/104-19, Амбасада СФРЈ, Вашингтон, бр. 1161, 13. 9. 1974.

35 АЈ, КПР, I-5-6/104-19, Из забелешке о разговору заменика државног секретара Л. Мојсова са амбасадором САД у Београду М. Туном на дан 18. септембра 1974.

односи почну повољно развијати неко одржи говор... Морам да кажем да смо осетљиви на оно што је речено у вези САД и Кипра. Ако у то верујете, онда је то опасно, а ако у то не верујете, а кажете, онда је то једнако опасно. Зашто би ми желели да рушимо Макариоса? Шта нам је он сметао и то у јулу 1974, у жеку Вотергејта, а и без тога.“ Минић је покушао да ублажи смисао југословенских изјава о главним актерима кипарске кризе, указујући да се те изјаве односе на деловање Ције, а не на америчку владу, али му је Кисинџер оштро указао на сву бесмисленост таквог става: „Дозволите да знам шта раде агенције владе. Оне се не могу мешати, а да ми то не знамо“. Још оштрија је била реакција америчког државног секретара на Минићеву опаску да је грчки председник Караманлис отишао даље од Југославије „и учинио америчку владу одговорном“ око Кипра. Говорећи о неприхватљивости таквог грчког наступа, Кисинџер је отворено запретио: „Није безбедно да се нападају САД, односно нико нас неће нападати и очекивати помоћ.“ Та претња је очигледно у датом моменту више била упућена на адресу Југославије него Грчке. „Не можемо прихватити да у сваком јавном иступању Југославија заступа тако оштре ставове који су против САД... Поштујемо вашу несврстаност. Међутим, као што сам прошле године рекао, ако је несврстаност увек окренута против САД, шта имамо од тога“.³⁶

Непосредно уочи разговора Минића и Кисинџера одиграо се још један догађај који је такође негативно примљен у Стејт департменту, а који је несумњиво представљао значајну манифестацију југословенске подршке архиепископу Макариосу у настојањима да се створе услови за његов безбедан повратак на Кипар и поновно преузимање руковођења овом острвском земљом. Радило се о посети Макариоса Југославији и разговорима које је водио са Титом, 22. септембра 1974. у Београду.

Макариос је и раније био упознат са ставовима Југославије о разрешењу кипарске кризе, али Тито је на почетку разговора те ставове још једном разложио, наглашавајући потребу активнијег наступа несврстаних земаља у Уједињеним нацијама у циљу постизања што шире међународне подршке поновном успостављању уставног поретка на Кипру. „Морамо свим снагама да уверимо све несврстане земље шта их очекује ако би успео маневар на Кипру, да то онда могу очекивати и друге земље... Прво је атак учињен на несврстану земљу Чиле, па сада на несврстану земљу Кипар, то је атак на несврстане.“ Констатујући да несврстани сметају империјализму, Тито је упозорио да „ако несврстане земље не би биле јединствене у борби против таквих покушаја империјализма и разних велесила, онда би улога несврстаних земаља јако опала“. Сматрао је да је пуч на Кипру тесно повезан са збивањима на Блиском истоку. „Са стратегијске тачке гледишта, Кипар је од огромне важности за НАТО пакт као база, јер он географски тако стоји да угрожава – наиме када би био НАТО база – угрожава у првом реду Сирију и читав арапски регион... Значи, Сирија би била с мора потпуно опкољена“. Из овога је произашла и Титова процена шире позадине пуча на Кипру: „Тај план је направљен у Атланском пакту, то је сигурно. То није била само ствар Турске и Грчке, него је то план за даље опкољавање свих арапских земаља и

36 АЈ, КПР, I-5-6/104-19, Разговор друга М. Минића са државним секретаром САД Х. Кисинџером, 24. 9 1974. у Њујорку.

да би се омогућило Израелу да извуче чим веће користи из сукоба са Арапи-ма. То је далекосежан план који је врло опасан за мир у свету уопште. Зато ми сада морамо учинити све, колико највише можемо, да упознамо свет са тим намерама које су биле и које постоје. Осим тога, ако би империјализам успео на Кипру, онда у Европи остаје од несврстаних земаља само Југославија.³⁷

Тито и Макариос су се сложили да Американци подржавају план Турске да се Кипар подели на два потпуно аутономна дела. Тито је сматрао да Американцима одговара оваква подела јер схватају да у новонасталој ситуацији, када је спречена ликвидација Макариоса, а извршена турска војна интервенција,³⁸ није могућна реализација првобитног плана – да цео Кипар постане база НАТО-а. Скромније, али једино реално решење, за које се Американци сада залажу је да се НАТО базе макар инсталирају на турском делу острва. „Хоће да имају базу бар у једном делу Кипра. Чим већи део Кипра буде под Турском, тим већа ће бити база... Ако би интереси извесних сила Атлантског пакта преовладали, онда би то било трагично.“ Макариос се сложио са овом констатацијом: „То је и моје мишљење, да ће се на делу који би држала Турска, једног дана формирати НАТО база“. Да би се спречио овакав обрт, два државника су се договорили о иницирању координисане акције несврстаних земаља у УН и ван светске организације, којом би се спречила подела Кипра и осујетили планови НАТО-а. Југославија се око тога већ пуно ангажовала.³⁹ Тито је предложио Макариосу да кипарски представник у УН контактира Минића, који ће бити информисан о овом разговору и који улаже велике напоре како би Кипру обезбедио што ширу подршку осталих чланица УН.⁴⁰

Американци су са великом дозом подозрености и незадовољства гледали на југословенско ангажовање око разрешења кипарске кризе и на југословенске оптужбе на рачун САД-а у вези са избијањем кризе. Нису више очекивали да ће Југославија променити став по том питању, али су инсистирали на томе да макар „ограничи своју акцију“, нарочито међу несврстанима.

37 АЈ, КПР, I-3-a/57-4, Забелешка о разговору Председника Републике Јосипа Броза Тита и Председника Кипра Архиепископа Макариоса, одржаног 22. септембра 1974. године у 17.30 часова у Белој вили у Београду.

38 Турска је после државног преврата на Кипру два пута војно интервенисала на овом острву. Први пут је то учинила јула 1974, уз образложење да жели да заштити кипарске Турке и уставни поредак на Кипру. Југословенска влада је с тим у вези објавила посебно саопштење у коме је условно подржала тај потез уколико је његов циљ искључиво оно што је у образложњу наведено. Друга интервенција уследила је наредног месеца и Југославија ју је у својој променији 11. августа осудила и указала на то да је та војна интервенција противна духу Резолуције 353 Савета безбедности УН. (АЈ, КПР, I-3-a/57-4, Резиме наших акција, 19. септембар 1974)

39 На иницијативу Југославије појачани су контакти и заједничке акције несврстаних земаља у УН; већ 6. августа 1974. Координациони биро несврстаних земаља донео је прву декларацију о Кипру у којој захтева покретање адекватних мера за превазилажење кризе; Макариос је, подстакнут сугестијама Тита и Југославије, упутио поруку у вези са кипарском кризом свим несврстаним земљама. (АЈ, КПР, I-3-a/57-4, Југословенски став у вези са Кипарском кризом)

40 АЈ, КПР, I-3-a/57-4, Забелешка о разговору Председника Републике Јосипа Броза Тита и Председника Кипра Архиепископа Макариоса, одржаног 22. септембра 1974. године у 17.30 часова у Белој вили у Београду.

О томе је извештавао амбасадор Гранфил из Вашингтона, објашњавајући да додатну деликатност ту има неповољан обрт кипарске кризе по америчке интересе. „У Вашингтону се сматра и оцењује (јавно и интерно) да је досадашњи неуспех Кисинџерове политике према Кипарској кризи веома оштећио америчке интересе на целом том региону и шире у НАТО-у. Политичка акција САД када је избила криза имала је за циљ јачање америчких позиција у том региону и добијање нових – поделом Кипра и његовим стављањем под контролу НАТО-а, односно VI флоте, и тиме јачања америчког утицаја на Блиском истоку. Међутим, резултат досадашњег тока кризе је: војно повлачење Грчке из НАТО-а и антиамеричко расположење у Грчкој, дистанцирање већине западно-европских савезника од политике САД према Грчкој и Кипру, одбијање Кисинџерове посредничке улоге у Кипарској кризи, оштре критике у Конгресу да се обустави помоћ Турској све док не постане флексибилнија у решавању Кипарске кризе, што ће изазвати негативно реаговање у Турској.“ Уместо да ојачају своју позицију на Медитерану, Сједињене Државе су оствариле сасвим други ефекат и изазвале подозрење и револт држава са тог простора, што је несумњиво ишло у прилог СССР-у и његовим аспирацијама. Због свега тога, по Гранфилу, Американци су револтирани југословенском политиком према Кипру и не чини им се прихватљиво становиште да различити прилази Југославије и САД-а актуелним светским кризама не би требало да доводе до погоршања билатералних односа.⁴¹

Оно у чему су се, ипак, поклапала политичка настојања Београда и Вашингтона, када је реч о кипарском питању, била је обострана заинтересованост за хитно разрешење тог проблема. Наравно, мотиви су били као и обично сасвим различити. Југословенска страна је у томе видела предуслов за елиминисање једног озбиљног изворишта међународне нестабилности и опасности по безбедност саме Југославије, али и за очување престижа несврстане политике на ширем међународном плану. Једногласно усвојена резолуција Генералне скупштине УН, коју је формулисала контакт група, прихваћена је као шира платформа решавања кипарског питања. Југославији су за њено ангажовање посебно признање одале несврстане земље, али и већина чланица ОУН. Американци су, пак, били заинтересовани за хитно решавање кипарске кризе јер је она генерисала међусобни сукоб две кључне чланице јужног крила НАТО-а (Грчке и Турске) и истовремено подозрење тих земаља према политици коју води званични Вашингтон (Грчка је напустила НАТО, а Турска је, због најаве америчког Конгреса да ће јој, уколико не буде кооперативнија у вези са решавањем кипарске кризе, бити обустављена војна помоћ – испољавала све већу дозу револта према званичницима САД-а). Исто тако, Американци су били свесни да је криза у неку руку погодовала совјетским настојањима да се на простору Медитерана редукује вишегодишња доминација НАТО-а. СССР је био заинтересован да се постојеће стање што више пролонгира, јер је сукоб Грчке и Турске озбиљно подривао систем НАТО-а на овом важном подручју.⁴²

41 ДА МСП РС, 1974, ПА, САД, ф-124, 448 898, Телеграм Амбасаде СФРЈ у Вашингтону Савезном секретаријату за иностране послове, 11. октобар 1974. године.

42 ДА МСПРС, 1974, стр. пов., ф-3, 310, Најновији развој Кипарске кризе.

Обострана заинтересованост Југославије и САД-а за хитно решавање кипарске кризе дошла је до изражаја током разговора које су у Београду, 4. новембра 1974, водили Тито и Кисинџер. Амерички државни секретар је, осврћући се на раније југословенске оптужбе о умешаности САД-а у државни удар на Кипру, истакао: „Хоћу и да Вам кажем да ми нисмо имали ништа са ударом против Макариоса. Нисмо имали никаквог интереса да се дестабилизује ситуација у источном Медитерану јула 1974. Имали смо великих унутрашњих проблема у нашој земљи са председничком кризом и са проблемима на Блиском истоку. Свакако нисмо желели да узрокујемо један додатни проблем у источном Медитерану. Могу Вас уверити да ми нисмо били свесни да се планира удар.“ Тито се није супротставио овој аргументацији, али му се није чинио реалан Кисинџеров став да би решење кипарског проблема требало заснивати на „федералном систему са неким географским принципима“ (заправо на подели острва на два дела). Сматрао је да Грци неће прихватити такву опцију, већ искључиво „кантонално решење са јаком централном владом“. С друге стране, Тито се сложио са Кисинџером да би „Макариос требао да се држи даље од Кипра док не буде прелиминарног договора“ и да би било добро да подржи компромисно решење које припремају Клеридис и Денкташ. У том случају „било би у реду да се врати“. На крају разговора дошло је до необичног обрта у коментарима двојице саговорника на рачун Макариоса. Кисинџер је одбацио аргумент Макариосових противника да би Макариос требало да да оставку на место председника Кипра и преузме улогу верског вође. Сасвим супротно, истакао је „да је он боље квалификован да буде председник него верски вођа“. Из Титовог наступа, пак, провејавало је незадовољство Макариосовим прилазом најновијим акцијама несврстаних. Сав коментар на Кисинџерове похвале о Макариосовој државничкој мудрости свео се на упадицу: „Не уздржава се од дељења савета. Сећам се кад сам се носио са њим у Лусаки (на Самиту несврстаних земаља – Д. Б.)“⁴³

У анализи југословенског министарства иностраних послова о актуелном стању у решавању кипарске кризе, сачињеној средином децембра 1974. године, са доста песимизма и резигнације се процењује исход преговора и будући домашaj иницијатива контакт групе несврстаних земаља. Сматра се да услови за спровођење Резолуције УН о Кипру „нису сазрели“. Исто тако, „не постоје ни одговарајући услови да се Контакт група јавно активира“. У таквој ситуацији, унутар контакт групе дошло се до закључка да би најбоље било убудуће се ослањати на што интензивније иступање несврстаних земаља несталних чланица Савета безбедности УН. На иницијативу тих земаља, 13. децембра 1974, усвојена је резолуција Савета безбедности у којој се тражи „што хитније извршење Резолуције Генералне скупштине о Кипру“. Међутим, спровођење те резолуције је у датом моменту било тешко изводљиво. Предстојећи избори у Грчкој и актуелна криза владе у Турској довели су до даље радикализације ставова о Кипру супротстављених страна. Повратак Макариоса на Кипар у овом извештају југословенског ми-

43 *FRUS*, 1969–1976, Volume E–15, Part 1, Documents on Eastern Europe, 1973–1976, Yugoslavia, doc 71, Memorandum of Conversation, Belgrade, November 4, 1974.

нистарства иностраних послова није окарактерисан као искорак у правцу разрешења кризе. Уочено је да, иако је Макариос ублажио своје раније „тврде ставове“ о кипарском питању, он и даље не улива поверење Турцима, који су у њему видели кривца за новонасталу ситуацију и политичара склоног да игнорише права турске заједнице на Кипру. Званичницима из Београда је посебно сметало то што је Макариос у својим првим јавним наступима по повратку на Кипар у потпуности игнорисао акције несврстаних земаља и експлицито указивао на то да САД и СССР морају имати кључну улогу у коначном решавању кипарског проблема.⁴⁴

Макариосово становиште је знатно одступало од његових изјава које је дао током сусрета са Титом у Београду, септембра 1974. године. Оно је уједно било и у директној колизији са југословенским ставовима и у Београду није могло наићи на позитиван пријем. С друге стране, Макариосов наступ деловао је врло отржењујуће на југословенске политичаре у ситуацији када је Југославија због свог експонирања у овој сфери плаћала високу цену стављајући у други план свој витални интерес за побољшање односа са САД-ом. Иако Југославија није променила став о кипарском проблему, међународне околности су ограничавајуће деловале на сврсисходност дотадашњег енергичног експонирања несврстаних земаља око тога. Током будућег вишегодишњег процеса усаглашавања ставова сукобљених страна у кипарском спору, Тито и његови сарадници нису више могли много помоћи, нити је то ико од њих посебно тражио. Иако им то није било право, бар једна препрека на путу унапређења сарадње са САД-ом је углавном отклоњена.

44 ДАМСПРС, 1974, стр. пов., ф-3, 310, Најновији развој Кипарске кризе.

Summary

Dragan Bogetić, Ph. D.

Cyprus Crisis of 1974 and the Deterioration of Yugoslav-American Relations

Key words: Yugoslavia, USA, Greece, Turkey, CIA, Cyprus crisis, Mediterranean, Tito, Kissinger, Makarios, military junta, NATO

The coup in Cyprus in July 1974 and attempt to overthrow Archbishop Makarios, Tito's important ally from the non-alignment movement, provoked serious concern in Yugoslav political circles. Not since WWII had any armed conflict been so physically near to Yugoslavia.

The conflict between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus, which coincided with the escalation of the Middle East crisis and the Trieste crisis, followed by NATO maneuvers in the Trieste region – further complicated the already complex and tinderbox situation in the Mediterranean and had a serious impact on the ongoing bipolar détente between the USA and the USSR.

The Yugoslav leadership accused the American government to have instigated these crises while the Yugoslav press daily printed front page articles assessing that Yugoslavia could be the next victim of "American imperialism". Namely, Belgrade was afraid that the US intended, after establishing influence on the Mediterranean, to continue to expand and would take actions in the Balkans and Europe, attempting to destabilize the regimes in Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia as they had already done supporting conservative circles in Greece and pursuing a similar policy in Cyprus.

The Sate Department reacted harshly to the Yugoslav allegations on the Cyprus crisis. These allegations, also coming from Western countries and initiated a serious debate in the American Congress that specially affected President Nixon coming amidst the infamous Watergate Affair and internal political turmoil that would later lead to his resignation.

The serious deterioration of Yugoslav-American relations was eased and ceased by the end of 1974 when Makarios returned to Cyprus and negotiations on the settlement of the Cyprus crisis began. Meetings of Yugoslav Foreign Affairs Minister Milos Minić and the US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger played a key role in successfully laying the groundwork for new positive bilateral relations and were followed by talks between the new American President Gerald Ford and President Tito in August 1975.

УДК 331.556.46(=163.3/.6)(100)“196/198“
94:314.151.3-054.73(=163.3/.6)(100)“196/198“

Petar DRAGIŠIĆ, Ph. D.

**SEARCHING FOR EL DORADO. WORKERS FROM SERBIA
TEMPORARY EMPLOYED ABROAD FROM THE 1960S
TO THE DISSOLUTION OF YUGOSLAVIA***

Abstract: The paper examines labor emigration from Serbia from the beginning of large-scale emigration in the 1960s to the breakup of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s. The research focuses, among others, on push factors of the *Gastarbeiter* emigration from Serbia/Yugoslavia in the 1960s and 1970s, the emigration policy of the communist regime in Yugoslavia and the financial impact of the labor emigration on the Serbian economy. The research is based on archival data analysis, statistical reports and secondary sources.

Key words: labor emigration, Gastarbeiter, Serbia, Yugoslavia, remittances

The political tensions as well as the economic stagnation in Yugoslavia in the 1960s brought to light the fragility of the ‘Yugoslav experiment’. The dream of the socialist paradise was replaced by the pessimistic predictions of the Yugoslav future. The rise of nationalism demonstrated the unsustainability of the Yugoslav motto – brotherhood and unity (Bratstvo i jedinstvo). The precarious political situation was accompanied by economic problems. The failure of the economic reform (in the mid-1960s) generated the intense pressure on the Yugoslav labor market. In 1976, the unemployment rate in the most underdeveloped regions of Yugoslavia (Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Socialist Republic of Macedonia) exceeded twenty per cent (20%). The unemployment rate in central Serbia and Montenegro was considerably high as well.¹ This push factor, coupled with an acute need of the booming Western economies for additional labor force triggered the biggest emigration wave in the history of socialist Yugoslavia.

* This article has been written within the framework of the scholarly project *Tradition and Transformation – Historical Heritage and National Identity in Serbia in 20th Century* (№ 47019), financed by the Ministry of Education, Science and Technological Development Republic of Serbia.

1 Arhiv Jugoslavije (AJ), Socijalistički savez radnog naroda Jugoslavije (142), f-740, Savezni komitet za rad i zapošljavanje, Izveštaj o ostvarivanju politike zapošljavanja, zapošljavanja u inostranstvu, i postepenog vraćanja jugoslovenskih građana sa privremenog rada u inostranstvu u 1977. godini (analitičko-dokumentarna osnova), March 1978. The average unemployment rate in Yugoslavia in 1976 accounted for 11.4%.

I

The massive migration from Yugoslavia started in the mid-1960s reaching its peak at the beginning of the 1970s.² According to Yugoslav statistics, only in 1970 about 225,000 Yugoslav migrant workers were employed abroad. By the beginning of the 1970s the number of Yugoslav labor migrants exceeded one million. Nevertheless, the process decelerated in the first half of the 1970s due to the immigration restrictions imposed in the main receiving countries in Western Europe, following the oil crisis. Whereas in 1973 more than 100,000 Yugoslavs found employment abroad, in the following year only 20,000 job seekers from Yugoslavia joined the colony of Yugoslav *Gastarbeiter*.³

Yugoslav migrant workers 1964–1977⁴

	Annual number of Yugoslav labor migrants employed abroad	Total number of Yugoslav labor migrants
1964	20,000	138,000
1965	41,000	174,000
1966	110,000	275,000
1967	40,000	296,000
1968	124,000	401,000
1969	187,000	572,000
1970	225,000	783,000
1971	151,000	923,000
1972	108,000	1,020,000
1973	103,000	1,100,000
1974	20,000	1,035,000
1975	24,000	940,000
1976	27,000	870,000
1977	25,000	825,000

2 On labor migrations from socialist Yugoslavia, see, among others: Vladimir Ivanović, *Geburtstag pišeš normalno. Jugoslovenski gastarbajteri u SR Nemačkoj i Austriji: 1965–1973*, Beograd, 2012; Ivana Dobrivojević, „U potrazi za blagostanjem. Odlazak jugoslovenskih radnika na rad u zemlje Zapadne Evrope 1960–1976“, *Istorija 20. veka*, 1 (2008), 89–100; Slobodan Selinić, „Ekonomska emigracija iz Jugoslavije šezdesetih godina XX veka“, in *1968 – četrdeset godina posle*, ed. Radmila Radić, Beograd, 2008, 549–573; Vladimir Ivanović, „Brantova istočna politika i jugoslovenska ekonomska emigracija u SR Nemačkoj“, in *1968 – četrdeset godina posle*, ed. Radmila Radić, Beograd, 2008, 275–292; Milena Primorac, *Strani radnici. Sociološki aspekti privremene ekonomske emigracije*, Beograd, 1980; Ivo Baučić, *Social Aspects of External Migration of Workers and the Yugoslav Experience in the Social Protection of Migrants*, Zagreb, 197; Othmar Nikola Haberl, *Die Abwanderung von Arbeitskräften aus Jugoslawien*, München, 1978; Ulf Brunnbauer, „Jugoslawische Geschichte als Migrationsgeschichte (19. und 20. Jahrhundert)“ in *Schnittstellen. Gesellschaft, Nation, Konflikt und Erinnerung in Südosteuropa. Festschrift für Holm Sundhaussen zum 65. Geburtstag*, ed. Ulf Brunnbauer et al., München, 2007, 111–132; Ulf Brunnbauer, „Emigration aus Südosteuropa, 19.–21. Jahrhundert. Kontinuitäten, Brüche, Perspektiven“ in *Südosteuropa. Traditionen als Macht*, ed. Emil Brix et al., Wien/München, Verlag für Geschichte und Politik/Oldenbourg Wissenschaftsverlag 2007, 119–142.

3 *Ibid.*

4 *Ibid.*

The substantial majority of the Yugoslav jobseekers (cc. 75%) settled in West European receiving countries. The majority of the Yugoslav *Gastarbeiter* immigrated to the German speaking countries. According to Yugoslav statistics, there were 535,000 Yugoslav *Gastarbeiter* living in the Federal Republic of Germany (Bundesrepublik Deutschland) in 1973. In the same year the Yugoslav communities in Austria and Switzerland numbered 195,000 and 35,000 labor migrants respectively. Moreover, a considerable number of Yugoslav migrant workers resided in France (75,000 in 1973).⁵

By 1970 the Yugoslav regime signed bilateral agreements on recruitment of Yugoslav workers with the most important receiving countries: France (in 1965), Austria and Sweden (in 1966), the Federal Republic of Germany (in 1968) as well as with Belgium, Luxemburg, Netherlands and Australia (in 1970).⁶

Yugoslav migrant workers 1973/1977 by countries of residence⁷

	1973 (in 1000)	1973 (%)	1977 (in 1000)	1977 (%)
FR Germany	535	48.6	350	42.3
Austria	195	17.7	120	14.6
France	75	6.8	58	7
Switzerland	35	3.2	25	3
Sweden	25	2.3	25	3
Netherlands	12	1.1	8	1
Belgium	5	0.5	4	0.5
Luxemburg	15	0.1	1	0.1
Italy	7	0.6	6	0.7
Denmark	5	0.5	4.5	0.6
Other European countries	4.5	0.4	13.5	1.7
Australia	95	8.6	95	11.5
Canada	45	4.1	40	4.3
USA	35	3.2	35	4.3
Other non-European countries	25	2.3	40	4.3
TOTAL	1000	100	825	100

In spite of its ideological skepticism regarding the migration of its citizens to the 'capitalist West' the Yugoslav regime not only tolerated but also supported the migration flows in the 1960s and 1970s. Obviously, the regime in Belgrade perceived the labor emigration as an efficient way to unload surplus workers. The Yugoslav sources suggest that the principal objective of the Yugoslav emigration policy was

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ Karolina Novinscak, „The Recruiting and Sending of Yugoslav ‚Gastarbeiter‘ to Germany: Between Social Demands and Economic Needs“, in: *Transnational Societies, Transteritorial Politics. Migrations in the (Post-) Yugoslav Regions 19th – 21st Century*, ed. Ulf Brunnbauer, München, 2009, 128.

⁷ AJ, 142, f-740, Savezni komitet za rad i zapošljavanje, Izveštaj o ostvarivanju politike zapošljavanja, zapošljavanja u inostranstvu, i postepenog vraćanja jugoslovenskih građana sa privremenog rada u inostranstvu u 1977. godini (analitičko-dokumentarna osnova), March 1978.

to reduce the pressure on the Yugoslav labor market by allowing the emigration of unemployed and unskilled labor force. At the same time the Yugoslav regime sought to set the limits as to the emigration of skilled workers.

This selective emigration policy of the regime in Belgrade was reflected in the legal framework for the 'export' of surplus workers created by the federal government in the early 1960s. In March 1962 the Federal Executive Council underlined the necessity of exporting unemployed workers and preventing emigration of employed skilled workers. This goal of the Yugoslav regime was put into practice by the Federal Ministry of Labor, which adopted instructions for employment of the Yugoslav workers abroad. Being approved by the Federal government, the instructions came into force on 23rd October 1963. The instructions of the Federal Ministry of Labor intended to foster the emigration of unskilled workers while imposing restrictions on emigration of skilled and highly skilled workers. The standard procedure provided that they could leave the country only with the permission of the Yugoslav Public Employment Services. The Federal Ministry of Labor entrusted the municipal authorities with deciding on the citizens' emigration applications, taking into account the Yugoslav economic interests.⁸ According to Yugoslav sources, the labor migration flows from Yugoslavia did not evolve into a brain drain. In the late 1970s only 0.2% of the Yugoslav labor emigrants held university degrees.⁹

The emigration policy of the Yugoslav regime was summarized in the document of the Federal Labor Office, issued in 1970. The document underlined the necessity of accommodating the emigration strategy to the Yugoslav economic „interests and needs“. In this respect, the Yugoslav Labor Office gave priority to the 'export' of unemployed and unskilled labor force.¹⁰

Nevertheless, the procedure for the export of surplus workers from Yugoslavia did not take root, since the majority of the Yugoslav labor migrants emigrated bypassing the Yugoslav institutions. According to Yugoslav sources, in 1973 only 30,000 (out of 104,000) jobseekers left Yugoslavia with the permission of the Yugoslav Labor Offices. The others emigrated to the West using their individual contacts i.e. through support of the social (migrant) networks abroad.¹¹

Despite anticipated positive implications of the migration flows from Yugoslavia for the Yugoslav economy (reducing unemployment, remittances of labor migrants), the communist regime in Yugoslavia had considerable reservations about the *Gastarbeiter* emigration in the 1960s and 1970s. According to Yugoslav sources, the regime in Belgrade was deeply concerned about the ideological, i.e. political consequences of this enterprise. The emigration from socialist Yugoslavia was anything but a simple migration from one country to another. Leaving their homeland and gaining a foothold in the western capitalist societies the jobseekers from Yugoslavia jumped over the Iron Curtain, which confronted them with the

8 Vladimir Ivanović, *Geburtstag pišeš normalno. Jugoslovenski gastarbajteri u SR Nemačkoj i Austriji 1965–1973*, Beograd, 2012, 57–58.

9 AJ, 142, f-740, Savezni komitet za rad i zapošljavanje, Izveštaj o ostvarivanju politike zapošljavanja, zapošljavanja u inostranstvu i postepenog vraćanja jugoslovenskih građana sa privremenog rada u inostranstvu u 1977. godini, March 1978.

10 AJ, 142, f-475, Savezni savet za rad, Neki elementi politike zapošljavanja u inostranstvu, November 1970.

11 *Ibid.*

new ideological values in the host countries. Therefore, the Yugoslav regime feared of potential „ideological indoctrination“ of the Yugoslav *Gastarbeiter* in the West. Since the government expected the repatriation of considerable number of Yugoslav „workers temporarily employed abroad“ the regime could not be indifferent to their potential political and ideological re-shaping. In this regard the Yugoslav regime was fearful of their „westernization“, as a result of their integration into host societies, and the repercussions of their „westernization“ on the socialist system in Yugoslavia.

The contacts of the labor migrants with the political emigrants from former Yugoslavia were seen as another severe threat to the socialist system in Yugoslavia. The bulk of the Yugoslav political emigration consisted of the anticommunists (particularly Croats and Serbs) who had left the country after the Second World War. In 1952 the number of Yugoslav political emigrants was estimated at 94,000, about 64 per cent of whom lived in the United States, Canada and Europe. According to Yugoslav sources, Serbs represented the largest group of the political refugees from socialist Yugoslavia, accounted for nearly 50 per cent of Yugoslav political emigrants in 1952.¹²

Having escaped from Yugoslavia they continued their „war“ against the communist regime in Belgrade sometimes using even the most radical methods. In 1970 the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry catalogued eleven right-wing organizations of the Serb diaspora in Western Europe, the United States, Canada and Australia, consisting, among others, of the Serbian anti-communist veterans of the Second World War (*Srpska narodna odbrana*, *Srpski kulturni klub Sveti Sava*, *Udruženje boraca kraljevske jugoslovenske vojske Draža Mihailović*, *Pokret srpskih četnika – Ravna Gora*, *Zbor*, *Južnoslovenski demokratski savez*, *Savez oslobođenja*, *Srpski omladinski pokret – Otadžbina*, *Srpski četnički centar*, *Udruženje Jugoslovena u Švedskoj*, *Srpski nacionalni odbor*).¹³

In order to protect the ideological purity of its *Gastarbeiter* the Yugoslav regime endeavored to control not only the recruitment of the labor migrants but also their everyday life abroad. For that purpose the Belgrade regime founded an extensive network of *Gastarbeiter* associations in the most important receiving countries. In the late 1970s there were hundreds of such clubs for the Yugoslav workers in the Federal Republic of Germany, Austria, Switzerland, Sweden, Great Britain, France and Belgium. The *Gastarbeiter* clubs represented an important tool of the Yugoslav propaganda machinery targeting the Yugoslav labor migrants abroad.¹⁴

Besides, the Yugoslavs desperately tried to control the education of the second generation of the Yugoslav labor emigrants, aiming to prevent their ideological indoctrination in the capitalist West. For that reason the Yugoslav government launched educational programs for Yugoslav school children in their native language in the most important receiving countries with the aim to instill the key elements of the Yugoslav ideological Weltanschauung (Marxism-Leninism, Yugoslav patriotism, the cult of Tito) in the *Gastarbeiter*'s offspring.¹⁵

12 Radmila Radić, *Država i verske zajednice 1945–1970*, Beograd, 2002, 292.

13 AJ, 142, f-474, Državni sekretarijat za inostrane poslove, Problemi vezani za aktivnost političke emigracije i potreba stalne i koordinirane protuakcije, June 1970.

14 Petar Dragišić, „Klubovi jugoslovenskih radnika u Zapadnoj Evropi sedamdesetih godina“, *Tokovi istorije*, 1/2010, 128–138.

15 AJ, 142, f-275, Odsek za školovanje jugoslovenske dece u inostranstvu, Informacija o nekim aktuelnim organizacionim pitanjima dopunske nastave za decu jugoslovenskih građana na

The efforts to control the recruitment of the Yugoslav „workers temporarily employed abroad“ as well as their political and ideological orientation reveal the ambivalent attitude of the Yugoslav regime towards the labor emigration from Yugoslavia. On one hand, it was perceived as an opportunity to relax the pressure on the Yugoslav labor market. On the other hand, the Yugoslav political elite was concerned about potential negative economic effects of the migration flows from Yugoslavia, such as emigration of skilled workers. The political consequences of the *Gastarbeiter* emigration were another major worry of the communist regime in Yugoslavia.

II

Being the biggest federal unit of former Yugoslavia Serbia contributed considerably to the migration flows from Yugoslavia since the 1960s. In 1981 more than one third of the Yugoslav *Gastarbeiter* population came from the Socialist Republic of Serbia and its autonomous provinces – Vojvodina and Kosovo. Nevertheless, the share of labor migrants in the total population was rather small in comparison with the top exporters of the labor force in former Yugoslavia. Whereas in 1971 only 2.4% of Serbian citizens worked abroad, the share of *Gastarbeiter* coming from Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina reached 5% and 3.7% respectively.¹⁶

According to the 1971 census, there were 228,115 „workers temporarily employed abroad“ and their family members coming from the Socialist Republic of Serbia. Ten years later the number of Serbian citizens living and working abroad increased by approximately 80,000. The official statistics from the 1991 census suggest a slight decline in the Serbian population abroad (278,724). Nevertheless, given the decision of the vast majority of the ethnic Albanian in the Socialist Autonomy Province of Kosovo as well as in the southern districts of the Central Serbia (Bujanovac, Preševo) to boycott the census, the estimated number of the Serbian citizens abroad (labor migrants and their family members) was 60,000 higher compared to 1981. The majority of the ‘workers temporarily employed abroad’ came from Central Serbia (uža Srbija). In 1981 the share of the migrant workers and their family members coming from Central Serbia in the total *Gastarbeiter* population from Serbia accounted for 65%. The 1981 census suggests

privremenom radu u inostranstvu, 8. 6. 1976; AJ, 142, f-275, Savezni zavod za međunarodnu naučnu, prosvetno-kulturnu i tehničku saradnju, Savetovanje o dopunskoj nastavi (Novi Sad 29–30. 6. 1976); AJ, 142, f-474, Savezni zavod za obrazovanje i kulturu, Društveno-pedagoška osnova obrazovno-vaspitnog rada sa decom naših radnika privremeno zaposlenih u inostranstvu i predlozi za rešavanje problema njihovog školovanja, 5. 5. 1970; AJ, 142, f-275, Savezni zavod za međunarodnu naučnu, prosvetno-kulturnu i tehničku saradnju, Izveštaj Rodoljuba Ignjatovića o obilasku dopunske i prelazne nastave u SR Nemačkoj i o održanim predavanjima od 2. do 6. 6. 1976; AJ, 142, f-275, Informacija ambasade SFRJ u Bernu o jugoslovenskim dopunskim školama na području Švajcarske, april 1976; AJ, 142, f-277, Savezni sekretarijat za inostrane poslove (Uprava za radnike u inostranstvu), Jugoslovenski građani na privremenom radu u Švajcarskoj – Problematika zapošljavanja, rada i boravka, jun 1978; AJ, 142, f-276, Generalni konzulat SFRJ Frankfurt, Dopunsko školovanje (1976).

16 Ulf Brunnbauer, „Jugoslawische Geschichte als Migrationsgeschichte (19. und 20. Jahrhundert)“, in *Schnittstellen. Gesellschaft, Nation, Konflikt und Erinnerung. Festschrift für Holm Sundhaussen zum 65. Geburtstag*, ed. Ulf Brunnbauer et al., München, 2007, 119.

that the second largest exporter of the Serbian labor force was the Socialist Autonomy Province of Vojvodina (21%). Nevertheless, ten years later (1991) the estimated number of the migrants from the Socialist Autonomy Province of Kosovo was slightly bigger than those from Vojvodina.¹⁷

*Workers temporarily employed abroad and their family members – from the Socialist Republic of Serbia*¹⁸

	Workers	Family members	Total
1971	198,220	29,895	228,115
1981	229,975	78,451	308,446
1991	202,850	75,874	278,724
1991 estimation			337,686

*Workers temporarily employed abroad and their family members – from Central Serbia (uža Srbija)*¹⁹

	Workers	Family members	Total	Share of population
1971	114,581	18,808	133,389	2.5
1981	152,932	50,489	203,421	3.6
1991	162,692	58,729	221,421	3.9
1991 estimation			226,295	3.9

*Workers temporarily employed abroad and their family members – from Vojvodina*²⁰

	Workers	Family members	Total	Share of population
1971	60,644	9,948	70,592	3.6
1981	48,078	17,513	65,591	3.2
1991	33,975	13,565	47,522	2.4

*Workers temporarily employed abroad and their family members – from Kosovo*²¹

	Workers	Family members	Total	Share of population
1971	22,995	1,139	24,134	1.9
1981	28,695	10,469	39,434	2.5
1991	6,201	3,508	9,781	2.7
1991 estimation			63,869	3.3

17 Republika Srbija, Republički zavod za statistiku, *Stanovništvo i domaćinstva Republike Srbije prema popisu 1991. godine*

18 *Ibid.*

19 *Ibid.*

20 *Ibid.*

21 *Ibid.*

The last census conducted in Serbia in the socialist period (1991) suggests that Germany and Austria received almost 50% of the *Gastarbeiter* population from Serbia. According to the statistics from the 1991 census, the community of Serbian citizens in Germany accounted for 25% of the *Gastarbeiter* from the Socialist Republic of Serbia. In addition, a considerable number of the guest workers from Serbia lived in Switzerland, France and Sweden. Typical of the *Gastarbeiter* emigration from Serbia was, in comparison to the Yugoslav average, a large percentage of Serbian immigrants in Austria. Whereas in 1977 the Yugoslav community in Austria accounted for 14.7% of the Yugoslav *Gastarbeiter*, the 1991 census recorded that roughly 24% of the labor migrants and their family members from Serbia were domiciled in the Austria. Nevertheless, Austria was far from being a favored destination for labor migrants from the Socialist Autonomy Province of Kosovo. The 1991 census recorded only 4.6% of the immigrants from Kosovo living in Austria.²²

The statistics on the labor migration from Serbia from the beginning of the 1960s to the dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia suggest that the bulk of the workers temporarily employed abroad and their families resided in Western Europe. The 1991 census recorded a relatively small number of guest workers from Serbia in the non-European countries.

*Citizens of the Socialist Republic of Serbia temporarily residing abroad 1991
(by receiving countries)²³*

	Serbia		Central Serbia		Vojvodina		Kosovo	
Austria	67,551	24.2%	58,623	26.5%	8,437	17.8%	451	4.6%
Belgium	757	0.3%	681	0.3%	56	0.1%	20	0.2%
Denmark	2,207	0.8%	1,770	0.8%	417	0.9%	20	0.2%
France	22,641	8.1%	21,097	9.5%	1,260	2.7%	284	2.9%
Netherlands	2,399	0.9%	1,962	0.9%	381	0.8%	56	0.6%
Italy	5,515	2%	5,022	2.3%	387	0.8%	106	1.1%
Luxembourg	528	0.2%	458	0.2%	53	0.1%	17	0.2%
Germany	70,839	25.4%	46,291	20.9%	20,938	44.1%	3,610	36.9%
Switzerland	41,046	14.7%	33,559	15.2%	3,882	8.2%	3,605	36.9%
Sweden	10,039	3.6%	7,796	3.5%	2,133	4.5%	110	1.1%
UK	1,740	0.6%	1,507	0.7%	204	0.4%	29	0.3%
Other European countries	2,343	0.8%	1,691	0.8%	510	1.1%	142	1.5%
North and Middle America	13,988	5%	10,528	4.7%	3,165	6.7%	295	3%
South America	334	0.1%	301	0.1%	26	0.1%	7	0.1%
Africa	1,448	0.5%	1,284	0.6%	135	0.3%	29	0.3%
Australia	5,098	1.8%	3,748	1.7%	1,317	2.8%	33	0.3%
Oceania	76	0.0%	57	0.0%	17	0.0%	2	0.0%
Asia	1,145	0.4%	1,022	0.5%	104	0.2%	19	0.2%
Other countries	29,070	10.4%	24,024	10.8%	4,100	8.6%	946	9.7%
Total	278,724	100%	221,421	100%	47,552	100%	9,781	100%

22 *Ibid.*

23 *Ibid.*

Serbian statistics reveal the existence of the *Gastarbeiter* stronghold in northeastern Serbia. According to the 1981 census, in the municipalities of Žabari, Malo Crniće and Svilajnac the *Gastarbeiter* and their family members made up more than 20% of the local population. In contrast to the large percentage of labor migrants from this part of Central Serbia the economic migration from the central parts of Vojvodina, the western parts of Central Serbia as well as from southeastern Serbia was far less extensive.²⁴

The statistical data on the educational level of the Serbian *Gastarbeiter* show a clear majority of the unskilled workers among the labor migrants from Serbia. According to the 1981 census, the labor migrants with secondary and tertiary education made up only 22.3% of the *Gastarbeiter* population from Serbia. The percentage of migrants with secondary and tertiary education was particularly low in Kosovo – 11.4%.²⁵ In spite of the inability of the Yugoslav regime to tightly control the economic migration from Yugoslavia, the official statistics suggest that the „exodus“ from Serbia from the early 1960s to the dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia corresponded to the main goal of the Yugoslav emigration strategy – stimulation of the export of the unqualified jobseekers, while keeping qualified and highly educated workers in Yugoslavia. In contrast to the extensive migration from Serbia during the 1990s the labor migration from Serbia during the socialist era did not escalate into brain drain.

The educational background of the labor migrants from Serbia played an important role in creating the image of Serbian *Gastarbeiter* in their homeland. The predominance of low-educated migrants in the *Gastarbeiter* population from Serbia shaped significantly the public perceptions of the „workers temporarily employed abroad“. In the 1970s and 1980s the negative stereotypes of the *Gastarbeiter* were commonplace in the Serbian film industry. The *Gastarbeiter* were depicted in the Serbian movies, as a rule, as impolite and uneducated nouveaux riches. Another locus communis was *Gastarbeiter's* above average wealth.²⁶ Nevertheless, this stereotype was not completely unfounded. According to Yugoslav estimates from 1970, the Yugoslav *Gastarbeiter* used to earn approximately 2.5-3 times the wages of their colleagues in Yugoslavia.²⁷

III

The migration flows Serbia from the 1960s to the beginning of the 1990s have had a significant impact on the Serbian economy. The export of labor force certainly contributed to some extent to reducing the pressure on the Serbian

24 Republički zavod za statistiku SR Srbije i Centar za demografska istraživanja IDN, *Stanovništvo i domaćinstva SR Srbije prema popisu 1981*.

25 *Ibid.*

26 Sara Bernard, „Il ritorno dei gastarbajteri nella politica migratoria della Jugoslavia socialista (1969–1991)“, *Percorsi storici*, 1/2013, [http://www.percorsistorici.it/numeri/numero-1/titolo-e-indice/saggi/sara-bernard-il-ritorno-dei-gastarbajteri-nella-politica-migratoria-della-jugoslavia-socialista-1969-1991]; Vladimir Ivanović, *Geburtstag pišeš normalno*, 309–313; Predrag Marković, „Gastarbeiters as the factor of Modernization of Serbia“, *Istorija 20. veka*, 2/2005, 150.

27 AJ, 142, f-475, Radna grupa Savjeta Izvršnog vijeća Sabora za odnose s inozemstvom, Zapošljavanje naših građana u inozemstvu, Zagreb, May 1970.

labor market during the socialist era. Besides, the *Gastarbeiter* migration has had profound financial effects, given that the remittances of the Yugoslav „workers temporarily employed abroad“ have been a significant source of foreign currency. This effect of the labor migration from Yugoslavia became noticeable already in the early phase of the export of Yugoslav labor force. In 1972 the remittances of the Yugoslav labor migrants for the first time exceeded one billion dollars. A decade later, the sum of the remittances was four times greater.²⁸

The remittances of the emigrants have continued to play an important role in the economies of the Yugoslav successor states after the dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The economic collapse during Milošević's era made Serbia extremely dependent on the cash infusions from the Serbian diaspora. For many citizens of Serbia the financial support of their relatives from the West was the only source of income during the „years of lead“ in Serbia in the 1990s. Nevertheless, the impact of the *Gastarbeiter* and other segments of the Serbian emigration on Serbia in this epoch had also political aspects.

The rise of nationalism in former Yugoslavia in the late 1980s and the Yugoslav disintegration at the beginning of the 1990s eliminated the border between political and labor migrants from Serbia. The nationalistic sentiments in the homeland had a significant impact on the Weltanschauung of many labor migrants from Serbia, resulting in their politicization and radicalization. Their long-distance nationalism manifested itself particularly in financial and humanitarian support for their compatriots in the home country. In 1989 the Serbian diaspora contributed enormously to Milošević's fundraising project – „loan for the economic reconstruction of Serbia“ (Zajam za privredni preporod Srbije). Besides, in the course of the Yugoslav wars in the 1990s the Serbian emigration supported their native land through charitable activities. During the wars of Yugoslav succession many Serbian migrants in the West also participated politically in the Yugoslav crisis. Lobbying and protest rallies, particularly during the NATO campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1999, were paradigmatic expression of the long-distance nationalism of the diaspora-Serbs.²⁹

Given the modest economic growth of post-Milošević's Serbia, the Serbian economy remains heavily reliant on the cash infusions of the Serbian emigrants. The recent World Bank statistics record a permanent growth of remittances to Serbia. Whereas in 2006 (the year of the dissolution of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro) the remittances to Serbia amounted to 4.7 billion dollars, three years later the Serbian migrants transferred to Serbia round 5.4 billion dollars. The World Bank statistics suggest a major impact of the *Gastarbeiter's* financial resources on the Serbian economy. In 2009 the share of the remittances of the Serbian GDP was estimated at 13%.³⁰

28 Waltraut Urban, „Die Wirtschaftsbeziehungen zwischen Österreich und Jugoslawien 1955–1985“, in *Österreich und Jugoslawien: Determinanten und Perspektiven ihrer Beziehungen*, ed. Otmar Höll, Wien, 1988, 385.

29 Birgit Bock-Luna, *The Past in Exile. Serbian Long-Distance Nationalism and Identity in the Wake of the Third Balkan War*, Berlin, 2008, 44, 109–113, 120; Paul Hockenos, *Homeland Calling. Exile Patriotism and the Balkan Wars* (Cornell University Press, Ithaca–New York, 2003), 106, 126, 164–165; Harald Waldrauch, Karin Sohler, *Migrantenorganisationen in der Großstadt: Entstehung, Strukturen und Aktivitäten am Beispiel Wien*, Wien, 2004, 208–215; Sam Pryke, „British Serbs and long-distance nationalism“, *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 1 (2003), 154–155.

30 The World Bank, *Migration and Remittances Fact book 2011*.

*Top remittance-receiving countries in 2010 (in \$ billions)*³¹

India	55.0	Pakistan	9.4
China	51.0	Poland	9.1
Mexico	22.6	Lebanon	8.2
Philippines	21.3	Egypt	7.7
France	15.9	UK	7.4
Germany	11.6	Vietnam	7.2
Bangladesh	11.1	Indonesia	7.1
Belgium	10.4	Morocco	6.4
Spain	10.2	Russian Federation	5.6
Nigeria	10.0	Serbia	5.6

Notwithstanding the „generosity“ of the Serbian *Gastarbeiter*, their savings have not significantly contributed to the economic modernization of Serbia. The attempts of the Yugoslav communist regime to attract investments of its emigrants through „*Gastarbeiter* factories“ had little success.³² Likewise, the post-communist governments of Serbia have failed to motivate the diaspora-Serbs to invest their savings in the Serbian economy. As a consequence, a lion's share of the considerable financial resources of the Serbian emigration has gone into private consumption.³³ The most eye-catching unproductive investments of the diaspora-Serbs are their lavish houses in their native land. The grandiose houses, which exceed the needs of the emigrants and their families, became unique status symbols of the Serbian *Gastarbeiter*.³⁴

Nevertheless, the influence of the Serbian *Gastarbeiter* emigration on their native land is not only limited to the strong financial support. The *Gastarbeiter* and their descendants are well integrated into the receiving societies while maintaining close ties with their country of origin. Thus, through levitation between „here and there“ the large Serbian *Gastarbeiter* communities, together with the other segments of the Serbian diaspora, became an alternative „channel“ between Serbia and the *Gastarbeiter's* host countries in the West. In this regard, the German historian, Ulf Brunnbauer, underlined the role of the Yugoslav *Gastarbeiter* in transferring „new cultural patterns and values“ from the receiving countries to their homeland.³⁵

31 *Ibid.*

32 Ulf Brunnbauer, „Labor Emigration from the Yugoslav Region from the late 19th Century until the End of Socialism: Continuities and Changes“, in *Transnational Societies, Transteritorial Politics. Migrations in the (Post-) Yugoslav Regions 19th – 21st Century*, ed. Ulf Brunnbauer, München, 2009, 46.

33 <http://www.politika.rs/rubrike/vesti-dana/Srbiji-od-dijaspore-55-milijardi-dolara.lt.html> (accessed April 2014); Ulf Brunnbauer, „Labor Emigration“, 46.

34 Predrag Marković, „Gastarbeiters“, 155; Ulf Brunnbauer, „Labour Emigration“, 34.

35 Ulf Brunnbauer, „Labour Emigration“, 49.

Резиме

Др Петар Драгишић

У потрази за Елдорадом. Радници из Србије на привременом раду у иностранству од 60-их година до распада Југославије

Кључне речи: економска емиграција, гастарбајтери, Србија, Југославија, дознаке

Шездесетих година прошлог века социјалистичка Југославија је била суочена са политичким тензијама и економском стагнацијом. Криза на тржишту рада приморала је стотине хиљада Југословена да посао потраже изван граница земље. Највећи талас емиграције из Југославије трајао је до почетка 70-их година, када је у иностранству радило више од милион југословенских гастарбајтера. За Југословене на привременом раду у иностранству кључне дестинације биле су земље немачког говорног простора.

Према србијанским статистичким подацима, 1971. у иностранству је живело близу 230.000 гастарбајтера из Србије и чланова њихових породица. У наредним деценијама тај број се увећао, па је у години распада Социјалистичке Федеративне Републике Југославије (1991) у иностранству живело, према резултатима пописа, око 280.000 миграната из Србије. Процењено је, међутим, да је реалан број био за око 60.000 већи. Најзначајнији удео у укупном броју миграната из Социјалистичке Републике Србији имали су мигранти из централне Србије. Извоз радне снаге посебно је био карактеристичан за подручје североисточне Србије. Према резултатима пописа из 1981, у општинама Жабари, Мало Црниће и Свилајнац удео емиграната у локалној популацији прелазио је 20%. Статистички извори указују на значајно низак образовни ниво миграната из Социјалистичке Републике Србије.

На Србију, као и на остале југословенске републике, интензивна гастарбајтерска емиграција имала је двоструки економски ефекат. С једне стране, одлив вишкова радне снаге растеретио је домаће тржиште рада. Са друге стране, гастарбајтерске дознаке представљале су и представљају значајну економску инјекцију за Србију и остале земље региона.

УДК 392.37:343.54/.55(497.11)
343.62(497.11)
316.662-055.2(497.11)

Vera GUDAC DODIĆ, Ph. D.

DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN IN SERBIA*

Abstract: The history of intimidation and violence against women, within the family in Serbia, has deep-seeded roots in the past. The violent treatment of women has been woven into the foundations of society and is the result of a variety of historical, cultural, political and other factors. An analysis of the phenomenon of domestic violence against women in Serbia and the historical legacy of it are the focal points of the analysis presented in this paper.

Key words: Serbia, patriarchy, violence against women, domestic violence, subordination of women

Introduction

Violence in terms of the family and everyday life has long been glossed over and considered a taboo. The phenomenon of marriage and family violence, terminologically also marked as domestic violence, refers to all shapes and forms of violent behaviour within the family. It covers different manifestations of violence to which women, as well as, all other members of family were exposed to, thus becoming victims. Most often this referred to women and children, elder family members, the ones who were weak and unable to resist an abuser. A violent person is always the one from the closest environment, a spouse, a partner or former partner, children and parents, or other relatives, persons who live in the same household. Domestic violence has evaded influence and control of the state and its institutions for a long period of time, being deeply shrouded in privacy.

“Traditional cultures in the Balkans often support violent behaviour towards women (and children), whereby the issue is still covered with shame, which disables women to speak out and demand their basic human rights”.¹

Domestic violence which is characteristic for all societies and social communities is widely spread. Statistics have shown that the least safe place for women is their own home. According to the statistics, the prevailing cause of death or disability in women aged between 16 and 44 is family violence, at so high a rate that exceeds cancer, traffic accidents and even war.² In most cases, it is women who are

* This article has been written within the framework of the scholarly project *Tradition and Transformation – Historical Heritage and National Identity in Serbia in 20th Century* (№ 47019), financed by the Ministry of Education, Science and Technological Development Republic of Serbia.

1 Marina Blagojević, *Status of Women in Balkan Countries, Comparative Review*, Belgrade, 2003, p. 135.

2 *Nasilje nad ženama u porodici* [Domestic Violence Against Women], *Nasilje nad ženama, prepreka razvoju – međunarodni dokumenti* [Violence Against Women, Obstacles to Development – International Documents], editor Tanja Ignjatović, Belgrade, 2005, p. 79.

the victims of domestic violence. The World Bank Report on the *Status and Rights of Women* published in May 2014 indicates the epidemiological levels of domestic violence against women. Appalling results reveal that millions of women worldwide were subjected to physical or sexual violence committed by their husbands or partners. "Gender based violence has reached global epidemic levels because it affects women in all parts of the world. In many parts of the world, there is no place less safe than their home because more than 700 million women are exposed to physical and sexual violence committed by their husbands, boyfriends or partners".³ Every other woman or 43% of them were exposed to this kind of violence in South Asia. Similar data pertains to women in North Africa and the Middle East where 40% were exposed to physical and sexual violence committed by their partners. The percentage of women who have been exposed to physical or sexual manifestation of domestic violence in their lives is also high in other parts of the world: 33% in South America, 30% in East and Pacific Asia, 29% in Central Asia, 21% in North America, 28% in Australia and New Zealand.⁴ The report of the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights presented the violence women faced at home, work and in public reveals that every third women in the European Union suffered physical or sexual violence and one fifth of them were victim of partner related violence. Almost half of the surveyed women 43% were victims of different forms of physiological violence inflicted by their present or former partner.⁵

The research conducted within the territory of Serbia and former Yugoslavia has generally shown the same pattern.

Only during 2013, the total of 131 women in Serbia died as the result of family and spousal violence.⁶

History of marriage and family violence in Serbia

The history of spousal and family violence in Serbia against women could be seen and explained through the prism of domination of men over women and their overall position in society. The dominance of men used to be present in everyday life. The well preserved tradition and models of behaviour transmitted for generations also shaped gender relations. The warrior tradition was present in all aspects of cultural patterns and behaviour. Domestic violence was particularly characteristic in regions where family cooperatives started to gradually become smaller. The position of women and children in the family on the territory of the Yugoslav state before the Second World War was described by Vera Erlih.⁷

3 "Nasilje nad ženama problem u svetu" [Violence Against Women is a Problem in the World], www.Euractiv.rs/ljudskaprava/7266/nasilje (accessed: 6 November 2014).

4 Data presented in the report of the World Bank on the status and rights of women were based on a preliminary analysis of the World Health Organization in 2013, but did not include data for Europe. *Ibid.*

5 The report "Nasilje nad ženama, svaki dan i svuda" [Violence Against Women, Every Day and Everywhere] is based on a survey of 42,000 women, aged between 18 and 74 years. www.Euractiv.rs/ljudskaprava/6961/nasilje (access November 2014).

6 "Violence Against Women – the Most Usual Form of Women's Rights Abuse", <http://www.euinfo.rs/sr/blog/11110/Nasilje+nad+ženama>, [access September 2014].

7 Vera Erlich, *Jugoslovenska porodica u transformaciji*, [Transformation of Yugoslav family], Zagreb, 1971, p. 69.

Scenes from the parents' homes, seen and learned communication between genders in family relationships, models of behaviour marked by domestic violence, encouraged and resulted in the transmission of violence from generation to generation. Subordination of women to their husbands reflected at different levels and displayed in numerous segments of life, involved violent behaviour. Such a historic legacy, powerlessness of a woman, legal as well as other dependence of women on their husbands, was the environment that not only made the violence possible, but also common.

While exploring, among other, the lives of Serbian people, Tihomir Đorđević sought to examine the position of women. He pointed to the vast differences in the position of men and women, the subordination of women that was particularly common in rural areas, such an attitude originated and went way back deep into the past. To illustrate this, he described the inhumane conditions in which rural women gave birth and the treatment of women in confinement, pointing out that women were often treated poorly; they were beaten, scolded and not allowed to rest even after the childbirth.⁸

Believing that man, as the master of the woman, had the right to beat her was typical of the time. The preserved records show that in the past, there were even cases of priests beating their wives. Back in 1732, in the village Livadice on the Morava River, the priest named Golub was reported to "so severely beat his wife because she drank and did not behave decently" that she ran away to Kragujevac. Nine decades later, in Kragujevac, a woman named Rista from Sirogojno, sued her husband Ilija Savić before the People's Court because he relentlessly beat her. When asked by the Court why he was doing that, he replied, "I did beat her a few times, as my wife, but not as she says..."⁹ Husbands used to beat their wives in other regions, as well. In Slavonia, wives were told "I am your God, your Court, your judgement! God created you, and I will destroy you". "A man used to be proud of having beaten his wife. Today, people are different". Vuk Karadžić wrote that a woman in Montenegro "... should be lucky to get a husband who ... does not beat her without a reason, just as he so pleases".¹⁰

Until as late as 1945, the subordination of a married woman to a man had been legally codified. According to the Serbian Civil Code, a married woman was, with respect to her general business capacity, ranked among the under-aged, the mentally disordered, the wastrels and the bums. The discrimination of women in inheritance was manifested by making the male children, that is, the male descendants the heirs, and likewise.¹¹

The climate between the two wars in Serbia contributed to the practice of violence in the family, wrote Vera Erlih. According to the research conducted in Serbian villages and the testimonials by the villagers, beatings were frequent in families and they were approved by almost all the peasants that had been surveyed. Still, there were some exceptions. The cause of such unusual harshness towards women, according to the author, was a mixture of a number of different factors, ranging from the

8 Istorijски arhiv Beograda [Historical Archives of Belgrade], Personal Collection of Nebojša Popov, 2678, b. 15; Tihomir R. Đorđević, "Položaj žene u našem narodu" [Status of the Woman in our Society], *Srpski književni glasnik*, NS, XXVII, (1 August 1929), p. 528.

9 *Ibid.*, p. 530.

10 *Ibid.*, p. 531.

11 *Građanski zakonik Kraljevine Srbije* [Civil Code of the Kingdom of Serbia], Beograd, 1913.

warrior tradition, the Turkish influence, and the rapid penetration of money economy. Such a set of circumstances and their specific combination brought about the use of physical force and generally harshness towards women. In this respect, there were no major differences between the patriarchal villages and those undergoing strong turbulences.¹² Sayings coming from pre-war Serbia are testimony to this.

"A man should beat his wife and his horse every three days" (the county of Niš). "If you do not beat your wife for forty days, she goes mad" (the Morava County). "A man who has never slapped his wife is unworthy" (the county of Dragačevo). "A husband should beat his wife so that she knows who the head of the family is. If a wife is not beaten, she would jump over the house" (the county of Banja). "A brother and an ox should be bribed, a woman and a horse should be beaten", "Take a swing at an ox, hit a woman", (the county of Kosmaj) and many other.¹³

Other authors also pointed to the existence of similar sayings: "He who never beats his wife, is not a man", "A sharp-tongued woman gets beaten more often", "A wife that fears not her husband, often sheds tears" (M. Mijušković).¹⁴ They reveal the fact that the use of force by a husband against a wife in the patriarchal culture within this region used to be generally accepted. Inured to violence, they often accepted it as something inevitable.

The custom of some Serbian regions persuasively reflect the reality in which physical punishment of women was inveterate and expected. In 1940, the daily newspaper *Politika* wrote about customs that had been kept since "the old times" in the villages of Zaplanje region, where on the wedding day, the bride's mother would hand an iron rod to the groom, in the presence of other senior women, including the girl getting married... "So that you would beat her if she is not good. So that she would obey you as the head of the family..." after this, the wedding couple would eat fried eggs prepared by the bride's mother, as a ritual that made sure that her daughter would be subordinate to her future husband and not bring shame on her family.¹⁵

The violent behaviour against women used to have the character of a "demonstration". The villagers from the county of Vlasotince used to say that the husband would beat his wife when his parents complained that their daughter-in-law had insulted them. His beating her in the presence of the children or the neighbours was considered to contribute to his authority. "A husband is the master of a wife, and he ought to beat her".¹⁶ By demonstrating power and violent behaviour against a wife in front of others, a husband would create a 'good reputation' which in itself presents the dominating and adopted values of the time and reflects the position of women, predominantly the married ones.

Violence committed within the privacy of homes and various forms and manifestations of domestic abuse, have not affected women only. Children in Ser-

12 Erlich, pp. 239, 240.

13 Erlich, p. 221.

14 Žarko Trebješanin, "Stereotipi o ženi u srpskoj kulturi" [Stereotypes About the Woman in Serbian culture], (<http://beogradskaka5anija.cyberfreeforum.com/t4105-stereotip-o-zeni-u-srpskoj-kulturi>) [accessed 1 June 2012].

15 D. I. Jovičić, "Po Zaplanju" [Across Zaplanje], *Politika*, 18 July 1940, p. 11.

16 Erlich, p. 240.

bia ere often beaten by their parents. Corporal punishment of children was part of their upbringing, family life and growing up.¹⁷

Domestic violence against women in the socialist period

This legacy, shaped and born out of the controversies of the past as the outcome of historical and cultural influences was inherited by the socialist government. In the socialist period, the Yugoslav state criminal law did not treat or regulate domestic violence as a separate criminal offense, but instead, some other provisions of the criminal or other laws were applied. A special Article in the Law on Amendments to the Criminal Code regulating sanctions against domestic violence, that recognized it as a separate criminal offense for the first time, was passed as late as 2002.¹⁸ The introduction of domestic violence as a separate, independent offence in criminal legislation was preceded by, among other, numerous activities of different organizations. Particularly sensitive to its victims, and active against domestic violence have been women's organizations and groups who lobbied for the change of law.

The violence woven into everyday lives of many women embodied a dark side and a distressing picture of life. For quite a long period, the modernization of the socialist state was resisted by the accustomed behaviour relying on the belief that "a wife is subordinate to a husband, she must obey him. Hence the beating of wives..."¹⁹ Unequal distribution of power and patriarchal cultural patterns from which the violent treatment of women originated, prevailing dominated in rural environment. The recollections of peasant women reveal instances of domestic violence committed by a member of the extended family. Mira Dervišić married when she was not yet 16 to a man from the village of Debeli Lug near Majdanpek in 1970s. She replied to a question whether her mother in law ever hit: "My mother in law? Yes, she hit me once. She hit me with a piece of wood, hit me on the head. She did, she did. My father in law hit me twice and I cried, he grabbed my hand and said: Don't cry, it is no big deal..."²⁰

Despite the leftist political orientation of the government promoting gender equality, at least at a declarative level, with the state adopting laws to eliminate the inherited legally founded discrimination of women, domestic violence continued to be invisible for the socialist state. Domestic violence evaded social control, while aggressive behaviour by some family members remained within the boundaries of privacy, behind the locked doors and hidden from the public. It would be revealed only in extreme cases or before courts when spousal abuse would lead to divorce. The fact that there were not many records of domestic violence in the period of socialism likewise shows that violence was treated as a private family matter.

Spousal abuse, the most frequent form of violence in Serbian families, often resulted in marriage breakdown and consequentially, divorce. The abusive

17 Vera Gudac Dodić, „Život u senci zla, nasilje u braku i porodici“ [Life in the Shadow of Evil, Domestic Violence], *Tokovi istorije*, [Currents of History] (3), Belgrade, 2012, pp. 226–241.

18 "Krivični zakon Republike Srbije", [Criminal Code of the Republic of Serbia], *Nasilje u porodici*, [Domestic violence], clause 118a, 76, *Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia*, Belgrade, 2002.

19 Arhiv Jugoslavije, (Archive of Yugoslavia) (AY), 837, KPR, II–2/16, 1953.

20 *Ja, žena sa sela* [Me, a Countrywoman] Sandra Mandić, coverage, TV B2 production "Redakcija" [Redaction] February 8, 2010.

behaviour of spouses used to be and remained one of the major reasons for divorce. Aggressiveness and physical abuse in family life is linked with alcohol abuse, in most of the cases by a husband. Alcoholism frequently precedes and accompanies violence. Under the influence of alcohol, almost always provoking a range of problems, husbands would quite often harass their wives both physically and in other ways. "They had a bad life together from the very beginning, because the husband used to drink, and he would have an intercourse with his wife in such a state and would also beat her" or "he would return home late, which caused serious fights, and even physical attacks, due to which the marriage became impossible to keep";²¹ are only some of the segments of the hidden family dramas, preserved in the documents dating from the beginning of the second part of the 20th century. When women initiated a divorce, which was less often in the early 1950s in Serbia, with the exception of Belgrade, considering that it was predominantly the men who instigated the divorce action, they were often motivated by the physical abuse they had been exposed to "in view of the fact that the petitioner beat the respondent (wife)", "physical attacks were occasional" etc.²²

*Last decade of the 20th century: war conditions
and social crisis as generators of violence*

In the 1990s of the twentieth century, during the civil war in Yugoslavia, amidst the social, economic and political crisis that fundamentally shook Serbia, the family was equally affected. The crisis that was manifested in all spheres of social life, bringing chaos and despair, accompanied by the dusk of almost all values of the ethical code upheld until then, degraded the position of the majority of the population, but it was the women who carried its full burden. The decline in production and employment, multitude of people laid off with underground economy concurrently flourishing, poverty brought to its extreme limits, are only a part of the picture of economic and social environment in Serbia in the last decade of the twentieth century.

Migration, conflicts and bombing of the FRY in 1999 also marked this period. The social transition in the late 20th and early 21st century, led to many changes. The research showed that these processes, among other, had the destabilizing effect on families and family relationships. The dysfunctional family relationships often ended in violence, whose victims, in most of the cases, were women and children. The studies on domestic violence in former Yugoslavia showed that the war, economic crisis and social transition were powerful generators of domestic violence.²³ Conditions that favour the increase of violence in the society reflected on the family as well, and therefore contribute to an increase in domestic violence.

Any form of family violence, physical abuse, psychological abuse, threats, including sexual abuse, are more frequent in poor families in Serbia and in

21 AY, AFŽ, 141, 33, Razvod braka u Srbiji, [Divorce in Serbia] 1952.

22 *Ibid.*

23 Sanja Čopić, "Porodično nasilje u zemljama bivše Jugoslavije: pregled najvažnijih rezultata istraživanja" [Domestic Violence in Countries of the Former Yugoslavia: Review of the Most Important Results of the Surveys], *Temida*, 6 (2), Belgrade, 2003, pp. 17–25.

those whose financial status had declined, that is, those which became poorer. The violence exerted on women is more frequent in families living in extremely underprivileged conditions. Data revealed that, with the exception of sexual abuse, that women living in various forms of extended families or households are more exposed to violence. Some authors find that with regard to the exposure of women to domestic violence, particularly risky form of household is the vertically extended family.²⁴ Unemployment among men and family situations where a partner constantly earns less than a wife or whose wages have been considerably fluctuating, also provoke domestic violence. This is more evident in families whose idea of the traditional role of a man as the provider has been undermined. The war extensively triggered domestic violence: the connection between the participation of men in war and violence in the family was established. Reasons that prevented a woman from leaving a violent partner were chiefly existential: they could not support themselves, they were unable to take care of the children, had no apartment and/or place to go to. This was specified as the main reason among women who had never attempted to leave the abusers, or who had left them, but returned later on. At the same time it was noticed that among the women who left the abusers, the largest proportion considered themselves to be the main providers, which indicates the importance of economic and financial independence of women as the key factor in finding the way out of domestic violence. Fear for their children is also among the important reasons declared by women that had stopped them from leaving a violent partner as did hope that the partner would change etc.²⁵

Domestic violence in Serbia is considerably widespread, while women who suffer it belong to different social strata, different education and profession. The moment when they are most vulnerable is when they decide to leave the abuser. Physical abuse of women is most often repeated and becomes more brutal over time. After a period of remorse for committing "evil", again there is a phase of violence. Women are afraid of the abuser's retaliation, and the majority of murders in family occur when a woman tries to leave.²⁶

Contemporary context of domestic violence in Serbia

Research on violence taking place in the privacy of the home in Serbia is of recent date, mostly conducted after the year 2000. It invariably shows that domestic violence in the contemporary conditions constitutes a part of the daily life of many women. One of the first research projects dealing with this issue was carried out by the Victimology Society of Serbia at the beginning of the twenty first century. The research on domestic violence in Serbia, its characteristics and expansion carried out in 2001, showed that a high percentage of women had been exposed to some of its forms or manifestations. The results of the research that

24 Vesna Miletić-Stepanović, "Nasilje nad ženama kao rizik za socijalnu transformaciju", [Violence Against Women as the Risk for Social transformation], *Temida*, 8 (1), Belgrade, 2005, p. 25.

25 Čopić, pp. 23, 24.

26 Nevenka Petrušić, Slobodanka Konstantinović Vilić, *Vodič kroz sistem porodičnogpravne zaštite od nasilja u porodici*, [Guide to the System of Legal Protection from Family Violence], Belgrade, 2006, p. 10.

included 230 women from the territory of Belgrade, 120 from the territories of Novi Sad and Niš, 60 from each of the towns of Užice, Zaječar and Vrnjačka Banja and 50 from the territory of Subotica, have been presented in the book titled *The Domestic Violence in Serbia*.²⁷ According to the obtained results, almost one half of surveyed female population suffered the psychological abuse in their families (46.1%), slightly below one third of surveyed women (30.6%) were exposed to physical abuse, while each fourth woman was threatened with violence (26.3%). The psychological abuse suffered by the women was manifested in different ways. The survey respondents specified as the most common forms of abuse they suffered, scolding, name calling, swearing and other forms of contempt and humiliation, followed by the restriction of movement or contact with other people, or more specifically isolation. They indicated that they had been psychologically and emotionally abused by arguing, shouting, rebukes, drunkenness, jealousy, etc. Economic violence for many women meant limiting or completely restricting their use of money, preventing them to work, insisting that they leave their jobs, etc. Threats and intimidations are manifested through various forms of blackmail, such as those that he would take her child from her, kick her out of home and other. Some respondents specified the use of different privileges, instructing them to behave in specific way and similar, as the forms of psychological violence.²⁸

The highest percentage of respondents who experienced physical violence in their own homes, manifested as slapping (12% of women have experienced this form of violence) and battery (9%). Other examples of physical abuse of women were reported as well. It is indicative that the highest percentage of women who have been physically abused is among those aged above 65. Women have been most frequently physically abused by the spouse, the percentage of husbands as the offenders being particularly high, reaching 74.8%. In a much smaller percentage, the survey has shown that also other family members and even former partners appear to be committing violence. 7.4% of women were exposed to violence involving weapons or tools that may cause serious injuries. Cases of forced sexual acts were recorded in 8.7% of women.²⁹

The data presented in this survey is testimony that violence against women in Serbia is widespread, with the percentage of women being victims of physical abuse in their families, higher than those recorded in Western countries, or those from the neighbouring countries. Moreover, the results show that the most common, albeit not the only abuser in the family appear to be the man, in particular the husband, or the partner. Being under the influence of alcohol is conducive to violence. Often, but not most frequently, violence is committed in a state of drunkenness. Exposure of children to either direct or indirect violence has also been reported. The obtained results emphasize the importance and impact of two major factors on occurrence of domestic violence, in particular: patriarchy and financial constraints.³⁰

27 Vesna Nikolić-Ristanović, *Porodično nasilje u Srbiji* [Domestic Violence in Serbia], Viktimološko društvo Srbije [Victimology Society of Serbia], Belgrade, 2002.

28 Ivana Vidaković, „Rasprostranjenost nasilja u porodici“ [The Prevalence of Domestic Violence], *Porodično nasilje u Srbiji*, [Domestic Violence in Serbia], pp. 13–19.

29 Vidaković, *ibid.*, pp. 39–61.

30 Nikolić-Ristanović, *Porodično nasilje u Srbiji* [Domestic Violence in Serbia], pp. 107, 108.

One decade later, research was conducted on characteristics of family violence on the territory of Serbia proper.³¹ It indicates that domestic violence is still widespread, to the extent that more than one half of female respondents (54%) have had certain experience related to family violence. The most common form in central Serbia is psychological violence, then physical, economic, and finally sexual abuse. One third of women-respondents have simultaneously suffered different forms of violence in their own home. Women who were exposed to violence in this area differed in education and schooling, age. Furthermore, they lived in different settlements and environments, belonged to different social strata and had different family status. The research confirms that the most common abuser in the family is a husband or a partner. It shows that “structural, cultural and individual factors of violence are less important than the family ones and they are mediated by them.”³² The same as in the previous research related to the phenomenon of domestic violence in Serbia, it has been noted that poverty contributes to violence within family, in other words it increases the risk of exerting violence against women. Cultural factors did not have a significant impact on the appearance of violence, and more liberal position of women in terms of gender roles was neither an obstacle to domestic violence nor did it raise the risk of its appearance. The position of a partner did have greater influence on violence. Women who were in relationship with persons with more liberal stances were rarely exposed to domestic violence, whereas the ones whose partners advocated patriarchal views were at greater risk to be subjected to various forms of abuses and violence. Women’s economic independence and employment is a precondition for the risk of family violence to be lower, but it is not sufficient for its prevention. Speaking of family factors, the problems such as alcoholism, drug addiction, “take the lead as predictors of family violence”,³³ as the research concludes. Life in larger, multifamily households increases the risk of women being exposed to domestic violence and abuse by several members. “It should be emphasized that one third of abused women who live in larger households has experienced violence from the three key segments of their primary social networks: from the family of origin, from the husband and his family and from their own children. Life in such a circle of violence, in conditions of distant, low-quality and non-efficient support services, does not provide women with a single way-out from the life marked by violence”.³⁴ Women rarely turn to an institution for help.³⁵ Abusers were, at least for a short period of time, abandoned by only one third of women who were victims of violence, whereas fewer women tried to divorce or to make them apply for some kind of therapy. The majority of women adapted themselves to life in which violence was a common episode and its inevitable part.

31 Marija Babović, Katarina Ginjić, Olivera Vuković, *Mapiranje porodičnog nasilja prema ženama u Centralnoj Srbiji* [Mapping of Family Violence Against Women in Central Serbia], Belgrade, 2010.

32 *Ibid.*, pp. 91–92.

33 Babović, Ginjić, Vuković, *ibid.*, p. 92.

34 *Ibid.*

35 This research discovered omissions in the work of institutions that are supposed to provide assistance to victims of violence. Doctors would sometimes provide medical help to victims, neither asking them about the origin of injuries nor taking any further action. Also, there were examples that a Social Care Centre did not report case of domestic violence, etc. Babović, Ginjić, Vuković, p. 93.

Research on violence in personal relationships conducted in an urban environment, in Belgrade, the capital of Serbia, also revealed that women were often exposed to violence.³⁶ According to the research, 23.7% of women from the surveyed sample who had been in intimate relationships during some period, had been exposed to violence (physical or sexual) at some time in their lives. Physical violence against them took on various forms of slapping, targeting with various objects, pushing, kicking, beating, punching, choking, causing burns, and other. The fact that one in five of women from the group that was exposed to violence suffered serious injuries completes the picture of domestic violence against women. Among respondents covered by the study, who reported that they were pregnant, 3.4% were victims of physical abuse by their partners during pregnancy.³⁷ This and other studies, confirm that the social status and educational level of women is not an obstacle to violence and that it is present in all social groups.

A high percent of alcoholics among abusers proves that alcohol contributes to an increase in violent behaviour of men. The research conducted using the data gathered from the SOS emergency phone for women and children victims of violence in Belgrade indicates that alcoholism initiated violence in 33.5% of cases.³⁸ Speaking of family violence, alcoholism was often accompanied by some other causes (jealousy, return from the war arena, etc.). Female victims of violence who sought help by means of SOS emergency phone often stated, in 49.2% of cases, that violence was not provoked, in other words that it appeared without any reason. Jealousy was the cause of violence in 10.2% of cases, problems related to apartment in 9.3%, money in 8.5%, and children in 5% of cases. Other causes were indicated in 11.1% of cases.³⁹ The fact that alcohol contributes to violence does not mean that it provokes it, but that it serves as a mechanism for the loosening of inhibitions that prevent men from behaving violently towards their female partners.⁴⁰ Therefore, it is better to say that alcohol and violence overlap than that alcohol causes violence.

The prevalence of domestic violence has also been confirmed by the research conducted in Vojvodina, implemented by the Victimology Society of Serbia. It included 516 women from seven cities and forty villages in Vojvodina. More than half of the women who participated in the survey confirmed that they had experienced some form of violence. One half of respondents experienced psychological abuse (49.8%). About one third of respondents (27.3%) had been exposed to physical abuse, and more than one third (33.9%) were its victims. Sexual abuse in family was experienced by 9.1% of women from the survey sample. In most of the cases, the abuser was a spouse or ex-husband, or the current or former partner.⁴¹

36 *Nasilje u partnerskim odnosima i zdravlje* [Intimate Partners Violence and Health], editor Stanislava Otašević, Belgrade, 2005.

37 *Ibid.*, pp. 25, 28.

38 Some other research present much greater percent of violence exercised in the state of intoxication.

39 Mršević Zorica, *Ka demokratskom društvu – rodna ravnopravnost* [Towards Democratic Society – Gender Equality], Belgrade, 2011, p. 58.

40 Mršević, p. 50.

41 "Nasilje nad ženama u svetu i kod nas" [Violence Against Women in the World and in Our Country],

Certain characteristics of family violence against women

Adaptation to violence within a family is of great importance for the understanding of this phenomenon. Both abusers and victims of violence often came from families in which domestic violence had been exercised on a regular basis, and they had been either victims of violence or observers of violent scenes. Some research indicate that male children who grew up in families characterised by violence are often prone to such reactions, or applications of the learned model of behaviour, more than other children who did not grow up in environment in which domestic violence occurred regularly. On the other hand, women who used to be victims of violence at their early age, or witnesses and observers, have more chance to be "abused" in partner relationships. According to research pointed out by Z. Mršević, 27% of women who experienced sexual abuse as minors were later raped, whereas other women had the same experience in 8% of cases. Speaking of sexually abused girls and minors, many of them, even 40%, were later beaten or raped in marriage. When it comes to women who did not have such experiences in their childhood or youth, the percent of the ones who were beaten or raped as grown-up women in marriage was lower, 14%.⁴²

While analysing the phenomenon of family violence, certain researchers paid special attention to so-called psychopathic violence in the family, and to characteristics and consequences of such violence.⁴³ Anglo-Saxon research has established that a considerable number of perpetrators of violence against women are persons with so-called "antisocial personality disorder".⁴⁴ Family violence that they exert partially differs from and indicates particular characteristics compared to domestic violence that is exercised by persons who are not characterized by this kind of psychopathic personality. The risk that domestic violence will appear, as well as that it will manifest again, is greater among abusers with psychopathic personality than among the others. Contrary to abusers who exercise violence at the moment of great emotional thrill, based on particular reason, either real or experienced in such a way by the abuser, a psychopath does not need any motive to carry out a violent act. Violence is planned and premeditated, cold-blooded, performed without emotions. Although it looks as if perpetrators are extremely angry and furious at the moment of exercising violence, they actually work themselves up into a fury intentionally, almost acting, and they are able get themselves out of such state in the same way. Psychopaths are able to stop, to make a pause during the very act of violence, e.g.

Republika Srbija, Autonomna Pokrajina Vojvodina, Pokrajinski sekretarijat za rad, zapošljavanje i ravnopravnost polova. (<http://www.hocudaznas.org/publikacije/Cinjenice-i-brojke-o-nasilju-nad-zenama>) [accessed 1 December 2013].

42 Mršević, p. 58.

43 Danka Radulović, "Osobnosti i posledice psihopatskog nasilja u porodici" [Characteristics and consequences of psychopathic violence in the family], *Temida*, 2005, pp. 11-19.

44 Psychopathy is defined as "relatively permanent state of structural psychological personal disorder characterized by: particular set of personal characteristics dominated by aggressiveness; anti-social, egoistically-hedonistic value orientation with the conspicuous lack of moral and evil intentions; and behavioural manifestations of behavioural disorder, among which perpetration of criminal acts particularly stands out". Since psychopaths understand social regulations and behavioural norms, "they must be considered mentally capable and criminally responsible". Radulović, p. 13.

to answer the phone and to talk quietly and calmly, even kindly, and then attack its victim even more violently.⁴⁵ While the majority of persons who do not have characteristics of psychopaths exert violence in the state of great emotional thrill, and completely possessed by rage, the situation with psychopaths is opposite. Their planned, cold-blooded violence does not provoke remorse. Psychopaths are the most violent persons who abuse their wives and children all the time, and their families are exposed to the greatest risk of repeated violence. Abusers with psychopathic personality are almost resistant to treatments, even the ones particularly created for abusers. Good at camouflage and manipulation, they force their victims to utter and unquestioning submission.⁴⁶

Judicial practice

Practices of the Prosecutor's Offices and Courts in processing criminal offences of family violence were subject of a research carried out in Belgrade and Niš.⁴⁷ The analysed sample in Belgrade was composed of 420 items (280 prosecutors' cases and 140 court cases), and in Niš 59 court cases and 50 prosecutors' cases. According to the said sample, the greatest majority of perpetrators were male (92%), mainly aged between 33 and 40. Abusers and victims were mainly married, or divorced. The majority of abusers were employed, and had secondary school education. In the examined sample, the greatest number of violence executers were born and lived in towns. Among perpetrators of the criminal offence of family violence there was a slightly greater number of persons who had not been convicted before. The majority of them were of sound mind at the moment of carrying out criminal offence. A smaller number of them, 40%, were not intoxicated, whereas the others were. Usually, they did not admit to the deed they had performed. The greatest number of victims of violence, even more than 80%, were women. Persons aged between 41 and 56 prevailed among the victims. Children appeared as perpetrators of violent acts and parents as victims in around 15% of cases. In the greatest majority of cases violence had been practiced for a longer period of time. In more than a half of the cases victims suffered from physical violence, in 40% physical and psychical, and in the rest only from psychical violence. Criminal charges were mostly brought by the police. The study concludes that understanding continuity of domestic violence as an important feature of family violence has not been completely acknowledged in practice, though the situation is better than before. Several charges were rejected "based on an explanation that the manifested violence was accidental as the suspect has not been convicted before".⁴⁸ Around 30% of charges were rejected due to lack of evidence, as it was provided. When a prosecutor received criminal charges, he would usually not talk to a victim. The police was the one who did

45 Radulović, pp. 13, 14.

46 Radulović, pp. 17-19.

47 Slobodanka Konstantinović-Vilić, Nevena Petrušić, *Krivično delo nasilja u porodici, aktuelna pravosudna praksa u Beogradu i Nišu* [Criminal Offence of Family Violence, Current Court Practice in Belgrade and Niš], Belgrade, 2007.

48 Konstantinović-Vilić, Petrušić, p. 108.

that. According to the research, in judicial practice the idea of “family member” was interpreted in different ways, sometimes very restrictively, which conditioned the narrowing of range of family violence protection. The study emphasizes that “there are neither mechanisms that would make the courts and the prosecutor’s offices accept the same stand on certain elements of the criminal offence of family violence, nor has uniformity been reached within these judicial institutions”.⁴⁹ Also, it has been established that imposed sentences “indicate a tendency towards mild punishment: offenders are mainly charged a fine or put on probation, whereas effective prison sentences usually last for legal minimum time”.⁵⁰

Other attempts to consider judicial practice in the Republic of Serbia related to family violence and imposed sentences⁵¹ were based on an analysis of data obtained through information requests. Requests were sent to 20 courts in various regions.⁵² The research shows, among other, that from the moment the criminal offence of family violence was introduced in 2002, the number of court proceeding was constantly rising. This could be explained by an increased number of family violence cases, as well as a raise in their processing. According to the tested sample, sentences imposed for cases of family violence in Serbia were as follows: terms of probation in around 67% of cases, fines in 15%, prison sentence in 11% and protective measures in about 7% of cases.⁵³

The study that focused on abuser’s gender and its influence on processing of family violence cases, and on other factors that affect the implementation of legal provisions, examined cases in which either men or women were accused, cases in which they were mutually accused, or “in which men and women are both victims and perpetrators.”⁵⁴ Men are more often arrested for family violence⁵⁵ and they are more often subject to a fine or prison sentence. A significant link has not been established yet between gender and prison sentence, but it has been

49 *Ibid.*, p. 109.

50 *Ibid.*, p. 110.

51 A research for the period 2009–2010 was conducted by the organisation “Pravni skener” (Legal Scener) in cooperation with the association “Dijalog” (Dialogue).

52 Judicial practice has been analysed based on verdicts in accordance with the Criminal Code (Article 194), but not on legal proceedings, as it was not possible to acquire copies of all effective verdicts that have been reached based on the Family Law. “Family violence, the penal policy of courts” <http://www.pravniskener.rg/ljpp01.htm#sthash.cvEUgQnY.dpuf>. [accessed 5 September 2014].

53 The measure of providing treatment to alcoholics used to be imposed as a protective measure. This research emphasizes that protective measures, particularly the one related to medical treatment of alcoholics, were imposed in only 6 to 7% of cases, despite a great number of cases of violence executed in the state of intoxication. There were differences between courts when imposing fines. “Family violence, the penal policy of courts”.

54 Vesna Nikolić-Ristanović, *Praćenje primene zakonskih rešenja o nasilju u porodici u Srbiji: nalazi pilot istraživanja*, Un Women, 2013 [Supervision of the Implementation of Legal Solutions to Family Violence in Serbia: results of a pilot study, Un Women, 2013]. [http://Pracenje primene zakonskih resenja o nasilju u porodici u Srbiji](http://Pracenje%20primene%20zakonskih%20resenja%20o%20nasilju%20u%20porodici%20u%20Srbiji.pdf). [accessed 5 September 2014]. The research was conducted based on the sample of 219 men and women who were convicted in 2007, 2008 and 2009 in Niš (18.3%), Kruševac (15.5%), Leskovac (6.4%), Valjevo (12.8%), Veliko Gradište (10.5%), Obrenovac (14.2%), Lazarevac (8.7%) and Aleksinac (13.6%).

55 From 2007 to 2009, women constituted a smaller percent of the total number of persons charged for the criminal offence of family violence, but a raise in the number of accused women in 2008 was greater than a raise in the number of accused men. *Ibid.*, pp. 4, 5.

noticed that other factors have a decisive impact on imposition of prison sentence. According to this research, courts will more often impose a prison sentence if family violence is treated as "part of the wider context of long-term violence", and the possibility that a perpetrator of the violent act be imposed a term of probation or a prison sentence increases with "a raise in the seriousness of an offense".⁵⁶ The decision to arrest and impose a prison sentence is greatly influenced by the circumstances in which spouses, as well as other members of family are abused (children, parents...). If a violent act is committed in the state of intoxication, sometimes protective measures are undertaken based on abuser's treatment, but this does not refer to all cases. Decisions regarding probations and charges, according to this research, are mostly influenced by the existence of previous charges for family violence, in other words the knowledge that a perpetrator has a history of repeated violence offences. Previous charges are important for other criminal acts, as well. "This research speaks in favour of the existence of significant gender implications when it comes to the implementation of legal solutions to family violence in Serbia, rather than of the direct discrimination of women. The mentioned implications generally refer to an inadequate treatment of cases in which there is continuous violence (usually violence of men toward women), as well as of cases of mutual violence in which a victim (usually the male one) is a primary offender, but a woman, who is a primary victim, is condemned."⁵⁷

Culprits or victims

The background and life stories of women who had been victims of domestic violence, sentenced for criminal offenses, described in the study on domestic violence and crimes committed by women constitute the harrowing testimony of the causes, nature and consequences of violence. The study was based on the testimonies of female prisoners of the Correctional Institution Požarevac. The study included a sample of 20 women who, at the time, in late 1997 and early 1998, were undergoing sentences of imprisonment. Most of the respondents, more specifically sixteen of them, were convicted of murder.⁵⁸ The lives of these women had been marked by violence, both the one they had been exposed to in their daily lives and which they had endured for years, and by the criminal act that they eventually committed. The time periods during which they had been exposed to domestic violence differ, from six months to forty years. In most cases, the violence had persisted for more than five, for many of them over ten years, and it took place in the period of the socialist state. The attempt to form a clear picture using different individual experiences of women who lived with the abusers, only confirmed the existing findings. Most male abusers have encountered violence against their mothers by the fathers in their childhood which apparently points to the intergenerational transmission of violence. Male socialization inherent in traditional patriarchal forms of upbringing, and violence as a pattern of behaviour seen and learned in the elementary family,

56 *Ibid.*, p. 44.

57 *Ibid.*

58 Vesna Nikolić-Ristanović, *Od žrtve do zatvorenice, nasilje u porodici i kriminalitet žena*, [From Victim to Prisoner, Domestic Violence and Crimes Committed by Women] Belgrade, 2000, pp. 32, 35.

has been the significant precursor of aggressive behaviour. At the same time, the marginalization of women in many perspectives has also been one of the factors conducive to violence. Women who encountered physical abuse and violence in marriage for the first time, would be stunned and surprised, less prepared to confront the abuser, than those accustomed to such patterns of behaviour, having encountered it in childhood. Where they attempted to resist the perpetrator and leave, the perpetrators would become more aggressive, they would be beaten more fiercely and the violence they suffered would become more severe. Without any adequate support by either the society or their immediate environment, they gradually became overwhelmed by the feeling of helplessness. At some point the whole situation is upturned, and many of them, often when violence culminates, commit crimes, even the most serious ones – the murder. The offenses committed by the respondents for which they were convicted, and their criminal behaviour had been directly or indirectly related to the violence that they had survived. Although ‘violence is not in itself a justifying reason for committing a criminal act’ usually the criminal behaviour of these women would not have occurred if they had not been exposed to violence.⁵⁹

Conclusion

Almost all societies are familiar with family violence. Conditioned by historical and socio-economic factors, domestic violence principally originates from patriarchal, unequal power relations between men and women. It is deeply woven into the fabric of society, based on the model of male domination over women, devised to ensure keeping control over them. In traditional cultures, domestic violence stemmed from the very structure of the society. Historical legacy, women’s weakness and their legal and other dependence on a husband, favoured relations in which the use of violence was common. Despite changes in the status of women, domestic violence was invisible in the period of socialism, as it was treated as the matter of family privacy. At the end of the 20th century, deep social and economic crisis, war, and social transition, contributed to a raise in domestic violence. Family violence was first established as a separate criminal offence in Serbia in 2002. The research on domestic violence, conducted in different parts of Serbia, has shown that it is characteristic of both the rural and urban areas and has discovered a large number of women who experienced it, either in the form of physical or some other violence. Domestic violence is widespread in Serbian society, and women who endure it come from various social strata, they have different levels of education and professions. It usually occurs in poor families, as well as in different forms of extended families. Some research on the judicial practice of penalty imposition for the criminal offence of family violence implies that evidence pointing to repeated violence, as well as a history of previous criminal charges for other violent criminal acts, have most influence on the prosecutor’s decision whether to punish a perpetrator or not.

59 *Ibid.*, pp. 104–114.

Резиме

Др Вера Гудац Додић

Насиље над женама у породици у Србији

Кључне речи: Србија, патријархат, насиље над женама, насиље у породици, подређеност жена

Милиони жена у свету које су биле изложене породичном насиљу сведоче о његовој распрострањености. Истраживања спроведена на подручју Србије уклапају се у такву општу слику. Историјат насиља над женама у кругу породичне приватности снажно је повезан са праксом подређености жене мушкарцу. До завршетка Другог светског рата инфериорност и подређеност удате жене мужу имала је у Србији своје законско упориште и одсликавала се на многе сегменте живота. Родни односи засновани на патријархалном устројству друштва и моделима моћи, те традиционалним образцима и нормама понашања, омогућавали су појаве насилничког понашања према женама. Упркос левичарској идеологији владајућег поретка, који је макар декларативно промовисао родну равноправност, а држава законима уклањала затечену правну утемељеност дискриминације над женама, за социјалистичку државу насиље у породици и даље је било скривено и утопљено у сферу приватности. Деведесетих година двадесетог века, у условима грађанског рата у Југославији, друштвена, економска и политичка криза која је из темеља потресала Србију одражавала се и на породицу. Истраживања о насиљу над женама у приватности дома и породице у Србији новијег су датума. Она без изузетка показују да је породично насиље у савременим условима део свакодневице и сведоче о високом проценту жена које су биле изложене неком од његових облика и манифестација. Најчешће насиље над женама врши супруг, односно партнер. Домаће насиље је присутно у свим социјалним групама. Виши ниво образовања жене и мушкарца није препрека испољавању насиља у породици. Алкохол, мада није његов узрок, повећава насилничко понашање мушкараца. Поједини истраживачи су у анализи феномена породичног насиља посебну пажњу усмерили на насиље које су починили људи са тзв. „антисоцијалним поремећајем личности“. Њихове жене и чланови породичног домаћинства изложени су жестоком насиљу вештих манипулатора, а шансе за понављање насиља у овим случајевима су велике. Континуитет породичног насиља, односно чињеница да починилац понавља ово дело, према различитим истраживањима судске праксе у Србији има, поред тежине извршеног дела, највећи утицај на судске одлуке о притвору насилника и изрицању затворске казне.

POWER GAME IN TITO'S YUGOSLAVIA: CONUNDRUM OF ALEKSANDAR RANKOVIĆ'S OVERTHROW FROM POWER*

Abstract: Article strives to explain the ousting of Aleksandar Ranković through rivalry within the League of Communists of Yugoslavia that originated from both Party and state crises. Reforms adopted in 1950s, made Yugoslavia more difficult to control from the federal level, since republican and other centers saw their opportunity in self-management to expand power on account of the federal government. Whole process is observed from the standpoint of a struggle for power within the LCY, and the state and question how much Yugoslavia needed to be centralized. Tito put in a tremendous effort to create an image that Ranković's overthrow was in fact a continuum in Party's policy, neglecting the facts that they had been the closest associates till 1963. Ranković was falsely accused for deviations of the Security apparatus in an attempt to take power by force. Hence, this article tries to reveal structural reasons for his downfall.

Key words: LCY unity, Party "rift", Aleksandar Ranković, Brioni plenum 1966

Quite a long time after the work of Branko Petranović¹ in historiography, no serious efforts were made in presenting a different picture of the Brioni Plenum apart from the official Party allegations² where the number two official, Aleksandar Ranković Marko³ was stripped of all his posts under the accusation

* This article has been written within the framework of the scholarly project *Tradition and Transformation – Historical Heritage and National Identity in Serbia in 20th Century* (№ 47019), financed by the Ministry of Education, Science and Technological Development Republic of Serbia.

1 Branko Petranović, *Istorija Jugoslavije*, Vol III, Beograd: Nolit, 1988, str. 383–388.

2 Z. Radelić, *Hrvatska u Jugoslaviji 1945–1991: od zajedništva do razlaza*, Zagreb: Hrvatski institut za povijest i Školska knjiga, 2006, str. 360–366; D. Bilandžić, *Hrvatska moderna povijest*, Zagreb: Golden marketing, 1999, str. 489–504.

3 Aleksandar Ranković (1909–1983) was born in the village Draževac near Belgrade. He worked and trained to become tailor. In 1927 he joined YCLY (Young Communist League of Yugoslavia). He was twice arrested for illegal activities in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. After the second arrest he served six years in prison, and after was promoted to the president of provincial committee of YCLY. He was arrested by the Gestapo on 27 June 1941, but was freed in a spectacular rescue action organized by the YCLY. During WWII he was one of the closest associates of Josip Broz. He was member of politburo 1940–1966 and organizational secretary of central committee of CPY/LCY 1942–1966. He was the head of party police OZNA 1944–1946, Minister of Interior 1946–1953, Vice President 1963–1966. R. Radošin, *Jugoslovenski savremenici: Ko je ko u Jugoslaviji*, Beograd: Hronometar, 1970, str. 885–886. From 1953–1963 he headed the Coordination Committee of Interior, thus controlling the whole state security apparatus. He was married twice. His first wife and brother were killed by Chetniks during WWII. His second wife was Slovenian, Ladislava.

that he had wired the bedroom and bathroom of Josip Broz Tito, president of Yugoslavia and the head of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) in order to overthrow Tito from power.⁴ Petranović was the first who stated in his work that the whole event was a décor to cover the real reasons for toppling the most powerful man after Josip Broz.

Attempts were made to explain Ranković's downfall but the majority of the various interpretations offered, only repeated the official accusations, making it clear that the authors had not read the available sources or taken advantage of the different details from the rich political life of Yugoslavia.⁵ The mist covering this topic could finally be cleared when the archives were opened and, documents and many memoirs became available in the late 1980s and 1990s. A new book written by a group of authors published new documents from the archives of the Security Organs within the State Secretariat of National Defence of Yugoslavia.⁶ These documents are of great importance since this is the first time they have been used, and this institution was the major instrument of Josip Broz in operationalising the removal of Aleksandar Ranković. These documents also confirmed that the removal of Ranković was done under false accusations. Having this knowledge we must seek to uncover the real or deeper reasons of this conundrum.

The most dominant concept used to explain the overall history of Yugoslavia and its breakdown has been the national question⁷ which tormented the Yugoslav state from its establishment in 1919. We will try to use a different approach in this article. Not because we think that the national question was of no great importance or that it was obsolete as a concept, but because we think that in the case of explaining the downfall of Aleksandar Ranković using this concept the explanation will be binary – Croats and Slovenians against Serbs. However we think that the ousting of Ranković was a climax of something far more complex and beyond the concept of clashed nationalities within Yugoslavia. Ethnic animosities existed but they, although troubling Yugoslavia were more or less successfully contained. We claim that the

4 The full official case was named: "Actual problems related to damaging activities of certain security organs and consequences of their activities upon both development of a system and activities of Central Committee". Archive of Yugoslavia, "League of Communists of Yugoslavia", F. 507, IV (Brioni) Plenum 1966, VII 1, II/28, pp. 1–3.

5 For historiographical overview covering this topic, deconstructing various myths and reconstructing the whole event look for more details in: Милан Пиљак, "Брионски пленум 1966. године: покушај историографског тумачења догађаја", *Токови историје*, 2010/1, Београд: Институт за новију историју Србије, 2010, стр. 73–95.

6 Светко Ковач, Бојан Димитријевић, Ирена Поповић Григоров, *Случај Ранковић из архива КОС-а*, Београд: Медија центар Одбрана, 2014.

7 Dennison Rusinow, *The Yugoslav Experiment 1948–1974*, London: C. Hurst & Company, 1977, pp. 179–191; Sabrina P. Ramet, *Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia: 1962–1991*, Bloomington IN: Indiana University Press, 1992; Sabrina P. Ramet, *The Three Yugoslavias: State-Building and legitimation 1918–2005*, Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2006, p. 5, p. 219; more balanced, but Ranković was still seen as Serbian paramount leader in: Tim Judah, *The Serbs: History, Myth and the Destruction of Yugoslavia*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009, pp. 143–145; John Lampe and Stevan K. Pavlowitch has more reserved approach concerning accusations toward Ranković, but does not bring any proofs or elaborate deeper reasons in: John Lampe, *Yugoslavia as History: Twice There Was a Country*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp. 279, 284–285; Stevan Pavlowitch, *Serbia: The History of an Idea*, New York: New York University Press, 2002, p. 172

deeper causes were the rising cleavages, on the level of a system, among republics and particularly between republics and the federal centre. Struggle for division of power was at the very root of the conflict within Yugoslavia. The Sixth Congress of LCY in 1952 opened the possibility for decentralisation⁸ It was an opportunity for republican leaderships to increase their powers at federal expense. In order to better understand how these changes caused the rivalry within Yugoslavia we will take into account the positions of the people who were holding high posts in the LCY, its republican clones and the republic they were able to influence the events on how the Yugoslav Party and the state will develop.

The period of development that we will focus on refers to the period from the mid of 50s until the Brioni Plenum in 1966. This period was marked by party leadership in search of a path in the new world order during the Cold War, after relations with USSR had been normalized. The stability of the system was an imperative if Yugoslavia wanted to keep its hardly acquired sovereignty. Being a small and undeveloped country meant that political unity was one of its greatest goals. After introducing self-management in 1952, the LCY leadership was again at the turning point in 1958. The major question that was posed among top Party members was whether to continue with more decentralisation⁹ or to return to the course of strong central government decision-making. Two main currents emerged: representatives of the idea that self-management is what distinguishes and makes the Yugoslav model superior to the Soviet model and those who thought that the process of decentralization went too far.¹⁰

We claim that there were at least three reasons behind the Ranković's downfall. The first was his failure to accomplish the task given to him in 1958 by Josip Broz. This task consisted of restoring unity and much needed party discipline within the LCY. By unity we mean unity in decision-making of the Executive Council of LCY and implementation of that reached decision. Tito as it will be presented latter was the major promoter of that path, which was in fact Lenin's democratic centralism. The second reason was that Aleksandar Ranković and Edvard Kardelj¹¹ were, after Broz the two most influential politicians. Even if they were not personally striving to

8 Branko Petranović, *Istorija Jugoslavije*, pp. 334–335.

9 About federalism in Yugoslavia see in: Sabrina P. Ramet, *Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia: 1962–1991*, Bloomington IN: Indiana University Press, 1992; Olivera Milosavljević, „Centralizam i republikanizam – nacionalizam u Jugoslaviji 1945 – 1955“, *Sociologija*, Vol. XXXIV, No. 3, Beograd, July–September 1992; Milivoj Bešlin, „Josip Broz Tito i jugoslovenski federalizam (1963–1974)“, Olga Manojlović (ur.) *Tito – viđenja i tumačenja*, Beograd: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije, 2011, str. 58–85; Mile Bjelajac, „Karakter jugoslovenskog centralizma u svetlu analize tajne sednice Izvršnog komiteta Centralnog komiteta Saveza komunista Jugoslavije marta 1962“, *Dijalog povjesničara-istoričara*, (eds H. Fleck, I. Graovac), Zagreb, 2001, str. 373–393.

10 See more in: Mile Bjelajac, „Karakter jugoslovenskog centralizma u svetlu analize tajne sednice Izvršnog komiteta Centralnog komiteta Saveza komunista Jugoslavije marta 1962“, *Dijalog povjesničara-istoričara*, (eds H. Fleck, I. Graovac), Zagreb, 2003, str. 373–393.

11 Edvard Kardelj, was born in 1910, Ljubljana, Slovenia. He finished the Teacher's Training Faculty, but got involved in illegal political activity, since he joined YCLY in 1926. He was arrested in 1930 and served two years in prison after which he become the head of Slovenian Communist Party. He taught in Moscow at the Communist University for Western minorities. He was a member of Central Committee 1937–1979, within the closest Tito's circle during the WWII, prime minister of Yugoslavia 1946–1953, Minister of Foreign Affairs 1948–1953, Vice President of the government 1953–1963, President of the Federal Assembly 1963–1967. R. Radošin, *Jugoslovenski savremenici: Ko je ko u Jugoslaviji*, Beograd: Hronometar, 1970, str. 445.

be Tito's successors, other high members of the LCY had been gravitating towards them. With a crisis evolving and deepening Tito seemed to be a leader who was losing control over subordinates. His age (Tito was 74 in 1966) and health certainly greatly contributed to these rumours. Finally, the economic reforms in 1961 and 1965 did not result in the desired economic growth and stability. The first reform brought instability and recession and the second up to a staggering 30% price rise.¹² However, not all parameters were bad, on the contrary, but the effect of both reforms had a heavy impact on the already low standard of living in Yugoslavia.

Tito's trust in Ranković was not unjustified. Ranković was a proven communist. He spent six years in prison before WWII, and he stood firmly when he was arrested in the summer of 1941. During the war he was within the closest Tito's circle. After Tito-Stalin split in 1948 Ranković was again loyal and greatly contributed to stopping any possible dissent within CPY/LCY. Together with Jeftimije Šašić,¹³ Ranković was the iron fist of the new government. With the new constitution in 1953 his power within the state significantly increased. He was transferred from the post of Federal Minister of Interior to a newly created post of the president of Coordination Committee of Interior. With this new post Ranković had control over the federal and republican security services. Combining this high state post with the post of Organisational Secretary within the LCY and his friendship with people like Svetsilav Stefanović¹⁴ who was his successor to the post of Federal Minister of Interior and Jeftimije Šašić as the head of Security Organs within the State Secretariat of National Defence (DSNO) – there was no doubt that Tito highly regarded Ranković's loyalty and competence. Having in mind that all this took place at the time when the Soviet Union and its satellites were massing their military effectives along the Yugoslav borders, we can say that Josip Broz among all of his associates, in those days, relied mostly on Aleksandar Ranković.

It is of great importance to say that both Tito and Ranković never had ambitions to be involved in theoretical work or had intentions to contribute to Marxist theory. Both came from poor families, and had no higher education. Both were workers, who had been jailed for their activities. However, Ranković was 17 years younger and as most of the other high ranking communist members he regarded Tito as their father called him *Stari* – (the *old man*) In other words, they generally shared certain experiences in life (although Tito's life experience is unique). Both shared a vision of Yugoslavia with a strong federal government and thus it was not strange that after turbulences in the 50s and emerging economic and political crisis at the end of that decade Tito chose Ranković as the person who

12 Fred Singleton, Bernard Carter, *The Economy of Yugoslavia*, London: Croom Helm, 1982, p. 137.

13 Šašić was born in 1917 in Novka, Croatia then a part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. He joined CPY in 1939. After the war he was head of military intelligence and security apparatus and head of political bureau for Yugoslav People's Army. R. Radošin, *op. cit.*, p. 1019.

14 Stefanović was born in 1910 in Kučevo, Serbia. He was member of YCLY since 1927 and member of CPY since 1928. He was arrested several times in Kingdom of Yugoslavia. Since the formation of OZN in 1944 he was deputy of Aleksandar Ranković, later he was in 1946 deputy of Minister of Interior during Ranković's ministership. In 1953 he assumed position of Federal Secretary of Interior (position of minister was in 1953 changed with position of secretary). He held the post until 1963. He was member of Federal Government till 1966. R. Radošin, *op. cit.*, p. 983.

would bring unity to the Executive Committee of LCY and suppress strong and constant pressures of the republican leaders on the federal government.¹⁵

Overview of the international position of Yugoslavia 1948–1966

Yugoslavia did not have a strong ideological partner after 1948, but succeeded in resisting the pressure of USSR. Stalin's death (1953) opened possibilities to end hostilities, which was grasped by both sides. The USSR was interested in closing the rift within the international workers' movement by again incorporating Yugoslavia into the Eastern Block. Yugoslavia, on the other hand was exhausted from the blockade and it desperately needed normalization of relations. The declaration that was signed in Belgrade in May 1955 ended hostilities on the state level. Next year in Moscow another declaration ended disputes between the LCY and the CPSU.¹⁶ Still Yugoslavia remained outside the Eastern Block (EB) but with a desire to revive economic relations with the EB since its economy was projected on the same pattern, despite the changes after 1950. Yugoslavia, not counting Greece and Italy, was surrounded by the Soviet sphere of influence from which it escaped. Without hard currency and with low quality products, low production output, kliring (clearing) system of payment, the huge and less demanding COMECON market seemed to be the best place for the placement of Yugoslav products which would spur the development of Yugoslav industry.

However, American influence was still strong in Yugoslavia in 1950s. Generally the process of de-Stalinization started in the EB in 1956. Abandoning the practices that one person holds the highest posts both in the party and the state Khrushchev seemed as man who would, at the end, accept the special position of Yugoslavia in the world. Still, the head of the CPSU retained the dominant position of the Party. The New Program of LCY presented at VII Congress in 1958 created new tensions with the USSR (1958–1963).¹⁷ The formation of the European Economic Community (EEC) and mutual economic integration between member states left Yugoslavia economically isolated between two economic blocks.¹⁸

Internal development of Yugoslavia and rising tensions between the federal centre and republics 1950–1966

The Tito–Stalin split, after the first shock, posed a dilemma about how Yugoslavia should retaliate in the ideological sphere where it was relentlessly attacked by USSR and its allies. During the “shock period” the CPY leadership

15 Executive Council meetings in 6. February 1958, 14–16 March 1962 and 12–13 November 1965 are the best examples of crisis and disunity within top LCY officials. AY, F. 507, EC CC LCY, III/75; AY, F. 507, EC CC LCY, III/88; AY, F. 507, EC CC LCY, III/113.

16 Branko Petranović, *op. cit.*, p. 357.

17 Dragan Bogetić, “Jugoslovensko-sovjetski odnosi početkom 60-ih godina: razlika u Titovom i Hruščovljevom poimanju načela miroljubive koegzistencije”, *Istorija XX veka*, 3/2011, Beograd: Institut za savremenu istoriju, pp. 205–206, 210.

18 Dragan Bogetić, *op. cit.*, p. 205.

defended itself,¹⁹ but it adopted a new position as a communist party in 1949, whose system was closer to the ideal of Marxism-Leninism than that of the CPSU. That approach corresponded with the desires of the West which wanted to see Yugoslavia as more democratic and different from USSR and its allies. In order to understand the extent of the Yugoslav transformation after the Tito-Stalin split, we must mention that at VI Party Congress in 1952, the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY) was renamed into the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) which underscored that the LCY consisted of parties which corresponded to the federal system of Yugoslavia, where each republic had its own communist party. Self-management was introduced and the ruling role of the LCY was transformed into the leading role in the state and society. The highest party forum – the Party Congress was the body which initiated and defined all these changes, thus the ideas of decentralization were promoted in every sphere of the political, economic and social life. Consequently, the authority of the republics increased on account of the federation, both at Party and state levels. As in the USSR nobody thought that anyone would abuse this opportunity since it was a communist government and not the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. However, in practice the Yugoslav federal republics used the opportunity of newly created relations to take their share of federal power. Tito understood this problem and was aware of the pressure which the republics exerted on the federation. He called the republics “advocates” of various local interests at the expense of the federal government.²⁰ At the same time, the republican local leaderships began replicating the centralistic system of federation in their home republics, the very system which they constantly criticized.

Despite its rigidity and monolithic appearance when observed from the outside, the political life in Yugoslavia and in other communist party countries was less dynamic than in the democratic regimes, but it was far from inactive. The official policy, within the system of communist parties, was a product of struggle waged through different party forums around the most powerful officials and with the supreme leader as the arbiter. Executive Committee meetings, plenary sessions and Congresses and other lesser party forums were all previously arranged. Decisions were made in advance on which official(s) would deliver the report(s) that would define the future party policy. Opening and closing words were reserved for those who were the most influential and who laid down the guidelines. Other officials who already had enough experience followed the guidelines of the main report(s) or if not they would become a case for discussion at the next party meeting which will result, at least, in their disposition from all posts. One person, no matter how influential, needed the support of the majority of party members. That support was always secured through the rise in hierarchy and cultivating clientelism in the process. The system relied on a perpetual accumulation of power, which meant that the oldest members usually, but not always, were the most powerful. Having all this in mind, Edvard Kardelj and Aleksandar Ranković were the closest and most influential associates of Josip Broz. Naturally, other, higher and lower party officials gravitated towards one or the other because of their affiliations, beliefs,

19 Josip Broz Tito, *V Congress of CPY - Political report at the CC CPY*, Belgrade, pp. 111–119.

20 AY, “Executive Committee CC LCY”, f. 507, III/75, p. 13.

interests, etc. Tito's policy of putting someone in charge of a particular problem²¹ and then himself deciding on its final form and character at the very end, even more emphasized this practice in the LCY.

In order to prevent further discord within the LCY and to close the "rift" one of his closest associates needed to be politically neutralised in order to end the division with dangerous potentials within the LCY. Unable to eliminate Kardelj, because of the strong resistance of Slovenia's top party cadres,²² he turned on Ranković whose policy of recentralisation alienated him from the home base in the republic of his birth. Binding his source of power only to the federal level and to Tito's mercy, left him exposed when Tito changed his strategy due to his inability to remove Edvard Kardelj. This shows how much trust Ranković had in Josip Broz.

After 1958, Tito supported Ranković because they shared belief that only centralism and old discipline and faith in Party decisions can lead Yugoslavia to peace and prosperity. Those old/new hallmarks probably caused fear among other party members that were in rank below the first two. Unlike the USSR Yugoslavia did not have one powerful republic or nation to overpower the other, which made it impossible to easily destroy the achievements of the empowered republican leaderships. Encountering strong resistance Tito tried with even greater centralistic measures to close the rift in the Party and to regain monolithic appearance.

The economic reform launched in 1961, caused by an economic crisis of balance of payment at the end of 1950s failed, plunging Yugoslavia into a severe recession.²³ Only by huge government intervention and increased public spending was it stopped in the second half of 1962, but not before it resulted in increased public debt.

Tito tried once more to resolve the problem of disunity by calling a secret Executive Council meeting on 14 March 1962. After three consecutive days, the problem was not solved, in fact the dispute escalated and Kardelj with Bakarić's backing continued to oppose even more. If memoir sources were to be trusted, Tito asked Ranković to call a plenary session in order to discuss the position of Edvard Kardelj which Ranković refused, explaining that it would bring more instability, since Kardelj had firm support in the Slovenian federal party and state unit.²⁴ In any case Kardelj went to the U.K. for the second time and sickness was used as excuse.²⁵

21 Interview with Kiro Gligorov 2010, by Mijat Lakićević, whom I owe this information and sound record.

22 It was a result of three day Executive Council meeting in 14-16 March 1962 when Tito for the last time supported Ranković during a confrontation with Kardelj and others who were for more decentralization on all levels. Kardelj went to UK, under the pretext of illness and Slovenian top official led by Miha Marinko, Kardelj's closest associate in Slovenia stood firmly behind Kardelj, thus putting the pressure on Tito to back down. Dennison Russinow, *The Yugoslav Experiment 1948-1974*, London: C. Hurst and Company, 1977, p. 107.

23 Dennison Russinow, *The Yugoslav Experiment*, p. 111.

24 Добрица Ћосић, *Пишчеви записи 1958-1968*, Београд: Филип Вишњић, 2001, стр. 217.

25 Same situation was when after Tito's visit to Moscow in 1956 Ranković also needed to cool down Tito in his desire to remove Kardelj. Александар Ранковић, *Дневничке забелешке*, Београд: Југословенска књига, 2002, стр. 126.

“Ranković’s concept” of recentralization

Being given the task of restoring unity within the LCY, Ranković needed some sort of a plan, concept or platform. Today’s available sources are very scarce on this issue. However by analysing the sources that we have at our disposal we can conclude that Ranković had Tito’s full support in the period between early 1958 and mid 1962. During this period of a little more than four years, he was guided by the thought, as he said at the February session in 1958, that the source of the problem was not disorganization but demobilization in the Party, including the highest echelon of party members.²⁶ This, according to Ranković, resulted in the lack of a united standpoint during decision-making process.²⁷ The solution was logical, it was imperative to restore party discipline.²⁸ Tito strongly supported Ranković at this very meeting.²⁹ The reason was that both shared the same vision regarding the position of the LCY in Yugoslavia. The meeting was called because of a large strike of miners that took place in Slovenia early in 1958. The problem becomes a major issue since Tito accused the Slovenian leadership as the instigators of crisis. Tito directly named Miha Marinko, the leader of League of Communists of Slovenia.³⁰ He accused them of using social discontent in order to exert pressure on the federal government³¹ to get permission to export raw materials to Austria where they could get several times over a better price than if they sold it within Yugoslavia as planned. Tito saw this case as the last drop that spilled the cup. It marked the turning point in the relations between the federation and the republics. Further reading of Tito’s speech reveals the magnitude of the conflicts between the republics and federal organs. Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina were named as places where these transgressions occurred. Federal inspections were expelled in Croatia or severely beaten in Bosnia and Herzegovina.³² Despite Tito’s interventions, certain directors of enterprises were not dismissed from their posts although they bullied the workers but were protected by high republican officials.³³ This was a direct obstruction of Tito’s authority. With the support of high republican officials, directors were able to nullify Tito’s actions.³⁴ Broz claimed that although the Party was given the leading role in

26 Meeting of Executive Committee of CC LCY in 19. July 1962. AY, “Executive Committee CC LCY”, f. 507, III/75, p. 26

27 AY, “Executive Committee CC LCY”, f. 507, III/75, p. 26.

28 AY, “Executive Committee CC LCY”, f. 507, III/75, p. 31.

29 AY, “Executive Committee CC LCY”, f. 507, III/75, p. 32

30 Distributions of equipment and differences in salaries were in fact major trigger for the strike of miners in Trbovlje and Zagorje coal mines. Miha Marinko who was born in Trbovlje distributed new equipment to new mines in Velenje, Slovenia. Slovenian leadership was accused for not reacting earlier and preventing social discontent, submitting to the workers’ demands. AY, “Executive Committee CC LCY”, f. 507, III/75, p. 8. This created a precedent because it was used as an opportunity to ease the authority of planned economy regulations on the economy in their republic.

31 Belgrade was constantly, as in this case, accused for “Serbian centralism and hegemony”. Tito immediately realised that this struggle between republics and federation was more significant than the ordinary sporadic quarrels, and that it challenged the system itself. AY, “Executive Committee CC LCY”, f. 507, III/75, p. 6.

32 AY, “Executive Committee CC LCY”, f. 507, III/75, p. 13.

33 AY, “Executive Committee CC LCY”, f. 507, III/75, pp. 10–11.

34 AY, “Executive Committee CC LCY”, f. 507, III/75, p. 10.

1952, it should remain as the ruling Party (without changing the phrase: leading)³⁵ If Tito wanted to successfully manoeuvre between blocks he needed a strong and united Party. He could not allow disobedience or rift to happen within the LCY. At the February meeting 1958 Tito had addressed the other members of Politburo and raised the question of Party unity. On that occasion, he directly told Aleksandar Ranković that some party members had wrongly understood the position and the role of the Party and started to assert certain deviations.³⁶ The meeting exposed that, according to Tito's stance, republican disobedience and criticism towards the federation had reached a climax. This meeting was also of great importance because Aleksandar Ranković delivered the closing report in which he explained what the causes of this behaviour were and what according to him the solution was.

Tito started to perceive decentralization as disunity of action; therefore he gave his most trusted collaborator the task to reinstate "unity". In the process of reinstating "unity" inside the LCY other high ranking party members would be deprived of their positions. If we are right, than Tito thought that he could not allow disunity to evolve in a period of economic crisis and while Yugoslavia was faced with the Cold War, so he ordered his Organisation Secretary of the LCY and President of the Federal Committee of Interior to deal with the issue. On the other hand, the reformists were party officials who wanted to retain their positions and privileges. Those who were against the new wave of recentralization thought that they had three good arguments in their favour. The first was Yugoslavia's national complexity, the second socialist self-management that was an important factor because it was the main Yugoslav ideological identity among socialist countries and workers movement. The last one was that, although troubled by disunity, Yugoslavia still represented an over centralized system. Despite the processes in 1950s, Yugoslavia was a very centralized state and its economy was being stifled by such a state. Thus, the reformists thought that the intended task that Tito and Ranković wanted to undertake was too simple and totally wrong, since centralization was the cause not the solution to the problems. Comparing "glorious old days" of unity in the revolution to peace time and need to modernize a backward country that intended to be a supreme model of modernization for developing nations was absurd.

One of the options discussed at the meeting held in February 1958 was the possibility of purges in the LCY, since the other option was, as Tito said, for the Party and state to disintegrate.³⁷ The words had great weight since exactly 10 years earlier Ranković and Jęftimije Šašić took the same stance within repressive apparatus. Other participants were probably caught by surprise, even Vladimir Bakarić³⁸ devotedly announced to take harsh measures against anyone in Croatia who opposed the will of the General Secretary of LCY. The logic of his thinking was that just faith in the Party, discipline and responsibility would make the

35 AY, "Executive Committee CC LCY", f. 507, III/75, p. 10.

36 AY, "Executive Committee CC LCY", f. 507, III/75, p. 10.

37 AY, "Executive Committee CC LCY", f. 507, III/75, p. 6.

38 Vladimir Bakarić was born in 1912 in Gorica near Zagreb. He graduated from the Faculty of Law and did a PhD in 1937 in Zagreb. He became member of the CPY in 1933. He was active in Partisan movement as one of main organisers of Partisan resistance against Independent State of Croatia in WWII. From 1944–1969 he was head of Croatian Communist Party branch and thus the first man in Croatia. R. Radošin, *op. cit.*, 1970, p. 47.

socialist revolution possible. Hence, the LCY should return to those values. The crucial problem was in the lack of centralism. After closely analysing every speech, it seems that only Tito and Ranković were prepared for what would be said at the meeting. Jovan Veselinov, the general secretary of League of Communists of Serbia spoke after Broz emphasizing the importance of unity in decision making.³⁹ Only Kardelj was reserved but nothing more, everybody just agreed, supporting Tito in their speeches.

One of the first measures was to stop convening the Executive Council meetings. From the VII Congress of the LCY in Ljubljana held 22–26 April 1958 until May 1959 no Executive Council meetings were held for more than a year.⁴⁰ During that time, Tito had ruled Yugoslavia with the help of Aleksandar Ranković and Ivan Gošnjak, Federal Secretary of Peoples Defence. This form of running the Party without consulting other major political leaders was no solution to the problem.

If we look closely into the folder of Commission for Development of Cadres,⁴¹ we will be surprised with its activity from 1959–1964. However, it is surprising that after the first huge increase in data by 1964 its activity started to slow down and in 1965 the Commission was barely functioning.⁴² The questions it was addressing in 1965 begun to be too abstract and general. From 1959–1963, even a bit during 1964 the Commission dealt with creating huge data bases and discussed how many functions each member of LCY had. Some of them had circa 15 or more and it was necessary to relieve them of some duties so they could focus on their work and at the same time make room for younger cadres.⁴³ For example, if we look the year 1962, we can see that a new register had been made. This was prepared for the new LCY Congress that would determine Party policy for next 4–5 years. This was an opportunity for Tito and Ranković to install the cadres according to their wishes.

It is interesting that in the same year we have lists of nomenclature members who had a villa in their possession. How much the value of each villa was, how much was invested in it and what the value of the villa was in 1962. Of great importance is the origin of invested money in each villa.⁴⁴ All of this was presented at the Executive Council meeting as non-communist behaviour.

Throughout that period, especially 1959–1963 the Party was working to reduce the functions of officials who had accumulated too many duties and were thus unable to carry out all of them effectively. Some of them had more than 10, 15 or 20 functions.⁴⁵ This task could not have been executed without Aleksandar Ranković, since he was Org-secretary. His duty was also to determine who the old

39 AY, "Executive Committee CC LCY", f. 507, III/75, pp. 16–22.

40 Dennison Russinow, *The Yugoslav Experiment*, p. 107.

41 AY, f. 507, A-CC LCY, Commission for Development of Cadres, XIII, k. 7–9.

42 AY, f. 507, A-CC LCY, Commission for Development of Cadres, XIII, k.10.

43 Meeting from 6. June 1958. AY, f. 507, A-CC LCY, Commission for Development of Cadres, XIII, k. 6/9, p. 4; Meeting from 1. July 1960, *ibid.* 7/9, p. 3.

44 Meeting of Executive Committee of LCY in 19. July 1962. AY, "Executive Committee CC LCY", f. 507, III/92, attachment 3.

45 Meetings of the Commission and extra materials from 1959–1963. AY, "Commission for Development of LCY and Cadre Policy", F. 507, XIII, k.7/9, p. 2.

officials were and to give the chance to new, younger party members.⁴⁶ No doubt that this policy angered many high LCY officials.

Increased activity of the Commission for Development of Cadres,⁴⁷ huge campaign of collecting and sorting new data for every member of LCY, dismissing LCY members from certain posts and listing their weekend houses possessions⁴⁸ in great details certainly was not welcomed by the LCY members. It seemed as if they had been under investigation, and that they had started to behave as a new, untouchable elite with very distantly connected with ordinary citizens. From the point of view of Org-secretary this was done in order to create a fresh data base that would improve the Commission's efficiency. However, all these activities could have seemed ominous to the LCY members, especially if we have in mind the turbulences in the Executive Committee from 1958 and 1962 and Tito's speech in Split, Croatia in May 1962, which was in fact his summary of the March meeting. In April 1962, Ranković tied to be more aggressive towards the Slovenian leadership when he said at Executive Committee meeting at 3rd of April: *Only conclusions of Slovenian Executive Committee CC SK Slovenia deviate from the conclusions of EC CC LCY. They are in contrast to the whole extended meeting. It gives the impression of silent disagreement. That would be the worst form of relations within our Party. These things should be discussed, otherwise there are no guarantees that our findings will be correctly accepted and implemented. That impression does not lie just within these findings, but it has roots in different conceptions, which were revealed in its full form at the January (1962) meeting of CC SKSlovenia.*⁴⁹ Despite Ranković's stance there were no consequences for any member of Slovenian leadership.

Aleksandar Ranković – decline and fall from power

But then the change did happen. Kardelj was appointed the President of the Constitutional Commission, whose task was to draw up the new (1963), third, more federal constitution and rename the country the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

Obviously, it was Ranković's inability to solve the problems dealing with more centralism, and the firm backing of the Slovenian federal unit to Kardelj that forced Tito to reconsider his judgment. However, between the two groups: Tito and Ranković on one side and that of Kardelj and Bakarić on the other, there was a third group of high ranking officials of the LCY who saw the opportunity in self-management and in the decentralization process to reform the Yugoslav economy and state. We can position them into the reluctant group. They did not support the crude centralistic system and advocated for more market instruments in the economy. Serbian cadres together with the Croatian and Slovenians represented

46 AY, "Executive Committee CC LCY", f. 507, III.

47 Meetings of the Commission and extra materials from 1959–1963. AY, "Commission for Development of LCY and Cadre Policy", F. 507, XIII, k. 7–9.

48 Meeting of Executive Committee of LCY in 19. July 1962. AY, "Executive Committee CC LCY", f. 507, III/92, pp. 6–7; especially attachment 3 from the same meeting where all nomenclature members have been listed, together with their seaside villa.

49 3 April 1962, AY, f. 507, III/89.

the majority of the LCY cadres. These cadres and the unsuccessful policy of recentralization and enforcing discipline in LCY were the forces that would end Ranković's career.

Ranković had blind faith in Tito because he had been chosen to solve the problem of unity in the LCY and was appointed the vice president, thus he was feeling overconfident. His other mistake was an inability to realize that the process of decentralization of such a rigid system was inevitable, when Yugoslavia started to open towards the West in 1950s, otherwise the Yugoslav economy would collapse. Of course a harsh and quick decentralization was unsuccessful mostly because it had been implemented in a centralistic manner. Further, Ranković underestimated the potential of republican political organizations. Being from Serbia he could count on the support of the largest federation unit, however that was in collision with his task. If we examine the meetings of the Serbian government we will notice that not even one economic problem that troubled Serbian authorities was passed on to Ranković to help with its solving. Serbian republican cadres counted on Mijalko Todorović⁵⁰ (in charge of economic affairs) and Petar Stambolić (prime minister of Yugoslavia 1963–1967). If the rumours were correct about conflict between Ranković and Slobodan Penezić Krcun⁵¹ than we can conclude that Ranković not only lacked support from the Serbian political unit but faced a steady growing opposition of Serbian cadres on both the federal and republic level.

In 1963, he was appointed vice president and with his power as Org-secretary of LCY it seemed as if his power was increasing, however he no longer held the post of the President of Federal Board of Interior and the LCY which now had its republican branches and were more powerful than ever, which consequently limited Ranković party powers in the republics.

Taking in consideration the previously given situation, we can conclude that somewhere at the end of 1963 when he was appointed the vice president, according to the new Constitution, because of his mistakes, he stood almost alone in the political arena and after more than five years the problems were unresolved, only the economic situation in Yugoslavia was worse.

50 Todorović Mijalko was born in 1913 in Dragušica, near the town of Kragujevac in Serbia. Before the WWII he finished Technical Faculty (section for Mechanical Engineering) in Belgrade. He became member of the CPY in 1938 He actively participated in the resistance during WWII as deputy of political commissar of the First Proletarian Division (the first division established by CPY during WWII), later he was promoted to the first commissar of the First Army). He was Minister of Agriculture and President of Council for Agriculture and Forestry till 1953. He was member and vice-president of Federal Executive Council (Government) from 1953–1963, president of Federal Assembly 1963–1966. R. Radošin, *op. cit.*, pp. 1078–1079. He was also the key person in Yugoslavia for economic issues from 1958 till 1963 he was President of Economic Council of Federal Executive Council. This institution was like a super ministry, monitoring and running secretariats of economy, finance and agriculture.

51 Slobodan Penezić was born 1918 in Užice, Serbia. Student of agronomy in Belgrade. He was political commissar of the Second Proletarian Division during WWII. He was Minister of Interior in republic of Serbia 1946–1953, later member and then vice president of Serbian Executive Council (Serbian government). He was also member of Federal Executive Council. Slavko Jovanović, Mihajlo Milanović (ed.), *Ko je ko u Jugoslaviji: biografski podaci o jugoslovenskim savremenikima*, Beograd: Sedma sila, 1957, p. 531. From 1963 till his death in a car accident in November 1964 he was President of Executive Council of Serbia.

Now Tito's burden was heavier than ever. The policy which he ordered Ranković to carry out proved to be a total failure. Since the LCY derived its power from the revolutionary struggle and ideological supremacy, the possibility that something could go wrong was never an option. The system was forcing other cadres to seek help from Kardelj or Ranković in order to protect their interests. Ranković, unlike Kardelj was deaf for the appeals coming from his republic. With no solution in close sight, Tito appeared more as a spectator in internal policy, which in the long run could undermine his own authority. His age and health were not on his advantage. In order to retain his influence and impose his will in the Party he needed to prove that he was still capable of risky but radical moves. One side needed to go and Ranković was the one who had no support from his republic.

However, the removal of Ranković from his posts needed to be presented as a logical continuity of Party development. Since Ranković was not involved with party ideology, it was necessary to find different reasons for his downfall. Tito faced one more problem concerning Ranković's removal from power and it was Ranković's standing in the LCY and state. He had tremendous authority within the LCY and thus had the nickname "the soul of the Party".⁵² So, it is no surprise that Tito choose him, at first, to carry out the "unification mission". Thus, the accusation against him needed to be brutal, shocking and shameless, convincing at first hand. After gradually limiting his state and party powers, the same process was undertaken with his close associates. Svetislav Stefanović Čeća, Federal Secretary of Interior, was the first to be removed from his post and transferred to Federal Assembly, Jeftimije Šašić followed. The final change was the shift of Vojkan Lukić, Federal Secretary of Interior after Stefanović who was transferred to LCSerbia as Org-secretary late in 1965. This transfer of Lukić occurred thanks to General Secretary of LCSerbia Dobrivoje Radosavljević who quickly joined the winning team, since he always supported the implementation of market instruments and decentralization in economy. Jovo Kapičić, ex-member of security apparatus gave Tito the cadre structure of State Security Service and prediction of their reactions if Ranković was attacked.⁵³ Ivan Krajačić Stevo⁵⁴ helped in sending Croatian operatives from their republican security service⁵⁵ to check Josip Broz's mansion. They discovered the microphones, but it was unusual that they were without power source and unable to transmit information.

52 Group of authors, *Snaga lične odgovornosti*, Belgrade: Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia, 2008, p. 82

53 Tamara Nikčević, *Goli otoci Jova Kapičića*, Podgorica: Daily Press, 2009, p. 219.

54 Ivan Krajačić Stevo was born in 1906 in Poljane near Nova Gradiška Croatia. He became member of the CPY in 1933. He fought in the Spanish Civil War 1936–1938 and had a rank of Capitan of Republican Army. During WWII he was one of the main leaders of Partisan resistance in Independent State of Croatia. He was org-secretary of Central Committee of Communist Party of Croatia. After the war he was Minister of Interior in Croatia 1946–1953, vice-president of Croatian Assembly 1953–1963 and President of Croatian Assembly 1963–1967. He submitted his resignation to League of Communists of Croatia. R. Radošin, *op. cit.*, pp. 508–509.

55 *Vijesnik*, No. 13342, 28 October 1984, p. 7.

Both crucial posts in the civil and military security apparatus had been replaced by Croatian cadres the Mišković brothers Ivan⁵⁶ and Milan.⁵⁷ Tito had full state support thanks to Petar Stambolić. At the Party level after the VIII Congress republican organizations gained more power diminishing federal structure where Ranković was second strong man. However, he still had power in the Party, thus the preparations for his removal were carried out through state structures.

One of the key events was the extended LCY meeting of Executive Council on 12th and 13th November 1965. If we compare this meeting with the one of February 1958 we can see that the roles had changed. This time Kardelj had the final word, but unlike Ranković's final word in 1958 where the main problem was a demobilized Party, Kardelj said:

*But there are those who think that it is necessary to create order and force using the policy of firm hand in Yugoslavia. And when I say the firm hand I say it with negative connotation, to force upon, in fact, one greater system which will subdue to that greater interest all the other just interests of all nations in Yugoslavia.*⁵⁸

Although camouflaged in syllogism, it was clear who had the upper hand. Ranković was unaware of the scale of the future events. The final showdown came in June 16th 1966 at a secret extensive LCY Executive Committee meeting. He was accused for spying on Tito and putting microphones in his bedroom and bathroom in his Belgrade mansion and that conspiring to overtake the LCY with secret police SDB. Ranković was stunned but quickly regained his spirit, understanding that he was caught within Party machinery like many before him. He cooperatively offered his resignation from all posts, which was accepted. Political Commission had been set up to interrogate him for the second time on 22nd June, before the plenary session.⁵⁹ It was said that Technical Commission would also be formed and it would examine the evidence. However, its report was never published. Fourth plenary session was held on the island of Brioni, Croatia and just several participants knew what was happening.

The operation was brilliantly planned in Tito's closest circle.⁶⁰ It was decided who would give speeches, what would be said and in what order. Tito personally spoke with every important official, especially with the Serbian cadres. The deposition of Aleksandar Ranković opened the question who would replace him at the posts which he held. Serbian cadres were aware of the importance of these posts and the power that they would lose if they were taken by someone else. That is why one of the conditions of Serbian support was that Konstatin

56 Ivan Mišković was born in 1920 in Premantura, near Pula, Croatia. Ex-law student, after the WWII he finished Higher Military Academy. He became member of CPY in March 1941. He actively fought in WWII. He was in high position in military intelligence after the war and he replaced Jeftimije Šašić in 1963 as the head of Security Organs in State Secretariat of National Defence (Defence Ministry). R. Radošin, *op. cit.*, p. 678.

57 Ilan Mišković was born in 1918 in Premantura, near Pula, Croatia. He was a student of Faculty of Engineering in Zagreb. He became member of CPY in 1940. He was active during WWII. After the war he was in OZN till 1946, later he was State Secretary of Interior in Croatia 1953–1963 and Federal State Secretary of Interior in 1965–1967. R. Radošin, *op. cit.*, p. 679.

58 Executive Committee meetings, 12–13 November 1965. AY, "EC CC LCY", F. 507, III/ 113, p. 164.

59 AY, "LCY", F. 507, IV (Brioni) Plenum 1966, VII 1, II/28, attachment 1, p. 6.

60 Predrag Lalević, *S Titom po svetu*, Beograd: Službeni glasnik, 2011.

Popović,⁶¹ Mijalko Todorović, Milentije Popović⁶² and Dobrivoje Radosavljević⁶³ assume ex Ranković's posts or be promoted.⁶⁴ They gave Broz full support in exchange for a discussion on the army and party reform, which Tito agreed to do.⁶⁵ What they were unable to compensate was the reputation and authority within the LCY which Aleksandar Ranković had. Among the prominent Serbian cadres, no one was older than Ranković and so close to Josip Broz. In other words, despite retaining the posts within the Serbian ethnical sphere, Serbian influence was diminished. On the other hand, Serbian cadres strongly disagreed with Ranković's ideas, they saw them as unacceptable.

Ranković received the meeting agenda only on the night before the plenary meeting, and after reading it had a heart attack.⁶⁶ At the plenum Ranković denied all allegations, except the moral one and accepted the possibility that during his long stay in power he probably made mistakes and that his time had run out. Svetislav Stefanović was also accused at plenum more belligerently but he did the same as Ranković.

All Ranković posts had been transferred to Serbian cadres to soothe possible Serbian discontent. Mijalko Todorović became the organizational secretary, but did not become member of the Executive Committee. He was appointed president of Commission whose task was to reform the LCY. The thesis of that Commission had never been implemented. Tito used it to cool the tense situation. Konstantin Popović, very popular in Serbia and Yugoslavia, became vice-president but he resigned when he realized that no significant changes would occur and that Ivan Gošnjak, Federal Secretary of People's Defence was ousted from his position.⁶⁷ Although no judiciary measures had been taken against Ranković, Josip Broz generously offered to pardon him by, which he accepted.

61 Konstantin Popović, nickname Koča, was born in 1908 in Belgrade in a rich Serbian family. He graduated philosophy at the Sorbonne, Paris; became member of CPY in 1933; was arrested several times because of his political activities; participated as a volunteer in the Spanish Civil War (1937–1939) and in WWII as a commandant of the first organized Partisan unit—the First Proletarian Brigade. He commanded the Second Yugoslav Army in final operations of WWII. After the war, he was Chief of Staff of Yugoslav People's Army 1945–1953; Foreign Affairs Minister and member of Federal Government from 1953–1965; replaced Aleksandar Ranković as vice-president of Yugoslavia from 1966–1967. R. Radošin, *op. cit.*, p. 827.

62 Milentije Popović was born in 1913 in Crna Trava, Serbia. He graduated from the Faculty of Engineering in Belgrade; became member of CPY in 1939; participated actively in WWII after which he was Minister of Trade and Supplying and Planning Commission in Serbian government 1945–1948. Between 1948 and 1953, he was Federal Minister of Trade and Federal Minister of Finance. After the fall of Ranković he took his post in Executive Committee of LCY. R. Radošin, *op. cit.*, p. 828.

63 Dobrivoje Radosavljević Bobi was born in 1915 in Knjaževac, Serbia. He studied agronomy in Belgrade, but never finished it. He became member of LCY in 1933; because of his activities he was arrested and put in jail; was active in Partisan movement during WWII. He was Federal Minister of Finance from 1948–1950. After the fall of Ranković, he was co-opted in Central Committee of LCY and appointed president of Central Committee of LC Serbia. R. Radošin, *op. cit.*, p. 867.

64 It is interesting that Bilandžić depicts, correctly, complex motives of Serbian leaders who gave strong support to Tito in removing Ranković and elaborating thoroughly the factors that had influenced the removal of Ranković, but at the same time abiding to the official accusations of Ranković. D. Bilandžić, *op. cit.*, p. 487.

65 Venceslav Glišić, *Susreti i razgovori: prilozi za biografiju Petra Stambolića*, Belgrade: Službeni glasnik, 2010, p. 86; M. Пиљак, *op. cit.*, p. 80.

66 Predrag Lalević, *S Titom po svetu*, Beograd: Službeni glasnik, 2011.

67 AY, "League of Communists of Yugoslavia", f. 507, VII 1, II/28, p. 152.

Josip Broz's final words of at the Brioni plenum were that despite the events it was time for unity and state stability. He also added that those who thought (meaning the West) that liberalism would come after Ranković were wrong. Indeed he was right. Leaders of so called reformist block Kardelj and Bakarić mainly stood aside during the whole process. Probably not to irritate the Serbian ethnical component, but they were certainly happy that Josip Broz, mastermind of the whole event, directed his edge at Ranković and not at them. The State Security Service (SDB) and some other security agencies were purged because they were thought to be sympathizers of Ranković.⁶⁸ But after everything had settled there were no signs of reforming the military or reform in the LCY. In just five-six years Broz destroyed the last threat to his rule purging the Party throughout the country, especially in Croatia in 1971 and Serbia in 1972.

*Practically everything ended in destroying one of the most powerful men within a highly centralised government, instead of transforming the government itself into a more democratic one, as was promised by everyone at that time.*⁶⁹

These words said on this event confirm that some of the "reformists," led by Bakarić and Kardelj, and supported by Tito, were above all concerned with losing their posts and their power. Had they wanted to truly reform the system through democratization, their power and influence within the system would have been curbed, which obviously was not their intention.

Conclusion

Josip Broz Tito was certainly the mastermind in the power game. His charisma, sense for compromise combined with brutality when needed, secured him the position of number one in Yugoslavia. Although closer to Ranković than Kardelj, on the issue of central government, Tito needed to act and not allow to be overrun by events. In removing Ranković he cunningly used decentralists forces and those who were Ranković's rivals in power as instruments in his scheme. He wanted to show that he was in control of the whole process and every other major issue in Yugoslavia. Those who helped Tito in this operation were soon retired like Gošnjak, the Mišković brothers, Krajačić. The others did as they were told, like Kardelj and Bakarić who were silent through the plenary session at Brioni. The crucial importance of the military whose loyalty was obviously unquestionable was evident in the whole operation. The whole Brioni plenum in 1966 also had two important implications: the first being that no one was untouchable who was lower in rank than Tito. Even the most trusted, loyal comrade could fall from power if he was weak and unsuccessful in getting the task done. The second was that only a strong backing he or she had in one of the major republics could protect someone's position. Thus, Tito showed that the

68 Antun Duhaček, *Ispovest obaveštajca: uspon i pad jugoslovenske obaveštajne službe*, Beograd: Grafopress, p. 76. More details about purges and its origins and consequences could be found in Zdravko Vuković, *Od deformacija SDB do maspoka i liberalizma: moji stenografski zapisi 1966–1972*, Beograd: Narodna knjiga, 1989.

69 Aleksandar Nenadović, *Razgovori sa Kočom*, Zagreb: Globus, 1989, p. 140.

power game could be brutal if he sensed that the strife within the LCY went too far and began to undermine his authority. Regaining authority was an imperative for Tito, and Ranković played a part in it, if not as one who could have solved the problem then as a scapegoat.

Резиме

Милан Пиљак

Игра моћи у Титовој Југославији: загонетка смене Александра Ранковића

Кључне речи: јединство СКЈ, „пукотина“ у Партији, Александар Ранковић, Брионски пленум 1966.

Брионски пленум 1966. остао је упамћен по смени Александра Ранковића, до тада, како се сматрало, другог човека у Југославији. Оптужбе против њега су деловале шокантно, што је и био циљ, јер је смисао целог процеса био уништење политичког утицаја Ранковића. Досадашња истраживања и документа све чвршће потврђују да је, што се тиче оптужби за које су га теретили, Александар Ранковић био невин. У тежњи да се разумеју прави разлози његове смене извршена је анализа промена у држави и Партији након сукоба Тито–Стаљин, као и концепата најутицајнијих људи и њихових истомишљеника. Рад је показао да је још 1958. Броз сматрао да је Југославија у великој политичкој кризи која је настала због тражења новог пута након 1948. и због привредних тешкоћа у којима се налазила. За решавање проблема јединства унутар врха СКЈ одабрао је Александра Ранковића, са којим се слагао око узрока који су до њега довели. Ранковић није успео ни након четири године да реши проблем јединства СКЈ, а током процеса затварања „пукотине“ унутар врха СКЈ савезну власт је поставио као врховну изнад свих република и тако себи одсекао базу за одмеравање и наметање свог концепта на савезном нивоу. Другим речима, Ранковић не само да је био по убеђењу Југословен већ се сам одрекао подршке српске републике. Сматрамо да је ово чинио из принципијелних разлога уско везаних за концепт који је примењивао током покушаја да заустави слабљење савезне владе, опходећи се према српској републици као према било којој у Југославији. Броз се суочио са неуспехом да поврати јединство у врху СКЈ, са неуспелим привредним реформама, иза којих је стајао целокупан ауторитет СКЈ, и све успешнијим отпором струје која се залагала за све већу улогу република у савезном одлучивању. У немогућности да смени децентралисте, док је Ранковић својим федералним концептом одсекао подршку српске републике, Броз је одлучио да се реши најближег сарадника, узимајући га за „жртвеног јарца“ кривог за пропале реформе и

сматрајући да ће тако окончати даље сукобљавање између централиста и децентралиста. Бивајући све старији и слабијег здравља, Броз је морао да покаже снагу како би ставио до знања да није пуки посматрач сукоба између ове две струје. Сматрамо да је Броз руководио целокупном акцијом, да се дуго ломио, али и постарао да све оне који су на оперативно-обавештајном плану учествовали у операцији смене Ранковића полако и тихо уколони са сцене. Браћа Мишковић, Иван Крајачић Стево и други полако су отишли у пензију, а Владимир Бакарић и Едвард Кардељ, најутицајнији политичари у Хрватској и Словенији, руководили су се смерницама које им је Броз одредио.

**THE BEGINNINGS OF PRC'S DIPLOMACY:
DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITY OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST REGIME
IN THE XIBAIPU PERIOD – MAY 1948 TO MARCH 1949**

Abstract: Diplomatic activities of the Chinese Communist Regime in the Xibaipo period constitute the beginning of PRC's diplomacy. In this period, Chinese Communist leaders reexamined the international situation and decided to form a strategic alliance with the Soviet Union. At the same time, they also laid down the basic principles of PRC's diplomatic policy and established the organizational structure of the PRC's diplomatic system. Most of the diplomats in the early days of new China were trained in the war fighting against CCP's enemies inside or outside of China. From then on, the CCP gradually turned the spontaneous contacts with other countries into a national diplomacy with state conscious and colorful skills.

Key words: Xibaipo period, PRC diplomacy, Sino-Soviet relations, Sino-US relations

Xibaipo is a small mountain village in the central part of Pingshan County, Hebei Province of China. During the Civil War in China, due to the circumstances of war, the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) leaders decided to move their central party organs from Yan'an, Shaanxi Province, to Xibaipo in May 1948. It was from this small village that Chairman Mao Zedong and the Central Committee of CCP waged three of the most famous battles during the last phase of the Civil War – the Liaoshen, Pingjin and Huaihai battles. The CCP's army successfully won all three battles and finally laid the foundations for national victory. The Seventh Central Committee of CCP convened its Second Plenary Session, in order to plan for the establishment of the government of China. The CCP also convened a National Land Conference in the village and formulated the basic principles of China's land policy. In March 1949, after ending the Second Plenary Session, the Central Committee of CCP left Xibaipo for Beiping. This period is often referred to as the "Xibaipo period" (from May 1948 to March 1949) in the history of the CCP.

For a long time, scholars researching this period of the CCP's diplomatic history often focused on one event, the visit of a member of the CC CPSU, Anastas Mikoyan to Xibaipo village, where he discussed different issues with

the CCP leaders.¹ Most of these scholars argued that this visit marked the initial establishment of the Sino-Soviet alliance. In addition, the Ward Case that happened in Shenyang – the biggest city in Northeast China also drew a lot of attention.² But few scholars explored CCP's diplomatic activity in this period as a whole or studied foreign policy patterns formulated by this activity. This paper is largely focused on exploring the diplomatic activities of the CCP during this period. Considering the changes that took place in CCP's international strategy, the formulation of basic diplomatic principles and structuring of diplomatic institutions, as well as the training of diplomats, it can be said that the diplomatic activities of this period do constitute the beginning of PRC's diplomacy.

From the "intermediate zone" to "leaning to one side" – formulation of PRC's basic international strategy

Due to the Soviet attitude towards the CCP in the early days after the end of the Second World War, Mao Zedong and other CCP leaders decided to put forward the strategic theory of the "intermediate zone". The Soviet Union's postwar policy was to maintain the alliance with the West and ultimately form a partnership. Through cooperation with western countries, Moscow could consolidate and extend political rights it obtained in Yalta and at Potsdam. In the Far East, Stalin's strategic objectives revolved around two issues: firstly, preserving the independence of Outer Mongolia from China as means to ensure broad security of the Soviet Union; secondly, restoring Russian influence in Manchuria as a way to provide the Soviet Union with an ice-free port in the Pacific. The demands of the Soviet Union at the Yalta conference had been recognized by

-
- 1 In 1995, the Publication *Far East Problems* which belongs to the Far East Institute of Russian Sciences Academy published Andrei Ledovski's article - "Секретная миссия А. И. Микояна в Китай (январь–февраль 1949 г.)", *Проблемы Дальнего Востока*, 1995, № 2, 3. Since then, with the decryption process of Russian archives, historians have done a lot of research on Mikoyan's visit to Xibaipo. One of the most major articles on this topic in China was written by Xue Xiantian and Wang Jin: "The Problems about Mikoyan's Visit to Xibaipo-Review of Ledovski's Article – Mikoyan's Secret Visit", *Modern Chinese History Studies*, Vol. 3, pp. 147–164. As more Russian documents had been declassified, more history research papers and books came out. In 2009, professor Shen Zhihua used the latest declassified Russian archives and wrote two articles which basically explained the issues regarding Mikoyan's visit. Shen Zhihua, "Hard-seeking Meeting: The Tests and Communications Between The Leaders of CPSU and CPC: The Discussion on The Background and Foundation of The Sino-Soviet Alliance (Part I)", *Journal of East China Normal University*, Vol. 1, 2009, pp. 1–13. Shen Zhihua, "From Xibaipo to Moscow – Mao Zedong's Decision to Lean to the Side of the Soviet Union: The Discussion on the Background and Foundation of the Sino-Soviet Alliance (Part II)", *The CCP History Studies*, Vol. 4, 2009, pp. 14–33. Shen studiously described Mikoyan's visit from its beginning to its end and analyzed the reasons and approaches leading to the establishment of the Sino-Soviet Alliance. Shen believed that Mikoyan's visit in 1949 had made Stalin understand the CCP's intentions in China and on the world stage due to the same ideology shared by the CCP and the CPSU.
 - 2 Researchers who explored this event hope to discover relations pertaining to it, including the relations between the CCP's Northeast Bureau and the Soviet government, and the relations between the CCP's regime and Washington. One of the famous accomplishments is Yang Kuisong's article. Yang Kuisong, "The Ward Case and the PRC's Policies towards the United States", *Historical Research*, Vol. 5, 1994, pp. 104–118.

the Western powers and the Chiang Kai-shek government. The Soviet Union and the KMT government signed the "Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance". In return, Stalin was ready to support Chiang Kai-shek's KMT government and discourage CCP's revolutionary activities.³ In view of this, the CCP had to be self-reliant, and create a new path to establish its authority. Mao Zedong used a vivid argument, dubbing the CCP struggle as one of the revolutions in the "intermediate zone".

In August 1946, when he was interviewed by the American journalist Anna Louise Strong, Mao put forward his theory: "The United States and the Soviet Union are separated by an extremely vast area, there are so many countries of Europe, Asia, and Africa. Some of them are capitalist countries; others are colonial or semi-colonial countries. Before conquering all of these countries, the reactionaries in the United States cannot attack the Soviet Union."⁴ This vast area was the "intermediate zone" and China was part of it. So, the CCP's struggle for power should and must be done independently, as it would prove helpful for the interests of the socialist camp. Mao's theory was the ideological base of the CCP's internal and foreign policy issues during the Civil War. Some scholars believed that by putting forward this theory Mao signaled for the first time, his independence from the rules established by the great powers, particularly the U.S. and the USSR. In this way, he set down an independent strategy inside the international system with respect to both big powers.⁵ However, I would argue that Mao's theory of the "intermediate zone" was one of his tactics used at a time when Moscow could not directly support the Chinese revolution. Thus, when the situation inside or outside China changed, Mao and the CCP changed their foreign policy accordingly.

In June 1947 when the Marshall Plan was introduced by the United States, Moscow reacted strongly. In order to counter the influence of the Marshall Plan and enhance its own influence among the Eastern European countries, the Soviet government respectively signed bilateral trade agreements with six of these countries (Romania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, East Germany and Hungary) from July 10th to August 26th, thus implementing the "Molotov Plan". The Soviet Union's foreign policy strategy had also changed when it established the Communist Information Bureau (Cominform) as the coordinating center for all communist parties and workers' parties around the world. The confrontational policies of both the USA and the USSR greatly accelerated the process of setting up two distinct blocs. Ultimately, two camps, each with its own isolated, parallel economic systems and fundamentally hostile political concepts appeared in Europe. The Cold War between the USA and the USSR swept through Europe and began to spread to other parts of the world.

Inside China, the KMT government signed a treaty with the U.S. government named the "Sino-US. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation" in November

3 Shen Zhihua, "The Soviet Union Sent Troops in Northeast China: Goals and Ends", *Historical Research*, Vol. 5, 1994, pp. 88-103.

4 Mao Zedong, "The Interview by American Journalist Anna Louise Strong", *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*, Beijing: People's Publishing House, 1991, p. 1193.

5 Yang Kuisong, *The Revolution in the Intermediate Zone – Evolution of the Tactics of the Chinese Revolution in the International Context*, Central Party School Press, 1992, pp. 442-443.

1946. Along with this treaty Washington and the KMT government concluded a series of agreements or secret agreements that protected the dominant American position pertaining to Chinese politics, economy, military etc. The stance of the CCP on this treaty was that it was an arrangement that allowed American capital to fully occupy China, to overrun Chinese national industry and commerce, and ultimately to transform the whole of China into one of American's new "colonies". After all, it was an unequal treaty. The CCP believed that the signing of this treaty meant that the KMT government had implemented its own "one-sided" policy, tying itself to the chariot of the U.S., which would result with anti-Soviet, anti-Communist policies and leaning to the side of the Americans.

Mao Zedong delivered a speech on this issue at the CCP Central Committee meeting on December 25, 1947. Mao pointed out that the "Soviet-led anti-imperialist camp had been formed. As a socialist country, there was no economic crisis in the Soviet Union. The Soviets had a strong upward mobility which was cherished by the majority of the people around the world. In contrast, the biggest capitalist country – the United States went through a lot of economic crises. So, it was on a serious downward decline and it was also opposed by the majority of the people around the world."⁶ In addition, he said: "We will cooperate with the truly democratic forces in the world. As long as all of us do our best, we can defeat the conspiracies planned by imperialist countries, we can also successfully prevent the Third World War when we overthrow the oppression imposed by the reactionaries on the people. At last, we can achieve permanent peace."⁷ It was obvious that at the time when Mao made this speech, the CCP aligned itself with the socialist bloc.

In April 1948, after the CCP's central party organs had moved into Xibaipo, the People's Liberation Army launched a comprehensive counter-attack on the mainland that signaled a nationwide victory for the communists. Therefore, the CCP leaders began to outline a blueprint for a new China, which also implied the establishment of a new government. On November 14, the Xinhua News Agency, which had been the voice of CCP since 1931 published one of Mao Zedong's review articles: "A Major Change in the Military Situation in China". This article pointed out: "We had originally estimated that it would take about five years to completely overthrow the KMT reactionary government from July 1946. Now, it seems that we could throw them out in a year or so from now."⁸ After the success of the Chinese Revolution, the most important task of the CCP was domestic reconstruction. But economic reconstruction in China became a new issue for the CCP leadership. Mao and other leaders believed that they required international aid in order to achieve the goal of reconstructing China. Since the beginning of the Chinese Civil War, the CCP leaders had already recognized the United States government as the sponsor of the KMT government and had named them the "America-Chiang" group. So they did not expect that

6 Mao Zedong, "Current Situation and Our Mission", *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*, Beijing: People's Publishing House, 1991, p. 1259.

7 *Ibid.*, p. 1260.

8 The Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee, *Mao Zedong Chronicle, 1893–1949* (Vol. 2), Beijing: The Central Literature Press, 2002, p. 389.

the People's Republic of China could receive any aid from the United States,⁹ but they hoped they could receive aid from the Soviet Union due to the obvious ideological affinity.

On September 13, 1948, Mao gave a speech on China's future development at the Politburo meeting of the CC CCP. He said that "complete independence of the Chinese economy could not be achieved in ten or twenty years" and "the Soviet Union would help us prepare for the transition from New Democracy to Socialism. At first, the Soviets would help us develop our economy".¹⁰ But in fact Mao and other CCP leaders were not completely confident that they would receive Soviet aid. At that time, they were still concerned about the Soviet stance towards the revolution in China and the policy of the CCP. Because of the frequent capriciousness in Soviet's policy towards China,¹¹ the CCP was concerned whether the Soviet government would give open support to the People's Republic of China after the revolution. Could the Soviet Union accept New China as one of its main allies and one of the key members of the socialist camp?

During the Xibaipo period, the most important diplomatic activities of the CCP leaders pertaining to the construction of New China's international strategy were connected to defining the close relationship with the Soviet Union. Mao and other CCP leaders were keen to establish close high-level contacts with the leaders of the Soviet Union. They were eager to get official recognition from Kremlin, as well as, to receive Moscow's commitment regarding aid for reconstruction. On April 26, 1948, a few days after the CCP's central party organs moved into Xibaipo, Mao expressed his wish to Stalin to visit the Soviet Union.¹² Mao directly indicated that the main purpose of his visit to the Soviet Union was to "listen to the advice of the Soviet Communist Party in political, military, economic and other important fields". In addition, he also wanted to explore Soviet military, economic, administrative,

9 There has always been a lot of debate among scholars regarding this issue.. The main topic among American historians was the 'Loss of China' argument and the 'Lost Chance' argument. Some American researchers believed that there were some opportunities for a normalization of Sino-American relations after the establishment of the Central Government of the PRC. However, because of ideological differences, and the troubled history of mutual contacts, together with the pressure applied by the Soviets on the CCP, the CCP government and Washington could not materialize these opportunities. I do not share this view. According to my research, there were no such opportunities during the founding years of the PRC.

10 The Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee, *Collected Works of Mao Zedong* (Vol. 5), Beijing: People's Publishing House, 1996, p. 146.

11 The changing process of the Soviet policy towards China has been interpreted by some Chinese historians, see: Shen Zhihua ed., *History of Sino-Soviet relations, 1917–1991*, Beijing: New China Press, 2007; Xue Xiantian and Kim Donggil, *History of Sino-Soviet Relations During the Republic of China Period*, Beijing: The CPC History Press, 2009; Niu Jun, "The Complex Relationships Among the KMT, CPC, The Soviet Union and The United States from 1945 to 1949", *Historical Research*, Vol. 2, 2002, pp. 84–103; Yang Kuisong, *Friendship and Hostility between Mao Zedong and Moscow*, Nanchang: Jiangxi People's Republishing House, 2008.

12 There have been some disputes in the academic circles about the specific time of Mao Zedong's first request to visit the Soviet Union. Some researchers pointed out that when Hu Zongnan's troops attacked Yan'an in March, 1947, Mao Zedong sent a telegram to Stalin and asked to visit Moscow. But some other researchers, like Shen Zhihua, believe that this request was first made by the Soviet leadership.

and party policies.¹³ However, Stalin asked Mao to postpone his visit for various reasons.¹⁴

Nevertheless, while trying to close an alliance with the Soviet Union, the CCP at the same time still maintained its independence and adhered to its own interests. It was this very firmness of the CCP's stance and insistence on their own opinion that made Stalin realize the true strength of the CCP, thus dictating the necessity for a high-level meeting between the CPSU and the CCP. On January 14th, Stalin sent Mao a telegram that said: "Since you have to stay in China at present, we can immediately send a Politburo member to your country, if you agree. He could meet you in Harbin or where you choose and talk with you about any problems you would be interested in".¹⁵ The CCP soon expressed its interest and extended its welcome. So Mikoyan, one of the CPSU Politburo members, finally arrived to Xibaipo on January 30, 1949. These were the first direct talks between the leaders of two communist parties.

Mikoyan's visit gave Soviet leaders a chance to intuitively understand the state of China's internal politics, economy, diplomacy and other fields. It also gave the CCP leaders a chance to understand the true stance of the CPSU towards the Chinese Revolution. Firstly, Mikoyan praised the victory of the Chinese Revolution and the CCP's outstanding leadership. Secondly, he conveyed the CPSU's position on the problems concerning Mongolia, Xinjiang, Northeast of China, etc. As for Mongolia, the CPSU insisted on the independence of Outer Mongolia and believed it had become a fact during the years of the Republic of China. In Xinjiang, the CPSU neither wanted to provide impetus to the independence movement nor hoped to take control of any part of Xinjiang. In Northeast China, the CPSU admitted that the Sino-Soviet Agreement about Port Arthur was an unequal treaty which was signed by the KMT government and the Soviet government in 1945. In addition, the Soviet government was prepared to cancel this treaty and withdraw its army from Port Arthur.¹⁶ Thirdly, Mikoyan listened to several CCP's high level officials reporting about the CCP's policies on many domestic and foreign issues and he made some comments and gave some advice. For example, when he talked with Mao and some other leaders, Mikoyan said: "In my opinion, the CCP shouldn't join the Cominform. You should form an East Asian international communist organization which would

13 "Mao Zedong's telegram to Stalin on a visit to the Soviet Union", April 6, 1948. АПРФ, ф. 38, оп. 1, д. 31, л. 32; *Русско-китайские отношения в XX веке*, Т. V, К. 1, с. 417.

14 Stalin repeatedly postponed Mao's visit to the Soviet Union for two reasons: firstly, Stalin was afraid that the news about Mao's visit would be leaked. If this happened, the Western countries would have enough excuse to accuse Mao of being Moscow's agent. It would do harm to the CCP's prestige in China. Secondly, Stalin hoped that Mao would visit the Soviet Union as the Head of the formal government of China after the founding of the new regime. If this was the case, the visit would raise the prestige and confidence of the CCP. It would have a major international significance. This can see in A. M. Ledovski, Chen Chunhua trans., *Stalin and China*, Beijing: New China Press, 2001, p. 59.

15 "Stalin's telegram to Mao on peaceful negotiations between the CPC and the KMT, January 14, 1949. АПРФ, ф. 39, оп. 1, д. 31, л. 69; ф. 45, оп. 1, д. 330, л. 110–113, *Русско-китайские отношения в XX веке*, Т. V, К. 2, с. 21–22.

16 "Mikoyan's Report to the Politburo of the CPSU: My Visit to China in January–February, 1949", September 22, 1960, АПРФ, ф. 3, оп. 65, д. 606, л. 1–17; *Проблемы дальнего востока*, 1995, № 2, с. 96–111.

be led just by you. You-the CCP, the Japanese Communist Party and the Workers Party of Korea should be its initial members. It would absorb other communist parties in Asia later". Then Mao asked him whether the CCP could make contact with the CPSU directly or not, and Mikoyan answered positively.¹⁷ Mikoyan, therefore, on behalf of the Central Committee of the CPSU, accepted the CCP as an important member of the socialist camp, and they started to resume their responsibility inside the camp. The attitude of the Soviet Union, which implied satisfying CCP's demands with regards to its national interests and international status, only strengthened its willingness to form an alliance with the Soviet Union.

While pursuing the realization of talks with the leaders of the CPSU, the CCP complied with Soviet foreign policy interests as much as possible, especially when it came to the relations with the United States. In Northeast China where the rule of the CCP was stable, this tendency of complying with Soviet demands in foreign affairs was very obvious. In late October and early November, 1948, during the process of taking over the most important city in Northeast China, Shenyang, by the CCP's Northeast Bureau, the American, British and French consulates were treated relatively mildly by the CCP officials according to "*The Directive of the CCP's Central Committee on Treating Foreigners in China*" which had been issued on February 7, 1948.¹⁸ The Soviet Union, however, was not satisfied with this state and told the CPC officials: "Chinese people are too polite to the United States". The delegates of the CPSU in Northeast China suggested to the CCP leaders that they should block the American consulate, restrict the consulate staff's freedom of movement and confiscate its radio transmitter. It was said that Stalin also agreed with these suggestions.¹⁹

So, after the liberation of Shenyang early in November, the CCP's Central Committee instructed the Northeast Bureau to negotiate with Soviet representatives in Shenyang, listen to their advice and correct the method of treating Americans. The local officials of the CCP were asked to abandon their fantasies about friendship with the Americans and strive to 'squeeze out' the American, British and French consulates by making it difficult for them to work so they would leave China. Consequently, the Ward Case happened, which was obviously planned by the CCP's officials to force the Americans out of China.²⁰ During their meeting with

17 "Memorandum of The Conversation Between Mikoyan and Mao Tse-tung About the Foreign Relations and Historical Problems", February 2, 1949, АПРФ, ф. 39, оп. 1, д. 39, л. 47–53; *Русско-китайские отношения в XX веке*, Т. V, К. 2, с. 62–66.

18 On February 7, 1948, the Central Committee of CCP issued *The Directive of the CPC's Central Committee on Treating Foreigners in China*. It asked the army and the local CCP authorities to protect all foreign representative bodies in China, whether they were imperialist institutions or not. It pointed out: "If the consulates of any foreign countries would want to negotiate with us to protect their citizens' interests, we must regard their negotiators as diplomatic representatives and protect their legitimate rights, regardless of fact whether their countries had recognized our army and regime or not." The State Archives Administration of the People's Republic of China, *Collected Documents of The CPC Central Committee (1948–1949)*, Beijing: The Central Party School Press, 1987, p. 23.

19 C. H. Gangchalov, Chen Chunhua (trans.), "Interview of Kovalev on the conversation between Stalin and Mao Zedong", *National History Research Resources*, Vol. 1, 1993.

20 Professor Yang Kuisong has analyzed this case thoroughly from the start to the end. Yang Kuisong, "The Ward Case and PRC's Policies Regarding the United States", *Historical Research*, Vol. 5, 1994, pp. 104–118.

Mikoyan, the CCP leaders repeatedly explained their stance towards the United States. They said: "In the three years after the Second World War, the prestige of the United States has declined drastically in China. In general, the people of China hate America. To tell the truth, most progressive people like us are frightened by its power." They also told Mikoyan about the "squeezing out policy" in Northeast China: "The foreign consulates (American, British and French) hinted that they were unwilling to leave China and that they wanted to establish true friendship with us...But we didn't want to see them in Shenyang. So, we took measures to isolate them, make them feel bad. At last, they had to retreat from Shenyang."²¹

Undoubtedly, the attitude toward the United States which the CCP deliberately displayed to the Soviets made them very satisfied. Although Mikoyan sometimes indicated that it should also refer to treating foreign capital in China: "CPC's new government should nationalize all Japanese capital, French capital and even most of the British capital as soon as possible". And "you should implement cautious policies towards the American capital... only after your new government controlled the overall situation in China, you could make a final decision about the American capital according to the current situation and the Americans' attitude".²² But this was not the true intention of the Soviets regarding Sino-US. relations. This formulation just reflected that the Soviets remained cautious in their relations with the United States; they wanted to avoid provoking the United States during the first years of the Cold War. But privately the Soviets did not want the new CCP government to maintain normal contact with Washington. Mikoyan's many other speeches reflected such an attitude. For example, when he spoke about the economic problems with the CCP leaders on February 2, 1949, Mikoyan did not agree with Ren Bishi's²³ suggestion about importing 30 tons of raw cotton from the United States due to its shortage on the Chinese market. Mikoyan believed "cotton does have a major role in Chinese national economy, but importing raw cotton from the United States is inappropriate. Cotton production in China should be independent and self-sufficient". Ren had to give in and applaud Mikoyan's opinion in the end.²⁴ Thus, it could be seen that the Soviets were not willing to see contacts between the CCP government and Washington, thus even some necessary foreign trade relations were also not approved. Since the CCP already set up its international strategy as the "leaning to one side" policy, they were compelled to agree with the Soviets on these issues.

At the same time, in order to win the trust of the Soviets, the CCP also did their best to maintain an identical position with the Soviet Union regarding

21 "Mikoyan's Conversation with Zhou Enlai and other CCP Leaders on Diplomatic Principles", February 1, 1949, АПФ, ф. 39, оп. 1, д. 39, л. 17-24; *Русско-китайские отношения в XX веке*, Т. V, К. 2, с. 43-48.

22 "Mikoyan's conversation with Mao Zedong on CCP's domestic policies, February 5, 1949, АПФ, ф. 39, оп. 1, д. 39, л. 64-73; *Русско-китайские отношения в XX веке*, Т. V, К. 2, с. 72-78.

23 Ren was one of the CCP Politburo members and the Secretary of the Central Committee's Secretariat at the time.

24 "Memorandum of Mikoyan's Conversation with CCP's Leaders on the Chinese economy", February 2, 1949, АПФ, ф. 39, оп. 1, д. 39, л. 31-38; *Русско-китайские отношения в XX веке*, Т. V, К. 2, с. 52-57.

the issue of Yugoslavia. On November 30, 1947, before the Xibaipo Period, Mao regarded Yugoslavia as one of the role models worth studying by the CCP, as he said in his cable to Stalin: "After accomplishing the victory of the Chinese Revolution, we should construct our political system like the systems of Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. All other parties and political forces, except the CCP, should leave the political stage. This kind of political system would greatly strengthen the results of the Chinese Revolution".²⁵ It was obvious that Mao appreciated Yugoslavia's model at that time. But after June 28, 1948, the day when the CPSU manipulated the Cominform to pass an anti-Yugoslav resolution and expel the CPY from its ranks, the CCP accordingly also changed its position towards the CPY. On July 10, the CC CCP also adopted a resolution on Yugoslavia which fully supported the decision of the Cominform. In addition, on November 7, the voice of the CCP-*People's Daily*- published an article written by Mao's deputy, Liu Shaoqi.²⁶ In this article "On Internationalism and Nationalism", Liu condemned Yugoslav leadership "as bourgeois nationalists", and pointed out that one of CPY's main errors was "not to ally with the Soviet Union, but to go against the Soviet Union".²⁷

When Mikoyan visited Xibaipo at the beginning of 1949, Mao and other CCP leaders discussed Yugoslavia several times and they demonstrated their disapproval of Tito's policies. For example, during the discussion with Mikoyan on February 3, Mao asked Mikoyan to present the Yugoslav case. At last, Mao concluded: "Tito is Zhang Guotao,²⁸ who is a traitor of the CCP".²⁹ In the conversation with Mikoyan on February 5th, Mao again stressed his opinion that Comrade Stalin's instruction on the Chinese revolution and his criticism of Yugoslavia were equally precious for him. Because Stalin believed that the Chinese Revolution was part of the world revolution, Mao reiterated that he was Stalin's 'student' and insisted on the policy of aligning with the Soviet Union.³⁰ Why did the CCP leaders emphasize the consistent attitude with the Soviet Union on the Yugoslav issue? It was because the CCP leadership was concerned about any possible comparisons between China and Yugoslavia by the Soviets, especially by Stalin. They were concerned that the Soviets regarded Mao Zedong as 'Tito' in China. Any similar parallel would undermine the Sino-Soviet alliance. Nevertheless, their fear was well-founded as later facts showed. In Xibaipo period, therefore, to win the recognition and support of the Soviet Union, the CCP leaders tried to make a clean break with Yugoslavia.

In a nutshell, during the Xibaipo period, together with continuous victories, the CCP gradually adjusted its understanding of the international situation and it sided

25 "Telegram from Mao Zedong to Stalin", November 30 1947, АПРФ, ф. 45, оп. 1, д. 330, л. 13-17.

26 Liu was one of the CCP Politburo members and the Secretary of the CCP Central Committee at that time.

27 *People's Daily*, Nov. 7, 1948, Vol. 1/Vol. 2.

28 Zhang Guotao was a founding member and important leader of the CCP and a bitter rival of Mao Zedong. During the Long March, Zhang's armies took a different route from Mao's and were badly beaten by local forces in Gansu. When his depleted forces finally arrived to join Mao in Yan'an, Zhang continued challenging Mao. In 1938, Zhang left the party and defected to the Kuomintang.

29 АПРФ, ф. 39, оп. 1, д. 39, л. 47-53; *Русско-китайские отношения в XX веке*, Т. V, К. 2, с. 62-66.

30 АПРФ, ф. 39, оп. 1, д. 39, л. 64-73; *Русско-китайские отношения в XX веке*, Т. V, К. 2, с. 72-78.

firmly with the socialist camp. Therefore, the international strategy of the upcoming new regime which was characterized as “leaning to one side”³¹ evolved during this period.

The basic diplomatic principles of the PRC government were gradually formed in Xibaipo

With the gradual formulation of “leaning to one side” foreign policy strategy, the basic principles of the new regime’s diplomacy were finalized in this small mountain village. In Mao Zedong’s own style, these principles could be summed up as “setting up another household” and “cleaning the house before entertaining guests”. They meant a totally fresh start for PRC’s democracy.

Zhou Enlai explained the principle of “setting up another household” as “not recognizing the KMT government’s diplomatic relations with other countries, and establishing our new diplomatic relations with these countries on new bases”.³² The new bases implied mutual respect for each other’s sovereignty and equality and cooperation for mutual benefit. As for the principle of “cleaning house before entertaining guests”, the first time that Mao put it forward was in his talk with Mikoyan at the beginning of 1949. During this conversation, Mao compared China to a family and he believed the house of this family was dirty because of the existence of “garbage”, “fleas” and “bedbugs” etc. He said: “After the liberation, we must carefully clean up our house, clean the dirty things and do well the rectification of the furnishings. Only by restoring good order in the house, can we invite guests to come in. However, we can invite true friends to come in before such works are accomplished, because they will help us do some cleaning. But the other guests have to wait for a while until we want them to come in”.³³ The “other guests” included the United States and other Western capitalist countries. In this period, the CCP already dealt with the foreign affairs on the national level. Relations with other countries were also different from the former foreign relations of the party or of the Yan’an local government.

First, the CCP clearly put forward that its new regime would not recognize the KMT government’s diplomatic relations with foreign governments in the future and it would resolutely eliminate the privileges that imperialist countries had obtained from China. The CCP also made this clear: “Many governments of the imperialist countries, especially the United States, helped the reactionary KMT government repress the Chinese people’s liberation forces in the past years. So, we cannot recognize the representatives of these countries who were with the KMT government as formal diplomats in the new era of China. Of course we cannot recognize their diplomatic privileges. As long as we take such measures, we can gain the initiative in foreign affairs and eradicate all previous diplomatic humiliations

31 Some scholars pointed out that “leaning to one side” was not only an international strategy of the CCP, but it was also a national strategy. I totally agree with this opinion, but I only discuss its significance in the diplomatic field.

32 Zhou Enlai, “Our Foreign Policy and Mission”, *Selected Works of Zhou Enlai*, Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1984, p. 86.

33 Jin Chongji ed., *Biography of Mao Zedong (1893–1949)*, Beijing: The Central Literature Press, 1996, pp. 910–911.

throughout history. Privileges of imperialist countries in China must be revoked in principle. And the independence and liberation of the Chinese nation must be realized. This is our unchangeable stance".³⁴ In other words, the new regime would first clean up the old diplomatic relations and then re-establish diplomatic relations with other countries on the new basis. The future central government would not recognize old diplomatic relations with the Western countries, and it would not inherit the obligations that the KMT government had been committed to. However, the new regime would also like to develop new diplomatic relations with the Western countries, including the U.S. and the UK.

Second, the CCP also emphasized the main precondition of the future regime to develop diplomatic relations with other countries, including the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. This was "equality". The CCP's regime would not be eager to establish diplomatic ties with foreign countries until this main condition was met. Mao also talked about this condition with Mikoyan in Xibaipo. He said: "The basic principles of our diplomacy are mutual equality and mutual assistance."³⁵ *The Directive on Diplomatic Affairs* issued by the CC CCP in 1949 pointed out: "We should strive to solve diplomatic issues which are favorable to the Chinese people and can be easily solved. As for the problems which are impossible to solve right now, we should lay them aside. As for the problems which are just harmless or not so important for the Chinese people, we should not be in a hurry to solve them, even though they are easy to solve. As for the problems which are not clear or premature, we shouldn't deal with them haltingly".³⁶ In his conversation with Mikoyan on February 1, 1949, Zhou Enlai referred to two proposals on diplomatic recognition of the future national regime. The first proposal was that the CCP would strive for immediate recognition of the new regime by major foreign powers. In this case, he hoped the Soviet Union would be the first country that would recognize the PRC government. The second proposal was "in no hurry" to strive for recognition. "If the foreign governments declared their willingness to recognize the new government, we would not reject them, but we would not welcome them either". Zhou hinted that the second proposal would last for more than one year if it was chosen to be implemented, and the basis for this second proposal was the CCP belief that its new regime would earn the recognition sooner or later in the future. Zhou said that he personally thought the second proposal was better. If the new government adopted the second proposal, it could be free to curb all foreigners' privileges in China, opposition of foreign governments notwithstanding. Therefore, the PRC government would limit the rights of foreign citizens in China and supervise their activities.³⁷

34 "The Directive on Diplomatic Affairs", January 19, 1949. The State Archives Administration of the People's Republic of China, *Collected Documents of The CPC Central Committee* (Vol. 18), Beijing: The Central Party School Press, 1992, p. 44.

35 "Memorandum of Mikoyan's conversation with Mao Zedong on the united government in China", January 31, 1949, АПРФ, ф. 39, оп. 1, д. 39, л. 7–16; *Русско-китайские отношения в XX веке*, Т. V, К. 2, с. 37–43.

36 "The Directive on Diplomatic Affairs", January 19, 1949. The State Archives Administration of the People's Republic of China, *Collected Documents of The CPC Central Committee* (Vol. 18), Beijing: The Central Party School Press, 1992, p. 44.

37 "Mikoyan's conversation with Zhou Enlai and other CCP leaders on diplomatic principles", February 1, 1949, АПРФ, ф. 39, оп. 1, д. 39, л. 17–24, *Русско-китайские отношения в XX веке*, Т. V, К. 2, с. 43–48.

Third, the diplomacy of the future regime must be independent. In the same conversation with Mikoyan, Zhou Enlai especially stressed the principles of the CCP's diplomacy, and the first of them was "independent foreign policy".³⁸ Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence which have been present in the PRC's diplomacy up till the present were formulated at this time. The principle of independence was not only applied to the Western countries, like the U.S. and the UK, but it was also used in establishing relations with socialist countries. Although, *The Directive on Diplomatic Affairs* asked the department of foreign affairs to distinguish socialist countries from capitalist countries, nevertheless "as socialist countries haven't yet established formal relations with the Chinese people's regime, just like other countries, we have to regard their representatives, including their military officers and agencies in China, as foreign civilians and informal foreign agencies".³⁹ This reflected consistency in CCP's foreign policy and its independence from the socialist camp.

In addition, the CCP was also trying to clean up the unequal treaties existing between the Soviet Union and China. On February 3, 1949, during his talks with Mikoyan, Mao tentatively put forward a question: "There is a Chinese woman who was a member of the KMT Legislative Committee and she declared that, if the CCP could recover the territory and sovereignty of Port Arthur from the Russians, it would be a great achievement for the Chinese nation." Mao immediately added that he personally thought that this woman did not understand national politics.⁴⁰ The question raised by Mao was soon reported to the Central Committee of CPSU by Mikoyan and it drew Soviet leaders' attention. The CC CPSU instructed Mikoyan to reply to Mao like this: "On the issue of the *Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance*, the CPSU believes the treaty is unequal. But it also believes that the purpose of complying with this treaty at present is to prevent the KMT government from colluding with Japan and the United States against the Soviet Union and the Chinese Revolution. The Soviet government decided to abrogate from this treaty in the future. After signing the peace treaty with Japan, we will withdraw our troops from Port Arthur. Of course, if the CCP believes immediate withdrawal is appropriate, we are also prepared to implement it right now. As for the *Chinese Manchuria Railway Treaty*, the CPSU does not consider it an unequal treaty. The main reason was that this railway had been built by Russian capital. But the CPSU also believed that the principle of equality was not fully respected in this treaty. Therefore, the CPSU is prepared to discuss this issue with the CCP as brothers, until we solve this problem completely".⁴¹ The CCP, of course, could not ask the

38 "Mikoyan's conversation with Zhou Enlai and other CCP leaders on diplomatic principles", February 1, 1949, АПРФ, ф. 39, оп. 1, д. 39, л. 17-24; *Русско-китайские отношения в XX веке*, Т. V, К. 2, с. 43-48.

39 "The Directive on Diplomatic Affairs", January 19, 1949. The State Archives Administration of the People's Republic of China, *Collected Documents of The CPC Central Committee* (Vol. 18), Beijing: The Central Party School Press, 1992, p. 44.

40 "Memorandum of Mikoyan's conversation with Mao Zedong on cooperation between the CCP and the CPSU", February 4, 1949, АПРФ, ф. 39, оп. 1, д. 39, л. 54-62; *Русско-китайские отношения в XX веке*, Т. V, К. 2, с. 66-72.

41 "Memorandum of Mikoyan's conversation with Mao Zedong on urgent political problems", January 31, 1949, АПРФ, ф. 39, оп. 1, д. 39, л. 78-88; *Русско-китайские отношения в XX веке*, Т. V, К. 2, с. 81-87.

Soviets to withdraw their troops when it really needed support from the Soviet Army in the Civil War. But the generous statements of the CPSU surprised the CCP leaders greatly and motivated them to decide to ally with the Soviet Union. The issue of the treaties signed between the Soviet Union and China in the Xibaipo period established a good foundation for signing a new treaty between them after the establishment of the PRC government.

Fourth, in the Xibaipo period the CCP focused attention to the economic and cultural undertakings controlled by the foreigners, but it did not formulate specific approaches to all these problems. *The Directive on Diplomatic Affairs* issued in 1944 by the CC CCP just stipulated the attitudes and approaches with regards to foreigners. But when the complete victory on the mainland of China was in sight, after the central party organs of the CCP had moved to Xibaipo, CCP's new *Directives on Diplomatic Affairs* issued on January 19, 1949 were much more specific. The *Directives on Diplomatic Affairs* issued in 1949 divided the foreign affairs and foreigners' activities into 15 categories, including diplomatic relations, foreign capital contacts, foreign trade, customs taxes, foreign missionaries, schools run by foreigners, hospitals run by foreigners, foreigners' newspapers and news agencies, foreign journalists, etc. The "directive" also stipulated definite provisions for each category. Except for the foreign-related activities which caused tangible harm to the Chinese people, all other activities were subjected to the status quo. However, all foreigners and foreign-related undertakings were asked to submit to the CCP's administration and accept registration and inspection. For example, regarding the foreign capital contacts, the "directive" stated: "As for all economic privileges, business enterprises, factories and other investment, whatever belonging to foreign persons or countries, we cannot give formal legal recognition to them, but we are not eager to deal with them at present, no prohibition, no confiscation". However, the "directive" also detailed provisions that constituted "the greatest harm to Chinese people's economic life, such as financial speculations," and "greatest infringement on China's national sovereignty, such as inland navigations, etc." The theme of these provisions was "an immediate ban". But some other foreign-related undertakings such as foreign banks had not been asked to close down. They were asked to report their capitals, accounts and business affairs to the local CCP's governments and wait for the decisions of local authorities. Foreign insurance companies, especially marine insurance companies, cannot be treated in a harsh manner".⁴² On March 3, 1949, the Second Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee of the CCP further emphasized: "The economic enterprises and cultural establishments which are directly run by the imperialists have to be permitted to exist for some time. We must distinct these undertakings and deal with them separately and properly".⁴³ Thus, in the Xibaipo Period, the CCP's diplomatic principles regarding foreigners and foreign-related economic and cultural enterprises were formulated. But some specific questions in this field had not been solved yet.

42 "Directive on Diplomatic Affairs", January 19, 1949. The State Archives Administration of the People's Republic of China, *Collected Documents of The CPC Central Committee* (Vol. 18), Beijing: The Central Party School Press, 1992, p. 44.

43 The State Archives Administration of the People's Republic of China, *Collected Documents of The CPC Central Committee (1948-1949)*, Beijing: The Central Party School Press, 1987, p. 595.

With the progress of the Chinese Civil War, the People's Liberation Army not only defeated the KMT army, but also eradicated certain privileges of imperialist countries in China. The remaining privileges included the barracks garrisoned by the troops of the Western countries in Beijing, Tianjin and Shanghai. They also included the free navigation of foreign vessels in the inland rivers of China and old rules of China's customs which were favorable to the foreigners. These privileges were soon revoked by the administration of the PRC government according to the diplomatic principles established in Xibaipo. In January 1950, the Beijing Military Control Commission announced the expropriations of the barracks' property belonging to the United States, France, and the Netherlands in Beijing. Soon the British barracks were also expropriated. The Western countries' barracks in Tianjin and Shanghai were also subjected to expropriation. In this month, the central government of the PRC also adopted the *Decision on Tariff Policy and Customs*. In April and May of 1951, this government announced the *PRC Interim Customs Law* and determined the new customs tariff. At the same time, privileges to trade with the foreigners were totally reverted to state institutions. No enterprise could conduct foreign trade unless it had the export-import licenses. The tariff sovereignty of China had been fully restored. In July 1950, the Finance Committee of PRC's Central Government issued instructions on shipping management which required the shipping affairs in whole country to be managed in the unified manner by the Central Government. Afterwards, foreigners' ocean liners could not enter inland rivers without the permissions of the Chinese government. The management of navigation in China's inland rivers was fully restored. After all, in less than one year's time, the Central Government of the PRC basically eliminated the privileges of imperialist countries in China.

After the establishment of the new regime, it insisted on the principle of equality and independence when it established diplomatic relations with the other countries as it was stipulated in *The Directive on Diplomatic Affairs* issued in Xibaipo. The Central Government of the PRC soon established diplomatic relations with socialist countries such as the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Mongolia, Albania, Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the German Democratic Republic. These diplomatic recognitions did not need any preparatory negotiations. But for other nationalist countries, such as Burma, India, Pakistan, Ceylon and Afghanistan, and Western capitalist countries such as the United Kingdom, Norway, Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Switzerland and Netherlands, things were different. Before establishing formal diplomatic relations, the new Chinese government conducted serious negotiations, asked them to clarify their attitude towards the KMT government and explicitly insisted that the Central Government of the PRC was the only legitimate government of China. These diplomatic actions reflected that the new regime's diplomacy was strictly principled and highly flexible.

As for the capitalist countries' economic undertakings in China, the newly founded government dealt with them according to the Decisions of the Second Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee of the CPC which was held in Xibaipo. It adopted a distinctive policy "according to the nationalities, systems, industries and other various specific conditions". Therefore, the new Chinese government carried out detailed investigations regarding the foreign-related

enterprises.⁴⁴ After the outbreak of the Korean War, on December 28, 1950, the Central Government of the PRC issued a special order to control the American assets and enterprises located in China because Washington had implemented similar policies with regards to China's properties in America. For Britain, France and assets of other capitalist countries in China, also due to their hostile attitudes towards the PRC, many had been nationalized before the end of 1953. Some other enterprises continued to work, but later on they slowly disappeared due to the Western economic embargo and China's socialist transformation of the trade and industry. As for the foreign cultural establishments, with the victory of the CCP, most foreign news agencies and propaganda agencies had to stop their activities in China. As far as religion was concerned, the Three-Self Patriotic Movement of the Protestant Churches in China began in 1951, and it was completed in 1954. After this movement which had three famous principles of self-governance, self-support (i.e., financial independence from foreigners) and self-propagation (i.e., indigenous missionary work), most of the Chinese religious organizations severed their relations with their foreign churches. The institutions dealing with culture, education, health and relief etc., which were run by foreigners or accepted foreign capitals, were also treated according to the principles established during the Xibaipo Period. *The Directive on Diplomatic Affairs* stated: "Foreign owned schools can be allowed to maintain their status quo tentatively. But all presidents of these schools must be Chinese. They also have to report their sources of funding. Their curriculums need to be formulated according to the same rules implemented in other schools. As far as the relief agencies run by foreigners were concerned, only if their international cooperative organizations were not adverse to our independence and national sovereignty, they can receive foreign assistances and relief. As for foreign newspapers and journals, we could tentatively ignore them. However, they are required to send their newspapers throughout the year to us and to have them registered. The foreign news agencies have to be banned from reporting news, not to mention secretly setting up radio stations".⁴⁵

To sum up, during the Xibaipo Period, in addition to the formulation of the new international strategy of the future regime with the alliance with the Soviet Union at its core, the CCP also established relatively specific diplomatic principles and policies.

*Staff formation and organizational preparations for the diplomacy
of the future regime in the Xibaipo Period*

If the CCP wanted to implement a brand-new foreign policy of independence and autonomy, it had to disband KMT government's diplomatic institutions and abandon the use of KMT diplomats. It had to set up its own diplomatic institutions and develop its own diplomatic personnel. This was something that had also been done in the Xibaipo Period.

44 *Contemporary Chinese Diplomacy*, Beijing: China Social Sciences Press, 1990, p. 20.

45 The State Archives Administration of the People's Republic of China, *Collected Documents of The CPC Central Committee (1948–1949)*, Beijing: The Central Party School Press, 1987, p. 516; *Contemporary Chinese Diplomacy*, Beijing: China Social Sciences Press, 1990, p. 22.

During the period of the new-democratic revolution in China, members of the CPC who were engaged in foreign affairs and had diplomatic experience came from three different institutions. The first institution was the Foreign Affairs Office in the CC CCP's Southern Bureau. The second Institution was the Yan'an Foreign Affairs Department in the CCP's Central Military Commission. And the third institution was the Military Executive Headquarters in Beiping. CCP members in these three institutions became the driving force of CCP's foreign affairs and most of them had also gathered in Xibaipo.

According to the memoirs of Ling Qing, who was one of the old diplomats in new China, all the staff engaged in foreign affairs retreated from Yanan in March 1947. They crossed the Yellow River and came to the Shanxi District of Jinsui Revolutionary Base.⁴⁶ On May 1, 1947, Ye Jianying⁴⁷ gathered all these foreign affairs workers in the small town named Sanjiao of Linxian County, Shanxi Province. Ye announced the establishment of the Central Foreign Affairs Group of the CCP's Central Committee, and he published the organizational structure and personnel arrangements of this Group. The president of the Group was Ye himself and the vice-president was Wang Bingnan. There were three offices in the Group. One was the Research Office, one was the Press Office and the other was the Compilation and Propaganda Office.⁴⁸ According to the instructions coming from Zhou Enlai, Group members should do some basic preparations for the future diplomatic careers and exercise their diplomatic skills in the current, relatively quiet environment. The core work of the Group at that time was to translate the famous works of Mao Zedong, translate and edit some reference books about the United States, and compile a few booklets about the basic policies of the liberated areas. "You should spend 1 or 2 years doing this, and concentrate all your efforts on it. The individual Group members should spend at least six months participating in the Land Reform Movement. Thus you would be taught by the grassroots. In all, you must strengthen your political qualities and English skills during this period."⁴⁹

In April 1948, the Central Foreign Affairs Group moved to Xibaipo together with other key central party organs. The public name of the Group was the English Class in the Central Workers' School. The Group was guided by the CC CCP. The

46 Jinsui Revolutionary Base was established in the Northwest of Shanxi Province and Southeast of Inner Mongolia as Jinsui Anti-Japanese Base by the CCP's army in 1937, after the Japanese army had invaded and occupied Northern China. After the Chinese Civil War began, it became one of the most important CCP revolutionary bases.

47 Ye Jianying was one of the ten Marshals of the People's Liberation Army. He had been assigned as the Chief Representative of CCP in the Military Executive Headquarters of Beiping in 1946. He came back to Yanan in 1947 and served as the Secretary of the CCP Rear Central Committee, the Deputy Chief of Staff in the CCP Central Military Commission and in the People's Liberation Army. He held a concurrent post as the President of North China Military University since 1948.

48 Ling Qing, "From Yan'an Cave to Xibaipo", *International Politics Studies*, Vol. 3, 2004, pp. 42–54. Organization Department of the CPC Central Committee, the Party History Research Center of the CPC Central Committee and the State Archives Administration of the People's Republic of China, *Historical Data Collection on the Organization of the CCP*, Beijing: Central Party School Press, 2000, pp. 66–67.

49 "Zhou Enlai's letter to Wang Bingnan", July 29, 1947, cited from Gao Liang, "New China Diplomacy was Created Like This – Rereading Zhou Enlai's Five Letters to Wang Bingnan", *Yan Huang Chun Qiu*, Vol. 4, 1998, pp. 14–19.

Group continued its preparations for future diplomatic work by preparing all kinds of documents, research reports, and policy recommendations.⁵⁰ During the Xibaipo Period, the primary objective set for the Central Foreign Affairs Group by the Central Committee was “training and storing cadres to meet the needs of future diplomatic work”.⁵¹ It was precisely at this period that not only had most of the old diplomatic personnel been gathered in this small village for some time, but also a lot of new personnel for diplomacy had been recruited. The Diplomatic Policy Research Office and the Foreign Language School were added to the already existing Research Office, Press Office, and Compilation and Propaganda Office.

During this period, the CC CCP devoted its attention to education and training of foreign affairs personnel in institutions such as the special foreign language school run by the Foreign Affairs Group. This school was established in August of 1948, whose public name was the English School of North China Military University. But it was run by the North China Military University and the Foreign Affairs Group at the same time.⁵² In January 12, 1949, Zhou Enlai met with the staff of the Central Foreign Affairs Group and gave a speech on the future of diplomatic policy. His speech was a comprehensive instruction to the CCP's diplomats on the eve of the founding of the new regime. After the PLA seized cities with diplomatic offices, Zhou reaffirmed that certain principles and policies had to be followed in diplomatic work. He also emphasized the necessary discipline in dealing with foreign affairs. Zhou said: “Diplomats are civilian ‘PLA cadres’. Foreign affairs have an important influence on the outside world. So, any foreign-related affair is of great importance. The Central Government is the only one who can conduct diplomatic affairs. No local government can freely decide on its own diplomatic policy”.⁵³ Rules defined in Zhou's speech had become the norm that the diplomatic personnel of the PRC government had to generally follow.

Diplomatic talents integrated and trained in Xibaipo played key roles in the foreign affairs of the PRC government right after it was formed. For example, in January 1949 some members of the Central Foreign Affairs Group marched to Tianjin, thus participating in taking over the power from the KMT government. They took charge of the foreign affairs of Tianjin and conducted contacts with foreigners in this city. Other members of the Group did the same in major cities like Beijing and Shanghai. In October of this same year, after the Central Government of the PRC had been established, all members of the Group were transferred to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC. The first formal diplomatic letter of the PRC to other countries was sent out by the original members of the Central Foreign Affairs Group such as Hanxu and Ke Bainian, who rode a bicycle to send the letter

50 Organization Department of the CPC Central Committee, the Party History Research Center of the CPC Central Committee and the State Archives Administration of the People's Republic of China, *Historical Data Collection on the Organization of CPC*, Beijing: The Central Party School Press, 2000, p. 67.

51 Ling Qing, “From Yenan Cave to Xibaipo”, *International Politics Studies*, Vol. 3, 2004, pp. 42–54.

52 Organization Department of the CPC Central Committee, the Party History Research Center of the CPC Central Committee and the State Archives Administration of the People's Republic of China, *Historical Data Collection on the Organization of CPC*, Beijing: The Central Party School Press, 2000, p. 67.

53 Yang Shangkun, *Yang Shangkun Diaries*, Beijing: The Central Literature Press, 2001, p. 14; Ling Qing, “Zhou Enlai's Early Indications about Foreign Affairs”, *World Affairs*, Vol. 6, 2008, pp. 50–52.

to each embassy or consulate of foreign countries in Beijing. Many members of the Group later became excellent diplomats. Huang Hua, Zhang Wenjin, and Wang Bingnan were the outstanding figures in China's diplomacy. In 1971, after the PRC restored its lawful seat in the UN, Huang Hua served as PRC's first ambassador to the United Nations; from 1977 to 1982, he was also appointed as the Chinese Foreign Minister. As for Zhang, he took part in the important work of normalizing Sino-American relations; and in 1978, Zhang was assigned as the Deputy Foreign Minister. Wang helped Zhou Enlai and other leaders form the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC and conduct the Chinese people's diplomacy. From 1955, he had been appointed the ambassador to Poland. At the same time, he had been in charge of the Sino-US ambassadorial talks for nine years until his return in 1964. Beside these famous figures, Dong Yueqian, Han Xu, Xu Danian, Ke Bainian, Ling Qing, Wu Qing etc. also held important posts in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC and made significant contributions to China's diplomacy.

After the establishment of the new regime, due to the expansion of diplomatic efforts, the need to expand diplomatic forces became urgent. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs deployed a large number of staff from the military, the local government, the foreign language schools and other institutions. Even so, the original members of the Central Foreign Affairs Group still held the most important posts of the Ministry for a few years. For example, the inner cadre statistics of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on August 25, 1950, showed that among 449 cadres, the number of personnel from the Group and the local foreign Affairs Offices was 80, still accounted for 17.8% of the total number of diplomats and was still the second biggest group inside the Ministry (The first biggest group was the staff from the language schools). The most important thing was that these officials occupied the vast majority of the upper positions inside the Foreign Ministry.⁵⁴ This was consistent with Zhou Enlai's expectations. According to an old diplomat Kang Jimin's memoirs, Premier Zhou Enlai had pointed out that at the beginning of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, its staff constituted of three groups of people: generals from the PLA and some local government leaders served as ambassadors and held other leading positions; members of the Central Foreign Affairs Group and some underground workers who had some experience in foreign affairs and could do professional works in operational positions as branch-level leaders; young intellectuals were also taken into the Foreign Ministry and they could work at the grassroots level as the professional staff.⁵⁵ Therefore, the members of the Foreign Affairs Group who had been trained in Xibaipo were the backbone of China's new diplomacy.

These new foreign affairs agencies established by the CCP in the liberated areas during the Civil War represented the organizational foundation for the future regime's local foreign affairs. By the end of 1948, the CC CCP began to establish the Tianjin Foreign Affairs Agency and the Beijing Foreign Affairs Agency. As for the Beijing Foreign Agency, it took over the management of the Beijing office of KMT government's Information Bureau, the Representative Office of the KMT's

54 The People's Republic of China Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives, No. 122-00347-01, p. 3.

55 Kang Jimin, "Yan Baohang and the Diplomatic Etiquette of New China", *Bainianchao*, Vol. 11, 2010, pp. 51-56.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs Office and the Diplomatic Office of the local Beijing government. This Agency was named the Alien Affairs Office and took charge of all foreign-related matters in Beijing after its liberation. But it was just an executive body and it had to follow instructions from the CCP's division in Beijing and it had to report all major issues to the CC CCP. This office opened to the public on February 14, 1949, while in March the new regime, the People's Government of Beijing, decided that the Alien Affairs Office was directly led by the mayor of Beijing and it could establish its own policy-study agency.⁵⁶ With the gradual liberation of other cities, a lot of foreign affairs agencies were set up in the same way. The staff of these agencies consisted of former KMT diplomatic personnel and former members of the Central Foreign Affairs Group of the CCP. *The Directive on Diplomatic Affairs* issued in Xibaipo also specified the rules that on all levels foreign affairs agencies had to be established in the liberated areas and they had to follow these instructions: "Every city that has any alien residents has to set up the alien management office. This office will take charge of the registration, inquiring, and inspection of foreign nationals' living, communication and profession. It will also issue passports to aliens. Some special cities also have to set up foreign affairs offices. These offices will take charge of the affairs related to foreign nationals (such as factories, enterprises, banks, companies, shops, schools, hospitals, churches, organizations, newspapers, periodicals, news agencies, etc.). They will deal with registration, inspection and grant permission for these affairs".⁵⁷

The central diplomatic agency of the future regime was also established during the Xibaipo period. During their conversations with Mikoyan in the February of 1949, CCP's leaders also reported their plans on the establishment of new China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In Mikoyan's report to the CC CPSU we can see: "When I asked Zhou Enlai which party would be responsible for the future operation of the Foreign Ministry, he answered without hesitation that the Minister must be a member of the CCP. In addition, he believed that one deputy minister has to be a communist, while the other can be a non-party person".⁵⁸ The CCP leadership took the stand that, the new Chinese Foreign Ministry must follow the leadership of the party in its entirety. It also had to reject the old regulations of the KMT government and eliminate all KMT's personnel arrangements. This was the policy of "clean slate".

To conclude, the Xibaipo Period in the history of CCP represents a special and important transition period. CCP's foreign policy-related activities gradually evolved from party's external communication to national diplomacy. The CCP leaders carefully observed and analyzed the international situation and they made an important choice at the beginning of the Cold War. They chose to ally with the Soviet Union and suffer the consequences of confrontation with the United

56 Wang Erbao, "Construction of New China's Local Diplomatic System – Research on the Diplomatic Rules of Beijing", *Contemporary China History Studies*, Vol. 2, 2010, pp. 90–96.

57 *The Directive on Diplomatic Affairs*, January 19, 1949. The State Archives Administration of the People's Republic of China, *Collected Documents of The CPC Central Committee* (Vol. 18), Beijing: The Central Party School Press, 1992, p. 48.

58 "Mikoyan's conversation with Zhou Enlai and other CCP Leaders on Diplomatic Principles", February 1, 1949, АПРФ, ф. 39, оп. 1, д. 39, л. 17–24; *Русско-китайские отношения в XX веке*, Т. V, К. 2, с. 43–48.

States. In this period, the corresponding diplomatic principles and foreign policies gradually evolved. While many of the CCP's own diplomats had been gathered and trained in this small village, the foreign affairs institutions had been set up during the process of taking over the cities from the KMT government. All this activity laid a solid foundation for the future regime's diplomacy. Therefore, it can be said that the CCP's diplomatic activity in the Xibaipo Period in fact constituted the beginning of the People's Republic of China new diplomacy.

Резиме

Др Хе Јенђинг

Почетак кинеске дипломатије: Дипломатска активност кинеског комунистичког режима током сибаипо периода (мај 1948 – март 1949)

Кључне речи: сибаипо период, дипломатија Народне Републике Кине, кинеско-совјетски односи, кинеско-амерички односи

Сибаипо период у историји Комунистичке партије Кине је посебан и важан период. Активности КПК у односима са иностранством су се полако развијале, почевши од веза које је успостављала партија па све до развитка националне дипломатије. Почетком хладног рата вођство КПК је пажљиво пратило и анализирано међународну ситуацију и донело важну одлуку. Изабрали су савезништво са Совјетским Савезом и као последицу трпели конфронтацију са САД-ом. Током овог периода, одговарајући дипломатски принципи и спољна политика земље су се полако формирали. Док се већина дипломатског кадра КПК налазила у малом селу Сибаипо, институције спољне политике су осниване током процеса преузимања градова од владе Куоминтанга. Све ове активности биле су добра основа за будућу дипломатију режима КПК. Дакле, може се рећи да је дипломатска активност током сибаипо периода поставила основе нове кинеске дипломатије.

УДК 94(=112.2)(497.11)
323.15(=112.2)(497.11)
323.1(=163.41:=112.2)(497.113)

Zoran JANJE TOVIĆ, Ph. D.

THE ROLE OF THE DANUBE SWABIANS IN THE HISTORY OF THE SERBS: A HETERODOX VIEW*

Abstract: The paper deals with the overall influence of the Danube Swabians, i.e., the Vojvodina Germans on the Serbs and their history. It deals with modes of contact and their significance.

Key words: Serbs, Germans, Danube Swabians, Vojvodina, WWII

The Serbs and the Germans had never been neighbors in the real sense of the word, but throughout large part of history they had been in steady contact. Sometimes it was direct, although in those cases it did not involve larger numbers of the two peoples. However, the importance of these contacts always surpassed the sheer number of people actually making them. Thus for instance Saxon miners from Transylvania came to Serbia after 1240 and developed the mining industry that, according to some historians, was the main economic pillar of the medieval Serbian state, i.e. the branch of the economy that made possible the rise of the Nemanjić state. The Saxons brought along mining technology and expert terminology that survived long after the Saxon miners had disappeared. They also brought the make-up of autonomous towns modeled on towns in Germany. All these were important novelties in medieval Serbia and the agents who had introduced them were few in number. It is not known what eventually happened to these Saxon miners: maybe they were assimilated by the locals over time, or maybe they moved away before the Ottoman expansion.¹ To this day there are place-names in Serbia and Bosnia reminiscent of their fruitful stay. The influence of German mercenaries serving Serbian rulers (Czar Dušan for instance) was certainly much smaller, although a larger number of historical sources (that unfortunately are not very likely to emerge) would probably bring about new discoveries in that respect.²

* This article has been written within the framework of the scholarly project *Serbs and Serbia in the Yugoslav and International Context: Internal Development and Position within European/World Community* (№ 47027), financed by the Ministry of Education, Science and Technological Development Republic of Serbia.

1 Stojan Novaković, *Novo Brdo i Vranjsko Pomoravlje u istoriji srpskoj XIV i XV veka*, Godišnjica Nikole Čupića, III, 1879, pp. 280–294; Mihajlo J. Dinić, *Za istoriju rudarstva u srednjevekovnoj Srbiji i Bosni*, I, Beograd, 1955, pp. 1–27; Sima M. Ćirković, *Srbi među evropskim narodima*, Beograd, 2004, pp. 58–59; *Istorija srpskog naroda* (henceforth: ISN), I, Beograd, 1981, pp. 345–348, 369–371, 385–386, 471, 539.

2 Maybe it would be proven that some typical Western achievements came to Serbia (also) through foreign mercenaries. (ISN, I, p. 506; Zoran Konstantinović, *Deutsch-serbische Begegnungen*, Berlin 1997, p. 29)

After the fall of the medieval Serbian state, apart from occasional travelers, direct contacts with the Germans were probably reduced mostly to contacts with the Habsburg officers in the Military Border that was gradually set up since 16th century. The contact became more frequent during the Viennese War (1683–1699) and the Great Migration of the Serbs that took place in the course of the war (1689/90). The Viennese War that ended the 150-years long Ottoman rule was fateful for the middle Danube basin, but the Great Migration of the Serbs was even more fateful for the history of the Serbs.³ Although the Serbs had lived in the territory of Southern Hungary ever since they had come to this part of Europe,⁴ and although their number increased during 15th and 16th centuries,⁵ the importance of the Great Migration cannot be overestimated. It is not only that the number of the Serbs in Hungary increased.⁶ For the first time in history the Serbs were granted imperial privileges recognizing them, not as a historical people of the same rank as the Germans or the Hungarians, but at least as an organized entity that could rightfully demand certain rights and privileges to which completely “unhistorical” peoples of the Monarchy (such as the Romanians, Slovaks, Ruthenians etc.) could never aspire.⁷ These privileges enabled the Serbs to survive as an ethnic community throughout the subsequent centuries, despite the losses through assimilation, conversion to Roman-Catholicism and emigration. At the same time, the spread of the Habsburg power to Southern Hungary would enable the re-integration of these part into the Central European cultural sphere, whereas the economic development of the hereditary Austrian lands would eventually spill over to these parts. Thus, the part of the Serbian people that found themselves under the Habsburg rule were able to reconnect to the European civilization with which relations were severed by the Ottoman conquest in 15th century. It also enabled them to be integrated into an economy that albeit comparatively belatedly, started to modernize. Gradual economic and cultural rise of the Serbs in Southern Hungary would have

-
- 3 About it and its significance: Dušan J. Popović, *Velika seoba Srba*, Beograd, 1954; Idem, *Srbi u Vojvodini, I. Od najstarijih vremena do Karlovačkog mira 1699*, Novi Sad, 1990. (2nd ed.), pp. 328–335; Stefan Čakić, *Velika seoba Srba 1689/90. i patrijarh Arsenije III Crnojević*, Novi Sad, 1982; ISN, III/1, Beograd, 1993, pp. 506–553; Olga Zirojević, *Srbija pod turskom vlašću 1459–1804*, Beograd, 2007, pp. 169–190; Ćirković, pp. 148–152.
 - 4 Popović, *Srbi u Vojvodini, I*, pp. 37–43; ISN, I, pp. 122–123, 157; Yovan Radonitch, *Histoire des Serbes en Hongrie*, Paris, Barcelona, Dublin, 1919, pp. 6–14; Mita Klicin, *Kratka istorija srpskog Elzasa od VI–XX. veka*, Beograd, s. a., pp. 5–9; Aleksa Ivić, *Istorija Srba u Vojvodini (od najstarijih vremena do osnivanja Potisko-pomoriške granice (1703))*, Novi Sad, 1929, pp. 5–6.
 - 5 ISN, II, Beograd, 1982, pp. 248–267; 315–389, 413–490; Popović, *Srbi u Vojvodini, I*, pp. 74–109, 171–173, 205–213; Radonitch, pp. 30–81; Ivić, pp. 7–187; Klicin, pp. 10–17.
 - 6 During the Ottoman rule and immediately after it the Serbs even made up the majority of the population in the liberated territories. (Radonitch, pp. 81–85, 99; Klicin, pp. 20; Radivoj Simonović, *Etnografski pregled Vojvodine*, Novi Sad, 1924, p. 9; Gerhard Seewann, *Serbische Süd-Nord-Migrationen in Südosteuropa als Voraussetzung für die deutsche Ansiedlung im 18. Jahrhundert*, in: *A Kárpát-medence vonzásában*, Pécs, 2001, p. 429.)
 - 7 Čakić, pp. 214–222, 279–323; Popović, *Srbi u Vojvodini, I*, pp. 328–345; Ibid., II. *Od Karlovačkog mira 1699. do Temišvarskog sabora 1790*, pp. 55–57, 191–228; ISN, IV/1, Beograd, 1986, pp. 41–57; Dimitrije Đorđević, *Die Serben*, in: Adam Wandruszka, Peter Urbanitsch (eds), *Die Habsburger Monarchie 1848–1918*, III/1, Wien, 1980, pp. 734–774; Fran Zwitter, Jaroslav Šidak, Vaso Bogdanov, *Les problèmes nationaux dans la Monarchie des Habsbourg*, Belgrade, 1960, p. 29.

beneficial influence on the development of the main mass of the Serbian people living in Serbia in 19th century.

Two factors were decisive for the transfer of achievements of modern European civilization to the Serbs in Hungary. The first was that the Habsburg government as such, strove to introduce modernizing measures in that part of its territory – according to the contemporary conceptions, its abilities and needs. The other factor was the Danube Swabians who were at the same time, both the tool and the object of these modernizing measures.

The name *Danube Swabians* was created by geographers only in 1920s as a designation for descendants of German colonists of various ethnic backgrounds.⁸ The Serbs, as well as other peoples of the region, called them simply Swabians – as indeed they themselves referred to their ethnic group. Although their ethno genesis was completed only in 20th century, they had always been perceived as a whole by the Serbs and members of other peoples. Furthermore, among achievements of civilization, objects of material and spiritual culture, language influences and other novelties that the Serbs were encountering in their contacts with the Habsburg state and German colonists, the Serbs were often not able to differentiate between the influences stemming from the authorities and those coming from the Swabians themselves. They also could not distinguish between things that were genuinely Swabian (very conditionally speaking) and achievements that had been only transferred to the Serbs and other peoples through Swabian colonists' mediation.⁹

In this paper we will not deal with the things that the Serbs from Southern Hungary took over from their Swabian neighbors or vice versa,¹⁰ but rather with the role the Danube Swabians had played in the history of the Serbs – not only in Southern Hungary, but also in Slavonia, Bosnia and Serbia itself. We shall explore various kinds of influences and their importance, placing them whenever necessary into a broader context of Serbian-German relations.

On initial consideration it is clear that the Swabians were of much larger importance for the Serbs in Vojvodina, and the Serbs in general, than the Serbs for the Germans. Due to the difference in number, economic and cultural development this is no wonder: the Germans had always been an important factor for the Serbs, whereas vice versa held true only for exceptional, as a rule conflicting historical junctures, and even then not for long.

The settlement of German colonists in Southern Hungary was part of the Habsburg strategic policy of military and economic strengthening of the newly-

8 The name was coined by the Stuttgart geographer Hermann Rüdiger in 1922. in order to designate the Germans living in the territory of the historic Kingdom of Hungary who were not Transylvanian Saxons. (Cf. Leidenweg der Deutschen im kommunistischen Jugoslawien, II. Erlebnisberichte über die Verbrechen an den Deutschen durch das Tito-Regime in der Zeit von 1944–1948, München, Sindelfingen, 1993, p. 16.)

9 Cf. Zoran Janjetović, Gegenseitige Kultureinflüsse zwischen Serben und Donauschwaben in der Vojvodina, Jahrbuch für deutsche und osteuropäische Volkskunde, 50, 2008/2009, pp. 103–133.

10 More about that and about the things the Swabians took over from the Serbs in: Janjetović, Gegenseitige Kultureinflüsse; Idem, Srpski uticaj na svakodnevnu kulturu Nemaca u Vojvodini, Godišnjak za društvenu istoriju, XVI, 2, 2009, pp. 19–32; Idem, Neprolazna svakodnevica: Nemački doprinos narodnoj kulturi Vojvodine, Tokovi istorije, 3–4, 2008, pp. 214–223; Zlatoje Martinov, Nemački uticaj na ishranu Srba u Banatu, Pančevo, 2004. (2nd ed.); Nives Rittig-Beljak, Švapski kulinarij – dodir tradicija u Hrvatskoj, Zagreb, 2002.

acquired territories. The colonization of the Germans was motivated above all by economic reasons: German peasants were obedient, hard-working, comparatively modern in their working methods and Roman-Catholics (which was up to 1780 one of the primary conditions of eligibility).¹¹ As such it influenced the political and ethnic make-up of the region in the long run. At first it damaged the existing economic structure and the way of life, particularly of the Serbian population that was the most numerous after the end of the Ottoman rule. After the collapse of the medieval Serbian state, the Serbian population turned to a large extent from agriculture to cattle-breeding that offered better surviving possibilities under Ottoman rule.¹² It made possible speedy withdrawal before the approaching Ottoman armies or punitive expeditions, crossing from the Turkish to Habsburg territory and vice versa, quick acquisition of livelihood by robbing cattle belonging to other clans and tribes, migration to more fertile, friendlier and safer areas etc. Cattle-raising was thus the most convenient form of economy for a population that was constantly forced to move.¹³ This economic model was transplanted to Southern Hungary too, and after the Great Migration of the Serbs in 1690 it became the dominant mode of economic life in that region: the Ottoman power disappeared together with substantial portion of the population, the new authorities had not yet consolidated and the land was still not returned to the old, or given to new private owners. As the situation in the newly-liberated areas started to normalize, i.e. when the social and economic regime similar to the one in other Habsburg lands started to be established, the semi-nomadic and cattle-breeding way of life of the Serbs became increasingly threatened.¹⁴

Colonization of peasants of different ethnic background was the main means the authorities and landowners employed in order to increase the number of inhabitants, and consequently, revenues from the newly acquired areas. However, this also proved to be the main means for the destruction of the Serbian way of life, while the German colonists were the main proponents of the new, predominantly land-tilling way of life. This coupled with the obligation to till the land and build houses for the newcomers and to pay taxes, from which the colonists were exempted for a while, spurred the Serbs to attack the colonists

11 Seewann, pp. 421–442; Oskar Feldtänzer, Georg Wildmann, *Donauschwäbische Geschichte*, I. Das Jahrhundert der Ansiedlung 1689–1805, München, 2006; Márta Fata, *Einwanderung und Ansiedlung der Deutschen (1686–1790)*, Günter Schödl (ed.), *Deutsche Geschichte im Osten Europas. Land an der Donau*, Berlin, 1995, pp. 90–196; Konrad Schünemann, *Österreichs Bevölkerungspolitik unter Maria Theresia*, I, München, 1935; Sonja Jordan, *Die kaiserliche Wirtschaftspolitik im Banat im 18. Jahrhundert*, München, 1967; Imre Wellmann, *Die erste Epoche der Neubesiedlung Ungarns nach der Türkenzeit (1711–1761)*, *Acta historica*, XXVI, 1980, pp. 241–304. The Serbs, on the other hand, being tough border soldiers, were settled primarily for military reasons.

12 In some South Slav dialects cattle is still called „blago“ i.e. „treasure“.

13 Jovan Cvijić, *Balkansko poluostrvo i južnoslovenske zemlje. Osnovi antropogeografije*, Beograd, 1966, pp. 128–156; Seewann, p. 421; Ćirković, p. 124; Radonitch, p. 99.

14 This does not mean the Serbs did not engage in land-tilling. On the contrary: it was the activity they engaged in ever since their settlement in the Balkans, but under the changed conditions it became only a subsidiary branch of the economy. In the Balkan mountains where a large part of the population sought refuge before the Ottoman invasion, it could not have developed much anyway due to the characteristics of the soil.

on several occasions.¹⁵ Contrary to the claims of some Serbian nationalists, the aim was not to destroy the compact Serbian settlement:¹⁶ it never existed due to the small number of Serbs and presence of members of other nationalities on the territory as a whole, and the colonization was implemented for economic reasons.¹⁷ It was organized by secular and ecclesiastical authorities, as well as by numerous private landowners who needed the labor force. The colonists themselves had little say in the choice of the place they were going to colonize, the way of their colonization, the way houses and villages were built, or the way land was tilled: in most cases all these things were decided by the authorities. However, it was the settlers who turned the orders of the authorities into practice. Thus, the rage of the Serbs who were hit by the change of the economic structure, impounding of pastures and fields (and sometimes even of houses) and destruction of their way of life was directed at the Swabians and not at the authorities who were behind them.¹⁸ On the one hand, the authorities were less visible, and on the other, stronger than the colonist families.

Afterwards, some Serbian authors tended to see only the bad consequences of the colonization for the Serbs – in the first place the facts that the Serbs had lost land and that their share in the overall population was constantly declining. Some of them overlooked not only the fact that large Serbian landowners also colonized peasants of other nationalities, including the Germans, but also that due to their spendthrift habits the Serbs themselves were to blame for losing land to the more diligent and thriftier Swabians later on.¹⁹ Some of them also overlooked the large importance of German colonization for cultivation of Southern Hungary and her

-
- 15 Seewann, pp. 433, 436. By far not all German were colonist farmers. There was a considerable number of war veterans, artisans, advenutrers and some deported convicts among them, especially in the begining. Contrary to the claims of some anti-German authors, the last mentioned were never very numerous, and most of them used the first opportunity to return to their Austrian homeland. (Cf. Schünemann, pp. 76–88; Wellmann, pp. 268)
 - 16 This view influenced a part of scholarly writings. (Klicin, p. 21; Toša Iskruljev, *O Vojvodini i njenoj kolonizaciji*, Novi Sad, 1925, pp. 11, 28; Mirko Mitrović, *Naseljavanje i kolonizacija Vojvodine 1690–1945*, *Godišnjak Društva istoričara SAP Vojvodine*, 1984, p. 202; ISN, IV/1, p. 214; Branislav Bukurov, *Naselja u južnom Banatu*, *Zbornik Matice srpske za prirodne nauke*, 39, 1970, p. 30; Vera Milutinović, *Nemci u Vojvodini*, *Etnološki pregled*, 4, 1962, p. 36) The first two authors here quoted should be seen as quite nationalistic.
 - 17 It is impossible to say what the Habsburg policy would have been had the number of Serbs and the density of their settlement been much larger.
 - 18 Erik Roth, *Die planmäßig angelegte Siedlung im Deutsch-Banater Militärbezirk 1765–1831*, München, 1988, pp. 45, 51; Felix Milleker, *Geschichte der Banater Militärgrenze 1764–1873*, Pančevo, 1925, pp. 41–42; Idem, *Die Besiedlung der Banater Militärgrenze*, Bela Crkva, 1926, p. 5; Borislav Jankulov, *Pregled kolonizacije Vojvodine u XVIII i XIX veku*, Novi Sad, 1961, pp. 26–27, 30, 34.
 - 19 Gavrilović, p. 15; Idem, *Privredne i društvene prilike u Indiji 1746–1849*, *Godišnjak Filozofskog fakulteta u Novom Sadu*, 6, 1961, p. 157; ISN, IV/1, p. 214; Radoslav Marković, *Pravoslavna srpska parohija u Indiji krajem 1900. godine*, Indija, 1997, (reprint), p. 22; Vasilije Kolaković, *Naselje Ovča*, *Godišnjak grada Beograda*, VII, 1960, p. 122; C. A. Macartney, *Hungary and Her Successors. The Treaty of Trianon and its Consequences 1919–1937*, London, New York, Toronto, 1937, p. 34. The nationalist Iskruljev also realized the reasons why the Serbs had lost land in favor of the Germans. (Cf. Toša Iskruljev, *Raspeće srpskog naroda u Sremu 1914. godine i Madžari. Sa madžarske granice. Bajski trokut*. Sent Andreja, Novi Sad, 1936, pp. 306–309, 327)

economic development.²⁰ They did as nationalists usually do: they saw only one side of the coin. They wanted Vojvodina²¹ (i.e. former Southern Hungary) to be predominantly Serbian and at the same time to remain the best developed territory inhabited by the Serbs. Once the ethnic predominance was finally achieved after WWII, it would happen at the expense of an economic and cultural decline, as will be shown briefly.

Having come to (predominantly) Serbian environment in Bacska, Baranya²² and Western Banat, the ancestors of the Danube Swabians brought a completely new element into Serbian history. Not only ethnic, but above all cultural. Throughout their history in the Balkans, the Serbs got used to living in contact with other peoples. However, these peoples were mostly (often despite religious differences) either ethnically related to them (the Croats, Bulgarians, Ragusans), or belonged more or less to the same Balkan-Ottoman-Oriental cultural sphere. In other words, they were different, but not completely alien.²³ The Hungarians with whom the Serbs had been living together under Ottoman rule and partly already since the Middle Ages, and particularly the Romanians who were also Orthodox and predominantly mountain shepherds, did not differ from the Serbs in customs, way of life and culture as much as the German colonists of various ethnic backgrounds who were truly foreign. To make matters worse, in language, religion, customs and other characteristics, they were akin to representatives of the unloved Habsburg authorities. In contact with them the Serbs of Southern Hungary had to learn how to live beside someone who was completely different. This is the lesson human beings, in general, have difficulty mastering. During two odd centuries of life in the neighborhood of the Swabians, the Serbs learned to respect them, to live peacefully with them and to cooperate with them occasionally, but it seems real intimacy between members of the two peoples never developed. Reasons for great differences still existed but in the second half of 19th century they were no longer so much in the way of life, but rather in interests and mentality.²⁴

20 Unlike some other authors Slavko Gavrilović even claims South Hungary was economically the best developed part of Hungary in 1848. (Slavko Gavrilović, *Srem, Banat i Bačka od kraja XVIII do sredine XIX veka*, Zbornik za istoriju, 6, 1972, p. 17.) On the other hand, some Danube Swabian authors overstressed the importance of Swabian colonists, disregarding numerous measures taken by the authorities and landowners, as well as the contribution of other ethnic groups to the economic development of Hungary.

21 The notion of Vojvodina changed its meaning over time. Conceived as an autonomous Serbian territory in Southern Hungary, Vojvodina was established briefly for the first time after the revolution of 1848/49. Even then it existed more on paper than in reality. Later on it became synonymous with the Bacska, the Banat and Baranya (especially their parts that became part of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes after 1918). After WWII the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina comprized Eastern Syrmium, Bacska and the Yugoslav part of the Banat, but no longer the Yugoslav part of Baranya. (Cf. Edgar Hösch, Karl Nehring, Holm Sundhaussen (eds.), *Lexikon zur Geschichte Südosteuropas*, Wien, Köln, Weimar, 2004, pp. 733–734) We shall deal mostly with the territory of Vojvodina as defined after 1945.

22 Considerable number of Serbs also lived in Baranya in early 18th century, as well as in parts of Banat that do not belong to the present-day Republic of Serbia.

23 A number of features that laymen consider typically „Serbian“ (such as numerous dishes, music, costume, words etc.) are in fact of Oriental, Arabic and Persian origin and were brought to Serbia by the Ottomans.

24 It is interesting to note that the relations of the Serbs with the Magyars have always been more emotional: when they were bad, it led to great bloodsheds, and when they

The Danube Swabians came to Hungary propelled by natural human desire to achieve a better living. After many decades and several generations most of them managed to secure a comparatively decent living. Realizing that the German way of production was more profitable, members of other ethnic groups, including the Serbs, have adopted it. However, the differences in mentality that still exist to a large extent remained: whereas the Germans are mostly practical, realistic materialists, the Serbs are mostly temperamental and often national idealists. The Serbs adopted the German way of tilling land, German dress, cuisine etc., but in most cases not the German thriftiness and sobriety.²⁵ These characteristics enabled the Swabians to enlarge their landownership at the expense of the Serbs and members of other ethnic groups. Thus the difference in mentality led to a difference in economic interests. When available arable land became scarce in Bacska and Banat in the second half of 19th century, parts of the Swabians started emigrating to Syrmium and Slavonia. There they were able to buy much larger plots of land than in Southern Hungary for the same amount of money. The ones who sold the land were the Serbs and the Croats who were pauperized due to improvident living, spread of capitalism and break-up of large family communities after the Military Border had been disbanded. Differences of mentality combined with these factors led to animosity here too: in a way, the Swabian newcomers, together with the Jews, were the symbol of the evils of modernization with which the patriarchal Serbian (and Croatian) society could not cope.²⁶ Similar situation, although on smaller scale, reoccurred in Bosnia after 1878 where a smaller number

were good to much greater intimacy. It was recorded during the inter-war period that the Serbs and the Hungarians addressed each other as „brother“, whereas they addressed the Germans only as „neighbor“. (Cf. Zoran Janjetović, *Deca careva, pastorčad kraljeva. Nacionalne manjine u Jugoslaviji 1918–1941*, Beograd 2005, p. 90.) On the Swabian mentality cf. Zoran Janjetović, *Duhovni profil vojvodanskih Švaba, Tokovi istorije*, 1–2, Beograd, 2000, pp. 55–67.

- 25 Marković, *Pravoslavna srpska parohija*, passim; Idem, *O raskošu (modi) i ostalim štetnim običajima i navikama našim*, Zagreb 1905; Idem, *Sadašnje stanje naše agrarne privrede (prilog k temi da li naš narod propada)*, *Letopis Matice srpske*, 286, 1912, pp. 46, 50; Popović, *Srbi u Vojvodini*, II, pp. 33–34; Mariann Nagy, *Nineteenth Century Hungarian Authors on Hungary's Ethnic Minorities*, László Kontler (ed.), *Pride and Prejudice. National Stereotypes in 19th and 20th Century Europe East to West*, Budapest, 1995, pp. 42–43; Leonhard Böhm, *Geschichte des Temeser Banats*, I, Leipzig, 1861, pp. 214–215; *Ibid*, II, pp. 205–211, 217; Paul Hunfalvy, *Ethnographie von Ungarn*, Budapest, 1877.
- 26 Milan Šenoa, *Doseljavanje tudinaca u Srijem*, Rad JAZU, knj. 201, reazred historičko filološki i filozofičko juridički, 1914, pp. 1–13; Valentin Oberkersch, *Die Deutschen in Syrmien, Slawonien und Kroatien bis zum Ende des Ersten Weltkrieges*, Stuttgart, 1972, pp. 22–41; Hermann Haller, *Die Entstehung der deutschen Tochttersiedlungen in Syrmien*, *Der Auslanddeutsche*, XX, 4, 1937; Georg Wild, *Deutsche Siedelungen in Syrmien, Slawonien und Bosnien*, *Südostdeutsches Archiv*, XIV, 1971; Holm Sundhussen, *Die Deutschen in Kroatien-Slawonien und Jugoslawien*, Schödl (ed.), pp. 309–314; E. Meynen (ed.), *Das Deutschtum in Slawonien und Syrmien. Landes- und Volkskunde*, Leipzig 1942. The relations between the Germans and the Croats was made easier thanks to the common Roman-Catholic church that also made assimilation of the Germans with the Croats easier. In the case of the Serbs the difference in religion was yet another insurmountable obstacle. (Carl Bethke, *Deutsche und ungarische Minderheiten in Kroatien und der Vojvodina 1918–1941. Identitätsenwürfe und ethnopolitische Mobilisierung*, Wiesbaden, 2009, pp. 106–114)

of the Vojvodina Germans sought fortune.²⁷ In Syrmium and Slavonia those Serbian and Croatian circles that sought cooperation on the grounds of ethnic similarity and opposition to the Hungarians were additionally pushed together by immigration of German and other foreign peasants. Thus, the Danube Swabians also made a small but direct contribution to the development of the Yugoslav idea that – as every national idea – needed a real or imagined foe in order to close ranks of its adherents.²⁸

This, however, was just one of the roles the Vojvodina Germans played in Serbian history. The Danube Swabians from South Hungary were, together with their Serbian fellow-countrymen, important agents of modernization in liberated Serbia after 1830s. There were no peasants among them, but there were many artisans (particularly those making new, modern handicrafts), workers and innkeepers.²⁹ Together with members of other nationalities, penetration of foreign capital, importation of goods, education of large number of local young men at German and Austrian universities, they became a factor of Serbia's modernization in 19th and early 20th centuries.³⁰ Surly, it would be impossible to separate their influence from that of other factors.

However, what is obvious is a comparatively slow and incomplete modernization of the Serbian society. It comprised towns in the first place (particularly Belgrade) and especially upper classes.³¹ Huge masses of peasantry remained for a long time illiterate, badly connected with domestic and international market, devoted to old customs and way of life. For them the adjective "Swabian" (meaning "German") continued to signify everything that was foreign and alien. Because a common man more often experienced the bad than the good sides of modernization, the "Swabian" influence was also perceived more as bad than as good, and a "Swabian" – even if he was a Vojvodina German who spoke perfect Serbian, and even if his achievements deserved respect – remained the paragon

27 More than one half of colonists belonged to other nationalities there and the share of the Vojvodina Swabians was quite small. Colonization of those territories was partly state-sponsored, which, among other things, made the colonists particularly unpopular with the local nationalists. Despite that, difficult living conditions in several places brought German colonists and local Serbian peasants closer. It seems the Serbs got along better with the Protestants. (Tomislav Kraljačić, *Kolonizacija stranih seljaka u Bosnu i Hercegovinu za vrijeme austrougarske uprave*, Istorijski časopis, knj. XXXVI, 1989; Ferdo Hauptmann, *Regulisanje zemljišnog posijeda u Bosni i Hercegovini i počeci naseljavanja stranih seljaka u doba austrougarske vladavine*, Godišnjak Društva istoričara Bosne i Hercegovine, XVI, 1965; Dušan Drljača, *Kolonizacija i život Poljaka u jugoslovenskim zemljama. Od kraja XIX do polovine XX veka*, Beograd, 1985; Hans Maier, *Deutsche Siedlungen in Bosnien*, Stuttgart, 1924; J. Heimfelsen, *Die deutschen Kolonien in Bosnien*, Wien 1911; Fritz Hoffmann, Josef Zorn (ed.), *Franz-Josefsfeld – Schönborn. Geschichte einer deutschen Gemeinde in Bosnien*, Freilassing 1963)

28 Ернст Гелнер, *Нациите и национализмот*, Скопје, 2001, pp. 85–92.

29 ISN, VI/1, Beograd 1983, pp. 10–31; Christian Brücker, *Deutsche Spuren in Belgrad*, Belgrad, 1944.

30 As a representative (to be sure, way above the average!) of those enterprising Swabians one can mention Đorđe Vajfert (Georg Weifert), entrepreneur, industrialist, business-man and patron of arts who ended his career as governor of the National Bank of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. (Saša Ilić, Sonja Jerković, Vladimir Bulajić, Đorđe Vajfert, *Vizionar i pregalac. Lična i poslovna ilustrovana biografija (1850–1937)*, Beograd, 2010)

31 Marie Janin Calic, *Sozialgeschichte Serbiens 1815–1941. Der aufhaltsame Fortschritt während der Industrialisierung*, München, 1994.

of otherness, invoking considerable amount of negative sentiments. Furthermore, the Vojvodina Serbs who came to Serbia to make careers as teachers, professors, doctors and civil servants were also included into this stereotype. They were often equated with the Germans and derogatory called "the Swabians".³² Probably it was this unwilling respect before the achievements of others, certainly combined with other factors (the main being Austro-Hungarian policy towards Serbia and the position of Serbs within the Monarchy) that bred the feeling of insecurity or even threat. For the Serbs in Vojvodina and in Slavonia it was complemented by the undisputed fact that the Danube Swabians presented dangerous economic competition. Furthermore, because of the propensity of a large number of wealthier and better educated Swabians to become Magyarized for purposes of social climbing, and because of open sympathies of the unassimilated Swabians for the Hungarians and the Hungarian state idea, nationally conscious Serbs in the Habsburg Monarchy tended to see the Swabians the "auxiliaries" of the otherwise insufficiently numerous Magyars.³³

The creation of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in the fall of 1918 forced the Serbian elites to change their attitude towards the Germans in Vojvodina. They were no longer perceived as a mainstay of foreign power, but they still had not become the pillar of the Yugoslav one. They were yet to be won over to the new state and its leading people, the Serbs.³⁴ This held true especially for the interregnum – from the Belgrade armistice of November 13, 1918 until the signing of the Trianon Peace Treaty on June 20, 1920 that definitively allocated Vojvodina to the Kingdom of the SCS. During the first couple of years it seemed that the Germans (at least those in Vojvodina) would be treated better than other national minorities.³⁵ Soon it turned out that that it would be impossible. There were several hurdles: the Germans could not be given (much) more than other minorities because these would demand the same (particularly the Hungarians and the Albanians who, due to their irredentist tendencies, were viewed as particularly irksome). Serbian politicians and "national workers" were not able to overcome

32 Petar Krestić, „Švabe ili Nemačkari“, Zbornik Matice srpske za istoriju, 49, 1994, pp. 31–43; ISN, VI/1, Beograd 1983, pp. 10–31; Andrej Mitrović, *Srbi o Nemcima. Jedno „viđenje drugog“* stvoreno istorijom, Milorad Sofronijević, Miodrag Maksimović (eds), *Srbi o Nemcima*, Beograd, 1996, pp. 11–16.

33 On Magyarization of the Germans in Hungary cf. Johann Weidlein, *Madjarisierung der Deutschen in Ungarn*, Schorndorf, 1955; Ingomar Senz, *Donauschwäbische Geschichte. Wirtschaftliche Autarchie und politische Entfremdung 1806–1918*, München, 1997, pp. 191–224, 287–314, 353–358; Idem, *Die nationale Bewegung der ungarländischen Deutschen vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg*, München, 1977, pp. 16–30.

34 During the last few decades of the existence of Austria-Hungary there were several sporadic attempts at cooperation between Serbian politicians in Vojvodina and nationally conscious leaders of the Danube Swabians. (Senz, *Die nationale Bewegung*, pp. 185, 245–247; Arpad Lebl, *Građanske partije u Vojvodini 1887–1918*, Novi Sad, 1979, pp. 88, 118) The problem was that the large majority of the Swabians was under strong Hungarian cultural and political influence, and part of them had already been assimilated into Magyars.

35 Janjetović, *Deca careva*, pp. 128–130, 228–229, 292–293; Toma Milenković, *Banatska republika i mađarski komesarijat u Banatu* (21. oktobar 1918–20. februar 1919), Zbornik Matice srpske za istoriju, 32, 1985, p. 136; Andrea Schmidt-Rösler, *Rumänien nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg: Die Grenzziehung in der Dobrudscha und im Banat und die Friedensprobleme*, Frankfurt, 1994, pp. 210, 254.

their own nationalism. They believed that Vojvodina could be “nationalized” mostly by the same methods the Hungarian authorities had been using with mean results for decades: schools, imposition of the official language, economic discrimination, colonization of their own co-nationals.³⁶ Furthermore, because of Croatian and particularly Slovenian partners in power,³⁷ the German minority (that for the greatest part lived intermixed with the Serbs) could not be treated more magnanimously. Therefore, the Swabians became part of what the leftists called „the unsolved national question“. Unfortunately the scope and importance of that matter did not make the Serbian elites realize the need for improving the treatment of members of other nationalities.³⁸ Certain privileges that the German minority (mostly in Vojvodina) was granted in 1930s³⁹ were but a comparatively small concession that came too late. What was most important, they were given for reasons of foreign policy. As such they did not have the inherent possibility of changing the way of thinking of the Serbian leading circles.⁴⁰

The national coming of age of the Vojvodina and Slavonian Swabians took place simultaneously with Nazi accession to power in Germany and this would have tragic consequences for the fate of the Yugoslav Germans. Due to unsatisfactory position of the German minority and the propaganda from the

36 Zoran Janjertović, *Nacionalne manjine u očima srpske elite 1918–1941, Srbi i Jugoslavija. Država, društvo, politika*, Beograd, 2007, pp. 118–143.

37 After the historical table turning in 1918 nationally conscious part of Slovenian intelligentsia continued with severe measures the struggle against the local Germans that had been going on ever since mid-19th century. (Arnold Suppan, *Zur Lage der Deutschen in Slowenien zwischen 1918–1938*, in: Idem, Helmut Rumpler (eds), *Geschichte der Deutschen im Bereich des heutigen Slowenien 1848–1941*, Wien, München, 1988; Martin Wutte, Oskar Lobmeyr, *Die Lage der Minderheiten in Kärnten und in Slowenien*, Klagenfurt, 1926; Stefan Karner, *Die deutschsprachige Volksgruppe in Slowenien*, Klagenfurt, Ljubljana, Wien, 1997, pp. 21–46) In Croatia, where the Swabians were less numerous than in Vojvodina, and scattered, creeping assimilation was taking place. The Croatian elites did not want to interrupt it by granting national concessions. (Bethke, pp. 312–323; Vladimir Geiger, *Nijemci u Đakovu i Đakovštini*, Zagreb, 2001, pp. 116–125)

38 It is only fair to state that the Serbs could hardly find (in history or in the then Europe) a model of magnanimous solution of the minority question. With the sole exception of Estonia and partly of Czechoslovakia, blind nationalism of the majority nation and its impatient imposition on the rest of the population were the rule both in the second half of 19th century and during the inter-war period. They were also the norm in treatment of Yugoslav national minorities in neighboring countries. This certainly did not encourage a more liberal treatment of minorities in Yugoslavia, especially since in most cases the neighboring countries were the nation-states of peoples living as minorities in Yugoslavia. (Cf. Ewald Ammende (ed.), *Nationalitäten in Staaten Europas. Sammlung von Lageberichte*, Wien, Leipzig, 1931; Janjertović, *Deca careva*, pp. 407–435)

39 The concessions concerned primarily education and partly organization of associations. The government made these concessions with the aim of improving relations with Germany. Furthermore, due to the opposition of the Croatian and Slovenian elites, they were implemented mostly in Vojvodina. (Janjertović, *Deca careva*, pp. 251–254; Josef Volkmar Senz, *Das Schulwesen der Donauschwaben in Jugoslawien*, München, 1969, pp. 91–100; *Das Schicksal der Deutschen in Jugoslawien*, Augsburg, 1995, p. 26E; Biljana Šimunović-Bešlin, *Prosvetna politika u Dunavskoj banovini (1929–1941)*, Novi Sad, 2007, pp. 274–275, 279–283, 298–302) On the foreign-policy background cf. Hans-Paul Höpfner, *Deutsche Südosteuropapolitik in der Weimarer Republik*, Frankfurt/M, Bonn, 1983, pp. 320 ff.

40 Quite little is known about views of „ordinary“ Serbs toward their Swabian neighbors. Judging by the Danube Swabian „homeland-books“ peaceful coexistence prevailed on the local level.

Reich,⁴¹ larger part of them supported actively or passively Hitler's Germany in WWII.⁴² The 7th SS-Division "Prinz Eugen" was largely composed of the German minority, especially the Banat Swabians. "It is remembered by the Serbian and other Yugoslav inhabitants of Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Dalmatia for the bloody war-crimes it committed."⁴³ Above all, the massacres of the division would be used after WWII by the communist regime as an excuse for the cruel treatment of the members of the German national minority.

This unit, however, was not the only one to commit crimes against the civilian population. They were also committed by other German, and non-German units.⁴⁴ Why then did this particular one become so infamous? The reasons are to be found not only in its crimes – that were nothing unusual in those days – but rather in the fact that it was stronger and more dangerous than other German units

-
- 41 Such propaganda and its influence are often described as nazification. It was more noticable in appearance than in the real adoption of tenets of nazi ideology from which individuals took what suited their own personal tastes best. More susceptible to influences from the Reich were the younger and poorer members of the German minority, as well as the Protestants. (Dušan Biber, *Nacizem in Nemci v Jugoslaviji 1933–1941*, Ljubljana, 1966; Zoran Janjetović, *O nacifikaciji vojvođanskih Švaba, Tokovi istorije*, 1–4, Beograd 1999, pp. 240–260; Idem, *Die Donauschwaben in der Vojvodina und der Nationalsozialismus*, in: Mariana Hausleitner, Harald Roth (eds), *Der Einfluss von Faschismus und Nationalsozialismus auf Minderheiten Ostmittel- und Südosteuropa*, München, 2006, pp. 219–235; Josip Mirnić, *Nemci u Bačkoj u Drugom svetskom ratu*, Novi Sad, 1974, pp. 36–74)
- 42 Petar Kačavenda, *Nemci u Jugoslaviji 1918–1945*, Beograd, 1991, pp. 21–163; Mirnić, pp. 74–332; Branislav Popov Miša, *Nemački zatvori i koncentracioni logori u Banatu 1941–1944. godine*, Beograd, 1992, p. 109; Akiko Shimizu, *Die deutsche Okkupation des serbischen Banats 1941–1944 unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der deutschen Volksgruppe in Jugoslawien*, Münster, 2003; Ljubica Šijački, *Teror i pljačka okupatora u Banatu 1941–1945. godine, Istraživanja*, 7, 1979; Sandor Vegh, *Le système de pouvoir d'occupation allemand dans le Banat yougoslave 1941–1944*, in: *Les systèmes d'occupation en Yougoslavie 1941–1945*, Belgrade, 1963; Ekkehard Völkl, *Der Westbanat 1941–1944. Die deutsche, die ungarische und andere Volksgruppen*, München, 1991; Z. Krnić, S. Ljubljanović, C. Tomljanović, *Neki podaci o organizaciji i radu Njemačke narodne skupine u NDH*, *Zbornik Historijskog instituta Slavonije*, 1, 1963; Antun Miletić, *The Volksdeutschers of Bosnia, Slavonia and Srem Regions in the Struggle against the People's Liberation Movement, The Third Reich and Yugoslavia 1933–1945*, Belgrade, 1977, pp. 559–603; Zdravko Krnić, *The German Volksgruppe in the Independent State of Croatia as an Instrument of German Occupation Policy in Yugoslavia, The Third Reich*, pp. 604–621; Josip Mirnić, *The Enlistment of Volksdeutschers from the Bačka Region in the Waffen SS, The Third Reich*, pp. 622–653; Thomas Casagrande, *Die Volksdeutsche SS-Division „Prinz Eugen“*. Die Banater Schwaben und nationalsozialistischen Kriegsverbrechen, Frankfurt, 2003; *Das Schicksal der Deutschen*, pp. 45E–75E.
- 43 Casagrande, pp. 228–297; Nikica Barić, *Ustaše na Jadranu. Uprava Nezavisne Države Hrvatske u jadranskoj Hrvatskoj nakon kapitulacije Kraljevine Italije*, Zagreb, 2012, pp. 348–358.
- 44 Although on the whole the crimes of the „Prinz Eugen“ Division were by no means negligible, they were no more gross as those of other German divisions (342nd, 704th, 714th, 717th, 113th) that quenched the uprising in Serbia in 1941. (Cf. Venceslav Glišić, *Teror i zločini nacističke Nemačke u Srbiji 1941–1944*, Beograd, 1970, pp. 41–80; Jovan Marjanović (ed.), *Srbija u ratu i revoluciji 1941–1945*, Beograd, 1976, passim; Jovan Marjanović, *Ustanak i narodnooslobodilački pokret u Srbiji 1941*, Beograd, [1963], pp. 120–128, 249–253, 377–390; Valter Manošek, *Holokaust u Srbiji. Vojna okupaciona politika i uništavanje Jevreja 1941–1942*, Beograd, 2007, pp. 56–61, 64–114) As opposed to 20–34.000 of military and civilian victims of the above mentioned divisions in 1941, the „Prinz Eugen“ Division killed less than 1.000 people during its stay in Serbia in 1942. (Cf. Kosta Nikolić, *Strah i nada u Srbiji 1941–1944. Svakodnevni život pod okupacijom*, Beograd, 2002, pp. 73, 79; Glišić, p. 79.)

operating in the Yugoslav territory. This was so because unlike the occupational German divisions, it had the normal strength and large number of its members who were not middle-aged reservists as were the soldiers of the occupation divisions from the Reich. Furthermore, it was comprised of people who knew the language and the mentality of the people they were fighting, and partly the territory too. Apart from that, they felt the need to prove themselves as real Germans before their officers from the Reich who looked down on them.⁴⁵ For these reasons they were probably the most dangerous of the numerous partisans' foes. Combined with other acts of collaboration this made it possible to brand the whole German minority as traitors. For the multi-ethnic communist authorities after the war this fact would play a two-fold role.

On the one hand, the behavior of the *Volksdeutsche* during the war (it did not differ from the other national minorities' pursuit of egoistic national interests or the pursuit of national interest of the majority peoples) served as an excuse for their elimination as an ethnic group.⁴⁶ In that way the new authorities laid their hands on numerous houses and huge tracts of land that were used for rewarding partisan veterans and their families. This was the means of binding a large number of new colonists to the new regime, but it also caused a considerable shortfall in agrarian production due to division of farms and colonization of people who had previously lived in mountainous areas and were unskilled in agriculture.⁴⁷ To be sure, that was also the way to solve one of the most burning social problems of the pre-war Yugoslavia: that of agrarian overpopulation and poverty in economically underdeveloped parts of the country.⁴⁸ On the other hand, in order to justify their cruel treatment of the Germans, the communist painted a completely black picture of the former German minority in public (including historiography).⁴⁹ Allegedly

45 More about it: Casagrande, pp. 187–298.

46 Das Schicksal der Deutschen, pp. 90E–119E, 180E–264E, 197–521, 589–633; Zoran Janjetović, Between Hitler and Tito. The Disappearance of the Vojvodina Germans, Belgrade, 2005, (2nd ed.), pp. 191–301; Michael Portmann, Die kommunistische Revolution in der Vojvodina 1944–1952. Politik, Gesellschaft, Wirtschaft, Kultur, Wien, 2008, pp. 228–267; Vladimir Geiger, Nestanak Folksdojčera, Zagreb 1997; Idem, Pisma iz Krndije, Zagreb, 1994; Idem, Radni logor Valpovo 1945–1946, Osijek, 1998; Idem, Nijemci u Đakovu i Đakovštini, Zagreb, 2001, pp. 171–188; Idem, Ivan Jurković, Što se dogodilo s Folksdojčerima, Zagreb, 1993; Leidensweg der Deutschen im kommunistischen Jugoslawien. Verbrechen an den Deutschen durch das Tito-Regime in der Zeit von 1944–1948, I–IV, Sindelfingen, München, 1991–1994.

47 Nikola Gaćeša, Agrarna reforma u Jugoslaviji 1945–1948, Novi Sad, 1984; Idem, Agrarna reforma u Jugoslaviji (1919–1948), in: Idem, Radovi iz agrarne istorije i demografije, Novi Sad, 1995, pp. 184–195; Portmann, pp. 305–326.

48 German colonization in 18th century helped alleviate the problem of agrarian overpopulation in South-West Germany of the time. Both the Habsburg and the Communist colonizations were basically state-run projects, but the latter was more so. The main difference lies in the fact that the Germans and members of other nationalities were settled into a sparsely inhabited territory where the colonists had to build the infrastructure and move the economy, whereas the colonists after WWII settled in one of the best developed parts of the country. Both Habsburg and Communist authorities achieved their goals by bringing loyal settlers to the area: the Habsburgs political and economic, and the Communists political, social and ethnic.

49 Ljubiša Stojković, Miloš Martić, Nacionalne manjine u Jugoslaviji, Beograd, 1953, pp. 60–62; Kosta Mitrović, Pod kulom vršackom. Hronologija događaja iz revolucionarnog pokreta Vršca i okoline od 1926. do 1945, Novi Sad, 1969; Žarko Atanacković, Vojvodina u borbi 1941–1945, Novi Sad, 1959; Idem, Srem u Narodnooslobodilačkoj borbi i socijalističkoj revoluciji, Beograd,

it had already entered the service of the occupiers even before the attack on Yugoslavia, and served them loyally afterwards – although solidarity with the occupiers was often induced by psychological or social pressure, as well as by repression, but also by partisan attacks on *Volksdeutsche* villages. Although most members of the German minority had sided (emotionally and practically) with the Reich, the picture painted after the war by the Communist authorities was oversimplified and one-sided.⁵⁰ This bad press had another purpose, maybe even more important than the one just mentioned. It served to put the blame for almost the whole collaboration on one single national minority that all but disappeared after the war and thus could not defend itself.⁵¹ This made it possible to pardon members of all Yugoslav peoples and other national minorities for their disloyal or/and anti-communist behavior during WWII – with only few exceptions who were, as a rule, known by their full names. Thus *all* the *Volksdeutsche* were labeled as traitors, but only *some individual* Serbs (the Chetniks, adherents of Nedić and Ljotić), only *some individual* Croats (the Ustasha), *some individual* Slovenes (the White Guard) etc. Thus the myth was created that the Yugoslav peoples, and national minorities as well,⁵² as a whole (with the few above mentioned exceptions) had been *good guys*, whereas only the *Volksdeutsche* as a whole (with few honorable exceptions)⁵³ had sided with the invaders. This fitted the black and white picture of the war that was spread by the Communist authorities through the media, historiography, schoolbooks,⁵⁴ films,⁵⁵ as well as by the politicians themselves.⁵⁶ It could be said that the Swabians, together with the Germans from

1968; Đorđe Momčilović, *Banat u Narodnooslobodilačkom ratu*, Beograd, 1977; Branislav Božović, Juraj Špiler, Zagreb, 1987. See also Yugoslav works from the 1945–1991 period adduced in the footnote 42.

50 That the picture was far from being just black-and-white was shown comparatively early by the Communist historian Josip Mirnić. (Cf. Mirnić, *Nemci u Bačkoj u Drugom svetskom ratu*)

51 To be sure, former members of the German minority – often former functionaries – tried in their numerous publications to confute Yugoslav accusations and even to accuse the Yugoslavs (and especially the Serbs) of having committed genocide on the Danube Swabians. However, their works usually did not manage to be heard outside of the expelees' circles so that large section of the public in Germany was not even aware that there had been a German minority in Yugoslavia and what had happened to it. Sometimes this held true for historians too. The best qualified and most fruitful apologist of the behaviour of the German minority in WWII was Johann Wüsch. (Cf. his works: *Beitrag zur Geschichte der Deutschen in Jugoslawien für den Zeitraum von 1933 bis 1944*, Kehl am Rhein, 1966; *Ursachen und Hintergründe des Schicksals der Deutschen in Jugoslawien. Bevölkerungsverluste Jugoslawiens im Zweiten Weltkrieg*, Kehl am Rhein, 1966; *Die magyarische Okkupation der Batschka 1941–1944*, Kehl am Rhein, 1975; *Die Ereignisse in Syrmien 1941–1944*, Kehl am Rhein, 1975)

52 Cf. for instance Stojković, Martić, pp. 38–63.

53 Slavica Hrečkovski, *Njemačka četa „Ernst Thälmann“ u jedinicama NOV i POJ*, Zbornik CDISB, 1, 1984, pp. 331–350; Stojanović, Martić, pp. 45–46.

54 Zoran Janjetović, *Nemci Jugoslavije u srpskim udžbenicima 1918–2000, Prvi i drugi međunarodni seminar Zajednice Nijemaca u Hrvatskoj 2001./2002.*, Zagreb, 2002, pp. 125–134.

55 Among films that created negative stereotypes about the *Volksdeutsche* particular mention deserve TV series „Salaš u malom ritu“ (1976) (Farmstead in Mali Rit) and „Zimovanje u Jakobsfeldu“ (1979) (A Winter in Jakobsfeld). To tell the truth, there are several *Volksdeutsche* who were not shown as *bad guys* in these serials.

56 The image of the *Volksdeutsche* was much more nuanced in literature. (Cf. Vladimir Geiger, *Sudbina jugoslavenskih Nijemaca u hrvatskoj i srpskoj književnosti*, Zagreb, 2009)

the Reich were foisted off on the Serbs as the main culprits for Serbian suffering during WWII. This was used to reduce the animosity towards the Croats, whose *bad guys*, the Ustasha, were joined to the Germans. Hence, the examination of the role of Croatian masses in the war was prevented. Also, it prevented the examination of the role of the Serbs in the war: sympathies of large number of the Serbs for Draža Mihajlović, King Peter II, collaboration with German occupiers, Chetnik slaughters of Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Partisan slaughters of the Chetniks, and vice versa, etc. In other words, by depicting the Vojvodina Swabians as "Hitlers from our Little Street"⁵⁷ the communist authorities precluded many embarrassing questions from being asked. It helped paint an oversimplified picture of WWII in Yugoslavia that was the founding myth of the post-war regime.

Such black and white picture of the war started to dilapidate, together with the socialist socio-economic system in late 1980s. In the context of raising many questions and re-examination of many old established „truths“, the interest in the members of the German minority was awakened too. It was manifested firstly in the press and in publicist works, and later on in historiography. A host of articles and several books⁵⁸ contributed to substantial change of image of the Swabians, especially in formerly predominantly Swabian villages. Part of that changed image reached the broader Serbian public. Unfortunately, the turbulent and tragic events in 1990s and economic difficulties in early 21st century diverted most of public attention to other topics. Furthermore, the adherents of the old, biased black perception of the *Volksdeutsche* are still quite loud.⁵⁹

It can be said that the importance of Germany in the second half of 20th century steadily increased in Serbian eyes – as an economic partner and the destination of the largest Serbian Diaspora – whereas the importance of remembrance of the German minority steadily declined. New generations have grown up who, particularly outside of Vojvodina, have no idea that a large German minority had ever lived in their country. The remnants of this minority itself became active again in 1990s, organizing associations, preserving the language and customs.⁶⁰ However, seen from the outside, it is hard to tell how much all this

57 „Hitler iz našeg sokaka“ was the title of the famous feature film from 1975 directed by Vladimir Tadej.

58 The first books with the new view on the Ethnic-Germans were: Slobodan Maričić, *Susedi, dželiti, žrtve. Folksdojčeri u Jugoslaviji*, Beograd, 1995; Nenad Stefanović, *Jedan svet na Dunavu*, Beograd 1997. The first supports the old version to a large extent, but enlarges for the first time on the Germans in partisans' ranks and on the suffering of the Ethnic-Germans at the end of the war. Stefanović's book comprizes, apart from the introduction and conclusion by other authors, a number of interviews – testimonies of old *Volksdeutsche* who had been born in the Vojvodina and who lived in Germany and Austria after WWII. This book marks a watershed in depicting the Vojvodina Swabians in Serbian public. Quite numerous newspaper articles about the *Volksdeutsche* had different tenors: some repeated old „truths“ and some presented facts until then unknown to the Serbian public.

59 Cf. comparatively numerous letters to the editors that appear every now and then spurred by various causes. Two completely new books that speak about Vojvodina *Volksdeutsche* in totally old way have appeared recently. (Cf. Srđan Božović, *Divizija „Princ Eugen“*, Pančevo, 2011; Goran Babić, *Paor s bajonetom. Zločin i kazna vojvođanskih folksdojčera*, Beograd, 2012.)

60 Aleksandar Krel, *Etnički identitet i položaj nemačke nacionalne manjine u Vojvodini od Drugog svetskog rata do danas, Zavičaj na Dunavu. Suživot Nemaca i Srba u Vojvodini*, Novi Sad, 2009. pp. 225–228.

is spurred by hopes of donations from Germany and how much by sentimental „going back to the roots“ like the one experienced by most ethnic groups e.g. in the USA. To what degree persons who declare themselves as Germans in the population census could be regarded as the Danube Swabians, is probably up to ethnologists to decide. Many of these people do not speak a word of German any more, but they have preserved some customs and religious affiliation. For their (broader) environment they are hardly more visible than during the previous decades.

It can be said that, despite their present „invisibility“, the Danube Swabians played an important role in the history of the Serbs, not only in Vojvodina. They were agents of modernization in economy and in material culture for almost two centuries.⁶¹ They contributed significantly to the economic development of the whole region they inhabited, which influenced the local Serbs too, who for their part, being richer and better educated, could aid the liberation efforts of their conationals in Serbia in early 19th century as well as their efforts to set up a modern state on a European model. Numerous Swabian artisans, workers, entrepreneurs, innkeepers and others also played a role in that. The history of those people remains to be written and the sheer number of Germanisms in everyday speech of those days proves that they deserve it.⁶² In the inter-war Yugoslavia Serbian politicians failed to use the German minority as a two-way bridge connecting the Serbs with one of the largest European nations. Instead, a short-sighted minority policy made it easier for the Nazis to capture the hearts and minds of the Swabians – with tragic consequences, both for the Serbs and the *Volksdeutsche*. The image of the *Volksdeutsche* as wartime enemies was probably even more important than their actual help for the war effort of the Third Reich. It served the communists not only to legitimize their harsh treatment of members of the German minority, but also to fortify a simplified view of WWII on the Yugoslav territory in which, allegedly, members of all “peoples and national minorities” fought on the “right side” led by the Communist Party, whereas the occupiers, the *Volksdeutsche* and not numerous local traitors such as the Chetniks and the Ustasha, fought on the side of Evil. In that way, the Danube Swabians had played an important real and virtual role in Serbian history. Probably the greatest injustice that has befallen on them is that most of the Serbs and the Germans of today are either not aware of their role or have a distorted perception of it.

61 German influences in the sphere of high culture usually went through completely different channels and not through the predominantly peasant Swabian population.

62 Miloš Trivunac, *Nemački uticaji u našem jeziku*, Beograd, 1937; Idem, *Deutsche Lehnwortforschung im südslawischen Sprachraum*, Belgrad, 1941. A large number of Germanisms entered the Serbian language in the Danube Swabian pronunciation or in the Danube Swabian (or Austrian) form that is different from the standard German one. Considerable number of these words disappeared meanwhile, but comparatively many still survive – particularly in the language of the cuisine and of various crafts.

Резиме

Др Зоран Јањетовић

Улога подунавских Шваба у историји Срба: један хетеродоксан поглед

Кључне речи: Срби, Немци, подунавске Швабе, Војводина,
Други светски рат

Рад разматра улогу коју су подунавске Швабе, немачки колонисти у Угарској, одиграле у српској историји Војводине, Славоније и Србије. Немачки насељеници, колонизовани да би се од Турака ослобођене територије економски подигле, допринели су уништењу сточарског начина живота Срба у јужној Угарској. Временом су Срби и припадници других народа прихватили немачки начин обраде земље, изградње кућа, кувања, облачења итд., али су остале разлике у менталитету и тежњама. Насупрот немачким штедљивим материјалистима стајали су не много штедљиви српски идеалисти, што је доводило до економског ривалства.

Живот у вишенационалној међуратној југословенској држави није задовољио националне аспирације Шваба, које су у том раздобљу почеле да се буде, што је олакшало продор нацистичких идеја и падање под утицај Хитлерове Немачке. Због тога се током Другог светског рата већина војвођанских Немаца солидарисала с Рајхом, све до злочина. Ово је после рата комунистичким властима омогућило да на бруталан начин уклоне целокупну немачку мањину а на њено место населе лојалне партизанске ветеране из пасивних крајева. И после свог практичног нестанка немачка мањина је играла важну симболичну улогу у пропаганди која је на рачун фолксдојчерског учешћа у рату ублажавала сарадњу с окупатором припадника југословенских народа.

IN MEMORIAM

Андреј Митровић (1937–2013): сећање



Професора Андреја Митровића упознали смо као студенти, негде у пролеће далеке 1974, у старој згради Филозофског факултета у Капетан-Мишином здању, у канцеларији секретара Одељења за историју Стеве Пољака. Степа је Драгана Опсеницу, Николу Марковића (колеге са студија и пријатељи) и мене представио професору. Те године је управо изашла његова књига *Време нетрпељивих*, а он је, колико ме памћење служи, био у Немачкој на студијском боравку. Размењено је неколико коментара поводом ове књиге.

Његова предавања смо почели да слушамо школске 1974/75. и наставили следеће године. Андреј Митровић је тада био међу најреномиранијим професорима, у великом креативном напону, и ту смо први пут чули за његову идеју о „округлом столу“, да бисмо ускоро били и позвани да се придружимо.

Идеја о округлом столу који би окупљао Андрејеве докторанте, постдипломце и студенте била је његова стара замисао (неко је говорио још из студентских дана) о озбиљном, дисциплинованом и равноправном научном дискурсу о разним темама и садржајима. На тој замисли је настао један од најотменијих научних, историчарских серклова у граду, а вероватно и у целој ондашњој земљи. Као историчар који је био део тог серкла, могу да кажем да ми је веома жао што Округли сто није оставио већу архиву за собом, посебно аудио, али је сигурно испунио Андрејеву жељу да одлучно утиче на научна опредељења оних који су имали ту срећу да га стално или повремено посећују.

Када је у јесен 1975. године добио Октобарску награду, тада једну од престижних награда епохе, на свечану вечеру смо били позвани и Никола, Драган и ја. То је био доживљај који се памти: професорска и научна елита Београдског универзитета и шире, елита ондашње историјске науке код нас. Андреј, окружен пажњом и подршком породице, пријатеља и колега, својих професора који су га толико ценили, исказивали му своју професорску, очинску пажњу, то је слика која ми је остала у сећању. Андреј нас је упознао са Георгијем Острогорским који је већ био у пензији; затим са проф. Васом Чубриловићем, проф. Радованом Самарџићем.

Историја округлог стола је добрим делом историја мог, и нашега, дружења са Андрејем Митровићем. Ту се на софистициран начин, уз његово мирно, отмено, зналачко усмеравање, разговарало о темама из филозофије историје, историјске методологије, одликама модерног времена, других епоха, о посебним истраживачким темама и садржајима појединаца, о новим трендовима у историографији, домаћој, европској и светској. Откривало се једно богатство историјског знања, оног које се крило иза формалних садр-

жаја програма историјских студија. Суштина Андрејеве замисли показивала се на сваком кораку. Он је учинио да свако ту добије место, да свако стекне сигурност да се искаже, да вежба и усавршава свој историографски исказ сваке врсте, да налази што бољи израз за своје мисли, да изгради своју самостаност као истраживач и историчар, да осети снагу и моћ својих мисли кад их искаже, као и да чује и разуме мисли другог, да се научи да слуша и да учини да га други слушају. Самопоуздање које смо ту стекли је било неизмерно важно за потоњи рад. Андрејева одмерена, мудра, паметна професорска реч нас је све водила ка спознаји где смо, шта смо и колико вредимо. Поштовање и уважавање другог, квалитетна перцепција другог, процена туђег знања и мисли у функцији историјске науке, то су били темељи Андрејеве школе коју смо прошли.

Током првих година окупљања „Округлог стола“ били смо сведоци настанка две Андрејеве књиге, *Историјско у Чаробном брезу* (1977) и *Prodor na Balkan. Srbija u planovima Austrougarske i Nemačke 1908–1914* (1981). Била је то својеврсна школа методологије историјских наука. Великодушност с којом је поделио своје огромно знање из филозофије историје и методологије, нарочито оно које је, да тако кажем, операционализовао током писања ове две књиге, била је нешто што се памти. Једноставно речено, уводио нас је у тајне заната историчара на једној великој теми епохе, оној која га и данас потврђује као великана српске историографије. *Продор на Балкан...* је била књига којом је отворио европску и светску димензију српског и југословенског питања како се онда постављало. Иза тога су следиле још две књиге које су представљале исту епоху, време, на другим равнима, као што су *Србија у Првом светском рату* (1984), *Устаничке борбе у Србији 1916–1918* (1987) и *Топлички устанак – место у српској историји* (1993), које испитују средњи и микро план истог простора и људи на њему. Са књигом *Ангажовано и лепо* (1983) пратили смо другу струју његових мисли и истраживања, учили се.

Захваљујући Андреју, много добрих књига нам је дошло у руке, али мени лично су били најмилији примерци часописа *Theory and History*, које је проучавао током неког од својих студијских боравака у Немачкој (неколико серија) и књига: Hyden White *Metahistory*. Андреј кога сам ја познавала некако није волео да ћаска и губи време. Разговор са њим је увек морао да буде дубоко смислом, и он је успевао да професорски докучи где си са својим радом, размишљанима, плановима, писањем. Умео је да разуме успоне и падове у бављену историјом, истраживању, да пружи подршку, имао је смисла за метаисторију, за емоцију која стоји иза креативног чина писања историје и друга је страна медаље.

У несрећним ратним годинама 1992–1999. његова мудрост и мера у речима и делима је била незаменљив водич кроз несреће и изазове који су нас пратили. Да ли уопште треба рећи да је пружао помоћ и подршку колико год је било могуће, својим студентима, сада пријатељима и колегама, од жеље да нас нахрани до писања препорука. Добра Андрејева рука која је и издалека умела да брине о свима нама.

Још је једна свечана вечера са Андрејем Митровићем остала у мом сећању, поред оних многих које смо провели уз увек упечатљиве разговоре

који су се водили. Вече којим су његови студенти обележили његово повлачење у пензију. Још памтим како су Андреј и Буба одреаговали на поштовање, пажњу и љубав коју смо им исказали том приликом.

Последњи мој разговор са Андрејем био је у смирај његовог активног интелектуалног и друштвеног живота, када га је болест већ узимала под своју власт. Посетио је наш институт на Тргу Николе Пашића и на крају смо, на путу према његовој кући, сели и попили кафу. Потпуно сабран и пун финих емоција, причао је о деведесетим, са дистанце, већ као историчар. Обавио је шал у једном тренутку, и отишао кући. Није желео да га се прати.

Др Гордана КРИВОКАПИЋ ЈОВИЋ

ПРИКАЗИ
Reviews

Σταυρούλα Μαυρογένη,
Εκπαιδευτική μεταρρυθμίση και εθνικισμός – Η περίπτωση
των χωρών της πρώην югосλαβίας,
Θεσσαλονίκη, 2013.

Ставрүла Маврогени,
Образовна реформа и национализам – случај земаља бивше Југославије,
Солун, 2013, 388 стр.

Књига Ставрүле Маврогени *Образовна реформа и национализам – случај земаља бивше Југославије* заправо представља прерађену докторску дисертацију коју је ауторка својевремено одбранила на Одељењу за балканске студије у Флорини, које се налази на Универзитету Западне Македоније.

На самом почетку књиге, докторка Маврогени говори о циљу свог истраживања – да посматра начин на који су различите националне идеологије под различитим околностима користиле образовање како би развиле и учврстиле југословенски или неки други национални идентитет код ученика. Наиме, у различитим периодима и под различитим околностима националне идеологије су продрле у образовни систем и покушале користећи се њиме да код ученика развију одређену националну свест. Према ауторки, случај Југославије је посебно интересантан због паралелног постојања више национализам који су, под одређеним условима и под кишобраном различитих идеологија, мутирвали.

Приликом истраживања за ову књигу професорка Маврогени је користила велики број извора насталих на простору бивше Југославије али и изван њега. У њих спадају: устави бивших југословенских република (пре осамостаљења и после њега), законски оквири за образовање, наставни планови и програми, школски уџбеници, извештаји владиних органа и међународних организација. Поред тога, ауторка је употребљавала и обимну стручну литературу, написану како на матерњем грчком тако и на другим језицима, укључујући ту и ону на српском/хрватском/бошњачком/црногорском. Уз све то, користила је новине, часописе, као и извештаје информативних агенција.

Књига се састоји од укупно десет поглавља, која се могу груписати у три целине. Прва три поглавља имају карактер увода и уједно представљају прву целину ове књиге. У њима докторка Маврогени уводи читаоца у материју којом ће се бавити, на тај начин што најпре говори о добу пре стварања заједничке државе, затим о југословенској држави између два светска рата и напослетку о Југославији социјалистичког раздобља. Ауторка пружа прилику читаоцу да стекне неопходна знања везана, пре свега, за политичку историју поменутих периода, развој система образовања и школске мреже, идеолошке циљеве образовања и школовање наставног кадра. Друга целина, која обухвата поглавља од четвртог до деветог, представља централни део књиге у коме се професорка Маврогени бави главном темом овог рада. Свако од ових поглавља посвећено је једној држави насталој распадом Југославије и у основи има исту структуру, подељену на више потпоглавља тематског карактера. Сва поглавља почињу уводом у којем се укратко описује

пут ка независности републике о којој је реч (сем у случају Србије) и политичке, економске и друштвене прилике у њој. Након тога, говори се о хронологији образовних реформи у основном, средњем и високом школству, образовном систему у целини, школовању наставног кадра, као и припадника националних мањина. Нарочита пажња посвећена је идеолошким циљевима образовања и спровођења образовних реформи. У вези с тим, ниједна од новонасталих држава није остала поштеђена оштрих критика, укључујући ту и Србију. На крају сваког поглавља налази се закључак у коме ауторка сумира оно што је до тог тренутка изнела у оквиру њега и доноси одређене судове на основу тога. Трећа целина ове књиге, коју сачињава само десето поглавље, представља заправо општи закључак у коме још једанпут сумира и анализира изнете чињенице и даје свој завршни суд о њима.

Поставља се питање какав ми суд можемо дати о овој књизи? Наиме, пишући ову књигу докторка Маврогени је поставила себи као задатак да посматра и потом детаљно представи начин на који су различите националне идеологије користиле системе образовања како би успоставиле и учврстиле одређени национални идентитет код ученика. Ради остварења тог циља, пажљиво је проучавала релевантне изворе у које се убрајају устави, закони, наставни планови и програми, уџбеници, извештаји влада и међународних организација, као и обимну стручну литературу. Такође, помно је анализирала образовне реформе – које су тесно повезане са циљевима националних идеологија – трагајући за тим шта се тачно жели постићи и на који начин. Пишући о идеолошким циљевима образовања и о природи образовних реформи у свакој од бивших југословенских република, професорка Маврогени није пропустила прилику да их разобличи и да упути низ оштрих критика на њихов рачун. Тако, читајући ову књигу имамо прилику да упоредимо циљеве националних идеологија и образовних реформи бивших југословенских република једне са другима и да их ставимо у одговарајући контекст. Нажалост, у књизи постоје извесне фактографске грешке и нетачне тврдње, које донекле кваре целокупан утисак о њој.¹ Наиме, у поглављу које се односи на Србију види се да је на ауторку у извесној мери оставила трага антисрпска пропаганда коју су годинама емитовали поједини медији на Западу. Осим тога, стиче се утисак да она не разуме у потпуности природу грађанског рата који се одвијао на територији бивше Југославије. Међутим, то јој не треба узимати сувише за зло, пошто по вокацији ипак није историчар. Такође, треба нагласити како докторка Маврогени није антисрпски настројена будући да са подједнаким жаром критикује и национализме других народа (а тиме и делове образовних ре-

1 Овом приликом навешћемо неке од грешака: Зоран Ђинђић је убијен у априлу 2003; тврдња да у Србији постоје само две врсте средњих школа и то гимназије и техничке; тврдња да је одлука Слободана Милошевића да не прихвати избор Стипе Месића за *представника* (експрoсoлo) колективног председништва СФРЈ 1991. године била повод за проглашење независности Словеније и Хрватске. Желели бисмо да подсетимо да није постојала институција *представника* колективног председништва СФРЈ већ председника, као и да Слободан Милошевић, будући да није био његов члан (Борисав Јовић је представљао Србију у то време), није могао да одлучује о прихватању или неприхватању кандидатуре Стипе Месића. Додали бисмо још и то да ауторка није правилно написала име и презиме последњег председника Председништва СФРЈ (не рачунајући тзв. крње председништво) – наиме, у књизи стоји *Štipe Mešić*.

форми који су њима инспирисани), можда понајвише хрватски, о коме говори изразито негативно. И поред поменутих недостатака, ова књига пружа једну целовиту слику и доноси обиље података о томе како се вршило формирање и учвршћивање националне свести посредством образовних система, што у заједничкој југословенској држави, што у државама које су настале након њеног распада. Стога се може закључити како ова књига, иако су јој потребне одређене корекције, има значајну научну вредност.

Душан СИМИЋ

Чедомир Вишњић,
Србобран 1901–1914. Српско коло 1903–1914,
Службени гласник, СДК Просвјета, 2013, 730 стр.

После изузетне аотиране библиографије Срба у Хрватској за период 1918–1941, Чедомир Вишњић нам је, нешто више од десетак година касније понудио друго капитално дело истог типа, аотирану библиографију чланака и текстова двају главних листова, односно часописа Срба у Хрватској *Србобрана* и *Српског кола* у периоду уочи Првог светског рата, од 1901. до 1914.¹ Уз друге две ауторове књиге: *Кордунашки процес* из 1997. и *Партизанско љетовање* из 2002, које су монографског типа, његов опус представља дубоко понирање у однос српске елите и народа на просторима Хрватске.² Кроз ове четри књиге он је идентификовао и добрим делом представио природу српске елите у Хрватској у кључним годинама њеног устрајања на југословенском пројекту, од 90-их година 19. века до 90-их година 20. века.

Да бисмо уопште могли да размишљамо о природи те елите, што је више од њене судбине односно њеног набоја спрам основних тенденција времена, њених идеја, њеног активизма, положаја, као и положаја самих српских заједница на тзв. хрватским историјским просторима, требало је да добијемо садржаје које нам је понудио аутор као што је Чедомир Вишњић.

Вишњићев досадашњи опус је обухватио скоро четири политичке генерације Срба на хрватским историјским просторима које су устрајале на интегративним процесима на целини јужнословенског простора. Истраживачко понирање све дубље и дубље у прошлост довело га је, за сада, до прелома 19. у 20 век, до велике епохе успона југословенског покрета, модерног европског феномена, који је и код нас штампу и периодичку учинио моћним средством комуникације, омасовљења уских кругова затворених политичких покрета. Вишњић је *Србобран* и *Српско коло* поставио у средиште свог истраживања не само зато што су то били традиционално познати листови

1 Čedomir Višnjić, *Srbi u Hrvatskoj 1918–1941, anotirana bibliografija*, Srpsko kulturno društvo Prosvjeta, Zagreb, 2000, 607 str; Чедомир Вишњић, *Србобран 1901–1914, Српско коло 1903–1914*, Службени гласник Београд, СДК Просвјета Загреб, 2013, 731 стр.

2 Č. Višnjić, *Kordunaški proces*, SDK Prosvjeta Zagreb, 1997; *Isti, Partizansko ljetovanje*, SDK Prosvjeta Zagreb, 2002.

и часописи Срба са тих простора које је требало детаљно представити и про- тумачити, већ и због своје дубоке спознаје да ће тако моћи да затвори круг југословенског искуства српске елите и народа са ових простора, да објасни њихов дубоки слом и нестанак „са мапе хисторијских путева“.³

Да ли је довољно рећи да горко звучи уводна реченица ауторове студије да „њихових имена нема у јавном животу држава наследица. Не само Срба, нема више никога. Једно временско раскршће, са којим су сви рачунали, сви знали фаворите и смјерове и радо о њима писали, као да је нестало са мапе хисторијских путева.“ Да ли нам то аутор понавља стару истину да се и из историје може протерати све што не одговара тренутку и времену, систематично и до краја, као и у животу, можда и боље?

У уводној студији под насловом „Гајева 4. Биљешке и размишљања“ (стр. 7–46), аутор нам се представља као врстан познавалац целокупног друштвеног миљеа у коме су никли *Србобран* и *Српско коло*. Он је не само реконструисао каријере и животе појединаца, проникао у њихову природу, већ до у детаље познаје њихове међусобне односе, родбинске и пријатељске везе, родовско окружење из кога потичу, претке, њихова размимоилажења и сукобе. Он је заправо проникао у структуру међусобних односа, у целину друштвеног миљеа, преко кључних личности и односа, преко важних друштвених догађања, преко њихових мисли, идеја, размишљања. Затим је даље пратио уже и шире околности њиховог деловања, како се мењао њихов однос према средини, као и промене у односу средине према њима. Причу почиње са првим уредницима *Српског кола* Будом Будисављевићем и Миланом Грчићем, новинарима и националним радницима, а наставља са плејадом најзначајнијих новинарских пера и политичких личности српског народа са хрватских простора као што су браћа Прибићевићи, Светозар, Милан, Адам и Валеријан, затим Михајло Медаковић, Пајо Обрадовић, Александар Омчикус, Милан Поповић, Богдан Ластавица, Јован Бањанин, Стеван Јелача, Душан Поповић.

Велико историјско питање, које из позадине притиска изврсну уводну студију аутора, чије објашњење представља његов најдубљи интерес, јесте историјска судбина српске елите са ових хрватских простора у распону од преко једног века, и то од тзв. старе елите, односно Куенових Срба, преко тзв. прво радикалске после самосталске елите, до комунистичке и лево оријентисане елите уопште. У том смислу он се бави и појединцима и њиховим биографијама и каријерама, родословљима и друштвеним миљеом. Ово велико историјско питање је део велике историјске теме чији је смисао праћење процеса промене положаја српских заједница у некадашњој хабзбуршкој Краљевини Хрватској и Славонији. То је процес промена који води те српске заједнице од живота у крајишком систему ка неком новом друштву. Да ли грађанском, у сваком случају конзервативном, у епохи модерности, тако пуној дивергентних процеса...

3 Ч. Вишњић, *Србобран 1901–1914. Српско коло 1903–1914*, Службени гласник – СДК Просвјета, 2013, стр. 7. *Србобран* и *Српско коло* су до сада стално и систематично коришћени у радовима Г. Кривокапић Јовић и Ранке Гашић о Српској народној самосталној странци и Србима са историјских простора Хрватске у овој епохи.

Средишње место и овде, у ауторовој уводној студији, има породица Прибићевић. Њихово родословље сведочи о дубокој укоренености у крајишке заједнице војнограничног система. Ту смо добили портрет Васе Прибићевића, оца Светозаревог и остале браће, који је живео од 1840. до 1897. године. Такође су нам дате и основне информације о деди Јакову Прибићевићу, који је у Револуцији 1848. ратовао у Италији.

Њихове породичне везе говоре да су они већ увелико били у покушају изласка из тог система, чије су суштине трајале мимо просте чињенице да је он укинут. Њихов излазак из војнокрајишког система је ишао преко школовања, које јесте имало српско обележје, али их је у већим градским срединама одвело у сусрет другим националним елитама, пре свега хрватској елити. Средњоевропски белепоковски урбани угођај ствара од њих новинаре, средњоевропске интелектуалце, националне раднике, односно средњоевропско-балканске политичаре. Оно што историчар Милорад Екмечић у својим бројним студијама и монографијама зове закаснелим облицима националног препорода српског, али и других јужнословенских народа, Чедомир Вишњић зове „позна српска патриотска група“ која претходи фази преласка у еру масовног национализма, што је општеприхваћен термин.⁴

Ми бисмо додали, како смо истицали у неколико студија и чланака, да се српски покрет на хрватским историјским просторима у ери масовног национализма с прелома 19. у 20. век, ери која је одредила и природу Првог светског рата, претворио у сектаријански покрет, односно странку каква је била Српска народна самостална странка. Она је била одговор на дубоко конзервативну политику угарског дела Двојне монархије, са изразито рестриктивним правом гласа, која се деловањем либералне српске и хрватске елите у споју са сектаријанским покретима, по угледу на хришћанске социјалисте или хришћанске демократе, претварала у демократски покрет јужнословенских заједница. Овај оригинални спој либералне елите и сектаријанског покрета Срба са ових простора никао је на подлози реалне угрожености јужнословенских заједница, посебно српских, на врхунцу сукоба великих европских национализма и њихових империјалних стремљења.

Свеукупни садржај књиге, уводна студија и аниотирание библиографске јединице, нам дају основе да са пуном јасноћом кажемо шта је то српска елита на хрватским историјским просторима кроз један век, до Револуције 1848. и кроз њу, од те револуције па надаље до 1902/03. и између два светска рата. То су тзв. традиционалне елите, крајишка и црквена елита. Обе имају своје варијетете и скоро су у потпуности народног порекла, никле из крајишких српско-православних заједница, премда има нешто и елите другачијег, да кажемо аристократског порекла. Од Револуције 1848. до почетка 20. века, војној и црквеној се придружује елита настала највишим образовањем на нивоу професија, која се делимично преливала са оном која ће се формирати као део управног система Војводства Српског и Тамишког Баната и аутономне тзв. Троједнице на подлози Нагодбе из 1868. Из ове последње су у споју са традиционалним елитама никли и тзв. Куенови Срби („мађарони“),

4 М. Екмечић, *Стварање Југославије*, том 2, поглавље III и IV, стр. 333–667; Ч. Вишњић, *Србобран...*, стр. 17.

који се везују за епоху бановања мађарског аристократе Куена-Хедерварија 1883–1903.

Нову, младу генерацију, ону која је дубински извела рушење војнокрајишког система, предводила су браћа Прибићевић, које нам у уводној студији и целој књизи представља колега Вишњић. Почиње са Валеријаном, Миланом и Адамом, а завршава са Светозарем. Окружује их тврдим језгром од 25 новинара, студената, свештеника, адвоката, књижевника, војника и професора, и ширим кругом од петнаестак људи, претежно трговаца, поседника, адвоката, пароха и учитеља (стр. 19–23).

Вишњић идентификује и ону елиту која није следила ни конзервативну мађаронску политику, или јој била блиска (ослањајући се на новообјављену мемоарску грађу и нову литературу, стр. 8–11), а није се укључила у нове самосталске токове око *Новог Србобрана* и *Сељачког кола*, већ је представљала да кажемо старе самосталце из времена када су Јован Пачу и Владимир Матијевић водили Српску народну самосталну странку (стр. 15, 19, 21). Први је био председник те странке у време великих погромашких догађања против Срба у Загребу у септембру 1902. (умро непосредно после тога), а други је био једна од средишњих фигура самосталског покрет и политике „свој к своме“. Ту су још представљени и делом описани Станићи и Пауновићи у Вуковару, Добровићи и Јовановићи у Дарувару, Бакићи у Бјеловару, Бањани и Барако у Карловцу. Изванредно је ситуирана, као и остали делови елите, уз пуно нових чињница и детаља, и група која представља најјачу друштвену везу са тзв. старом елитом. Њу су чинили махом адвокати, на првом месту Богдан Медаковић, припадник самог врха друштвене елите, па Срђан Будисављевић, син великог жупана и књижевника Буде Будисављевића Приједорског, једне од кључних личности Куенових времена; Богдан Стојановић је у Загребу преузео канцеларију Светислава Шумановића, још једне истакнуте личности међу Србима „мађаронима“; Душан Поповић је син септемвира и вјежбеник/практикант код Васе Ђурђевића.

Дакле, аутор у уводној студији и самим анотираним библиографским јединицама испитује природу српске елите на историјским просторима Хрватске (то су данас и њени национални простори), идентификује је и описује кроз типологије и преливања, испитује њене корене, затим околности које је обликују, идеје које је привлаче, мимо наслеђа, друштвене и политичке везе које ствара. Посебно испитује ритам промена у ставу хрватске елите према Србима задржавајући се само на основној линији. Даље испитује шта је основа посебности „Срба из Хрватске“. Вишњић истиче да је Милан Прибићевић Србе из Хрватске увек сматрао посебном формацијом. Бележи на страни 30 своје студије: „увијек је егзистирала свијест о де фацто мањинској позицији, о потреби да се има бар дио хрватске политике у савезничком односу“. С ретким тактом, у наоко парадоксалном споју са искреношћу, аутор заправо испитује положај етникума у целини, и за сада само назначава дубинска кретања која су учинила да се тај положај промени нагоре.

У садржају анотираних библиографских јединица има још пуно тога што може да обогати ову студију, још пуно личности се може идентификовати, представити и описати. На пример, једна занимљива личност о којој још није сложена поузданија слика – Данило Димовић. Затим ту је читава

историја отварања простора демократског дијалога коју отпочињу кругови око *Србобрана* и *Српског кола*, добрим делом и на страницама та два листа, простора у коме ће се неговати узајамно слушање, уважавање, поштовање, искреност.

Аутор нам је овом моћном књигом даровао много више од богатог садржаја двају најзначајнијих листова Срба у Хрватској, даровао нам је једну фреску епохе, отмено уоквирену једном префињеном студијом.

Др Гордана КРИВОКАПИЋ ЈОВИЋ

Милан Стојадиновић: Политика у време глобалних ломова
Институт за европске студије, Центар за конзервативне студије,
Београд, 2013, 290 стр.

Зборник *Милан Стојадиновић: Политика у време глобалних ломова* настао је на основу веома успешне научне конференције истог назива одржане крајем 2011. у Београду, чиме је обележена педесетогодишњица смрти овог српског и југословенског државника и политичара. На скупу у организацији Института за европске студије и Центра за конзервативне студије учествовало је десетак доктора наука, еминентних и признатих стручњака из различитих области: историје, економије, политикологије, филозофије... У радовима је обрађено више сфера деловања самог Стојадиновића, као и владе Краљевине Југославије којој је он био на челу од јуна 1935. до фебруара 1939. године. Већину тих излагања, прерађених и допуњених, можемо наћи на страницама овог зборника.

Текст зборника састоји се од увода, једанаест чланака подељених у три веће целине, интервјуа са Хуаном Радоњићем, Стојадиновићевим унуком, и библиографије радова о Милану Стојадиновићу. У уводу један од организатора скупа, Миша Ђурковић, из Института за европске студије, говори о Стојадиновићевој личности, његовом животном путу, третирању у историографији и оцени његовог живота и дела. Ђурковић је подвукао и нека отворена питања као смернице за будућа истраживања. Сажео је и читаоцима пренео два рада која се из техничких разлога нису нашла у зборнику а која покривају период након Стојадиновићевог силаска са власти, интернацију на Маурицијус и живот у Аргентини након Другог светског рата.

Научни саветник Института за савремену историју Бојан Димитријевић отвара први део зборника радом о развоју ваздухопловства за време владе Милана Стојадиновића и утицају који је на то имао југословенски премијер. Аутор закључује да је у том периоду ваздухопловство реорганизовано и унапређено а његово бројно стање и формација повећани. Наредни текст Мише Ђурковића обрађује једну од најконтроверзнијих области Стојадиновићевог деловања – спољну политику. Наиме, познато је да је Стојадиновић поред места председника владе заузимао и место министра иностраних послова. Ђурковићев текст представља одважну и квалитетну анализу спољне

политике Краљевине Југославије у предвечерје Другог светског рата. Аутор се аргументовано хвата у коштац са вишедеценијским црно-белим тумачењима и једностраним погледима. Наредна два текста у овом делу баве се највећим унутрашњим проблемом у Краљевини тзв. хрватским питањем, односно положајем Хрвата у међуратној Југославији и приказују донекле различите погледе. Срђа Трифковић ово питање анализира кроз делатност Милана Стојадиновића, с једне стране, и фашистичког режима у Италији, с друге. За разлику од Трифковића који је Стојадиновићеву политику на овом пољу оценио као успешну, сарадник Балканолошког института САНУ Мирослав Свирчевић тврди да Стојадиновић „није савладао лекцију из сопственог политичког искуства” и да није разумео „суштину српско-хрватских спорова”. Интересантни радови који нуде тумачења, али и позивају на даљи дијалог о овој теми.

Други део зборника чине три чланка која анализирају Стојадиновићеву економску политику, сегмент нужен за разумевање не само његове укупне политике као председника владе већ и саме његове личности. Економисти Бошко Мијатовић и Горан Николић обрадили су Стојадиновићев рад у овој области до и од доласка на место премијера. За историјску науку веома су битне анализе и тумачења економских експерата, што Мијатовић и Николић свакако јесу. Самим тим њихове оцене Стојадиновићеве економске политике настале након темељног проучавања свакако имају тежину, и надамо се да ће их у будућности користити сви они који се обухватније буду бавили Краљевином Југославијом и Миланом Стојадиновићем. Трећи текст у овом делу представља рад историчара старије генерације Смиљане Ђуровић, која се економском историјом Краљевине Југославије бавила још осамдесетих година прошлог века. Након краћег увода, рад нуди интересантну анализу Стојадиновићеве економске политике, видећи у њему „енергичног стратега модернизације и индустријализације”. Текст садржи и прилог, односно занимљив портрет личности председника владе који је донела оновремена чешка штампа.

Трећи део отвара квалитетан и опширан рад професора Димића, са Катедре за историју Југославије Филозофског факултета у Београду, који обрађује просветну и културну политику за време владе Милана Стојадиновића. Делатност на пољу културе и просвете анализира се не само на основу докумената о раду владе него и на основу критика које су упућивали припадници опозиције, а пре свега југословенски националисти. Димић јасно показује да је учинак Стојадиновићеве владе на овим важним пољима био сличан ранијим владама тј. да је прокламовано било далеко од реалног и оствареног. Наредна два рада баве се верском политиком у међуратној Југославији. Осетљиву тему конкордата између Ватикана и Краљевине Југославији још једном је обрадио професор Вељко Ђурић Мишина. Аутор детаљно анализира припремање овог документа, кризу која је настала око његовог усвајања и последице. Рад одликују добро коришћење постојеће литературе и смели закључци. Текст колеге Александра Раковића, из Института за новију историју Србије, говори о премештању седишта југословенског реис-улеме из Београда у Сарајево, који се десио током Стојадиновићеве владе и уз његов пристанак. Аутор је недвосмислено показао како неки потези владе учињени из краткорочне политичке користи могу имати трајније последи-

це. Последњи рад у овом зборнику представља текст директора Института за савремену историју Момчила Павловића везан за ротаријанство у време Стојадиновићеве владе. Аутор приказује историјат ове, широј јавности недовољно познате организације чији је Стојадиновић био истакнути члан, а једно време и члан борда директора. Треба истаћи да је он и до данашњег дана остао највише рангирани члан Ротари интернационале са наших простора.

Кратак интервју са Стојадиновићевим унуком Хуаном Радоњићем, који је урадио Миша Ђурковић, више је занимљив него што доноси нека нова сазнања. Радоњић је син Стојадиновићеве млађе кћерке Љиљане и садашњи уредник листа који је основао његов деда *Ел Економист*. У интервјуу налазимо податке и о другим члановима Стојадиновићеве породице који живе у Аргентини.

Обимна библиографија радова о Милана Стојадиновићу обухвата поред монографија, чланака и студија домаћих аутора и значајан број радова на страним језицима. На крају зборника налази се и десетак оргиналних фотографија из различитих периода Стојадиновићевог живота.

У целини узевши, зборник *Милан Стојадиновић: Политика у време глобалних ломова* представља нов и важан допринос разумевању ове значајне личности и њене улоге у историји Југославије, региона, па и Европе. Аутори текстова су признати стручњаци из различитих области са вишегодишњим истраживачким искуством. Сам зборник, поред систематизације постојећих, нуди нова сазнања из овог важног периода историје Краљевине Југославије. У њему се анализирају и преиспитују бројни стереотипи који су се задржали и до данашњих дана, како у стручној тако и у широј јавности.

Др Бојан СИМИЋ

Мира Радојевић, Милан Грол,
Филип Вишњић, Београд, 2014, 347 стр.

Проф. др Мира Радојевић истраживачки се већ дуже од две деценије бави историјом југословенских грађанских странака и парламентаризмом у Краљевини СХС/Југославији. Након објављивања вредних монографија о удруженој опозицији (*Удружена опозиција 1935–1939*, Београд 1994) и Божи Марковићу (*Научник и политика. Политичка биографија Божидара В. Марковића (1874–1946)*, Београд 2007) у средишту њеног истраживачког интересовања нашао се политички и друштвени рад Милана Грола, идеолога и вође Југословенске демократске странке, министра у емигрантској влади током Другог светског рата, позоришног човека и личности неспорне моралне и интелектуалне величине. Грол је свакако представљао једну од најмаркантијих личности своје генерације, али се чини да му српска историографија није посветила довољно пажње у последњих тридесетак година. Након објављивања Гроловог *Лондонског дневника 1941–1945* (Београд 1990) и реиздања његових књига *Искушења демократије* (Београд 1991), *Кроз две деценије Југославије* (Београд 1997, 1999) и *Из позоришта преткумановске Србије* (Београд 2004), добили смо, тек у другој деценији 21. века, и две монографије које у целини осветљавају његов живот и рад: театролошку студију Зорана Т. Јовановића *Позоришно дело Милана Грола* (Нови Сад 2011) и политичку биографију из пера проф. др Мире Радојевић: *Милан Грол* (Београд 2014).

Већ у уводним напоменама проф. Радојевић указала је на велики значај али и сложеност личности Милана Грола. Он се, током практично целог радног века, налазио у средишту политичких и друштвених догађања у Србији и Југославији. Живот му је укрстио путеве са најумнијим и најзначајнијим изданицима ондашњег српског друштва: учио је од Богдана Поповића и Љубе Стојановића, дружио се са Јованом Скерлићем, Миланом Ракићем, Александром Белићем, Војиславом Маринковићем, Исидором Секулић, сарађивао и одржавао преписку са Радојем Домановићем, Јашом Продановићем, Јованом Цвијићем, Љубом Давидовићем, Милорадом Драшковићем, Јованом Јовановићем Пижоном, Јованом Жујовићем и другима, а као гимназијски професор био је разредни старешина Станиславу Винаверу. Својим радним навикама и супериорним интелектом још у раној младости издигао се изнад свог скромног друштвеног порекла: отац Стеван био је кобасичар, а погинуо је у Милановој деветој години, због чега је породица годинама живела у сиромаштву. Временом је, уз свог пријатеља и страначког шефа Љубу Давидовића, постао синоним за лично поштење и политичку принципијелност. Његова чврста уверења чинили су га, по речима бројних савременика, „тешким“ и за разумевање и за сарадњу, али су његова висока радна етика и велики интелект изазивали поштовање и дивљење чак и код његових противника. И поред свега наведеног, стигма која је Грола пратила целог живота било је немачко порекло очеве породице, па се, иако су и отац и он били доказани родољуби, увек изнова морао доказивати.

Политичко деловање Милана Грола одвијало се кроз четири међусобно веома различита раздобља: период непосредно пре и током Првог

светског рата, период међуратног парламентаризма, Други светски рат и кратко послератно раздобље у коме је Грол политички суделовао. Уважавајући историјске особености сваког од наведених раздобља, проф. Радојевић уредила је композицију своје монографије тако да је сваком од њих посвећено једно хронолошки и тематски заокружено поглавље.

У првом поглављу: *Пред искушењима Првог светског рата* (стр. 26–89) ауторка пише о Гроловим данима за време Првог светског рата. Указујући час на његове дубоко личне патње и стрепње за судбину породице која је остала у окупираној Србији, а час на његово патриотско и професионално ангажовање у српском Прес-бироу у Женеви, проф. Радојевић осликава не само Милана Грола већ и судбину читаве једне генерације млађих српских интелектуалаца, које су рат и инструкције српске владе тих година расули по свету. Посебна пажња посвећена је Гроловом залагању за југословенско уједињење, за које је сматрао да мора да се изврши на најдемократскији могући начин и потпуно ослобођено свих националних и политичких предрасуда. Његова писма Јовану Цвијићу и Љуби Стојановићу, као и вођи српских социјалиста Триши Кацлеровићу, сведоче о снажном уверењу да је заједничка југословенска држава најбољи оквир за демократски, економски и културни развој Срба, Хрвата и Словенаца, те да у њој неће бити места за „ситне ствари“, „ситне људе“ и „ситничарску политику“. Грол, који се гнушао национализма и популизма, тако карактеристичних за радикале Николе Пашића, био је помало наивно склон да поверује да ће један шири државни оквир утицати да се „страховите кризе“ и „унутарње болести“ које је историјски развитак донео јужнословенским народима лакше и успешније разреши него што је то био случај у прошлости. Према речима проф. Радојевић ова „понесеност југословенском идејом“ понекад је прелазила чак и у њено „догматизовање“: она је била утемељена на часним и родољубивим побудама, али је у њој било много претераног оптимизма, политичког романтизма и, у суштини, нереланог заноса.

Друго поглавље монографије носи назив *Страначки идеолог* (стр. 90–191) и у свом највећем делу бави се Гроловом међуратном политичком каријером: изградњом и вођењем Југословенске демократске странке. Иако републиканац по интимном убеђењу, Грол није напустио руководство Самосталне радикалне странке када је група његових сабораца и блиских пријатеља, предвођена Љубом Стојановићем, Јашом Продановићем и Јованом Жујовићем, основала Југословенску републиканску странку. Прихватање монархизма, као и подршка усвајању Видовданског устава били су мотивисани југословенским заносом и тежњом да се што пре створи и уобличи заједничка држава. Ови компромиси Милана Грола нису значили његово одустајање од дубоких демократских уверења и тежње за моралом и чашћу у политици, што се одражавало и у његовом раду у новонасталој Југословенској демократској странци. Исправно осећајући да односи са Хрватима имају судбоносни значај за опстанак и развој заједничке државе, Грол је посветио године покушавајући да успостави мост са хрватским народним представницима, у циљу проналажења системског решења које би задовољило обе стране. Уз Љубу Давидовића (кога је, након смрти у фебруару 1940. наследио на челу странке), био је неспорни вођа демократа, писац прогласа и програм-

ских аката странке, креатор њене политике и једна од њених највернијих персонификација. Проф. Радојевић уверљиво је осликала и два значајна Гролова становишта из друге половине тридесетих година: његов реални антифашизам и негативан став према споразуму Цветковић–Мачек. Уочавајући, још током 1935. и 1936. године, опасност од успона фашизма у Европи, Грол се снажно вредносно определио као антифашиста и демократа, али је образриво упозоравао да „левичарење“ и „демагогија“ популиста могу да грађане одврате од демократије и усмере их ка десничарским снагама, а истовремено, и да спровоцирају напад фашистичке Италије или нацистичке Немачке на земљу. У погледу српско-хрватског споразума из 1939. и демократе и Милан Грол заузели су принципијелан став, указујући на проблематична и неправедна решења која су примењена у стварању Бановине Хрватске. Управо сврставање демократа међу политичке снаге у Краљевини Југославији које су захтевале ревизију споразума и стварање српске административне јединице указује до које је мере тај споразум био неприхватљив за српски народ.

Српско-хрватски односи, додатно закомпликовани дешавањима током Другог светског рата, доминирају као тема и трећег поглавља (стр. 192–273) монографије проф. Радојевић, насловљеног *Између српства и југословенства*. Анализирајући, на основу прворазредних историјских извора, Гролово ангажовање у емигрантским владама Краљевине Југославије, проф. Мира Радојевић истиче две константе у његовом политичком раду: решеност за одбрану Југославије и очување њеног поретка, као и један чвршћи став према Хрватима, узрокован незадовољством предратним споразумима и злочинима над српским народом у НДХ. Управо овакво држање и његов сложени, бескомпромисни карактер утицали су да лондонске године прођу у бризи за сином и снахом који су остали у окупираној Србији и жестоким свађама са југословенским политичарима у емиграцији, од Јураја Крњевића и Рудолфа Бићанића до Слободана Јовановића. Његова дубока принципијелност више пута дошла је до изражаја: осуђивао је колаборацију, али није дозвољавао изједначавање Милана Недића са Павелићем; иако је био велики критичар политичког рада Јована Дучића, жестоко се борио да му се на адекватан начин ода почаст и омогући сахрана о државном трошку; дубоко је саосећао са страдањем српског народа у НДХ, али је протествовао када је прота Ристановић у благодарењу поводом Дана уједињења 1942. године поменуо освету за невине жртве. У преломним тренуцима, када су Савезници утицали на стварање привремене владе са НОП-ом, одбио је да се стави у службу политике на коју није могао да има готово никакав утицај, али је задржао чврсту решеност да се врати у земљу чим прилике то дозволе, истичући, у својим последњим месецима у Лондону, да ће „радије умрети тамо у невољи, него овде у срамоти“.

Гроловим данима по повратку у ослобођену земљу посвећено је четврто и последње поглавље књиге проф. Радојевић: *Против ветрењача* (стр. 274–321). За разлику од ситуације након Првог светског рата, Грол се у Југославију 1945. вратио старији, уморан и, по неподељеном утиску савременика, потпуно измењен. Није желео да буде ни „бела гарда“, ни да се „бори против новог режима из шуме, као неки заостали четници“, али су се нове револуционарне власти према њему односиле са великим неповерењем, и

неретко чак и отворено непријатељски. Иако је ушао у Министарски савет ДФЈ као потпредседник, ова концентрациона влада ретко се састајала, а у њеној политици све значајније одлуке доносили су југословенски комунисти. У раду Председништва АВНОЈ-а истрајно се противио доношењу закона чији је једини циљ био да санкционишу „тековине револуције“, али је и у раду овог тела показао висок степен професионалности и принципијелности. Увиђајући све ауторитарнији став комуниста и немогућност постизања било каквог реалног компромиса са њима, Милан Грол је у августу поднео оставку на место потпредседника југословенске владе. Овај морални лични акт изазвао је прави пропагандни линч демократа и њиховог вође, у коме је за Грола истицано да је „по поријеклу Њемац, по култури Француз, а по политици великосрбин“, и који је за крајњи циљ имао потпуно дезавуисање Демократске странке и свих тековина њеног политичког рада. Због тога је последње године живота провео у изолацији, бавећи се писањем театролошке студије о позоришту у преткумановској Србији.

Послератне године Милана Грола приказане су у књизи проф. Мире Радојевић у форми епилога, због чега је објављивање класичног закључка у књизи постало непотребно и сувишно. Монографија је опремљена резимеом на енглеском језику (стр. 322–325), исцрпним списком коришћених извора и литературе, као и регистром имена. Рецензенти монографије били су проф. др Љубодраг Димић и проф. др Ђорђе Станковић.

Књига проф. др Мире Радојевић *Милан Грол* написана је изразито лепим стилем и чита се у једном даху. Изворну основу чине необјављени историјски извори из више од двадесет архивских фондова, велики број политичких чланака и брошура из међуратног периода, мемоарска и дневничка литература, научна историографија и дела самог Милана Грола. Анализирајући и описујући Грола, Мира Радојевић верно преноси утиске савременика, као и аутобиографске белешке, чиме читалац стиче директан додир са његовом личношћу и атмосфером прошлих епоха. Иако је још у уводним напоменама ауторка непретенциозно истакла да ни ова књига није „целовита биографија Милана Грола“, чињеница је да је заправо реч о до сада најпотпунијој и најзначајнијој историографској монографији посвећеној Гролу. Она ће свакако постати неизоставни део свих будућих истраживања која се баве Гролом, Демократском странком, парламентаризмом у Краљевини СХС/Југославији и емиграционом владом у Другом светском рату.

Др Александар СТОЈАНОВИЋ

Olga Manojlović Pintar,
Arheologija sećanja. Spomenici i identiteti u Srbiji 1918–1989,
Udruženje za društvenu istoriju, Čigoja štampa, Beograd, 2014, 429 str.

Књига *Археологија сећања* представља синтезу магистарске и докторске тезе које је др Олга Манојловић Пинтар (сарадница Института за новију историју Србије) одбранила, под менторством професора Андреја Митровића, на Катедри за историју Филозофског факултета у Београду. Заснована је на истраживању грађе из домаћих и страних архива, штампи и анализи уметничких дела и материјалних симбола несталих режима и држава, који су добили функцију извора, уз примену интердисциплинарног приступа. У уводним поглављима дефинисана су истраживачка поља и појмовни апарат. Ауторка такође пружа преглед развоја истраживања колективних сећања у историјској науци током последњих четврт века и указује на важност новоформиране научне дисциплине културе сећања, код нас још увек недовољно развијене и заступљене углавном кроз истраживања Тодора Куљића, Мiroслава Тимотијевића, Ненада Макуљевића и Александра Игњатовића.

Књига је структурирана кроз четири поглавља: Концентрични кругови памћења, Херојски узор и мартирски идеали, Национализација смрти, Археологија Југославије и анализира споменике на простору Србије (у југословенском оквиру) из различитих периода, режима и идеологија као археолошке артефакте, односно материјалне трагове друштва која су их подизала или уништавала.

Истраживање споменичке праксе обухватило је обележја која су у женским фигурама персонификовала идеале заједнице (Нике, Пијета, Спартанка), материјализације појединаца који су проглашавани за националне хероје и узор и споменике палим војницима и цивилима у ратовима. У књизи су анализирани стереотипне представе савезника и непријатеља и њихова функционализација у политичким дебатама, војничка гробља и костурнице, симболика незнаног јунака, „очева нације“, „младости и снаге“, „ратних другова“, „храмова и светилишта патриотизма“ и цивилних жртава (споменици жртвама Првог и Другог светског рата). Војничка гробља су градила слику величине победника, али и пројекцију његове величанствене будућности, док су костурнице материјализовале ратне ужасе. „Временом, пали у ратовима су кроз бројне симболе и ритуале од субјекта коме су церемоније посвећене постајали објекат на коме су базирани идеолошки концепти. Они су инструментализовани као централни симбол државног јединства. Брига о њима у политичкој пракси исувише често је била само одраз дневно политичких потреба и амбициозних пројеката владајућих политичких елита и опозиционих активиста.“

Полазећи од тога да „споменици никада нису само материјализација сећања на догађаје и личности из прошлости, већ пре свега снажан конститутивни елемент садашњице у којој настају“ и који „упросторавају идеологију и политику и представљају мизансцен друштвених и идеолошких промена“, ауторка анализира везу између званичних државно прокламованих визија прошлости и онога што је локална заједница, односно породица ода-

брала да памти и обележава, анализирајући спомен-паркове и „праксу обједињавања различитих актера из прошлости у јединствен историјски низ“. Уз споменике члановима династије Карађорђевић, споменици војничкој жртви и победи српске војске представљали су, каже ауторка, основ историјског наратива у периоду Краљевине Југославије, али је симболика палих војника имала мобилизацијски потенцијал и у периоду социјализма, када је херојство мултинационалне Народноослободилачке војске представљало снажну легитимацију Југословенске народне армије као једне од централних државних институција. Олга Манојловић Пинтар наглашава да је феномен спомен-паркова, подизаних са намером да превазиђу сложено наслеђе Другог светског рата, комеморишући цивилне жртве фашизма, постао основ новог друштвеног поретка и прокламованих идеала националног јединства.

Ауторка истиче да је, без обзира на снажне идеолошке разлике и директне супротстављености политичких режима, током читавог 20. века, учешћем појединаца у секуларним спектаклима и ритуалима креирана представа заједнице као складног организма, произвођена катарза и друштвена емпатија али и изражавано признање државном или партијском руководству и централној личности политичког живота. Колективне церемоније требало је да изразе виталност и снагу колектива а посебно су биле упућене најмлађим члановима друштва (соколски покрет, слетови, параде). Потенцирање младости као предуслова дуговечности заједнице временом је нашло израза и у меморизацији жртава рата.

Уклањање и уништавање споменика претходних режима био је континуирани процес током 20. века, али однос на релацији победник и поражени се мењао. Док су после Првог светског рата комеморације одржаване и на гробљима војника који су пали на супротним странама бојишта, већ током Другог светског рата ројалистичка и војничка обележја постала су објекат уништавања, а после 1945. чињеница да је рат вођен против идеологије нацизма и фашизма изменила је однос према пораженима који су „морали нестати из јавног простора“, али су масовно почели да добијају спомен-обележја после хладног рата, што је у постсоцијалистичким друштвима отворило нова сукобљавања. „Давно заборављени, поново су оживели у колективном сећању и обележени у јавном простору тек на крају 20. века. Оно што је, међутим, отворило нове проблеме је чињеница да је обнављање сећања за неке а ргіогі значило и њихову политичку рехабилитацију“.

Од времена настанка Југославије, преко промена које су уследиле 1945. године па све до распада 1990. били су уочљиви различити покушаји креирања колективних идентитета, од националне и мултинационалне унификације до наднационалног самоуправног концепта. Управо је то био разлог због кога су се споменици који су сведочили о процесу дефинисања различитих идеја заједништва и плуралних идентитета југословенских грађана први нашли на удару током процеса разбијања и уништавања Југославије и деконструкције социјализма.

Олга Манојловић Пинтар закључује да су, како у годинама Краљевине тако и социјалистичке Југославије, „споменици у формалном погледу кореспондирали са међународним политичким реалностима“, а да су „значајне промене наступиле током последње две деценије 20. века када су спомени-

ци у Србији, кроз потпуну безидејност и присутност превазиђених форми вајарског и архитектонског изражавања, одражавали али и градили политичку и друштвену изолованост“.

На крају ове оригиналне и иновативне књиге, која представља искорак у посматрању историје 20. века у српској историографији, приложене су фотографије анализираних споменика и опсежна библиографија. Велика је штета што књигу не прати превод закључка или неке врсте резимеа на енглеском језику, с обзиром да тема истраживања кореспондира са низом пројеката који су тренутно актуелни у свету.

Др Радмила РАДИЋ

**ИНФОРМАЦИЈЕ
О НАУЧНИМ СКУПОВИМА
Information on Conferences**

8th Annual Conference: Sport and the Politics of Exclusion,
Organized by the Political Studies Association – Sport and Politics Group
and John Moores University, Liverpool, UK, 21st and 22nd of February 2014

Prominent scholars – historians, politologists, sociologists, jurists and others from all over the world gathered in Liverpool on February 21st and 22nd 2014 in order to discuss the issues of politics of exclusion in today's sport. The organizer of the event was the Sport and Politics Study Group of the UK Political Studies Association (PSA), a group of enthusiastic researchers founded in 2005 with the goal to provide the opportunities for discussion, debate and research on sport politics. School of Humanities and Social Science at Liverpool John Moores University also participated in the organization efforts. The 8th annual conference of the PSA saw more than 40 participants and many more in the audience. Two keynote speakers were Andy Burnham, Labour Party MP and Shadow Secretary of State for Health, who gave a very inspiring speech on physical activity and public health strategies in the UK and Professor Maurice Roche from the University of Sheffield, who spoke of sporting mega-events, globalization and development. Both of the keynote speeches attracted a lot of attention from the participants and guests and triggered a lively discussion.

The two-day conference was divided into three parallel sessions. On the first day, the first session saw the following participants and their presentations: Matthew David from Durham University with the presentation *Live-Streaming and Football Broadcasts*, Danny Fitzpatrick from the University of Manchester with *Football in the British Political Tradition*, David Webber from Warwick University with *The People's Party, the People's Game: The Labour Party, English Football and the Exclusion of the Working Classes*, Idris Akkuzu from Maltepe University in Istanbul with the presentation *The Commodification of Turkish Elite Football and Fan Mobilizations*, Jamie Cleland from Loughborough University with *'Black and Whiter's': The Relative Powerlessness of Supporter Organization Mobility at English Premier League Football Clubs*, Dino Numerato from Loughborough University with the topic *Who Says "No" to Modern Football?: Italian Supporters, Reflexivity, and Neo-liberalism*, Dave Boyle, who is a freelance writer and researcher, with a very interesting presentation *Political Football: Déjà vu all Over Again*, where he spoke of his personal contacts with the football policy-makers in the UK, David McArdle from Stirling University with the presentation *"Worrying the Carcass of an Old Song": Prosecutors' and Judicial Perceptions of the Offensive Behaviour at Football etc. (Scotland) Act* and Anthony May from Kingston University with *Flags, Fans, and "Footie": Cultural Exclusion and Football in Northern Ireland During 2012/13 Season*. The second session of the first day saw the following presentations: Lybov Tsyganova from the National Research University Higher School of Economics Moscow with *Football Fans' "Mass Action": Nationalism, Anti-statism (State Criticism) and Deviance*, Russell Holden from the University of Worcester with *The Carberry Legacy: Cricket and Afro-Caribbean Social Exclusion*, Dejan Zec from the Institute for Recent History of Serbia with the presentation *Politics of Exclusion in 21st Century Serbian Football*, Milly Blundell and Kay Richards, both Liverpool John Moores University with *Women and Sport Participation: A Pilot*

Study from Bury, UK, Carrie Dunn from Manchester Metropolitan University with the presentation *Elite Sportswomen's Responses to the Role of Role Model: Promoting Young Women's Sporting Participation at Elite and Grassroots Levels*, Kate Themen from the University of Liverpool with *Discourses of 'Englishness': Examining Female Football Players' Narratives of Complicity and Transformation*, Paul Gilchrist from the University of Brighton with *Sport, Youth Culture and Public Space: Parkour Parks as an 'Everyday Utopia'*, Patrick O'Neil, Deirdrie Brennan and David Hassan from the University of Ulster with the presentation *'eHoops': Achieving Meaningful Youth Engagement in Northern Ireland* and Louise Platt and Chris Mackintosh, both from Liverpool John Moores University with *The Ping Pong Association vs. ETTA Ltd: New Narratives of Neo-liberal Resistance and a Cultural Politics of Recreational Play Spaces*. Finally, the third session of the first conference day was marked by following presentations: Andrea Giampiccoli from Durban University of Technology and John Nauright from the University of Brighton with *The World Cup Never Happened: Football and Community "Development" in South Africa, Towards a Politics of Inclusion and Sustainability*, Pippa Chapman from Loughborough University with *An Examination of the Reasons for Ongoing Government Support for and Investment in Elite Sport in the UK*, Robert Kielty from Glasgow Caledonia University with the presentation *To the Victor the Spoils: Politics of Exclusion within Scottish Football Club Academy Criteria*, Andy Adams and Emma Kavanagh, both from Bournemouth University with *A Step Too Far? The Politics of the Rights and Responsibilities of Performance Athletes*, Mads de Wolff from Loughborough University with the presentation *An Option, not an Obligation: Implementing Article 165 TFEU in the Age of Austerity*, Neil King from Edge Hill University with *The Consequences of Local Government Reform in Northern Ireland for Sports Development and Facility Management: Endgame, Paralysis or Renaissance?*, Geoff Walters and Richard Tacon from Birkbeck, University of London with *Modernisation and its Impact on Board-level Strategy Development within National Governing Bodies of Sport: A Process-based Analysis* and Daniel Potter from the University of Chichester with the presentation *The Impact of a Participant-centred Sport for Social Change Intervention Pilot Project in the UK*. The first working day of the conference ended with an apposite social get-together and a friendly chat in the Ship & Mitre pub.

The second working day of the conference was a bit more relaxed than first, two instead of three parallel sessions were held. The first session saw the following participants: Jim O'Brien from Southampton Solent University with the presentation *Shades of Basqueness; Football, Politics and Ethnicity in the Basque Country*, Joel Rookwood from Liverpool Hope University and Paul Brannigan from Loughborough University with *'Moving the Goalposts in Shifting Sands': Examining the Impact of Qatar's Bid to Host the 2022 World Cup Finals*, Emma Poulton from Durham University with *Anti-Semitism in English Football: A Case Study of Tottenham Hotspur Football Club*, Jonathan Grix from the University of Birmingham with *Fathoming the 'Feel-Good' Factor: Can Sports Mega-Events be Good for Us?* and David Hassan and Ken McCue from the University of Ulster and Sport Against Racism Ireland with the presentation *From Linfield to Dunfield and Beyond*. The second parallel session saw the following presentations: Diptesh DeChoudhury from Los Angeles with *Measuring the Impact Factor of 'Sense of Security' by a*

Sports Fan or Non-Sports Fans When Attending s Sporting Event, Malcolm MacLean from Gloucester University with *Sports Boycotts, International Federations and the Politics of Solidarity: the Case of UEFA and Israel* and Gina Comeau from Laurentian University with the presentation *Demystifying the Concepts of Exclusion and Inclusion in Canadian Sport Policies*.

The Sport and the Politics of Exclusion conference was a place where one could attend some very interesting presentations, be inspired by very constructive debates that gave one food for thought about in the domain of the sporting policies, social and sport interaction and the future development of sport. The quality of the presentations was such that the BBC World Service made a special report, for the Sports Hour radio show. As a participant, I can only give full credit to the organizers for making the conference a wonderful place for exchanging ideas and views on sport and express special gratitude to Peter Millward from the Liverpool John Moores University and Russell Holden from Worcester University for all their help.

Dejan ZEC

ПОДАЦИ О АУТОРИМА

Др Марија ЛЕСКИНЕН, научни саветник
Институт за славистику Руске академије наука, Москва

Проф. др НИУ Ђун, редовни професор
Школа међународних студија, Пекинг

Др Александар Р. МИЛЕТИЋ, научни сарадник
Институт за новију историју Србије, Београд

Др Воин БОЖИНОВ, научни сарадник
Историјски институт Бугарске академије наука, Софија

Др Бојан СИМИЋ, научни сарадник
Институт за новију историју Србије, Београд

Др Драган БОГЕТИЋ, научни саветник
Институт за савремену историју, Београд

Др Петар ДРАГИШИЋ, научни сарадник
Институт за новију историју Србије

Др Вера ГУДАЦ ДОДИЋ, виши научни сарадник
Институт за новију историју Србије, Београд

Милан ПИЉАК, истраживач сарадник
Институт за новију историју Србије

Др ХЕ Јенђинг, ванредни професор
Партијски историјски истраживачки центар, Пекинг

Др Зоран ЈАЊЕТОВИЋ, виши научни сарадник
Институт за новију историју Србије, Београд

Душан СИМИЋ, докторанд
Филозофски факултет, Београд

Др Гордана КРИВОКАПИЋ ЈОВИЋ, виши научни сарадник
Институт за новију историју Србије, Београд

Др Александар СТОЈАНОВИЋ, истраживач сарадник
Институт за новију историју Србије

Др Радмила РАДИЋ, научни саветник
Институт за новију историју Србије

Дејан ЗЕЦ, истраживач сарадник
Институт за новију историју Србије

УПУТСТВО ЗА ПРЕДАЈУ РУКОПИСА

- Часопис *Токови историје* објављује текстове на српском језику, **ћириличним писмом**, уз резиме на енглеском језику. Аутори из иностранства могу послати текст на свом матерњем језику и у том случају текстови ће бити праћени резимеом на српском језику.
- **Прва страна треба да садржи поред наслова рада и име, титулу и звање аутора, годину рођења и институцију у којој аутор ради.**
- **Сви текстови морају бити праћени апстрактом који не прелази 100 речи, кључним речима и резимеом који не прелази 250 речи.**
- **Обавезно је коришћење фонта за текст: Times New Roman, ћирилично писмо, величина слова 12, проред 1,5, и фусноте: величина слова 10, проред 1.**
- Текстови не треба да буду дужи од 25 страна, тј. једног и по табака (укључујући апстракт, кључне речи, фусноте, табеле и резиме), односно седам страна за приказе.
- Сви прилози (чланци, прикази, грађа, информације) морају бити куцани на компјутеру у MS Wordu и морају бити снимљени у формату MS Word докумената.
- Текстове послати електронском поштом и доставити Редакцији у штампаној верзији.

Прилоге слати на адресу:
Институт за новију историју Србије
Редакција Токова историје
Трг Николе Пашића 11
11000 Београд

или електронском поштом на: tokoviistorije@gmail.com

- **Редакција неће разматрати радове који не садрже наведене елементе.**
- Редакција часописа *Токови историје* увела је од 2006. године две обавезне анонимне рецензије за сваки достављени рад. Да би рад био прихваћен за штампу, потребно је да обе рецензије буду позитивне и да га оба рецензента препоручују за штампу. Рецензенти (како страни тако и домаћи) морају имати више или исто научно звање као аутор радова.

- Неће се прихватити за штампу они радови који су у било ком облику раније већ објављени.
- Рукописи достављени редакцији часописа *Токови историје* се не враћају.

УПУТСТВА ЗА ПИСАЊЕ ФУСНОТА, НАПОМЕНА И БИБЛИОГРАФИЈА

Име и презиме аутора: нормал

Наслов књиге: *italic (курзив)*

Наслов чланка или прилога (из књиге или зборника):
нормал под наводницима

Назив часописа: *italic (курзив)*

Исто: *italic (курзив)*

н. д.: *italic (курзив)*

Цитирање књиге

Љубодраг Димић, *Културна политика Краљевине Југославије 1918–1941*, I–III, Београд, 1997, стр. I/235.

Исто, стр. 44.

Цитирање чланака из часописа, новина, дневних листова

Љубодраг Димић, „Јосип Броз, Никита Сергејевич Хрушчов и мађарско питање 1955–1956“, *Токови историје*, 1–4/1998, Београд, 1998, стр. 23–60.

J. Јовановић, „Породица и њен васпитни значај“, *Хришћанска мисао*, VI, 1–2, Београд, 1940, стр. 9.

J. Јовановић, н. д., стр. 10.

Цитирање прилога из књига или зборника

Др Ђорђе Станковић, „Жена у уставима Краљевине Југославије (1918–1945)“, *Србија у модернизацијским процесима 19. и 20. века*, 2: Положај жене као мерило модернизације, научни скуп, (ур. Латинка Перовић), Београд, 1998, стр. 36–41.

Цитирање докумената из архивских фондова

Архив Србије (даље АС), Земаљска комисија за утврђивање злочина окупатора и њихових помагача, г. 25.

Архив Србије и Црне Горе, Савезно извршно веће (даље АСЦГ, СИБ), 130-783-1259.

Цитирање из енциклопедија

„Срби“, *Енциклопедија Југославије*, 7, Загреб, 1968, стр. 529.

Цитирање са World Wide Weба

Carrie Mc Lauthlin, „The Handmand’s Tale in the context of the USSR“, Section 18, 2003, www.y.arizona.edu (у загради обавезно навести датум посете сајту).

ДОБРОДОШЛИ НА НАШ САЈТ www.inisbgd.co.rs

Дођите на наш сајт, напишите нам своје идеје и предлоге у вези са садржајем, уређивањем сајта и пошаљите на e-mail: inis@ptt.rs

Издавач:
Институт за новију историју Србије
Београд, Трг Николе Пашића 11

Прелом и штампа:
Colorgrafx, Београд

Тираж:
300 примерака